// THE SEMIOTIC REVIEW OF BOOKS

VOLUME 15.3 2005 http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb ISSN 0847-1622

Editorial

Baffle

By Scott Pound

In light of Roland Barthes' achievement as an intellectual and writer, it can be difficult to imagine him as a teacher. Still, Barthes occupied teaching or research positions his entire career, and his students were a very significant point of reference in his intellectual life. "Often when I write, though I don't say it, I rely on the impressions I have in relation to students," he wrote in *A Lover's Discourse* (qtd. in Stafford 200). Toward the end of his life, Barthes' fame made it difficult to keep up the kind of personal and interactive teaching space to which he was committed, and he bemoaned the fact that his seminar at the *École des Hautes Études* had become overrun by a fashionable and passive audience. So he did what any self-respecting teacher would do. He clamped down and changed the format of the seminar, to include only "very small working research groups, committed to a truly collective work, and assembled in conditions of intimacy and community" (Barthes 2005, 226, n. 1).

Barthes' ability to hold court under his own terms would soon come to an end. In 1976, on the recommendation of Michel Foucault, Barthes was elected to the Collège de France, the country's most prestigious academic institution. As one of 52 chair-holders at the Collège, Barthes would be called upon to offer one lecture course per year. The audience for Barthes' lectures was predictably huge, and he disliked the unilateral format of lecturing. His initial discomfort at being thrust into this environment is evident in the recording made of the first session of his first course at the Collège, on which a large and giddy audience can be heard laughing and talking excitedly (1977, n.p.). When Barthes' voice cuts in, it is deep, resonant, and somber. Without any preamble, he begins to read his lecture, only to be interrupted by latecomers who blithely walk into a jam-packed hall where no seating remains and the lecture has already started. The audience laughs at these interruptions, but Barthes is clearly not amused. In an attempt to salvage some of the intimacy and interactivity that seems lost, he will set up a seminar to run parallel to the course.

In the recording of the first session of the following year's course, the atmosphere is very different. Barthes' delivery is more up-beat, and he seems reconciled to the format as he announces off the top, in a relaxed tone to another very large audience: "This year, no seminar: only a lecture course."

In hindsight, the topics for these two courses serve as ironic commentary on Barthes' initiation to the Collège. In the crowded cacophony of the 1977 course, the topic is *Comment vivre ensemble* ("How to Live Together"). In the more sedate and relaxed (though no less crowded) atmosphere of 1978, Barthes will discourse on "The Neutral," the set of lectures collected in English translation in 2005. Barthes would begin a third course the following year called "The Preparation of the Novel," cut short by his death on March 26, 1980.

The course on "The Neutral" lasted thirteen weeks, from February 18 - June 3, 1978. The meetings were held on Saturdays (an unthinkable day for a lecture in North America) and lasted two hours with a break in the middle. There is, not a reading list, but an eclectic list of "intertexts," which includes many of the usual suspects (Bachelard, Baudelaire, Benjamin, Blanchot, Freud, Hegel, and Rousseau) and several not so usual ones (most notably Tao). These texts, only a few of which are cited more than a few times, are not the objects of analysis, but rather function as a discourse network. The course presupposes them but does not interrogate them analytically. Four passages are offered "in guise of epigraphs." They are: Joseph de Maistre, *The Inquisition*, Tolstoy, *The Night of Austerlitz*, Rousseau, *Tuesday 24 October 1776*, and Tao, *Portrait of Lao-tzu*.

As if to get the one and only doctrinaire piece of business out of the way, Barthes opens the mesmerizing February 18 session with a definition of his topic. "I define the Neutral as that which outplays [*déjoue*] the paradigm, or rather I call Neutral everything that baffles the paradigm" (6). More affect than concept, the Neutral is functional, and Barthes tries it with lots of different verbs. The Neutral not only outplays and baffles, it also 'parries' and 'outsmarts' the paradigm. The figures that animate it 'shimmer' and 'twinkle' too.

The much maligned paradigm so deftly outplayed is simply, as Barthes describes it, "the opposition between two virtual terms from which, in speaking, I actualize one to produce meaning" (7). It is, by implication,

> the wellspring of meaning; where there is meaning, there is a paradigm, and where there is paradigm (opposition), there is meaning → elliptically put: meaning rests on conflict (the choice of one term against another), and all conflict is generative of meaning: to choose *one* and refuse the *other* is always a sacrifice made to meaning, to produce meaning, to offer it to be consumed (7).

The way to outplay the paradigm, according to Barthes, is to opt out of its either/or reckoning process and desire something else, something neutral. But this desire for Neutral is not the same as a desire for neutrality or some kind of indifference. Barthes is careful to emphasize that to outplay the paradigm "is an ardent, burning activity" (7).

Having force and eluding structure, the Neutral poses a methodological problem: How does one construct a discourse around it without invoking paradigmatic coordinates? If he's not careful, Barthes will risk "reconstitut[ing] the very paradigm the Neutral wants to baffle" (11). Accordingly, Barthes' method is not to "construct" the concept of Neutral but rather to "display" Neutrals (11). These take the form of figures

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The SRB is published 3 times per year in the Fall, Winter and Spring/Summer.

– Benevolence, Weariness, Silence, Tact, Sleep, Affirmation, Color, and some 16 more – taken up in random order. Random and discontinuous, of course, because "the exposition of the nondogmatic cannot itself be dogmatic" (10). The task with each figure is not to explain or define but to describe, or as Barthes in his compulsion to serialize verbs adds, "to unthread" (11). "To describe and unthread what?" Barthes asks himself. "The Nuances," he answers (11). If this sounds like a poetics rather than a theory, that's because it is.

After the opening preliminaries of the first session, Barthes lets the figures roam, taking up roughly two of them a session. It seems safe to say now that *The Neutral: Lecture Course at the Collège de France (1977-1978)* is an unusual and extraordinary document. A series of performances wrapped up like a book, the form of Barthes' discourse in every way outperforms the medium in which it is presented. The astonishingly resonant and nuanced way that Barthes riffs on his topic is not the stuff of monographs, or even essays. Still less does it seem to fit with the performative sphere of the lecture hall, especially one as prestigious as the Collège. In form and effect the book is in a league with a different genre all together: the postmodern long poem.

Barthes' presentation of the material is discontinuous, fragmentary, and imagistic. As in the postmodern long poem, Barthes' discourse eschews grammatical subordination and is wary of the adjective. The arrangement is pure parataxis (adjacency) in serializing flows. One thing leads to another, a form of relationality that is not entrusted to syntax, but rather flows through the signposts of ellipses, colons, arrows, parentheses, and equals signs that Barthes liberally uses to punctuate his text. There emerges a distinct rhythm in the text that seems designed to bring thinking back into the orbit of the body, as in the following passage from the session of March 25, 1978, which is typical in terms of its arrangement and flow.

> h. Restraint
>
> = That goes without saying, if I may say so. As well, I primarily want to underscore the Zen rule of bodily restraint. Rule laid down by an actor (and that is important because it articulates the issue with the problem of hysterical behaviors): Zeami (beginning fifteenth century), actor, author of *No* and of a marvelous treatise on theatrical doctrine → Zeami's rule: "When you feel ten in your heart express seven in your movements." For example, the actor should restrain a gesture (extending or withdrawing the hand) "to a lesser extent that his own emotions suggest"; the body is made to work with more reserve than the mind → absolute paradox for us, where actors often work, at least traditionally, in the more rather than the less → the Neutral would be the generalized dwelling of the less, of reserve, of the mind's advance over the body. → Perhaps that is what it means to be in tune [*la justesse*]: cf: Casals's word, profound and technically so true: rhythm is all in the delay → to oppose here as Indian drug users do: *datura:* acquisition of power ≠ peyote, knowledge of the "right way of living" (wisdom) (84).

The fashionable term to describe this in the 70's would have been 'bricolage', but I'm reminded more of Ezra Pound and William Carlos Williams who lashed things together in a similarly paratactic way.

To outplay the paradigm seems to have been a long-standing desire for Barthes (he traces the emergence of the topic all the way back to his first book, *Writing Degree Zero* (1953)). The key figure in this aspect of Barthes' oeuvre is, not surprisingly, Saussure: a thinker to whom Barthes remained remarkably faithful in key aspects of his thinking. It is Saussure, for example, who authorizes Barthes' reductive and highly formalist definition of the paradigm as simple opposition. The assumption that meaning springs solely from opposition at the level of the signifier is likewise a case of Saussurean structuralism in its most pristine form. Deleuze and Guattari will make mincemeat out of this notion in 1980 when they publish their second volume of "Capitalism and Schizophrenia," *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987: 114 ff.), but here Barthes leverages it into his discourse as a kind of a priori synthetic judgment concerning meaning. At this juncture, he is not even outplaying Kant let alone the paradigm.

In hitching his wagon to a preeminent advocate of paradigmatic and structuralist reason like Saussure, Barthes serves up a distorted image of what a paradigm is. And it is against the grain of this archly defined notion of the paradigm that Barthes will cast his figures. The paradigm these figures outplay is therefore a dull one.

In a 2002 lecture the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben offers a very different take on the relationship of the paradigm and the neutral. Working within the context of key thinkers of the paradigm that Barthes somehow manages to ignore (Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault), Agamben locates the neutral within the paradigm itself.

