AFFLUENCE, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND STRIKES

Common sense suggests that affluence breeds contentment. On this assumption, people with secure jobs, good working conditions, and high wages are happier than people who face the prospect of unemployment, poor working conditions, and low wages. Moreover, according to the common-sense view, happier workers are less likely to strike. After all, compared with unhappy workers, their needs and demands seem closer to having been met. They appear to lack the deprivations that would motivate them to strike.

It follows from the common-sense view that there ought to be an observable association between measures of strike activity and measures of economic well-being. Figure 4-1, covering the 1973–2000 period, seems to suggest there is such an association. The graph’s horizontal axis shows GDP per capita (GDPpc), or the total value of goods and services produced in Canada in a year divided by the number of people living in the country at year end. GDPpc is an indicator of the economic well-being of the average Canadian. It is measured in constant (1992) dollars to eliminate the influence of inflation. In effect, this indicator of economic well-being shows the purchasing power of the average Canadian in a given year. Meanwhile, the graph’s vertical axis shows weighted strike frequency, or the number of strikes that...

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took place in Canada each year divided by the number of non-agricultural workers in the country. The curve formed by annual scores on these two variables slopes downward. This suggests that when well-being is low, propensity to strike is high; and when well-being is high, propensity to strike is low. Affluence, it seems at first glance, does breed contentment.

Case closed? Hardly. GDPpc is an average, and averages can mask more than they reveal. For instance, GDPpc could conceivably rise when the purchasing power of high-income earners (a minority of the population) rises a lot and the purchasing power of middle- and low-income earners (a majority of the population) falls a little. In that case, rising GDPpc would mask the fact that most people are worse off.

Because workers who strike are unlikely to be rich, we need a better measure of workers’ well-being than GDPpc. One candidate is the unemployment rate. Unemployment is more likely to affect ordinary workers than the well-to-do. Doctors rarely lose their jobs, and business executives, even if they are fired, can live relatively comfortably off savings in the typically short period before they find work again. On the other hand, unemployment is likely to result in a sharp decline in living standards for ordinary workers, and sometimes the period before they find a new job is protracted.

How then does strike activity vary with the unemployment rate? Figures 4-2 and 4-3 provide the surprising answer. During the first half of the 1973–2000 period, weighted strike frequency fell when the

FIGURE 4-1 Weighted Strike Frequency by GDP Per Capita (1992$), 1973–2000

Notes: (1) $R^2$ measures the degree to which the independent variable is associated with (or “explains”) variation in the dependent variable. If the independent variable accounts for none of the variation in the dependent variable, the value of $R^2$ is 0. If it accounts for all of the variation, its value is 1. The $R^2$ given here is adjusted for the number of cases. (2) The “trend line” is a LOWESS curve. LOWESS stands for “locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.” After dividing the values of the independent variable into a number of equal parts, the LOWESS curve computes least squares regression lines for each part and then smooths the lines. This reveals patterns in the data that may be obscured by a single linear regression line computed over all values of the independent variable.
unemployment rate rose, and rose when the unemployment rate fell (see Figure 4-2). In other words, when workers were most economically deprived, they were least inclined to strike, and when they were most secure in their jobs, they were most inclined to strike. This is just the opposite of the common-sense view outlined above. Equally unexpected are the results for the second half of the 1973–2000 period (see Figure 4-3). After 1986, the relationship between the unemployment rate and weighted strike frequency virtually disappeared. Thus, the trend line summarizing
the association between weighted strike frequency and the unemployment rate shows little trend. What accounts for the inverse association between the unemployment rate and weighted strike frequency in the 1973–1986 period? What accounts for the near disappearance of this inverse association after 1986? These are the intriguing questions I address in the remainder of this chapter.

