Breaking the Iron Triangle of Sociological Causation

Structural, Cultural, and Agentic Influences on Fatah and Hamas during the Second Intifada*

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The Iron Triangle of Sociological Causation

When Marx and Weber assigned different causal weights to the conditions that led Europeans to transform feudalism into capitalism, they initiated a controversy over the relationship among structure, culture and agency that became more than a core issue in sociology. The controversy locked practitioners into a set way of thinking about sociological causation in general. Consequently, until today, many of the key debates in sociology center on how structure, culture, and agency interact, and which of these features of social life is causally dominant.

The controversy goes on—and on, and on, and on—because it cannot be resolved given the way it is formulated. In this chapter, I argue that structure, culture, and agency form a sort of iron triangle that constrains the way we think about sociological causation and hinders the development of the discipline. We would be better off breaking the iron triangle and viewing structure, culture, and agency as variables that independently influence strategic choice—with the causal weight of each variable varying from one circumstance to the next in accordance with identifiable conditions. I make my case by reviewing some of the research on state and collective violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that I have been conducting with a team of colleagues and graduate students since 2005 (Araj 2008; Araj and Brym 2009;

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Brym 2008; Brym and Andersen 2009; Brym and Araj 2006, 2008; Brym and Maoz-Shai 2009; Brym and Flamlin 2010).

I begin by briefly tracing the intellectual pedigree for my assertion that we are caught inside an iron triangle of sociological causation. Marx introduced the iron triangle when he argued that, although people make history, it is the crystallization of a structural condition—an irreconcilable contradiction between forces and relations of production—that allows them to create a new mode of production, including a new superstructure (Marx 1845; 1849; see also figure 5.1 below). Weber acknowledged “the economic factor” as a cause of capitalist development, but also showed the importance of tracing the religious conditions that independently facilitated capitalist growth (Weber 1905; see also figure 5.2 below). Moreover, he argued that all social action requires agency: the creative attribution of meaning to one’s social settings (Weber 1922). Thus, although Weber saw the causes of capitalist development differently than Marx did (hence the different directions of the causal arrows in figures 5.1 and 5.2), he retained the iron triangle of sociological causation.

The modern study of social movements illustrates how the iron triangle has been able to hold an entire subfield in its grip. In the 1970s, students of social movements emphasized the importance of dense social networks, access to material resources, state instability, and other structural factors in social movement formation. Zald and McCarthy’s resource mobilization theory illustrates the dominant trend of the time (Zald and McCarthy 1979; see also figure 5.3 below). In the 1980s, students of social movements started downplaying structural causes and focused increasingly on the significance of cultural repertoires in social movement formation (see figure 5.4). The framing theory of Snow and his colleagues typifies the thrust of opinion during that decade (Snow et al. 1986). In the 1990s and 2000s, a growing interest in emotional states and human agency signified the emergence of a more voluntaristic approach to the study of social movements, exemplified by Jasper’s work (Jasper 2004, 2006; see also figure 5.5 below). In each period, revisionists and traditionalists debated the causal primacy of their respective corners of the iron triangle (Goodwin and Jasper 1999, 2004; Kurzman 2004a,
causal impact on social action than structure does—or vice versa. Certain circumstances promote habitual action (the reproduction of structure and culture), while other circumstances encourage action that transforms structure and culture. If this intuition makes sense, we would be well advised to direct our effort not toward defending the assumed causal primacy of structure, culture or agency in shaping social action, but toward identifying the social contexts that allow structure, culture and agency to exert effects of varying strength on social action (cf. Emirbayer and Mische 1998; Fuchs 2001; see also figure 5.6 below).

Strategies of Palestinian Insurgency

Research that I have recently conducted with others on strategic action in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict illustrates my argument. Here I summarize some of our findings, touching on definitional, measurement, and related matters only in passing.