> To understand how a paradigm works, we first have to neutralize traditional philosophical oppositions such as universal and particular, general and individual, and even also form and content. The paradigm analogy is depolar and not dichotomic, it is tensional and not oppositional. It produces a field of polar tensions which tend to form a zone of undecidability which neutralizes every opposition. (Agamben 2002, n.p.)

Set free from its structural moorings in the figure of opposition, Agamben's paradigm outwits Barthes' version. Agamben continues:

> We don't have here a dichotomy, meaning two zones or elements clearly separated and distinguished by a caesura, we have a field where two opposite tensions run. The paradigm is neither universal nor particular, neither general nor individual, it is a singularity which, showing itself as such, produces a new ontological context. This is the etymological meaning of the word *paradigme* in Greek, *paradigme* is literally "what shows itself beside." (Agamben 2002, n.p.)

And yet, despite its structuralist vulgarity, there's something revealing about Barthes' idea of the paradigm which is not a function of Agamben's better informed and more supple definition. Like a misunderstanding that unfolds into a gripping narrative, the reductiveness of Barthes' definition of the paradigm sets the stage for a brilliant series of jousts in which the dullness of the ill-defined paradigm is endlessly sharpened into incisive and resonant moments. As real solutions to an imaginary problem, Barthes' figures take on a literary quality.

We need therefore to understand Barthes' sense of the paradigm as provisional, perhaps even tactically so. As an incitement to intellectual drama, it works to set everything in motion. It may have been pedagogically motivated. Barthes' pedagogy awaits critical treatment, but we could begin here with his decision to ground his teaching practice in the unusual realm of personal fantasy. In the "Inaugural Lecture," he speaks passionately, and even a little defensively, about it:

> I sincerely believe that at the origin of teaching such as this we must always locate a fantasy, which can vary from year to year. This, I know, may seem provocative: how, in the context of an institution, however free it may be, dare we speak of a phantasmatic teaching? Yet if we consider for a moment the surest of human sciences, if we consider History, how can we help acknowledging that it has a continuous relationship with fantasy? This is what Michelet understood: History is ultimately the history of the phantasmatic site par excellence, that of the human body…. It is to a fantasy, spoken or unspoken, that the professor must annually return (1982, 477).

In fantasizing about "How to Live Together" in the 1977 course, Barthes invented a concept he called "idiorhythmy" - each to her own rhythm - which he fashions as a way one can live among others without succumbing to the strict rhythms set down by institutions of power and, at the same time, without having to consign oneself to an extreme form of solitude. Idiorhythmy suspends the conflict between abject isolation and social paralysis, refuses that opposition, and presents us with a third way that somehow stymies the opposition itself. The result is a beautiful paradox: The only real way to imagine the fantasy of idiorhythmy is to attempt to live it. Like the best fantasies, it is steeped in experience.

There's probably no better way than this to describe how Barthes managed to bring intimacy into his large format lectures at the Collège. He does so by ministering to his own rhythm, suspending the abstract methodological rigour demanded by the austere environs of the Collège, and thereby invoking idiorhythmy as the operative

principle of his teaching. The effect is to introduce an affective dimension into the disembodied sphere of the grand lecture hall and cramped overflow room. Throughout every session, Barthes embodies a lyrical presence guided, not by wisdom, but by desire: "I desire the Neutral, therefore I postulate the Neutral" (12).

Everything about the topic is expressed in embodied terms. The word "Neutral" is "a stubborn affect" in Barthes (8). The word guides him "for a series of walks along a certain number of readings" (8). In his reading, "certain passages will crystallize around the notion of the Neutral as a whimsical sourcery" (9). This reading presupposes a library, but what library? "That of my vacation home," he says, "a place-time where the loss of methodological rigour is compensated for by the intensity and pleasure of free reading" (9). The entire point is, as he says, "to get myself vividly interested in what is contemporaneous to me" (9).

It would be easy to mistake the impulse here for solipsism or self-absorption, but Barthes' foregrounding of his own idiorhythmy springs instead from an ethical impulse: "What I am looking for, during the preparation of this course, is an introduction to living, a guide to life (ethical project): I want to live according to nuance" (11). It is, of course, Barthes' enormous privilege to be able to model a form of idiorhythmy that few could ever hope to accomplish. As the maestro, he exults in that freedom. And yet, there are limits, and the stance Barthes models takes place within clear institutional boundaries which are never far from his thinking.

In his "Inaugural Lecture" to the Collège, Barthes mused that since "teaching has as its object discourse taken in the inevitability of power, method can really bear only on the means of loosening, baffling, or at the very least, of lightening this power" (1982, 476). The image he chooses to illustrate this task is a remarkably tender and moving one.

> I should therefore like the speaking and the listening that will be interwoven here to resemble the comings and goings of a child playing beside his mother. Leaving her, returning to bring her a pebble, a piece of string, and thereby tracing around a calm center a whole locus of play within which the pebble, the string come to matter less than the enthusiastic giving of them (176-77).

In the months that intervened between the "Inaugural Lecture" and the first session of his course on "The Neutral," Barthes' mother, with whom he had lived his entire life, passed away. In the first session of the course on "The Neutral," Barthes acknowledges this event.

> To conclude these preliminaries, and before letting the figures of the Neutral roam, it seems to me that I should say something about the situation of the Neutral, the desire for the Neutral in my current life – for there is no truth that is not tied to that moment.
>
> Between the moment that I chose the subject of this course (last May) and the moment I had to prepare it, there entered my life, some of you know it, a serious event, a mourning: the subject who will speak of the Neutral is no longer the same as the one who had decided to speak of it → Initially, it was a matter of speaking of the suspension of conflicts, and that's still what we're going to speak of since one doesn't alter a posting of the Collège; but, underneath, this discourse whose argument and whose approach I just presented, it seems to me that today I myself hear, in fleeting moments, another music (13).

That Barthes can publicly acknowledge this event in the way that he does says everything about his almost Wordsworthian sensitivity and responsiveness as a teacher. It is these qualities that triumph over the alleged crypto-structuralism of his approach.

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SRB Insight:

Signs and Events: Deleuze in Translation

By Barbara Godard

Preface

Translation is how I came to write this essay, through a problem encountered as a reader, not a writer. It was a chance throw of the dice which brought about a conjunction setting things in motion. In one of my courses on Deleuze, a directed reading course specifically on his texts, I was following my usual practice of translating simultaneously into English from my French version of *Mille plateaux* and reading aloud alternately with the student who was reading aloud from his English version, *A Thousand Plateaus*, now happily available in translation along with most of Deleuze's other texts. The words we spoke from the two versions lead in opposite directions. Intrigued, I took a closer look at Brian Massumi's translation, then went looking at a number of translations of other texts by many different translators to see how they had handled the thorny problem for the translator posed by Deleuze, namely the extraordinary proliferation of neologisms which is central to his understanding of philosophy as the creation of concepts (*PP* 186). Deleuze's creativity as a philosopher manifested itself in his "power of translation," a gift for "transposition" that transformed and renewed the philosophical tradition by finding an unexpected "animating centre" (Tournier 151-52) which introduced a new logic of relations.

Deleuze in Translation

What is translation? Although questions are important for Deleuze as "paradoxical element[s]" in a field with a "redistributive function" (*LS* 72), he has addressed this question only indirectly through his elaboration of a dynamic semiotics where translation performs the work of making connections that effect incorporeal transformations creating new images of thought. As concerned pre-eminently with systems of relations, with the general commutability of the sign, semiotics in both the Peircian and Saussurian traditions has been conceptualized as translation.. Deleuze and Guattari's elaboration of "traduction" has affinities with Jakobson's understanding of intersemiotic translation. Translation, working within language not to "represent the contents of another language" but to synthesize a temporal succession in an "overcoding" may, as an assemblage, express other strata (geological, corporeal, political). While such a synthesis shares in the imperialist tendencies of language to dominate other semiotic systems, the immanent universal translatability of

language in its capacity to interrelate semiotic systems through "superpositions" implicates translation in "all human movement" (*MP* 81-82). Language in this perspective is not separated from meaning and left to circulate freely in some transcendent beyond, but is embedded within complex material and social semiotic processes of sedimentation and flux which are reciprocally implicated in the perception of and shaping by the contingencies of geographical location and political force (*MP* 33). Like the disjunctive synthesis of the coordinate conjunction or "AND AND AND," translation intervenes in regimes of signs as a paradoxical element that assures the convergence of series by making them diverge endlessly (*LS* 55). Translation as creative swerve or *clinamen* (Godard 56).

A shift to pragmatics from syntactics and semantics is central to Deleuze and Guattari's critique of both representationalism and linguistic abstraction: like the Bakhtin circle, they see language as force or event. The categories pertinent to analysis of linguistic universals cannot give a full account of how a word forms a complete enunciation except as a supplement. Yet this transformational force inheres in the speech event in the concrete "*mots d'ordre*" of various organized groups that give the words their performative effect as "immanent acts" in relation to the complex attributes deriving from the material and social (*MP* 105). "La pragmatique est une politique de langue" (*MP* 180): social action is performed through language. "The potential here is enormous," notes Deleuze, "language is coming to be seen as an activity, so the abstract units and constants of language-use are becoming less and less important" (*Neg* 28).