STRIKE RESEARCH ON THE EFFECT OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE

The existing body of strike research goes a long way toward explaining the trend for the 1973–1986 period, although not, as you will see, for the 1987–2000 period. Many strike researchers begin with the observation that capitalist economies undergo recurrent “boom and bust” cycles. During bad times, unemployment is high and business profitability low. During good times, unemployment is low and business profitability high. They then note the existence of an association between the business cycle and strike frequency (Rees 1952). They argue that, as unemployment falls, strike incidence rises. That is because workers are in a better bargaining position during good economic times. Accordingly, at the peaks of business cycles workers are more likely to enjoy higher savings and alternative job opportunities. At the same time, workers know employers are eager to settle strikes quickly since business is so profitable. Strikes are therefore relatively low risk. In contrast, during economic downturns, workers are less well off and have fewer job alternatives. They understand that employers have little incentive to meet their demands because profitability is low and inventories high. Workers avoid strikes during troughs in the business cycle since they are riskier than in economic
good times. From this point of view, workers’ contentment, levels of felt deprivation, and other states of mind are unimportant as causes of strike activity. What matters is how powerful workers are. Their bargaining position or their ability to get their own way despite the resistance of employers is what counts. Said differently, strike research suggests we can arrive at superior explanations for variations in strike activity by thinking like sociologists, not psychologists.

The association between strike incidence and the business cycle (or its proxy, the unemployment rate) was first demonstrated empirically for the United States (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969) and shortly thereafter for Canada (Smith 1972). Since then, researchers have shown that the association between strike incidence and the business cycle was a feature of most advanced capitalist countries in the twentieth century (Hibbs 1976). However, later research also introduced three important qualifications to the argument.

First, before the Second World War, the North American system of collective bargaining between workers and employers was not well institutionalized. In Canada, for example, the legal right to organize unions, bargain collectively, and strike with relatively little constraint dates only from 1944. Before then, strikes were often fights for union recognition. They were therefore less responsive to economic conditions (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987; Jamieson 1973 [1957]:102; Palmer 1987; Snyder 1977). As a result, in Canada and the United States, the effect of the business cycle on strike incidence is stronger for the post–Second World War period than for the pre–Second World War period.

The second important qualification concerns the fact that, in much of Western Europe, the institutional environment mitigates the effect of economic conditions on strike frequency. One important aspect of
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the institutional environment is the degree of centralization of bargaining units. Strikes are negotiating tools. They are therefore more frequent during periodic contract renewals than between contracts. In much of Western Europe, however, centralized, nationwide bargaining among workers, employers, and governments means that entire sectors of the workforce come up for contract renewal and negotiation at the same time. Thus, aggregate measures of strike frequency are affected not just by the phase of the business cycle but by the periodicity of contract renewal schedules. In contrast, the absence of a centralized bargaining structure in Canada and the United States makes aggregate measures of strike frequency more sensitive to the business cycle in North America (Harrison and Stewart 1994; Snyder 1977; Franzosi 1989).

Union density, or the proportion of the non-agricultural labour force that is unionized, is another aspect of the institutional environment that influences strike activity. Unions educate workers and enable them to speak with one voice. Their organizational assets allow unions to mobilize workers. It follows that union density will influence strike action, although strike frequency is often less affected than are strike duration and the average size of strikes (Shorter and Tilly 1971).

Finally, the third condition limiting the impact of the business cycle on strike frequency is political. In many Western European countries, left-wing or social democratic parties have formed governments or at least achieved representation in cabinets. This has the effect of moving negotiations over the division of rewards in society from the labour market, where strikes are important bargaining tools, to the political sphere. Where labour is powerful enough to negotiate favourable income redistribution and welfare policies at the political level, industrial conflict tends to recede. Agreeing to limit strike action has even been used as a bargaining chip in exchange for income redistribution and welfare concessions in Sweden, Germany, and other West European countries. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s, strike frequency in Sweden, for example, was relatively insensitive to the business cycle (Franzosi 1989; Hibbs 1978; Korpi and Shalev 1980).

In sum, a substantial body of research demonstrates an association between the business cycle and strike frequency. Moreover, it shows that the association is strongest in North America in the post–Second World War era because that is the setting least influenced by mitigating institutional and political variables (Paldam and Pedersen 1982).

In the context of this research, Figure 4-2 is as ordinary as Figure 4-3 is puzzling. The strong inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and strike frequency for the 1973–1986 period is wholly in line with expectations derived from the research literature. However, contrary to what we are led to expect by the research literature, there is little discernible trend for the 1987–2000 period. The unemployment rate is very weakly associated with strike frequency in the latter period. Said differently, cyclicality appears to have been largely wrung out of Canada’s labour relations system in the last 14 years of the twentieth century, at least in terms of its influence on the incidence of industrial disputes. With respect to its impact on strike incidence, the business cycle was somehow repressed—and this occurred in precisely the setting (post–Second World War North America) where its impact was previously the greatest.