Focusing on the second intifada (2000–2005), we wanted to determine the degree to which Hamas and Fatah, the two main Palestinian political organizations, changed or failed to change their strategies in response to shifting political opportunities (structure), different organizational norms that crystallized before the onset of the conflict (culture), and creative innovation exercised during the hostilities (agency). To measure these variables, we read organizational histories; conducted semi-structured interviews with forty-five leaders of Palestinian militant organizations and seventy-four Israeli counterterrorist experts in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel; systematically reviewed relevant newspaper accounts in English, Arabic, and Hebrew to create a database of collective and state violence events and the circumstances surrounding them; and collected data from official and NGO sources on Palestinian and Israeli deaths due to collective and state violence. We assumed that if we could not associate specific instances of
TABLE 5.1
Opportunity, Enculturation, and Strategic Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Issue/Period</th>
<th>Strategic Response by Organization</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel–Palestine peace treaty/summer 2000</td>
<td>Fatah: PE = 4, OS = 4 Fatah leaders fail to bend to Israeli and American pressure and reject Barak's peace offers because norms crystallized before intifada [PE]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide bombing and rocket attacks/fall 2000</td>
<td>Hamas: OS = 2, PE = 5 Hamas categorically rejects Israeli and American offers because of norms crystallized before intifada [PE]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential &amp; legislative elections/first half 2000</td>
<td>Fatah central leadership condemns suicide bombing and rocket attacks because of norms crystallized before intifada [PE]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential &amp; legislative elections /</td>
<td>Under increasing international pressure, Arafat announces presidential and legislative elections (consistent with principles declared and acted upon in 1996) [OS/PE]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>second half 2000</td>
<td>Fatah postpones legislative and presidential election [OS]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential &amp; legislative elections / November 2004</td>
<td>Fatah decides to hold presidential election (consistent with principles declared and acted upon in 1996) [OS/PE]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term ceasefire February 2003 to February 2005</td>
<td>Moderate Fatah leaders take control after Arafat's death and benefit from American-Israeli campaign against Hamas and Fatah's military wing, convincing them to declare a long-term ceasefire [OS]</td>
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OS = opportunity structure; PE = political enculturation
In principle, all three independent variables—opportunity, enculturation, and agency—could have helped to account for each of the twelve responses of Fatah and Hamas to key strategic issues. What we found instead is that political enculturation strongly influenced strategic decision making in nine cases, changing political opportunities had a strong effect in six cases, and creative agency failed to exercise an independent impact in even one case. Said differently, the major strategic choices we identified were largely a response to organizationally specific cultural desiderata and, to a lesser degree, shifting political opportunities, while creative agency was not much evident in the decision-making process.

To illustrate our argument, I now turn to an examination of Hamas’s decision to engage in suicide bombings and rocket attacks, and the decision of Fatah’s central leadership to refrain from such actions.

Suicide Bombing and Rocket Attacks

Shifts in the Opportunity Structure

During the first weeks of the second intifada, the repertoire of Palestinian protest was similar to that of the first intifada, involving demonstrations, marches, stone throwing, and so on. However, as Israeli authorities themselves admitted, the harshness of the Israeli response was out of all proportion to the intensity of Palestinian protest (Ricolfi 2005, 94). From the Israeli point of view, the Palestinians started the intifada after the Israeli government expressed willingness to make its biggest concessions ever, so the intifada showed bad faith and determination to gain advantage through violence. The Israelis therefore felt that a strong response was necessary (Tafe 2006). In addition, the intifada erupted just four months after Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon due to Hezbollah attacks. Israel wanted to prove that it was not weak and was still able to deter its enemies. Accordingly, it revised its 1996 plan (“Operation Field of Thorns”) for toppling Yasser Arafat and attacking areas under PA control (Reinhart 2002). Finally, an Israeli election campaign coincided with the intifada’s first months. Ehud Barak wanted to show the Israeli public that his policies toward the Palestinians were no softer than Ariel Sharon’s were (Araj 2008). Hence the severity of Israel’s response.

Harsh Israeli repression motivated a surge in popular support for suicide bombing on the part of the Palestinians. Especially after Sharon first took office, and even more after the attacks of September 11, 2001, when the Bush administration gave Sharon carte blanche, repression intensified. As a result, Palestinian public support for suicide bombing remained high. Interviews with senior Hamas leaders in the West Bank and Gaza during the summer of 2006 suggest that they believed the most effective way to stop the harsh repression was to make it unbearably costly for Israel (Brym and Araj 2006, 2008, Araj 2008, Bloom 2005, 19–44). Accordingly, Hamas launched its first suicide attack of the second intifada in December 2000.