Aligning their project with a more general pragmatic shift within semiotics, Deleuze and Guattari address the role played by order-words, the importance of indirect discourse and a criticism of linguistic constants (including "the despotic signifier" still stuck in the question of meaning emerging with the "writing-machine" of a certain post-structuralism) (*Neg* 21). They also outline a programme of "schizo-analyse" (*MP* 182) that studies variations in individual propositions and collective regimes of signs. This pragmatics, concerned with affective and socio-political forces immanent in linguistic transformation, is also a micro-politics of "translation" which is one of four modalities of *mixed* regimes of signs forming a "rhizome" (*MP* 182), the object of schizoanalysis. As the second "transformational" one among these modalities, translation establishes relations to an outside and creates new semiotics. Translation focuses on how one "semiotic translates utterances from somewhere else, but by making them deviate, and by leaving untransformable remainders" (*MP* 170). The "transformational," moreover, shows how an "abstract machine may be translated into another," changed into another, and especially create itself from others in complex relational interactions (*MP* 181). New regimes of signs are formed through translation which sometimes undergoes radical change as in the complex creative transformation of Afro-American songs. In translating the English signifier, slaves made a counter-signifying gesture, mixing English words with their African languages, singing their African songs in the new actions of the forced work of slavery. Then, when slavery was abolished, they went through a process of "subjectivization" or "individuation" that changed their music even as the music changed the process itself (*MP* 170).

Linguistic translation does not determine the importance of a "veritable semiotic translation": on the contrary, it is the semiotic transformation implicit in the variables of enunciation which is the major impetus for change (*MP* 172). Language is a political rather than purely linguistic matter, for even the appreciation of degrees of grammatical correctness entails making a political distinction (*MP* 174). Translation, linked to creative innovation among regimes of signs through the unique mixtures it brings about in an enunciation or speech act, overlaps with the constructivism of philosophical concepts and artistic percepts. Transcreation, then, performs both cognitive and sensorial-affective metamorphoses. As Deleuze notes, he pays much attention to the relations between music and voice in his concern for complex semiotic systems as "assemblages" or convergences of heterogeneous material (*Neg* 29). Attention to such non-verbal semiotic systems as rhythm and intensity displaces the interest in the enunciation from the individuation of people and things onto the circumstances and situations in which things happen and so breaks open linguistic fundamentalism with its distinction between subjects and signifiers, speech and content, meaning and context. His pragmatics/"diagrammatics" pushes language to the point where "immanent variation" depends on the "conjugation of mutant flows," on their combination of particles and their speed (*D* 141), on complex relations and interactions, then, rather than on structure or development as in "generative" and "transformational" linguistics. Such a differentiated pragmatics, or historicized pragmatics, attentive to the heterogeneity of "assemblages" offers not only an analytic framework for the transformative work of translation, but a method for analyzing translations to situate them within a continuum of variation or "becoming-minor." Transformational research, as Deleuze proposes, analyzes variations in relations of content-form and expression-form as these pertain to diverse centres of power in the aim "to find the conditions under which something new is produced" not to assess their truth in respect to some origin or end (*D* vii).

What has been the trajectory of "becoming-Deleuzian" in English? How do his texts work and whom do they work for? What kind of deterritorialization has the process of selection of texts for translation set in motion? What centres of power have been operative in the social obligations implicit in the decision-making process? For, as Deleuze has insisted, the reworking of translation shifts the enunciation to another publishing house and geopolitical site and so implicates a different "collective assemblage of enunciation." How such forces manifest themselves in the diversity of choices made by translators to render Deleuze's concepts is my focus here. Selection among variables engages the complex issues of the asymmetry of languages in the global arena, where English as hegemonic international language in the current era of late capitalism holds greater prestige than French, formerly such a lingua franca. English as world language works by division not unification, splitting the world into two copyright zones, the British and the American who divide the world between them and compete with each other for translation rights. Under this order, Australia and Canada are situated in different zones, textual relations between them possible only through the mediation of hegemonic centres, London and New York. The international rivalry for cultural supremacy between these centres is not the only relation of power operative in the transmission of Deleuze's work in English. There is also the internal stratification of each of these fields of cultural production, in particular within the American field between academic presses, large commercial publishers and avant-garde or little presses. Each relates to power differently, with the academic presses functioning as the instance of consecration and canonization. As well, there are the disciplinary distinctions which have attended the reception of contemporary French thought more generally with Derrida and Foucault finding their earliest and greatest support among literary disciplines rather than philosophers.

Deleuze has made his way across the linguistic borders independently. Most obviously, the difference may be observed in the lack of personal involvement in the process. In contrast to Derrida and Foucault, translation of Deleuze's texts has not followed upon lectures or teaching in North America which contributed to the dissemination of their ideas and aroused a demand for translations. Nor has Deleuze involved himself as directly in the translation process as has Derrida (1985; 1987), for instance, both in the selection of translators and the active intervention in relation to copyrights. Derrida's translators have almost invariably been his American students. Under these conditions, the act of translation has contributed to the transmission of knowledge through a reciprocal empowerment whereby the philosopher's word is widely disseminated in a move that enhances the disciple's authority and establishes or sustains an interpretive community. The process of translating Deleuze's work has not produced the same structures legitimating textual transmission nor the same institutionalization of "deconstruction is America." That Deleuze's most active and prolific translators have been Australian, Canadian and English exposes the geopolitical stakes of his border crossing. A number of translations were explicitly initiated by editors, as Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam acknowledge in their preface to *Bergsonism* (*B* 10). Among those undertaken by translators independently, several remain in manuscript, such as those Constantin Boundas made of *Dialogues* and *Différence et répétition*, while Daniel Smith's translation of *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation* was eventually published after a decade-long wait. These projects were plagued with

copyright problems. Nor can translating be said to have advanced the academic careers of his translators, not at least to the extent that translating Derrida made Gayatri Spivak, Barbara Johnston, Barbara Harlow and others into academic celebrities. Only some translators of Deleuze's work have been his students, though their translation practices have made a significant difference in the Deleuze-effect particularly in their numerous translations since the late 1980s. The most prolific of these translators, Hugh Tomlinson and Martin Joughin, are no longer academics. However, Deleuze's translators have formed a community amongst themselves helping each other in the process of translation, as they acknowledge in their prefaces to translations. So, Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell thank Martin Joughin and Michèle LeDoeuff in their "Translators' Introduction" to *What is Philosophy?* (x) while Joughin reciprocates for "the heroically indulgent collaboration of my friend Tomlinson" in his final translator's note to *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (427). Paul Patton's "Translator's Preface" to *Difference and Repetition* intimates the complexity of this web of indebtedness in his catalogue of acknowledgements where Hugh Tomlinson suggested the task, Martin Joughin commented on translation issues, Brian Massumi read the final version and Constantin Boundas sent along his own draft version (*DR* xiii). Generally, Deleuze did not ask to see translations before they were published, but left the approval process in the hands of the English language editors, considering his own command of English inadequate to the task (Boundas 1997). However, he responded cordially to translators and editors who sought his assistance in rendering concepts and in making selections from his work. Hugh Tomlinson thanks "Professor Deleuze" first of all "for his assistance with the translation" in his "Translators' Introduction" to *Dialogues*, noting in particular his collaboration in selecting the term "ritornello" and his new footnote explaining "hecceity" (*D* xiii). Similarly, Martin Joughin begins his "Translator's Notes" to *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* with the observation that he often quotes from Deleuze's correspondence with him in the footnotes, as in the very first note--a general reply to a query explaining his idiosyncratic practices of capitalization (*EIP* 403). While this correspondence traces Deleuze's continuing authorial involvement in the translation process, it is doubled and diffused as reported speech within a different "assemblage of enunciation."

Certainly, Deleuze has not sought to assert authorial control through copyright battles like the one launched by Derrida over an essay from *Le Nouvel observateur* published in *The Heidegger Controversy* (Wolin 1993). Not only did Derrida threaten a law suit against the first publisher of the collection, but he wrote a twenty page criticism denouncing the translation of an eight page article. A second edition was published by another press without the controversial translation. Ironical it is that a thinker who has done so much to call into question our conventions of authorial authority should invoke his entitlement for a text jointly produced--an interview initiated by the periodical which later granted permission to publish the translation. The question of textual afterlife so concerned Foucault that he forbade publication in any form of his unpublished lectures which may be consulted only in the controlled space of the Foucault archives. Deleuze's unpublished lectures on the contrary are being posted on a web site, accessible to anyone for manifold practices of textual manipulation and variation. One can only speculate about how he might respond to these transformations. Does this move to the internet further the "control society" which he saw emerging with the hegemony of communications technology displacing the biopolitics of the disciplinary society and introducing "frightful continual training, continual monitoring" (*Neg* 173)? Or does it set in play a line of flight, escaping the control of the publishing houses over the diffusion of his philosophy? Deleuze's death seems to have made a difference, placing fewer rather than more constraints on translation of his work, as is evident in the case of "A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme?" His instructions to his French publishers not to allow translation of this early essay seem to have been waived by his executors. While the essay could not be included in *The Deleuze Reader* prepared by Constantin Boundas in 1993, it was translated for inclusion in Charles Stivale's *The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari* published in 1998. To a certain extent this open access to texts while consistent with "becoming-imperceptible" contradicts Deleuze's concern about textual survival and continuity in another medium, in the transposition of his speech into written text. He paid considerable attention to the image of his thought in the interview process, often "publishing 'fake' or carefully rewritten texts" (Colombat 1996:237). Interviews were usually "authorized," published with a statement that he had agreed to their publication. In the case of translation from one language to another, however, the cross-cultural relations have been largely between publishers. And for Deleuze, these have been especially fraught relations.