Why? What accounts for the repression of the business cycle as a determinant of the incidence of Canadian industrial disputes? That is the question on which the remainder of this chapter turns. An intimation of my answer lies embedded in my
decision to divide the recent history of Canadian industrial disputes into two 14-year periods, as in Figures 4-2 and 4-3. Inspection of scatter plots suggested that a shift in the direction of the relationship between the unemployment rate and weighted strike frequency took place after 1986. Since data were available for 14 years following 1986, I chose to examine the relationship for a period of equal duration before 1987. That period starts in 1973.

Using 1973 as the cut-off is also justifiable on historical grounds, for 1973 was the year of the first oil shock. In that year, due to war in the Middle East, the price of oil on world markets tripled, intensifying already high inflation and galloping wage demands. As a result, a strike wave that had been growing since the mid 1950s gained force and crested in 1974–1975. In the entire history of Canadian labour, the only strike action that matched that crest was the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 and the ensuing sympathy strikes that stretched all the way from Amherst, Nova Scotia, to Victoria, British Columbia (see Figure 4-4). Understandably, therefore, the strikes of 1974–1975 caused a strong reaction among government and corporate leaders. They soon took measures to make it substantially more costly for workers to strike. Thus, 1973 marks the beginning of an historical era, one aspect of which is the substantive focus of this chapter.

In the balance of this chapter, I outline how, from the mid 1970s to the 1990s, government and corporate leaders weakened unions and made it more difficult for workers to achieve their goals. These actions had the effect of making strikes less frequent and repressing the effect of the business cycle on the propensity to strike. As you will see, they explain the near-trendless trend line in Figure 4-3.
A NEW ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL CONTEXT

Government and business leaders reacted to
the 1919–1920 strike wave by sending in
troops to restore order, throwing union
leaders in jail, legislating strikers back to
work, and changing laws to allow the depor-
tation of British-born immigrants, who were
thought to dominate the strike leadership
(Bercuson 1990 [1974]). Faced with a strike
wave of similar proportions in 1974–1975,
government and business leaders again felt
that drastic action was necessary. However,
the political, institutional, and cultural envi-
ronment had changed between these two
extraordinary episodes of labour unrest. As a
result, strategies for controlling labour were
different. In 1944, Canadian workers had
won the right to organize, bargain collec-
tively, and strike with relatively little con-
straint. In the context of three decades of
post-war prosperity, their new rights allowed
them to win substantial gains in real earnings
and a massive expansion of state supports and
services. In the mid 1970s, business leaders
and governments sympathetic to business felt
they had to control labour unrest while fighting
wage gains and the growth of the welfare
state. To accomplish these tasks, they organ-
ized a neo-conservative “counter-revolution”
that continues to this day.

The neo-conservative counter-revolu-
tion was, however, motivated by more than
just the strike wave that crested in the mid
1970s. Rising government debt and global
competition also contributed to the deci-
sion to go on the political offensive
(Johnston 2001).

Government borrowing rose quickly
in the 1970s and 1980s. By the end of that
period, interest payments were consum-
ing a quarter of the federal government’s
annual budget. With indebtedness threat-
ening to cripple government programs,
the neo-conservative claim that debt
reduction is sound public policy made
sense to more and more people.

At the same time, global competition
was becoming fiercer. By the early 1970s,
Japanese and West German industry had
fully recovered from the destruction of the
Second World War. Manufacturers in these
countries were exporting massive quanti-
ties of finished goods to North America
and other markets. In the 1980s, South
Korea, China, and other countries fol-
lowed suit. With growing global competi-
tion threatening the welfare of Canadian
industry, big business had to develop new
strategies to survive and prosper. One such
strategy involved restructuring: introduc-
ing computers and robots, eliminating
middle-management positions, outsourc-
ing parts manufacturing, and so forth.
Another strategy was to increase business
opportunities and to bring about job
growth by creating a free trade zone
encompassing Canada and the United
States (MacDonald 2000).

