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Editorial: Deleuze and Politics

By Karen Houle

Paul Patton, a professor of Philosophy at the University of New South Wales, is perhaps best known for his translation of Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* (Deleuze 1994), although he has made other notable efforts on behalf of disseminating continental thought, including translating Baudrillard's *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* (1995), editing *Deleuze: A Critical Reader* for the Blackwell Critical Readers Series (1996), and editing the untimely *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory* (1993). In addition, Patton has written a number of excellent, widely-reproduced papers in which he backlights key, load-bearing concepts from Deleuze and Guattari such as "the War Machine," "the event," and "difference," while preserving their shadowy idiosyncratic beauty as only a scholar of Patton's calibre can do. Eugene Holland succeeds similarly well with concepts from *Anti-Oedipus* in his *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis* (1999).

Now, in *Deleuze and the Political* (2000) Patton, with the same patience, skill and intellectual generosity, takes on an enormous, multi-levelled task. This task consists of: 1) extracting from Deleuze and Guattari's"[1]apparently endless series of new terms"(11) the "political concepts"; 2) systematically clarifying these concepts both for readers already familiar with Deleuze and Guattari and for many who will come to this work with none (the "Thinking the Political" series which this is a part of, is "designed to present the work of the major Continental thinkers of our time, and the political debates their work has generated, to a wider audience in philosophy and in political, social and cultural theory."); 3) translating these concepts "into the language of Anglophone political theory" without sacrificing the "remainder that does not translate," without effacing for the sake of philosophical cross-pollination the "series of points at which the normative dimensions of their work do not correspond to those of Anglo-American political theory" (2); 4) mapping the "continuities as well as divergences" (49) between Deleuze and Guattarian versions and those of the familiar political concepts (difference, power, desire, transversality, state) and how they appear in the works of, for instance, Hobbes, Rawls, Foucault, Derrida and Nietzsche; 5) actually doing, in the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari's conception of what it means to do philosophy, (spelled out explicitly in the opening chapters of their *What is Philosophy?*) the work of putting these concepts *to work* – either the work of causing us to think toward the zones of undecidability in presently employed political concepts, or the work of applying these concepts as tools in particular problems – not just meta-doing; and thus 6) convincing us on many levels and on both sides of the Anglo-Continental Divide that, despite the fact that he in no way conforms to the "standard image of a political philosopher"; despite the fact that he has not engaged with the writings of major political philosophers, "does not address issues such as the nature of justice, freedom or democracy, much less the principles of procedural justification, shows an almost complete lack of engagement with the central problems and normative commitments of Anglo-American political thought. Deleuze is a profoundly political thinker".

This task takes balls, smarts and imagination. Patton has them all. It is one thing to make the political features of Deleuze and Guattari more legible, more intense to continental-sympathizers. Patton's book, on these grounds alone, succeeds and in this, joins the company of Negri and Hardt's *Empire* (2001), *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left*, edited by Judith Butler, Slavoj Zizek and Ernesto Laclau (2000); *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001); *Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, a series of cross-fire discussion papers between Derrida, Laclau, Rorty and Mouffe, edited by Simon Critchley (1996). Whether, (cf. task # 3 and #5) Patton does justice to Deleuze and Guattari in the interest of doing justice to the intelligibility of Deleuze and Guattari *for* questions *of* justice, whether he sacrifices some of the untranslatable "remainder" in the interests of exegetical gain, indeed whether anyone could do otherwise, is a question to which I will return shortly.

It is quite another thing to care to make Deleuze and Guattari intelligible and usable to those with professed allergies to French philosophy, to those whose chief operational zone, whose values and methods are defined, in some cases, in outright opposition to the style and the principles that have blown into Anglo-thought from the Continent, like, some would say, dandelions. Some empirical evidence: I study philosophy. I am interested in political problems. In 1993, I attended an international conference on Political Theory and Activism. The keynote speaker was a famous environmentalist/feminist. The venue was a massive hall packed with over 1500 people. She began her speech by mocking academics, not all academics mind you, just the French ones. The philosophers. To crudely paraphrase: "Our girls are raped and sold. Our forests are raped and sold. Millions of people are starving. And they are writing about (long, pregnant pause) "the Body Without Organs"! She huffed indignantly and tossed the end of her sari around her solid, Real body, for emphasis. The crowd went wild with the thrill of mass mockery. I felt like a thief in a 50's movie where the guilty evidence lights up in the purse of Audrey Hepburn, or the key glows, fully visible, in the pocket of some androgynous bellhop. In my backpack was my dog-eared copy of *A Thousand Plateaus*. I knew this didn't bode well.