The assassination of more than two dozen Fatah militants and the killing of more than a thousand Palestinian civilians between September 2001 and January 2002 eventually led some local Fatah activists to launch their first suicide mission in February 2002 and their first rocket attack a month later. In all, through the Tanzim or al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, local Fatah activists were responsible for 32 percent of suicide attacks during the second intifada. Significantly, however, these activists were young—mainly in their 20s, 30s, and 40s. Having grown up in the occupied territories, they were attuned to realities on the ground. They believed that Israel would not ease off and the intifada could not succeed unless they exercised extreme violence. In contrast, Fatah’s top leaders were considerably older—mainly in their 50s, 60s, and 70s. They had lived most of their lives in exile and were less in touch with the urgent demands of the Palestinian people for retribution against Israel. Perhaps most importantly, the central leadership had denounced terrorism, made agreements with Israel, received international financial support, and feared that the use of extreme violence would give Sharon an excuse to destroy the Palestinian Authority. They had a political and bureaucratic stake in moderation, so they condemned the actions of the young activists, often strongly and publicly.

Our interviews with nine senior Fatah leaders support our assessment. Fatah’s leaders unanimously denied that the organization’s central leadership initiated the use of suicide bombing. Five said the initiative came exclusively “from below,” and three said it came from the middle and lower ranks of Fatah. Seven of the nine leaders reported that suicide bombing did not represent the official policy of Fatah and only one said that it sometimes represented official policy. True, the evidence seems incontrovertible that Arafat gave the green light to violence in the intifada’s first year or so. However, his repeated condemnation of suicide bombings, his willingness to meet with Israeli officials and declare a ceasefire, his attempt to dismantle the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in 2002, and interviews with people who were close to him in the period under study suggest that he was a relative moderate (Alimi 2007, Araj 2008, 295–96, Jamal 2005).

We thus see that, in response to changing political opportunities created by harsh Israeli repression, Hamas resumed the practice of suicide bombing, which it first used seven years before the second intifada began. It initiated rocket attacks when suicide missions became almost impossible because of Israeli counterterrorist measures. Fatah’s central leadership did not endorse such tactics. Indeed, some local Fatah activists undertook suicide and
rocket attacks precisely because they believed that their organization failed to respond appropriately to changes in political opportunities in the form of increasing Israeli repression. We conclude that, with respect to the decision to engage in suicide bombing and rocket attacks, changing political opportunities had some effect on Hamas leaders but little effect on the central leadership of Fatah. As we shall now see, political enculturation influenced both organizations in this regard.

Political Enculturation

When the second intifada erupted, Fatah's strategizing was constrained by four aspects of its organizational culture: its ideology of secular anti-colonial nationalism, its history of susceptibility to external influence, its legacy of detachment from the people it purported to represent and its tradition of political pragmatism.

For a decade following Israel's War of Independence, the Arab countries promoted pan-Arabism, a key element of which involved the creation of a unified military force to defeat Israel and liberate Palestine. In contrast, the founders of Fatah proclaimed it was time for the Palestinians to take their cause into their own hands—a position that gained treachery after the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war. Inspired by national liberation movements in Algeria, Vietnam, and Cuba, which used guerilla tactics to overcome colonial rule, Fatah's leaders challenged the notion that Israel could succumb to a swift military operation by a united Arab front and urged instead a war of attrition by irregular Palestinian forces (Kurz 2005, 32).

The trouble was that Israeli security measures proved highly effective, partly because of the quality of Israeli intelligence, planning, and military technology, partly because the geography of the West Bank and Gaza gave Fatah guerrillas little sanctuary. These circumstances forced Fatah to build up its military capabilities in neighboring countries. However, in Jordan and Lebanon, Fatah squandered its energy and opened itself to external influence by becoming embroiled in various local confrontations and civil wars. Finally ejected from Jordan in 1970 and Lebanon in 1982, Fatah's central leadership was forced to operate from Tunisia, three countries and 1,500 miles west of Israel, until 1993. In this way, Fatah left itself open to external influence and separated itself from the people it purported to represent.