Controlling labour while cutting debt,
restructuring, and promoting free trade
required deep ideological change. Business
leaders therefore set about the task of
redefining in the public mind the desirable
features of the market, the state, and the
relationship between the two. From
roughly the end of the Second World War
until the mid 1970s, labour demands
focused on improving wages and state ben-
efits. Now, an imposing ideological
machine sought to convince the public that
high wages and generous state benefits
decrease the ability of Canadians to com-
pete against workers in other countries.
Massive job losses will result (the neo-con-
servative argument continued) unless
wages are held in check and state benefits
slashed. That was the main message of
Canada’s two neo-conservative, corporate-
funded think tanks and pressure groups,
the Fraser Institute, founded in 1974, and
the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), founded in 1976. The creation of these bodies in the mid 1970s signalled that, like its counterpart in the United States, the Canadian business elite was becoming more ideologically and politically organized and unified (Akard 1992; Langille 1987).

One important sign of neo-conservative success was the outcome of the 1988 “free trade” federal election (Richardson 1996). Just four days before the election, a Gallup poll showed the pro–free trade Progressive Conservatives with the support of only 31% of Canadians intending to vote. The anti–free trade Liberals enjoyed a commanding 43% of the popular vote while the anti–free trade New Democratic Party stood at 22%. At about the same time, an Angus Reid poll disclosed that most Canadians opposed free trade by a margin of 54% to 35%. A majority of Canadians apparently sensed that free trade might open the country to harmful competition with giant American companies, thus leading to job losses and deteriorating living standards.

Then, a mere 100 hours before the first votes were cast, a little-known organization, the Canadian Alliance for Trade and Job Opportunities (CATJO), swung into high gear. CATJO was funded exclusively by the BCNI. With a campaign budget larger than that of the two opposition parties combined, CATJO bankrolled a media blitz promoting the PCs and their free trade policies. A barrage of brochures, newspaper ads, and radio and television commercials supported the idea that Canadian prosperity depends on the removal of all taxes and impediments to trade between Canada and the United States. CATJO argued that if goods and services could be bought and sold across the border without hindrance, and capital invested without restraint, good jobs would proliferate and Canada’s economic future would be assured. The CATJO onslaught succeeded in overcoming some of the public’s fears and drawing attention away from the opposition. On election day, the PCs won with 43% of the popular vote. The free trade agreement with the United States was signed just six weeks later.

The free trade agreement, later broadened to include Mexico, sharply increased competition for investment between jurisdictions, leading to a “downward harmonization” of labour policies (Gunderson 1998). Just as water seeks its lowest level, capital that is allowed to flow freely between jurisdictions will seek the jurisdiction with the lowest costs and therefore the highest profit potential, all else being the same. Increasingly, jurisdictions will compete for investment by offering outright tax concessions to investors and ensuring competitive labour costs in the form of lower state benefits, wages, and rates of labour disruption due to strikes. As Canadian workers learned, persistent demands for higher wages—indeed, failure to make wage and other concessions—increase the prospect of plant closings. Where capital mobility is unrestricted, it is only a short hop from southern Ontario to “right to work” states like Georgia or the Maquiladora free trade zone of northern Mexico. In this context, unions lose bargaining power and strikes become riskier actions with a lower probability of achieving their aims.

The slew of government budget cutbacks that took place in the 1990s also had a negative influence on strike incidence. Since workers who go out on strike sometimes quit or lose their jobs, declining income-replacing state benefits make strikes riskier for them. In other words, many of the cutbacks of the 1990s increased the potential cost of job loss to workers and therefore ensured that strike incidence would drop. Restricting eligibility for employment insurance and welfare were
two of the most important policy measures affecting the readiness of workers to strike.

High government debt, intense global competition, and neo-conservative publicity and lobbying continued to push the Canadian electorate to the right in the 1990s. The Reform Party became the official opposition, its popularity aided by the defection of members of the working class, most of them non-unionized, from the Liberals and the NDP (Butovsky 2001). The ruling Liberals, meanwhile, adopted much of the neo-conservative agenda. To varying degrees, all major parties supported the new industrial relations regime that had begun to crystallize in the mid 1970s.