If the Derrida "affair within an affair" involved the philosopher in an exercize of authorial prerogative paradoxically carrying out self-censorship, Deleuze's texts have found themselves caught in the cross-fire of capitalist publishing wars. *The Deleuze Reader* was also dropped from Columbia's list because of a threatened law suit, one from another publisher however, in what emerged as a struggle between two university presses over Deleuze's writings in North America. A problem in recording copyright authorization for an excerpt from a text by Deleuze previously published by the University of Minnesota Press resulted in legal action against Columbia by Minnesota who took the initiative of commissioning a new anthology with a different editor. Part of a general movement to commodify post-structuralist philosophy, this struggle over "ownership" and suppression of a translation had a less radical impact on the transmission of Deleuze's work and the trajectory of its becoming than did similar earlier incidents which considerably retarded his reception in English. An early global agreement with a New York publisher to translate Deleuze's complete oeuvre, collapsed when the publisher went broke leaving several contracted translations in limbo. Among these was Boundas's manuscript of *Différence et répétition* whose rights the bankrupt company sold to Athlone, a British press, without, however, transferring the contract with the translator. Boundas was unable to get Athlone to take the completed translation, with the result that it was more than a decade before Deleuze's philosophical writing which worked toward a new image of thought became available for English readers. When Boundas eventually published a translation of one of Deleuze's texts, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, it was at the invitation of an editor, Columbia University Press, when a spate of translations of Deleuze's philosophy was appearing that radically changed his image in English-speaking circles.

In the absence of any systematic project of translating Deleuze along the lines of the Strachey rewriting of Freud where the translator-function consistently doubles the author-function, Deleuze's body of work has been subject to the volatile forces of the market place and of disciplinary norms. A considerable disjunction separates the trajectories of publication in French from those in English. Whereas French-speaking readers were able to follow his work as an early period of "writing history of philosophy" gave way to "writing philosophy," a distinction that Deleuze considers central to his work and expounds for the reader of *Difference and Repetition*, his first book where he "does philosophy" (*DR* xv), English-speaking readers first encountered Deleuze's work in the fields of sexuality and anti-psychiatry. With the exception of "Pensée nomade" an essay on Nietzsche and "Les intellectuelles et le pouvoir" cowritten with Foucault, which appeared in anthologies under the names of philosophers Nietzsche and Foucault in the late 1970s, the earliest English translations of Deleuze might be categorized as "cultural studies," an emerging interdiscipline focused on issues of signification and power in a variety of media. A brief look at the first translations of his work highlights these differences. First to appear in English in the early 1970s was his sixth book with a transformation in title that shifts the orientation of the book from philosophical commentary (*Présentation de Sacher-Masoch*) to perverse sexual practice (*Masochism*). The translation was published by George Braziller, an American commercial press specializing in European translations and fiction. Not surprisingly given its literary orientation, the press published the following year Deleuze's fourth book, a study of Proust's semiotics which had appeared in France with an academic press. Translated by Richard Howard, the homosexual translator of Barthes, *Proust and Signs* was framed under the politics of gay liberation. It was the publication five years later of *Anti-Oedipus: Captialism and Schizophrenia* written in collaboration with Félix Guattari that made Deleuze an authoritative signature in English. Selections from this translation had appeared earlier in *SubStance* (1975), an

American literary periodical specializing in contemporary French literature which has done much to disseminate Deleuze's work in literary studies, and in *Semiotext(e)*, a New York based publisher specializing in French post-structuralist theory which subsequently produced as chapbooks a number of sections of *Mille plateaux* as it was in the process of being written.

Publication of the complete volume of *Anti-Oedipus* by the mass-market publisher Viking launched Deleuze's work into a different cultural domain, out of the avant-garde and restricted circulation literary presses into the sphere of general production. Foucault's preface facilitated this movement: his name and not those of the translators appears on the cover of the English edition. The preface links the book to the "revolutionary and anti-repressive politics" of 1968 and praises it as a guide to "counter all forms of fascism" in everyday life (*AO* xi). Ironically, the neutralization of "the effects of power linked to their own discourse" for which he praises Deleuze and Guattari (*AO* xiv) is subverted by the authority of the signature, his own in the first case and, as a result, Deleuze and Guattari's. Because of the great attention this work received, Deleuze became a kind of demiurge of counter-culture running with the wolves in the Bois de Vincennes. Linked to the anti-psychiatry movement, to various forms of fringe culture in music and other arts, Deleuze became the theorist of a poetics of desire and marginality which had a considerable impact on creative artists, in Quebec among other places. This image of Deleuze was further reinforced by translations appearing quickly in the wake of *Anti-Oedipus* which were among the fastest to be Englished, indicating the great interest in his work in certain fields. These include additional essays on psychoanalysis co-authored with Guattari which, published by a little press in France appropriately titled "des mots perdus," were within the year translated by an equally small and symbolically titled "Feral Press" in the wilds of remote Australia. Again, within a mere two years, Deleuze's essay on the filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard appeared in English in another film journal and his postface to a study by social theorist J. Donzelot was retained when the book was published in English. This tendency to present Deleuze as analyst or commentator on other thinkers or artists and not as a creator of his own system of thought is exemplified by the rapidity with which his book on Foucault was translated into English by University of Minnesota Press--the only one of his books to appear in translation within two years. There is an enormous irony in this reception of Deleuze the philosopher travelling on the coat-tails of Foucault who had prophesied that "this century will be known as Deleuzian" (*T* 165) On the other hand, the "Deleuzian differential" is what is at stake in the translation of his work not according to an "architecture of systems," but a "phantasmatology," as Foucault notes (*T* 166-67).

In translation, the Deleuzian signature needs to be read transversally, for it takes responsibility for writing that is not entirely "his" even while he is becoming something other through it. As Deleuze notes in his preface to the English edition of *Difference and Repetition*, "we try to speak in our own name only to learn that a proper name designates no more than the outcome of a body of work--in other words, the concepts discovered, on condition that we were able to express these and imbue them with life using all the possibilities of language" (*DR* xv). Deleuze's text offers itself in a "becoming-minor" to the translator-reader's delirium or experimentation in a passing beyond where, drawing their own maps, they introduce continuous variation privileging different "lines of flight." One such line extending from the initial reception of Deleuze as theorist of radical cultural and social experimentation in the spirit of 1968 has branched both into the proliferation of "rhizome" and "nomad" in academic writing where, in the absence of the complex calculus of relations of his philosophical system, they become thematized short hand for the total liberation of thought and into the cultural modalities of virtual reality that take up the imperative of a nomadological participation in the outside to explore its various disguises in the non-verbal semiotics of sound, pain, passion, in various art forms, in the nonhuman, the bestial, on mars, as queer theory, all participating in radical projects of redrawing the traditional boundaries patterning discourse and knowledge (Massumi 1997).

Another Deleuze emerges in the 1990s with the greatly delayed translation of his major philosophical works. Some forty years separate the publication and translation of Deleuze's first book *Empirisme et subjectivité: Essai sur la nature humaine selon Hume* which initiated a series in the history of philosophy written from an original perspective one, moreover, that diverged from contemporary French rereadings of German philosophy wrestling with the historical legacy of metaphysics. Instead, this study of Hume announced an empiricist and pragmatist of a particular stripe, a "'constructive' pragmatist," as Tomlinson calls him, who is concerned not with the test of practice but with "the manufacture of materials to harness forces, to think the unthinkable" (*D* xii). Still, the pattern of translation of Deleuze's philosophical texts reveals more of the current trendiness of certain philosophers than of interest in his novel system and conceptual innovation. His short studies of Kant and Nietzsche which first appeared in the 1960s with Presses Universitaires de France were translated in the early 1980s for Athlone Press in London who at the same time reissued *Anti-Oedipus* in a British edition. With the advent of Athlone on the scene holding the copyrights purchased from the bankrupt New York firm, the pace of translation of Deleuze's works quickened. Yet, his two books on film written in the mid 1980s, *Cinéma 1: L'image-mouvement* and *Cinéma 2: L'image-temps*, were translated within three to four years while the major publications of 1968 and 1969 were left untranslated until the 1990s. Some, like the second book on Spinoza (*Spinoza: Philosophie pratique*) and on Bergson (*Le Bergsonisme*), were eventually published by avant-garde American presses, City Lights in San Francisco, a literary press in the first instance, and Zone Books, a New York based cultural studies press in the second. This somewhat disrupts a facile binary pitting American interest in his cultural theory against a British interest in the history of philosophy. Nonetheless, the translators of Deleuze's philosophical works have been principally British, Australian and Canadian, former participants in Deleuze's seminar at Vincennes-Saint Denis, outsiders in the hegemonic American academy.