Fatah was the dominant force in the PLO, an ideologically diverse umbrella organization of Palestinian factions. To keep the PLO intact, Fatah's leaders had demonstrated considerable flexibility over the years. Now in Tunisian exile, the Fatah leadership took their pragmatism to new heights. In 1988, Fatah rejected the use of terrorism, recognized Israel's right to exist, engaged in talks with the United States, and declared that it would accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Then, in January 1991, a coalition of countries invaded Iraq following its occupation of Kuwait. The PLO sided with Saddam Hussein. Consequently, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states cut financial assistance and political support to the PLO. In December, the cash-starved Soviet Union—another important source of political and economic sustenance—was officially dissolved. Straitened circumstances now reinforced Fatah's political pragmatism.

On the eve of the second intifada Fatah's leaders were thus predisposed to heed the demands of the United States for moderation and resist the growing demand of the Palestinian people for suicide attacks, especially those launched against civilians in Israel proper (that is, outside the occupied territories). In our interviews, we asked nine senior Fatah leaders to rank factors that affected their organization's strategy at a given time. They ranked "international conditions" as the second most important of six influences. By comparison, the seven senior Hamas leaders we interviewed ranked international conditions the fourth most important of six influences. Moreover, while the Hamas leaders all said their chief aim was to defend the resistance and escalate the intifada, most Fatah leaders stressed that they wanted to keep the intifada popular and relatively nonviolent. As Qadoura Fares, one of Fatah's most admired leaders in the West Bank and a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), told us:

We and the Israelis do not live on an isolated island. . . . There is an international community and international public opinion. . . . We wanted the intifada to be popular and nonviolent. . . . Just look at the developments of the first months of the intifada and you will clearly see that Israel is the one who decided to change the rules of the game by flooding the intifada with blood. . . . The Israelis succeeded in dragging us to their most convenient position: military confrontation. . . . It was easier for Israel, the stronger party, to confront Palestinian militants rather than unarmed masses facing military occupation with their bare hands.

Fatah leaders saw suicide attacks as costly and unproductive. When asked to compare the costs to Fatah of suicide bombing versus other tactics used by their organization, six of the Fatah respondents said they were "much more costly" and one said they were "somewhat more costly." According to Hussein al- Sheikh, a senior Fatah leader in the West Bank:

[Suicide attacks,] particularly those conducted by some Fatah activists, led the Americans and the Europeans to put part of the organization, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, on their terrorism list, which caused a lot of damage to Fatah's international image. . . . Also, Israeli reactions to martyrdom operations, such
as assassinations and arrests, led [Fatah] to lose a large number of its best field activists.

When asked to compare the costs to the Palestinian people and the Palestinian resistance of suicide bombing versus other tactics used by their organization, the responses were identical. Abdullah Abdullah, a Fatah representative in the PLG and Chair of its political committee, outlined the costs as follows:

Martyrdom operations almost silenced the moderate voices in Israeli society, gave Sharon and his government a free hand to do whatever they wanted in the occupied territories, and made Palestinians look like terrorists in the eyes of large sectors of the international community. . . . Those operations were not consistent with our values, religion, or traditions, or with international law and legitimacy.

We also asked our informants whether they agreed that suicide bombings ought to be restricted to Israeli military targets in the occupied territories. Six of the Fatah leaders strongly agreed with that statement, one agreed, and only one disagreed. According to Hussein al-Sheikh: “Fatah policy in this regard is very clear since 1988. The ‘geography of the resistance’ is limited to the territories that have been occupied in 1967 and the targets should be only Israeli soldiers or armed settlers.”

Utterly different predispositions were embedded in the organizational culture of Hamas. Its first cultural lens was ground in the late 1980s when skepticism grew that Fatah could achieve the Palestinian national movement’s objectives. Islamism, inspired by the 1979 Iranian revolution, now began to overshadow Fatah nationalism (Abu-Amr 1994, 13). The revolution introduced a new version of political Islam that blamed Western powers and the secular regimes of Muslim countries for the failings of the Islamic world, and adopted new forms of violence to do away with these perceived impediments to change.

Significantly, Hamas took shape not in Cairo, Amman, Beirut, and Tunis, but in the occupied Palestinian territories, especially Gaza. Before the 1950s, Gaza boasted no significant urban agglomeration like the relatively cosmopolitan and secular city of Ramallah in the West Bank. Densely settled by religiously conservative villagers who fled the 1948–1949 war with Israel, Gaza’s population was deeply impoverished and embittered: an ideal environment for the growth of Islamism (Abu-Amr 1994, 20–21).