A NEW INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REGIME

Beginning in the mid 1970s, governments adopted a series of measures aimed at better controlling labour (Panitch and Swartz 1993 [1985]). Among them was the establishment of “wage and price controls” that, in practice, limited only wages but claimed to require equal sacrifices from labour and business. That strategy was followed by the Trudeau government in 1975 when it established the Anti-Inflation Board for a three-year period. Blessed by business and condemned by the labour movement, the anti-inflation program suspended collective bargaining for all workers in Canada. By undermining the ability of strikes to achieve wage gains, it also dampened labour militancy. A similar approach was taken in 1982, when the federal government passed the Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act. The Act imposed a two-year wage limit on federal employees, eliminating their right to bargain and strike. The provinces soon passed similar laws. In some cases, provincial cutbacks were even more draconian than those implemented at the federal level. Public employees in Quebec, for example, took a 20% pay cut. In 1991, the federal government announced a one-year wage freeze for federal employees followed by a 3% limit on wage increases for the next two years. By 1993, even the Ontario NDP was backing wage restraint. In that year, the government of Bob Rae introduced a “Social Contract” that overruled the provisions of existing collective agreements and effectively reduced the wages of all 900 000 provincial employees for a three-year period.

A second method of labour control involved amending a variety of laws and regulations. For example, governments persistently broadened the definition of “management” and “essential service,” thereby denying many public-sector workers the right to strike. Thus, in 1984 nearly 76% of public-service workers negotiating contracts were designated as providing managerial or essential services. In the preceding set of negotiations, fewer than 47% of those workers were so designated. In addition, and to varying degrees, governments imposed restrictions on political strikes and secondary picketing (picketing beyond the plant or department affected by a strike). They increased employers’ rights to fight organizing drives and employees’ rights to attempt decertification. They banned strikes in designated work sites, weakened the ability of unions to discipline members who carried out anti-union activities, permitted unions to be sued, and, in most jurisdictions, allowed the use of replacement workers. One result of these actions was that, beginning in 1984, union density began to decline (see Figure 4-5).

Finally, throughout the 1980s, and particularly after Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government was elected in 1984, federal and provincial governments increasingly adopted ad hoc back-to-work legislation to weaken workers’ bargaining position and thereby limit strike action. Used on average only 0.2 times per year in
the period 1950–1954, back-to-work laws were passed on average 5.0 times per year in the period 1975–1979 and 5.4 times per year in the period 1985–1989.

At first, limiting the right to strike was widely viewed as a temporary measure necessitated by fear of a resurgence of the strike wave of 1974–1975, the highest inflation rates Canada had ever seen, and the deep recessions of 1981–1982 and 1991–1992. However, limiting the right to strike became a matter of an enduring, if unstated, public policy, largely because economic and political conditions required a less expensive and less militant workforce. By the mid 1980s, a new labour relations regime had crystallized. One of its main purposes was to render labour’s ultimate bargaining tool—the strike—increasingly superfluous as a means of bargaining for improved terms of employment.

**CONCLUSION: THE WITHERING AWAY OF THE STRIKE?**

About 1960, some influential social scientists predicted that the strike was “withering away.” The working class, they wrote, had become “embourgeoisified” due to growing affluence. Class conflict was supposedly becoming “institutionalized” in stable systems of collective bargaining. These developments were viewed as a sort of natural evolutionary process, part of the peaceful unfolding of the “inner logic of industrialization” (Ross and Hartman 1960; Dahrendorf 1959).

In the 1960s and 1970s, an international strike wave caught these social scientists by surprise. It cast doubt on the validity of their generalizations. Now, however, amid an international “resurgence of labour quiescence” (Shalev 1992) that has
lasted more than two decades, some observers may be tempted to argue that affluence has at last caused the strike to wither away. For them, the generalizations of 1960 may appear valid after all.

My analysis suggests we should avoid this conclusion. I have shown that a measure of average affluence (GDPpc) is inversely associated with weighted strike frequency but is a poor measure of the economic conditions that shape the lives of Canadian workers. The unemployment rate is a much better indicator of workers’ economic conditions; and for the 1973–1986 period, the unemployment rate varied inversely with weighted strike frequency. This suggests that the relative power or bargaining position of workers—not their level of affluence—determined their propensity to strike. Complicating the story, however, is a fact most researchers have overlooked. In the 1987–2000 period, the inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and weighted strike frequency nearly disappeared. The business cycle had little effect on workers’ propensity to strike. The reason? Actions taken by employers and governments from the mid 1970s to the late 1990s—introducing free trade, cutting budgets for a wide range of government assistance programs, passing laws and regulations that undermined unions—disempowered workers and rendered the strike a less effective weapon.