At a more local level, probably every one of us who takes an avid interest in Derrida, or Irigaray or Deleuze (or any of the other spawn of Nietzsche), who is known for this avidity and who audaciously claims occupancy (squatting) in an established field of inquiry – political theory or religious hermeneutics – has their versions of a daily water-cooler comic book vignette not unlike the following: I'm photocopying something from *Difference and Repetition*, and the fellow waiting to copy something less pornographic, perhaps *Political Liberalism* or the *Baghavad Gita* idly snoops about my copied piles, a supercilious grin on his face, then nudges me hard in the ribs, saying in his best Oxford/Dracula voice "watch out for the D-a-r-k Precursor! S-c-a-a-a-r-y!!". Patton takes these hooligans on *qua* worthy agonist. In this, he joins other high profile political theorists highly respected within the Anglo-zone, who have professed continental thought has something to offer Anglo-political thinking: Iris Marion Young, in *Inclusion and Democracy* (2000) and Seyla Benhabib, in *Democracy and Difference* (1996) are two notable examples. Charles Taylor, is of course, another cross-dresser.

It is still another thing to do all this in a manner which does not aim for the lowest common denominator in Deleuze and Guattari, or in Rawls or in thinking political thinking. *Deleuze and the Political*, for the most part, meets the challenges of this complex task. This is particularly true of tasks #1, #2, #4, #5 (and hence #6): extraction, clarification, contextualization, application (and hence confirmation).

Deleuze and the Political is divided into six chapters. The Introduction is invaluable for orientating the reader to Deleuze against the kinds of political thinker he has been rumoured as, and toward what kind he might turn out to be. Patton signals to us early on that there is indeed an "immanent evaluative" structure in Deleuze and Guattarian thought, and that it is carried by, and also modelled by, their newly-rendered concepts: minority, becoming-revolutionary, deterritorialization, machinic assemblage. What each of these concepts does, what that evaluative structure is, and how we draw evaluative force from it, is elaborated in the second chapter, on difference, in the third chapter, on power, in the fourth chapter, desire, becoming and freedom, and a concentrated section on forms of deterritorialization (106-107). Right off the mark, Patton locates their two-fold relation to capitalism. He writes, "Deleuze reaffirms his sympathy with Marx and describes capitalism as a fantastic system for the fabrication of great wealth and great suffering. He asserts that any philosophy worthy of being called political must take account of the nature and the evolution of capitalism." (6) Patton then deftly sketches how Deleuze and Guattari's account of capitalism's nature and evolution differs from Marxist accounts in that it "favours a differential typology of the macro- and micro-assemblages which determine the character of social life ... rejects any internal or evolutionist account of the origins of the State ... according to which the form of the state has always existed even if only as a virtual tendency ... ."(6) This brief sketch

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alone will intrigue readers to pursue this thread, which finds its full elaboration in Chapter 5, "Social Machines and the State."

As for suffering, its possible relief, and what that means for us as a political vocation, we learn that it too lies, if anywhere, in the fact that concepts, phenomena, systems, subjectivities, by virtue of their composition, contain within them the permanent, multi-levelled possibility of change. Crucially, for "the political" what this means is that they are ever-contestable. The general task of the political, then, is a: "patient and meticulous practice of genealogy" (63) modelled by Deleuze according to which, we may limn, and contest: "the quality of the forces present and their affinity with one or other character of the will to power ... the dynamic aspects of the interplay between the qualities of will to power and those that supervene on force relations... ." (62-3) It is by virtue of these practices that we "trace the paths upon which things change or become transformed into something else," (66) that is, orientate ourselves as bodies capable of transformation and contestation. Patton suggests that this is not so much a voluntary application of method as it is a peculiar co-ordination of self to world which drives one more readily toward puzzlement and therefore, toward creativity (19-20). What these ontological facts ask of us depends upon where we are situated when the possibility of change becomes an answer to a problem posed to us which we are not too stupid to notice.