Most of Hamas’s leaders and military activists were born, raised, and radicalized in the occupied territories, with three important consequences for later strategic developments. First, spending their entire lives under Israeli military occupation made Hamas members more sensitive to the deprivations and demands of the Palestinian people than Fatah’s central leadership was (Abu-Amr 1994, 79; Araj 2008). Hamas enjoyed especially strong ties to refugees and their descendents, who comprised the more radical half of the Palestinian population. Tellingly, six of the seven men who took part in the meeting that led to the establishment of Hamas were themselves refugees (Jamal 2005, 107). Second, tight Israeli security measures often prevented Hamas activists from employing the methods of attack and types of weaponry that were the stock-in-trade of guerillas around the world. Their inability to stage typical guerilla raids stimulated innovative thinking about nonconventional methods and weapons. According to Khalil Abu Laila, a senior Hamas leader in Gaza:

When Hamas started using suicide bombing in 1993, the Palestinians did not have any other [military] weapons. . . . We had to create our own weapons from the limited materials we had. Yahiya Ayash [Hamas’s first and most famous bomb maker] was able to transform any material in the house into bombs. I mean he used to turn sugar and washing detergent such as Tide into bombs. He also taught others how to do so.

Third, operating inside the occupied territories made Hamas better able to avoid side battles with Arab forces, like those that weakened Fatah, and less susceptible to outside influence than Fatah was (Tamimi 2007, 268).

Susceptibility to outside influence hinged partly on perceptions of Israel-U.S. relations. Already in the 1980s, Fatah leaders came to believe that “only Washington counted” and that Israel’s decisions were “made in Washington and not in Tel Aviv” (Rubin 1997, 153). As a result, Fatah remained relatively responsive to American demands throughout the second intifada. In contrast, Hamas leaders held that Israeli and the Jewish lobby in the United States controlled American Middle East policy, leading them to conclude, “We must depend on the nation’s options of jihad and resistance rather than American or other mediators.” It followed that diplomacy was “a waste of time and an exercise in futility,” and that “whatever was taken by force would be regained only by force” (Hamas communiqué quoted in Alexander 2002, 107, 192). When we asked our Hamas informants to rank various influences on Hamas decision making, the top three influences concerned conditions on the domestic front. The mean scores for perceptions of the influence of domestic conditions were all higher for Hamas than for Fatah leaders. To support their analysis, Hamas leaders often referred to the failure of the Oslo peace process and the success of Hezbollah in forcing Israel to withdraw from Lebanon in May 2000 without preconditions (Alexander 2002, 256; Tamimi 2007, 197).

Clearly, Hamas members were culturally predisposed to become the first Palestinian organization to launch a suicide attack against Israel in 1993, deploy suicide bombers during the second intifada, and launch rockets after
counterterrorist measures made suicide bombing more difficult. They reiterated their faith in violence during our interviews. When asked to compare the costs to their organization and to the Palestinian people of suicide bombing versus other tactics used by their organization, the seven Hamas leaders we interviewed saw them as less costly than Fatah leaders did, and some of them, such as Khalil Abu Laila, enthusiastically listed their benefits:

Martyrdom operations enabled us to get rid of the unjust Oslo Accords, put the Palestinian cause back on the right path, mobilize the Palestinians around the choice of resistance, and attract Arabic and Islamic attention and support. . . . They also put an end to the Zionist dream of expanding Israel to include the area between the Nile River [Egypt] and the Euphrates River [Iraq]. Instead, and for the first time, martyrdom operations forced the Israelis to separate themselves from the West Bank by building a wall and hiding behind it.

Another Hamas leader, Abd al-Fattah Dukhan, focused on the retaliatory nature of suicide bombing:

They [the Israelis] target our civilians all the time, so martyrdom operations treat them the same way. . . . Our first suicide attacks came to avenge the killing of twenty-nine Palestinians in the al-Haram al-Abbas Mosque [in 1993] as well as the massacre that took place earlier in the al-Aqsa Mosque [in 1991].