None of the scandalous delay in publication of Deleuze's major work is addressed by Paul Patton in his "Translator's Preface" to *Difference and Repetition*, though significantly his preface is positioned before that of Deleuze written for the English edition, giving greater prominence to the strong claims Patton makes for the originality of this book. Nothing short of a complete reversal of 2000 years of philosophy, he announces: "a critique of the philosophy of representation which has dominated European thought since Plato" in the same manner as *Anti-Oedipus* critiques psychoanalysis, "by proposing a retrospective analysis based on an alternative" (*DR* xi). A work of "prodigious conceptual invention," *Difference and Repetition* draws not only on Deleuze's earlier readings in the history of philosophy but on contemporary mathematics and science along with art, literature and metaphysics interwoven into "a systematic philosophy of difference" (*DR* xi). The last of Deleuze's major works to appear in translation, not coming out until a year after the much later *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, it was accompanied in French by the secondary thesis for the Doctorat d'Etat, *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression*, and followed a year later by *Logique du sens* which makes another attempt primarily through literature and forms of nonsense to "liberate thought from those images which imprison it," the images which propose answers, solutions as the true and "error as the enemy to be fought" (*DR* xvi). This interrogation of the traditional image of thought began with his study of Proust, but in *Difference and Repetition* is taken up autonomously, no longer through reported speech. Moreover, it has informed all his subsequent books he notes, "including the research undertaken with Guattari" where a vegetal model of rhizome and tree was introduced (*DR* xvii). They return to the question again in *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* written and translated in the 1990s along with a number of interviews and articles in several collections which rework this theorization of complexity from a number of different angles, in relation to different semiotic and textual systems, expanding, clarifying, making more accessible. Still, without access to *Difference and Repetition's* systematic elaboration of the search to enrich philosophy by taking seriously its creative powers to expound concepts as these are interrelated with scientific functions and artistic constructions, anglophone readers have encountered these concepts as isolated lively metaphors disembedded from the rigorous mathematical and biological theorizations of different/cial relations.

The implications of this lag in translation of Deleuze's major synthetic work in regards

to his reception in English is still uncertain. However, the principal monographs on his work published in English in the U.S. have been written by bilingual literary scholars involved in comparative studies both literary and interarts (Bogue 1989; Massumi 1992; Stivale 1998), while those published in France by former seminar participants have addressed the body of his work primarily from a philosophical perspective where *Difference and Repetition* is a pivotal text (Martin 1993; Mengue 1994; Alliez 1993). Martin's is the only one of these to be prefaced by Deleuze which might appear to make it an "authorized" reading of his philosophy were it not for Deleuze's oblique qualifications which, while expressing pleasure at Martin's "rigeur et compréhension," comments that "the difference between us is more a question of words" (Martin 7). He concludes by advising Martin that, when analyzing concepts, he should begin from "simple, concrete situations which have no philosophical precedents" (Martin 8). Stivale includes interviews with Deleuze and Guattari conducted in March 1985 but not published during their life times and so not subject to Deleuze's careful editing. Deleuze's death in 1995 was a publishing event, releasing a flurry of short books explicating his concepts in French and inciting a number of conferences in Australia, Canada, Brazil, England whose proceedings multiply the variations on Deleuze's work. Still some of these forms of afterlife count more in the global relations of power than others. Assessments of the Deleuze-effect in a series of newspaper special issues following his death evaluate his international impact. *Le Monde* (November 10, 1995) published articles from the U.S. and Japan, powerhouses of the new "global" economic order, which noted conversely Deleuze's "considerable influence" in the first, and failure to connect in the second. *La Quinzaine littéraire* (15 February 1996) took soundings on Deleuze's influence in the traditionally related cultures of Germany (little) and England (some) and, more surprisingly even, of Brazil (considerable). No article analyzed or mentioned the cultural periphery Australia and Canada, where Deleuze's thought had considerable impact (Colombat 1996: 237).

Translating Deleuze

These dual phases of translation also mark shifts in practice, measured by the greater visibility of the translator's transformational work as one regime of signs is changed into another. The double signature of the translated text and the resulting conflict in jurisdictions has conventionally been managed in translation theory and practice through a series of normative discourses that posit a subordinate role for the translator who is thereby sentenced to invisibility in the translated text which must appear as though 'naturally' written in the language of translation. However, in contemporary translation theory and practice the transparency of the translated text and with it the subservient position of the translator has been challenged. "Transcreation" is how Haroldo de Campos (1998) terms the anthropophagic relation when the translator cannibalizes other regimes of signs to create a new semiotic. Not going quite as far as de Campos in the play of variation on a continuum, Deleuze's translators have adopted different translational strategies in-between the two extremes. Translations in the early phase for commercial publishers tend toward the former both minimizing the translator's signature and the process, while later translations of Deleuze's philosophical texts for the British publisher and academic presses take note of the geography of relations under which something new is produced.

The contrast between the two translation practices may be observed in the difference between the traces of the translator's interventions in *Anti-Oedipus* and *Difference and Repetition* that frame the interval between 1977 and 1994 in which the majority of translations of Deleuze were published. The "Introduction" to *Anti-Oedipus* written by one of the three translators, Mark Seem, focuses on the transfer of knowledge not on the translation process. Similarities are emphasized rather than differences. Quoting Henry Miller, Seem draws an analogy between the American counter-culture hero and the French theorists in their attacks on psychoanalysis's Oedipal complex, stressing the death of the ego to make way for a rebirth as "individual and related" (*AO* xv). A further comparison of their "breakthroughs" to R.D. Laing positions Deleuze and Guattari's writing in the centre of the Anglo-American anti-psychiatry movement (*AO* xvii). No mention is made of the style of *Anti-Oedipus* though the reader has been alerted to it by Foucault's "Preface" positioned before the "Introduction." Style is one of the ways Deleuze and Guattari have tried to "neutralize power," he cautions: among the traps that may discourage the reader is "humour." Translation consequently presents formidable difficulties. "Hence the games and snares scattered throughout the book, rendering its translation a feat of real prowess" (*AO* xlv).

The reader has difficulty admiring these feats, however, for the absence of reference to the translation process and the privileging of analogy in the Introduction testify to the domesticating strategy that has been followed in this translation. Throughout, the translators have chosen to render the text in fluent English making the process of lateral movement invisible. However, traces of the difficulty they have had in doing so are palpable in translator's notes at the bottom of the pages. As many as two or three to a page in the first forty pages, they quickly peter out, as though the translators were overwhelmed by the shere volume necessary. Moreover, the majority of notes focus not on questions of language but on those of reference. Some explain an implicit allusion tracing the intertextual networks of Deleuze and Guattari's text to Artaud, for instance, who is identified in a note which gives the French quotation in full (*AO* 9). Others are interpretive glosses, like the notes sending readers to what is deemed a parallel analysis by Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse (*AO* 30) or to analyses of hysteria by Georges Devereux and Karl Jaspers' (*AO* 33). Either euphoria or panic seems to motivate these notes as the translators try to tame the text's strangeness by a process of amplification that multiplies the fields of comparison in the hope of finding some anchorage in American cultural references for a reader disoriented by the striking originality of the text. Those notes which do refer to issues of language focus mostly on complexities of ordinary French words such as the explanation that "*manque*" operates in a double register as "lack or need" in both psychological and economic fields. Rather than explaining how the punning advances Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual elaboration, the translators limit their remarks to noting their target-oriented strategy: "Depending upon the context, it will hence be translated in various ways below" (*AO* 28). A similar alert for "*se rabattre sur*" and "*rabattement*" concludes that translation for meaning within the English context will be supplemented by the "French expression in parentheses" (*AO* 10). The notes focus almost entirely on meaning divorced from the transformational operation with the exception of one observation that the translators have followed the example of Lacan's English translator in capitalizing the "Imaginary" and the "Symbolic" (*AO* 52). Nowhere in these notes and introduction do the translators comment upon the extraordinary terminological invention of Deleuze and Guattari or inform the reader of what kinds of decisions they made in selecting English phrasing. Though the introduction and notes insert the translating subject self-reflexively into the translated text, the practice of oblique footnotes works rather to deflect attention from the translating process, instead of to create a new form that highlights the transversal cross-cutting, the work of making connections. Their practices are, however, normative within American publishing which generally subscribes to the Lockian formula that translation conveys sense translinguistically, transcending the language in which meaning is expressed. "Fluency," the criterion by which such a text passes smoothly, invisibly into the new culture (Venuti 1995:309), stands at the opposite end of the continuum from the "stuttering" that Deleuze considers the effect of the relative conjunction.

The process of translating *Difference and Repetition* has advanced on contrary principles clearly announced in the "Translator's Preface." While Paul Patton first situates the text temporally and within the trajectory of Deleuze's writing and pithly summarizes the significance of its innovations within the history of philosophy, the major part of his preface is concerned with the challenges the text poses for the translator and indicates how he has responded to them. His tactic generally opposes the domesticating, target-language strategies of the translators of *Anti-Oedipus*, for he has chosen most often to "maintain the *continuity* in Deleuze's use of this term" (*DR* xii), a source-text oriented solution with potentially foreignizing effects. As he observes: "In some cases, where standard French terminology differs from the English in ways which related to important aspects of

Deleuze's project, I have followed the French" (*DR* xii). The English reader must be brought to the French text through the negotiating functions of the preface, carried to the outside, rather than in a naturalizing strategy having the text brought inside. Nonetheless, Patton models his solutions on Deleuze's "distinctive style... which combines an extreme sobriety in the use of language with an extraordinary vitality in the use of concepts" (*AO* xii). Neologisms there are inevitably in such a novel system of thought. Generally, however, these involve "no typographical cleverness, no lexical agility, no blending or creation of words, no syntactical boldness"--the means by which deconstruction has frequently achieved its effects (*DR* xii). Instead, Deleuze uses existing words to create a terminology for the concepts he creates, most frequently taking a technical term from the sciences or mathematics or another philosophical system and stretching it through the lateral movement to invest it with different connotations. This question of terminology for original concepts is the focus of Patton's preface as he outlines several variations on the difficulty along with his solutions to the problem. For some neologisms, he adopts a similar principle in English, as with "a-presentation" and "*le dispars*." Such tactics work when the languages in question share similar resources, though the translator always runs the risk of the "*faux amis*," the look-alike words with diverging connotations. When there are no equivalent structures in the two languages, the translator needs to be more inventive, as in the case of the critical distinction between "*différencier*" and "*différentier*" in *Difference and Repetition* where the difference between making a difference and a mathematical operation is not a marked one in English. The introduction of "differenciate" into English has enabled Patton to notate this critical concept in his translation and allow the reader to follow the nuances of Deleuze's argument. On the other hand, sometimes English has more synonyms available than French as is the case with "*moi*" which may be rendered as either "self" or "ego," the latter term specific to psychoanalysis. Choosing to be consistent with English usage in this case introduces discontinuity into Deleuze's text. This selection is dictated, however, by a previous translation choice in the rendering of German into French and English. Considerable controversy has recently surrounded Strachey's choices of creating abstract terminology in English for psychoanalytic concepts that were expressed in more everyday language in German, as they are in French with "*moi*."