In sum, the history of Canadian industrial relations since the mid 1970s suggests that the “inner logic” of industrial capitalism is driven by power, not alleged evolutionary imperatives such as the rising average level of affluence. Industrial relations systems are institutionalized forms of class conflict—that is, enduring legal resolutions of historically specific struggles between workers and employers. But “enduring” does not mean “permanent.” Trends lasting a few decades should not be confused with the end of history. Industrial relations systems change when power is massively redistributed between classes. In Canada, for example, a massive redistribution of power in favour of workers took place from the mid 1940s on, when workers won the legal right to unionize and strike and were in a position to extract increased disposable income and benefits from employers and governments. Another massive redistribution of power, this time in favour of employers, took place after the mid 1970s. The Canadian industrial relations regime was transformed on both occasions. The transition from the first regime to the second was marked by a change in the relationship between strike frequency and the business cycle. It follows that, however difficult it might be to imagine in the current industrial relations climate, another massive shift in the distribution of power in society could once again help the strike regain its former popularity.

POSTSCRIPT: AN UPDATE AND SOME COMPARISONS

In Canada, strikes continued to decline in frequency in the first years of the twenty-first century. Between 2000 and 2005, weighted strike frequency fell nearly 30%. Moreover, the non-association between the unemployment rate and weighted strike frequency persisted until 2005, the most recent year for which data are available as of this writing.

Is Canada unique? The United States also exhibited a strong association between the unemployment rate and weighted strike frequency in the decades after the Second World War. Did that association disappear after the mid 1980s, as it did in Canada? And what about Western European countries such as Sweden, where, for reasons described earlier, the association between the unemployment rate and weighted strike
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Frequency was weaker than in North America? Are rich countries outside North America influenced by social forces that have shaped the Canadian pattern of strike activity in recent decades?

Figure 4-6 helps to answer the first set of questions. Change in the association between the unemployment rate and weighted strike frequency in the United States was evident three years earlier than in Canada, but the direction of change was identical in the two countries (Rosenfeld 2006). In the mid 1980s, both Canada and the United States saw the negative association turn into a non-association as employers and governments took concerted action to suppress strike frequency. The changing association between the unemployment rate and weighted strike frequency is thus a North America–wide pattern.

Figure 4-7 helps to answer the second set of questions. Strike frequency declined even more rapidly in Sweden over the past two decades. In Canada in 2005, weighted strike frequency was one-third as high as it was in 1987, but in Sweden it was just one-fifth as high.

These observations suggest that patterns of Canadian strike activity are not made entirely or even largely in Canada. They are strongly influenced by regional and global forces. Specifically, the consolidation of power by the owners and chief beneficiaries of multinational corporations that began in the 1970s was a worldwide phenomenon. By the 1980s, it resulted in the imposition of a host of new arrangements, including free trade agreements, liberal economic policies, and restrictive labour relations regimes on a large part of the world’s population. It follows that if the decline in strike activity that has taken place in Canada and other countries in recent decades is in substantial measure an effect of globalization, the prospects for a revival of strike activity may be bound up with the movement to resist globalization in its present form.
NOTES

1. Data sources for this chapter are as follows:

   Gross Domestic Product per Capita: CANSIM (2002a).

2. That is why the influence of union density on strike action peaks at intermediate levels of union density and then tapers off. In countries with the highest proportion of unionized workers, unions tend to exert considerable political influence.

3. As Morley Gunderson commented on a draft of this chapter, the argument developed here is also an argument about wage concessions. Moreover, for strike incidence to fall, the joint cost of strikes to both workers and employers must increase. In the present case, the cost of strikes to employers has increased, partly because strikes threaten the loss of global market share.

Note: The index of strike frequency is the number of strikes divided by the size of the active paid labour force, with the value for 1987 set at 100. U.S. data, not shown here, closely track the Canadian trend.

4. See, however, Cramton and Tracy (1994), who reach similar conclusions about the United States in the 1980s.

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