Unlike Fatah leaders, Hamas leaders strongly disagreed with the view that suicide bombings should be restricted to Israeli military and settler targets in the occupied territories. Mushir al-Musri, Hamas spokesperson in Gaza, defended Hamas’s position as follows: “They attack our cities, so we have the right to attack theirs. . . . In addition, [suicide attacks inside Israel] proper are more effective because they inflict more damage.” Moreover, while the central leadership of Fatah condemned Hamas’s suicide bombings—as well as the later and less numerous attacks by young Fatah activists—there was never any conflict between the central leadership of Hamas and its military wing. Hamas’s political leaders personally gave the go-ahead for numerous suicide and rocket operations (Gunning 2007, 115). Some of our Hamas informants commented on this issue by referring to the religious ideology of the organization:

Islam is very clear. If one foot of an Islamic land has been occupied, then jihad and resistance become religious duty [fard]. . . . The al-Qassam Brigades [Hamas’s military wing] do not do anything that contradicts the general lines determined by the political leadership. . . . Any [Hamas] leader who condemns an act of jihad will be sent home right away [i.e., will have to resign] (Fathi Hammadi, a senior Hamas leader in Gaza).

In sum, it seems that cultural predispositions formed for the most part before the beginning of the second intifada, not structural circumstances during the second intifada itself, largely account for the eagerness of Hamas leaders to engage in suicide missions and rocket attacks, and the reluctance of the Fatah central leadership to follow suit.

The Problem of Agency

As my account illustrates, shifts in the political opportunity structure and organizational differences in political entrenchment seem to account adequately for Fatah-Hamas differences with respect to the decision to engage in suicide bombing and rocket attacks during the second intifada. Indeed, as table 1 suggests, these two factors figured either separately or jointly in all of the major strategic decisions made by Fatah and Hamas between 2000 and 2005, including whether to participate in Palestinian presidential and legislative elections, declare a long-term ceasefire with Israel and negotiate a peace agreement with Israel.

This finding does not mean that Palestinian militants failed to exercise agency in their conflict with Israel. Throughout the second intifada, Fatah and Hamas leaders acted in an intentional, anticipatory, self-reflective, and self-reactive manner, making plans in anticipation of future contingencies, and regulating and correcting their actions in light of their current and past effects. However, the strategic actions that resulted from their reflection were more habitual than creative. As a result, their agency exerted little independent effect on their strategic actions and helped to reproduce culture and structure rather than transform them. Specifically, as a more complete analysis of Palestinian decision making would show (Araj and Brym 2009), during a more than five-year period when Israel crushed Palestinian hopes and expectations many times over, neither Fatah nor Hamas modified their minimum demands for a peace settlement. Fatah’s central leadership never changed its position on suicide bombing. Although Hamas launched suicide attacks from the very start of the second intifada, in doing so it drew on a strategic repertoire that had been in place since 1993. Fatah’s flexibility on the question of elections and a long-term ceasefire was similarly rooted in the organization’s cultural tradition. Hamas had to ground into submission before relenting on the latter fronts and replacing suicide missions with comparatively ineffective rocket attacks.

In arguing that structure and especially culture played a larger role in shaping strategic action than agency did, I readily acknowledge that if we had chosen a timeframe other than the five years of the second intifada we would
have found cases in which agency played a more prominent role in strategic decision making. Hamas’s 1993 decision to launch the first suicide bombing campaign in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one such instance. But surely it is unexpected and significant that agency by itself can explain none of the major strategic decisions of the two leading Palestinian political organizations during an especially turbulent and consequential period of Middle East and world history. Some students of social movements have recently suggested that creative agency holds universal causal primacy over political opportunities and culture in the lives of social movements. Our analysis suggests that they are wrong. In some circumstances, agency matters little. More generally, I contend that, rather than assuming the causal primacy of structure, culture or agency, we need to conduct research aimed at finding out when each factor matters most, because all three factors exercise independent and historically variable causal effects on strategic decision making.

Note

1. Even the young dissidents of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade did not launch suicide attacks until the sixteenth month of the second intifada, long after Hamas had repeatedly done so, and only in response to the assassination of Raed al-Karmi, a folk hero and leader of an al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade militia in Tulkarem.

References