This question of how to deal with the terminology of the diversity of philosophical languages he deploys is the second major challenge for the translator of Deleuze's work. When French translators have opted for a specific terminology and the argument and network of related concepts are created in relation to it, should the translator turn to the standard English translation of this passage and introduce its terminology, or should he rather retranslate the passage himself and follow the terminological choices of the French translator? In the first case, the translated text would be in language more familiar to the English reader--a domesticating strategy. In the second, the consistency and continuity of the French text would be maintained. With which "neighbourhood" should the text interact? With the history of philosophy as it has been written in English? Or as it has been written in French? Answers to these questions necessitate a critical assessment of the target-language culture, of its hierarchies and exclusions, of its relations to cultural others. Assessing a translation's intervention in a present situation demands a historicizing reading of its relation to a foreign past. Patton engages in such a comparison of the conditions under which the translation-transformation takes place though he does not have a consistent selection principle in these cases, determining his choices according to his assessment of the importance of particular terminology in specific instances. His reading of Deleuze's work places it both in the context of French poststructuralism and of philosophical discourses in English, balancing the one against the other. While he follows the received translations of Bergson's work and translates "*étendue*" by "extensity," when it comes to Deleuze's use of "Ideas," a term originating with Plato and Kant, but reworked by Leibniz and structuralists, Patton has retained Deleuze's terminological continuity to convey the interrelation of these variations on a continuum and used "Ideas" where English conventionally refers to Plato's "Forms" (*DR* xii). Likewise he has rendered the Greek "*phantasma*" by "phantasm" instead of the usual English translation of "appearance" in order to maintain the relation Deleuze makes between this word and the Freudian word for "phantasy" in a preceding section (*DR* 319). Nonetheless, the divergence in connotations between English and French limits the ability of the translator to maintain the complete network of terms that serves as relay for Deleuze's concepts. This is particularly the case he observes with "*fond*" which means both "ground" and "bottom." Keeping generally to the English "ground" which is used for a concept central to German philosophy connected to one usage of Deleuze, it is nonetheless impossible to convey all the terms Deleuze generates from this root, both cognates and opposites, in particular the play of contrast between "*fond*" (depth) and "*profond*" which are sometimes synonyms and sometimes antonyms. As Deleuze himself notes in his preface which follows, he has sought to make his concepts vital "using all the possibilities of language" (*DR* xv). This is the challenge he poses for the translator, to extend the materials of language to their limits. While not pushing this limit to the point of treason in the service of creation, Deleuze's texts undergo a "displacement" in the repetition of translation, curving outward from the French reading of the history of philosophy as inscribed in its translations toward an English reading of that history. Some new semiotic may emerge in the in-between with the mixing of things in an "incorporeal transformation."

Style in philosophy, as Deleuze notes, is what makes things move, "among things and within us," reaching toward new ways of thinking, seeing and feeling (*Neg* 164). Such vitality involves not just the creation of new words or of new sense for ordinary words, which is only one element of style, but also a matter of syntax. And this involves a movement toward something outside of language, among concepts, as well as among things and people. Sometimes concepts require "an extraordinary and even barbarous or shocking word," at others an "ordinary, everyday word filled with harmonics" suffices. "Archaisms," "neologisms," "crazy etymological exercizes" (*WIP* viii), all are necessary to "get things moving" (*Neg* 165). Such openings for thought to escape the constraints of convention pose challenges to the translator. Great translators are also great stylists, one might paraphrase him (*Neg* 164). And stylistic differences there are among Deleuze's translators precisely in the degree of their creative intervention. In making decisions about how to handle Deleuze's key concepts, Patton stressed the necessity for terminological continuity and consistency and drew on the choices of earlier translators. This echoes the strategy of Hugh Tomlinson, Deleuze's principal translator, articulated in a number of his prefaces. "In translating such words our first aim has been consistency," he proclaims. "We have sought to use the same English word on each occasion. Furthermore, we have tried to avoid departure from other recent translations of Deleuze and Guattari's works" (*WIP* viii). This focus on "consistency" of "key terms" privileges Deleuze's conceptual creation (*D* xii).

"Meticulous" is how one blurb writer describes Tomlinson and Habberjam's translation of *Bergsonism*, an adjective which aptly conveys the incisive brevity of their explications of the particular difficulties of each text that conclude their introductions. Each follows a similar format. A succinct explanation of the context of production of the book both in specific circumstances of Deleuze's activities and within the trajectory of his growing corpus is followed by an inventory of problems and decisions. So in *What Is Philosophy?* difficulties are enumerated with a number of terms taken from mathematics where there are no exact parallel terms, terms such as *chiffre*, *voisinage*, *ordonnée*. *Bergsonism* rehearses the challenges posed by the authorized translations which the bilingual Bergson had personally revised. Nonetheless, the connotative range of a number of the key terms in the authorized translation is considered unduly limited, so Tomlinson has modified some, as with *élan vital* in accordance with more recent commentators. Each of the books poses special problems, those in the history of philosophy raising questions of the history of philosophy's translation. Those where Deleuze is "doing philosophy" pose problems of conceptual invention. In *Dialogues* Tomlinson confronted a number of key terms for the first time. The introduction lists them and also Deleuze's replies to questions about them including an entire footnote on "heccity" (*D* xiii). Tomlinson's choices are not always taken up by other translators despite his aim for conceptual consistency: "order-word," which keeps the verbal allusion to power as the literal translation "slogan"

does not, was the choice made independently by Massumi, but "woman-becoming" has not been accepted by other translators despite Tomlinson's argument that it conveys well the subject-less condition of movement. Translator's endnotes frequently have an editorial function to note the use of English in the original, to provide references for terms adapted from other theorists, to supply missing bibliographical information. One even offers a literal translation of a French nursery rhyme whereas in the body of the text a familiar English nursery-rhyme has been inserted in a naturalizing strategy. Minimizing his notes, complying with the suggestions of "Professor Deleuze," Tomlinson's inscription of the translator-function recalls the humility topos where the translator conventionally negotiated the complex jurisdiction of the translated text with its mixture of systems and signatures by appeal to a higher authority whether institution or patron. Preceded by Deleuze's own prefaces to the translated edition, Tomlinson's work is presented as an authorized version.

Martin Joughin is more visible in his translations of Deleuze. Not that he puts himself forward, though he does write a preface to *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* in which he focuses on the relation between Deleuze's organization of Spinoza's conceptual universe of inner thought and outer extension and his use in his recent book on Leibniz of the concept of the fold for such complexity of relations. Where he takes up space is in the translator's notes at the end of his translation and here he is expansive--twenty pages or more. He rewrites the history of philosophy from the point of Deleuze's intervention, tells the history of the relations of different intellectual and political groups contemporaneous to the book's production, compares the grammatical and semantic resources of a number of different languages implicated in the quotations from a variety of philosophers. His extended commentary could well be read independently. But as presented it enfolds the text for which it functions as explication, extension. What is most striking about Joughin's notes is how he approaches language as a network of relations. Consistency is a principle he affirms, never in such a way as to freeze terminology, but rather to sustain the interplay among a group of derivatives or related terms, as in his choice of "affirm" over "assert" (S 405). Maintaining consistency leads him to translate *entendement* as "understanding." But his explanation of the reasons for doing so are advanced in convoluted syntax where phrases separated off by dashes are interrupted by parentheses extending beyond the dashes, as he assesses the connotations of the traditional English translation of a Spinoza text against the connotations of Latin, Dutch, French and other English versions (S 408). Syntax making connections, getting things in movement, is an aspect of style in translation on which Joughin expands at length in the notes, commenting at various points on the reflexive verb in French as an instance of the middle voice--neither active nor passive--for which English has no equivalent (S 404, 407, 409). Nor does English have parallels for the noun "affection" which is both a process and the result of the process (*S* 413). These are both important linguistic resources establishing complex, even contradictory relationships. So too is the device of "correlative apposition," though as he notes, it is impossible to exactly "transpose term-for-term equivalents" though the device works in each language similarly as "an 'attempt' to express expression itself" (*S* 426).

In analyzing Deleuze's conceptual creation, Joughin conveys a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of a philosophical system that approaches key terms not as substances but as relays. His historicized understanding of Deleuze's reading of Spinoza's work as "a nested system of relations" (*S* 422) carries over into his own approach to Deleuze. He does not only read Deleuze's text. Rather he reads Deleuze through Spinoza, through his Latin text and its Dutch, French and English translations weighing the choices of one version against another. Sometimes this leads to observations about the relative resources of languages, as when French and Dutch are considered closer to each other than either of them is to English in regards to the terms "*vertoning*," "*représentation*" and "representation" (S 405). In other cases, the chain of comparisons leads to a consideration of a continuum of translations and a selection of a line from one of them: "'Natural understanding" has been taken from Wolf's version, being closer than Curley's "natural intellect" to the French *lumière naturelle*" (*S* 422). One such chain traces how a departure from the usual terminology by the French translator of the version used by Deleuze brings out a resonance of "'proper or true' (as opposed to apparent) utility" which, emphasized by Deleuze, is made to play a significant part "in the network of sense" he identifies as constituting a parallel articulation to that of a logical order of demonstration in the *Ethics* (*S* 423). Through such nuanced and wide-ranging commentary on the many languages and translations implicated in Deleuze's text, Joughin both makes visible the conditions under which the text and its translation came to be and shows how the translation process is central to the creation, continuation and transformation of concepts. In exposing difference in the linguistic materiality of the philosophical text, translation offers philosophy the reflexive possibility of scrutinizing its discourses and institutions. Translation, in short, is a crucial part of the creative activity specific to philosophy which is framed by Joughin as a continuous process of sifting and connecting, not the pursuit of any final truth.

Joughin's translation of *PourParlers* as *Negotiations* also asserts the translator-function powerfully, but in this case engaging in conceptual creation as a philosopher. Again he offers a historicizing reading of the relations of a text in the present to past translations. Sometimes this involves a comparative consideration of different usages of a term, as in the case of "*le regard*" where he gives a concise and nuanced history of the concept of "the gaze" (*Neg* 191-2). In many, the history of translating he expounds is that of translating Deleuze. Rather than aiming for continuity with what has become the established phrasing for key terms, Joughin challenges many of these decisions and offers extended rationales for his innovations. Noting that Massumi has followed Foucault's translator Sheridan in translating *énoncé* and *énonciation*, Joughin calls this "thoroughly misleading." He argues for his choices of "an utterance" and "uttering" on the grounds that "statement" seems too close to a representative theory of language whereas Deleuze and Guattari insist that all speech acts are directive. Moreover, there is difference between their conception of the utterance and Foucault's in the "distinction between discursive 'arrangements' and 'apparatuses'" (*Neg* 187). Arrangement is another term Joughin revises, preferring it to "assemblages" both because it conveys a less mechanical connotation and more of the orientation toward action. Finally Deleuze himself translates "arrangement" by "agencement" (*Neg* 196). For "order-word," translation of "*mots d'ordre*," he substitutes "ordering words," again because of its less technical, more everyday feel and its action orientation (*Neg* 203). More significantly, he creates the neologism "precept" as an alternative by analogy with Deleuze's terms for the work of philosophy and the arts, in the creation of concepts, percepts and affects (*Neg* 189). But philosophy and translation too take place in a larger arena: Joughin's etymologies are often presented in the context of the intellectual and political field of the term's creation as when "*machine à désirer*" ("desiring machines"), as the configuration of connected entities producing subjects and objects and so radically different from the Lacanian concept of desire-as lack, is glossed in a note that explains the geographical proximity, yet conceptual distance, of Deleuze's philosophy seminar and Lacan's department of psychoanalysis. The translational-transformational operation has indeed produced something new when the footnotes have multiplied into another text folded, however, into Deleuze and Guattari's. Different from Tomlinson's, this translation is also a Deleuzian-becoming. Together, the translations highlight the active principle of transformational operations: there is not one but many possible translations.

The sheer number of recent published translations of Deleuze's works has entered what Charles Stivale has called a "process of machinic assemblages and metamodelization" (1998:237). Circulating widely in many different intellectual and social domains, their re-writing through translation now constitutes part of the "cultural capital" of the academy. Whether the twentieth century will at last have "become Deleuzian" as it reached its close in the Christian calendar, is a topic of considerable speculation. Against Foucault's apocalyptic prophesying, however, one needs to balance the pessimistic assessment of younger philosophers who note the ease with which one may "misappropriate [Deleuze's] ideas" in view of their partial dissemination outside of France. Of particular concern is the view of cybernetic theorists whose advocacy of Deleuzian philosophy, while promise of philosophy's continuing place at the heights of avant-garde intellectual fashion, has the problematic consequence of attributing to

Deleuze the belief that we are all mere machines which has generated a spate of writing about machinic desire and cyborgs. As a corrective against this, John Mallarkey (1997) advocates a reexamination of the powerful challenge to orthodox materialism in Deleuze's thought, materialism which is central to Deleuze's theory of language and of translation.

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Bone Trade

Helen MacDonald, *Human Remains: Episodes in Human Dissection,* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2005.

By Rachel Ariss

Human Remains tells stories of the dissection of human bodies in 18th and19th century Great Britain and its colony Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania). The use of Tasmanian Aboriginal peoples' skeletons both as evidence for theories of human origins and as artefacts of relationship between British anatomists and educated colonists are also taken up. MacDonald's book is aptly subtitled "episodes" because this best describes the stories of the individuals involved: bone collectors, dissectors and dissected as well as the cultural dis/connections between them.

MacDonald introduces her first few episodes by explaining anatomy as not only science, but also art and performance: "Examination of the records reveals performative moments in dissecting that are extraneous to the learning and practice of anatomical science" (9). MacDonald argues, though too briefly, that all three aspects of anatomy contributed to a proprietary approach to dead bodies in medical culture, which continues to foster an environment wherein dead bodies may be unethically treated. The focus on performance in the

introduction, and the linkages between dissection and current-day treatment of the dead, are best suited to the first three chapters of the book. The last three chapters, which I found the most compelling, are not as accurately introduced through the concept of performance as the first three. MacDonald explains that she weaves her social understanding of dissection from narratives of the lives of the individuals involved; overall, her goal is to "…explore[] dissecting as a cultural activity, rather than the foundational science of medicine, to reveal something about the societies in which such uses of the human body have been made" (9).

The first chapter "Companions with the Dead" provides an overview of the role of human dissection and anatomy in medicine in 19th-century Britain. Until 1832, and the passage of *The Anatomy Act*, the only way to legally dissect a body in Britain was if that body belonged to a person hanged for murder. Dissection was an additional punishment for murderers, and thus, dissections were publicly held in London's College of Surgeons, often to "excessive" applause (13). MacDonald explains:

> That surgeons, like executioners, went to work on behalf of the law in punishing murderers was a matter of discomfort to many of them. They thought the association between themselves and the hangman was degrading, and preferred a self-image that tied dissection closely to the promotion of medical science, rather than to inflicting indignities on human bodies on behalf of the Crown (17).

This movement from association with the hangman to scientific theory is described by the last three chapters, wherein surgeons and "bone collectors" in Van Diemans' land seem to be quite happy to work on behalf of one or another scientific theory of human origins, certainly without the consent of those who had died, and, finally, to the detriment of the reputations of both surgeons and the overall medical administration in the colony.

In the first chapter, MacDonald also begins her discussion of the interpretation and valuation of bodies marked by race and sex in dissection. She starts with those bodies marked by sex, bringing as much of the lives and dissections of Catherine Welch, Elizabeth Ross and Mary Paterson (all occurring in Britain) into coherent stories as is possible. These individual stories are used to explain contemporaneous assumptions about women, class and reproduction. MacDonald's explanation of the dissection of Catherine Welch is based on dissecting manuals available at the time rather than on any specific contemporaneous notes or descriptions of the dissection itself. While this is a very reasonable approach to explaining such an event, MacDonald does not clarify this to the reader. The writing style, "*Perhaps* Bell's students attempted to do the same….Bell *would* compare the clitoris to the male penis. *Perhaps* he sliced it in two for a more thorough examination…the students *would* fix the body 'in the same position as for the operation for the stone" (my *italics* 22), diverts attention from her sources to create a direct presence, for the reader, in the dissecting room. I found this distracting. MacDonald also explains that Bell cut off Welch's breasts so they could be displayed at the College of Surgeons (22). I have no doubt that Bell did so - similar scientific treatments of dead bodies have been documented - but I wonder why MacDonald does not give the reader a footnote on this practice.

The second chapter focuses on the dissection of Mary McLauchlan in Van Diemen's Land, in 1830, and a very effective "Dissection in Reverse" (54), the story of McLauchlan's short life. The story of McLauchlan's dissection also introduces the main characters of the medical, governmental and press establishments in Tasmania at the time - those who were entitled to "learn" from dissections. These stories provide glimpses into government, convict administration system and the roles of settlers, both men and women, in colonial Tasmania. McLauchlan's story is told through newspaper stories and official records, and supported by other historical explorations of life aboard convict ships. In the explanation of McLauchlan's dissection, the reader sees very clearly how human beings become bodies and then objects, losing all traces of humanity. The reconstruction of Mary McLauchlan's life is the heart of MacDonald's work, and is her potent counter to the always objectifying work of dissection: "I cannot leave Mary McLauchlan here, disintegrating beneath these men's hands and words" (53).

The next chapter "Interlude" shifts from Mary McLauchlan and gender to Tasmanian Aborigines and race. MacDonald explains that while she researched the fate of McLauchlan, she "kept stumbling across references to 'the Tasmanians'" (87). Relations between settlers and Tasmanian Aborigines were a central social issue at the time of McLauchlan's hanging. The Tasmanian Aboriginal population was rapidly dwindling, there was violence (on both sides), the government formed a committee to deal with this violence and finally, in 1836, the 200 remaining Tasmanian Aborigines were exiled to Flinders Island and "subjected to the benefits of civilisation and religion" (94). This is more than descriptive context for colonial society: both gendered and racialized bodies were used to provide evidence for medical and scientific theories of the time. By the 1850s, the Tasmanians were seen as almost extinct, and much of their material culture, language and religious beliefs and rituals were collected and recorded for the benefit of "European scientific narratives" (94). MacDonald's next two paragraphs, direct rather than descriptive, a style with which she nicely punctuates her story-telling, set up the next three chapters:

> And, in the knowledge that the Tasmanians held strong beliefs about the due treatment of their dead, medical men contributed in the way to which they were ideally suited. They harvested their bodies…
>
> Many of these body parts were sent to Europe, where metropolitan scientific gentlemen studied and interpreted them. Thus links were formed between colonial and metropolitan men through the exchange of Aboriginal bodies for rewards, and our focus on crime and its punishment as a way of gaining access to the dead is being replaced by one revealing scientific work on race and its…[author's ellipsis] delights (94-95).

Here, also, is the salient question about human origins of the 19th century and the frame for what will come: was there a single origin for human life, or several different origins? Contemporary human bones of all sorts, but especially those of Tasmanian Aborigines, were used as evidence to support one theory or the other of human origins.

Chapters four and five are structured much like the first two: individual stories of "bone collectors," both British scientists and colonial professionals, are made coherent so that the reader can make sense of their lives and their societies. Detailed webs of connection between the self-taught physical anthropologists of the time (some trained in medicine), members of the Royal Society, colonial medical doctors, and other upper-middle class colonists are surveyed and explained in chapter four. Understanding the lives of these individuals is a necessary first step to following MacDonald's analysis of the 1869 dissection scandal in Tasmania in chapter five.

Chapter Four focuses on the bone gatherers and analysts, referred to as "the foragers and cultivators of science" (109). Dr. Jospeph Barnard Davis, a "cultivator" was interested in categorizing skulls racially - he began by making notes on his own patients in 1823, and by 1867 had a collection of 1474 skulls (98). After years of taking notes on appearance, questioning people on the street and his patients about their ethnic origins (and secretly doubting their replies, based on his interpretations of physiognomy), purchasing and receiving skulls, he published the grandiose *Crania Brittanica* which presented "an account of regional differences between the British" (99) in 1865, followed by the *Thesaurus Craniorum* (a skull-type catalogue) in 1867. MacDonald's account of Davis' scientific and colonial connections and single-minded pursuit of skulls is fascinating. She explains the theories of Davis, and another scientist, Dr. William Flower on the single versus multi-human origins debate and the implications of these theories for social relations between colonists and natives.

The lives of the colonial bone "foragers" Dr. William Crowther (who had asked permission to attend Mary McLauchlan's dissection and been refused) and Morton Allport (a solicitor), their motivations, gathering activities and to whom they sent their gifts of bones are also set out in detail. Allport seems to have rivalled Burke and Hare in his grave robbing, both before and after the 1869 scandal, yet he "accumulated a large number of scientific honours" (117) during his lifetime. In this chapter, however, MacDonald exhibits a richer understanding and engages in a more detailed analysis of socio-cultural norms and structures than in the glimpses she gave the reader in earlier chapters:

> The relationships formed through these desirable bones enable us to better understand the place of colonial collectors in these exchanges. Neither William Crowther nor Morton Allport was primarily interested in scientific questions about the Tasmanians' place in the human scheme of things, but each had other interests that were well served through the links they made with metropolitan scientists. These relationships were complex: both scientific and personal and driven by local as well as metropolitan imperatives (134-35).

MacDonald pays more specific attention to her overall goal of understanding the culture of dissection here than in earlier chapters. The individual stories are smoothly synthesized in a manner that more strongly supports her investigation, allowing the reader to fully appreciate MacDonald's scholarship.

In chapter five "Death and Dissection, 1869" MacDonald ties together the individuals involved, professional and personal rivalries, contemporaneous structures of health care, and the everyday dealings with the dead in the Hobart General Hospital - focusing on the implosive scandal of "the theft of William Lanney's skull" (138). William Lanney was, apparently, the 'last' Tasmanian Aboriginal man, and his death resulted in a struggle over the rightful (in scientific terms) possession of his bones; this included switching his skull with that of a white man, Thomas Ross, and hiding this switch beneath each man's face, as well as a secret 'resurrection' of Lanney's buried body. MacDonald's skills at "reverse dissection" are challenged in this chapter, as there is little information on William Lanney and less on Thomas Ross - nonetheless, she succeeds. The scandal prompted two government enquiries (148), and much public media debate. Both Crowther and Allport participated in the switching and 'resurrection', but while the scandal followed Crowther for much of his life, Allport was able to continue (Tasmanian Aboriginal) grave robbing without censure. MacDonald carefully charts events and evidence following the scandal to explain the differential treatment of these two principal actors.

MacDonald, further, explains the connections between individual actions, reactions and the cultures of medicine and colonialism in clear and convincing terms:

> Lanney's death set Tasmania's savants, several of whom were medical men, quickly into action, for it turned him into a rare collectable…. Such an object would guarantee a collection's continuing and unique importance, for extinction meant that the Tasmanians could now only be known through such physical remains. It placed them more firmly than ever as a people of the past, who could be mapped and interpreted as inanimate objects (146).

The best example of this clarity of connection is in her thorough use of the transcripts from one of the government enquiries to illustrate the cultural gap between medical treatment (and categorization) of the dead, and public expectations of what respect is due dead bodies. Her approach in this chapter is especially energetic and its management of detail makes it compelling.

There is, however, a dissonance of style in the book which, by its end, reveals itself as a strength rather than a drawback. Although MacDonald frames her work in both performance and the culture of dissecting, a more subtle, not hidden but not quite acknowledged theme weaves its way through her work, a theme that tends to slow argument and allow a different kind of thought. MacDonald is herself performing a kind of mourning work for the individuals objectified through dissection: Elizabeth Ross, a poverty-stricken woman of London, hanged on doubtful evidence of murder; Mary McLauchlan, transported for a minor theft and hanged on weak evidence of killing her newborn infant; Mary Paterson, murdered by Burke and Hare, her body then sold to Robert Knox, the famous anatomist who "preserved her whole in a tub of whisky for three months" (34) as she was so beautiful; William Lanney, the 'last' Tasmanian Aboriginal, a whaler, whose friends attended the hospital where he died and ordered the coffin sealed as soon as rumours of the degradation of his body reached them; Thomas Ross, whose friends did not get to the hospital in time to prevent the dissection and later use of his body as a foil for collecting bits of Lanney's; and the bones of several Tasmanian Aboriginals, carelessly exhumed and made into gifts. Without this acknowledgement - that these were persons - MacDonald's critique would have been less powerful. It is in weaving the slow-paced and individual recognition of mourning work, with analyses and evidence of the medical and scientific culture of the times, that the yawning cultural gap between medical and non-medical treatment of the dead, both in the 1800s and today, can be fully grasped.

MacDonald concludes by drawing parallels to more recent examples of objectifying treatment of the dead, such as the unauthorized collection of children's organs at Alder Hey hospital in Liverpool in the 1980s and 1990s, and transfers of adults' organs for research without consent in Manchester. Moreover, she gives additional examples of the secret collection of dead bodies within medical institutions. There are other parallels that can be drawn to MacDonald's work, however, that echo the racist and colonialist attitudes of collectors and scientific theorists, rather than medical attitudes towards the dead. MacDonald's explanations of how Tasmanian Aboriginal bones were used to argue specific theories of human origins were reflected in the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP), proposed in the 1990s. This goal of this project was to document human genetic variation by ensuring that gene samples were collected from non-European and, in particular, relatively isolated populations (often indigenous - North American indigenous peoples are mentioned as an example). The North American Committee of the Project explained in 1994 that such collection of diverse gene samples "…may help clarify the major human migrations…And it may settle the continuing debate about whether *Homo sapiens* evolved to modern humans in Africa or over the whole world". It is the same argument as that engaged in by Davis and Flower in the 1800s: a singular origin for humanity, or several? The historical, colonialist objectification of Tasmanian Aboriginal lives and bodies for the sake of scientific knowledge is further repeated in this Project:

> And if sampling is too long delayed, some human groups may disappear as distinct populations, usually through urbanization or other forces leading to the loss of their language or the other characteristics that identify them as a discrete group.[ii]

Extinction by a gentler name - and thus, evidence, bits of peoples' bodies, blood and skin cell samples, must be preserved, made into things, studied, and perhaps, though not by the HGDP itself, made profitable. MacDonald focuses on the culture of dissecting historically - and allows readers to ask similar questions in contemporary frames. Gene sampling of some of the poorest people on earth continues to build scientific careers today, just as well as the collection of Tasmanian Aboriginal skeletons did over a hundred years ago.

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