In the first chapter, "Concept and Image of Thought," we are confronted with Deleuze and Guattari's assessment of the history of philosophy as a history of the dominance of immobile and immobilizing "images of thought." By this, "Deleuze means more than just a representation of thought, but something deeper that's always taken for granted, a system of co-ordinates, dynamics, orientations: what it means to think and orient oneself in thought." (18) The image of thought which has dominated the history of western philosophy, including its branches of political thinking, is the one which equates thinking with knowing/judging/recognizing and therefore understands philosophy's special vocation to be the discovery and announcement of the true, the rooting out of the false, and the policing of the perimeter, against further encroachment by error. This dogmatic image, claim Deleuze and Guattari, limits philosophy's own capacity for thought (25) precisely because of the way it edifies itself. That is, it does not conceive itself as containing, or being required to cultivate, within itself the necessity or, the capacity to, radically critique itself. It is an Idea of thinking minimally susceptible to variation, and hostile to the very elements which induce, in thought, engagement with, and responsiveness to the unknown. Worse, it tenders an irresponsible conception of the "thinking subject." No matter how sincere the intention, how noble the principles, this subject can not effectively disrupt this constitutive self-positing and self-confirming hegemony. Chantal Mouffe (2000:32-33), in *The Democratic Paradox*, comes at this conclusion from another angle. She argues that, in the Rawlsian conception of rationality, in the exorcism of the pluralism of potentially adversarial idiosyncratic interest to the private, and in the role that consensus plays as the telos of free public democratic reason, the ideals of democracy can never be realized. She writes: "postulating that there could be a rational definite solution to the question of justice in a democratic society ... leads to the closing of the gap between justice and law that is a constitutive space of modern democracy... . [T]he notion of the 'constitutive outside' forces us to come to terms with the idea that pluralism implies the permanence of conflict and antagonism ... by showing that a non-coercive consensus is a conceptual impossibility, it does not put in jeopardy the democratic ideal, as some would argue. On the contrary, it constitutes an important guarantee that the dynamics of the democratic process will be kept alive." The dream of mastering or eliminating undecidability is the very condition of possibility of decision and therefore of freedom and pluralism (34). Patton's inspired account of "the image of thought" and how this "image" enters social assemblages, delimiting the range of what constitutes what can be thought adds a crucial element to expressly political critique's like Mouffe's.

Deleuze and Guattari offer a view of philosophy as a unique locale from which "the absolute deterritorialization of the present can be effected in thought."(9) They do not privilege philosophy over art or science; rather, lexify their different distinct objects and vocations. Philosophy's "exclusive right to concept-creation" (24) derives from the nature of the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of thought it can effect. According to Deleuze and Guattari, to court the radically untimely and to respond by creating *new concepts* (not just "the polishing of old ones,"12) is philosophy's work. While the true might be disrupted, the uninteresting and the stupid might also be displaced. How this governing image constitutes philosophy *as* an essentially political vocation answering adequately the problem of suffering lies precisely in the fact that philosophy, here, *can* effectively constitute the very gaps and mobilizations in thought required for criticism and renovation of the "majoritarian," wherever that occurs. And, Deleuze and Guattari take pains to remind us and to explain the nature of that reoccurrence within what claims to be revolutionary thought and action. There are two excellent illustrations of the possible manifestations of this minoritarian approach, as forms of political action, in *Deleuze and the Political*. At the end of Chapter Two, "Difference and Multiplicity," Patton uses this framework to expand upon strategies that "minorities" might take. In Chapter Four, "Desire, Becoming and Freedom," Patton does some of his best juggling across the great divide when he draws the notion of "critical freedom" out of this Nietzschean gap-producing ontology and plugs it right into the hole created by the notion of "the revisability of one's conception of the good," a shadowy concept lurking in J.S. Mill, and articulated by Rawls, James Tully and (though Patton doesn't mention him) David Gauthier (83-87).

In the second and third chapters, Patton clearly spells out that to understand the political in Deleuze and Guattari we have to understand that, and how, the burden of normativity is borne by the ontology of multiplicities, assemblages, difference; in particular, by the capacities of the molecular as compared to the molar. Molecular assemblages are the kind of assemblage which, in Deleuze and Guattari's ontology, have the quality of giving rise to more connections (to the outside) and to the potential for change in nature, which is to say that these forms are most likely to give rise to revolutionary-becoming, the principle adjoining all possible variants of "the political" in Deleuze and Guattari. Patton clarifies that, contrary to the charge, this does not mean that they are a "new species of anarchist." This is principally because the aim of revolution is not wholesale social change (8). Rather, revolution is tactical and local: "cartographic." When we open up the possibility of new forms of individual and collective identity, new earths and new peoples might be summoned (9). The new people might be the old people anew. The new law might be the old law anew: yet, this is not "the return of the same but rather the production of sameness through the returning of that which differs."(35) The difference between the continuity of the same, and the disruption of the same by the differences of which they are composed, a molecular disruption, makes all the difference, politically speaking. An opening toward possibility is an opening toward the possibility of the political. Not knowing what that is or will be, a present can always be tactically "held" open via energetic attention to qualitative difference such that the *to-come*, whether it be a revised conception of the good, (83-87) or a reformed subjectivity, or an adjusted collective will toward reshaping the political landscape, can come.

Patton's inspired detailing of the principle of difference in (primarily)Deleuze, and how this principle operates, generates three of the book's most significant contributions to thinking the political. First, it directs the traffic around "the politics of difference" into fruitful and unfruitful streams. The unfruitful stream confuses difference with alterity or distinctness. Second, it gives us a clear way out of the annoying eddies which traps poststructuralists and modernists alike, after the trend set by Parmenides and Heraclitus, swirling rather dully around "questions of difference." For example, Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble* scolds Kristeva for positing "the locus of multiple drives" and then "subordinating these to the self same." Butler writes: "her opposition between the Semiotic and the Symbolic reduces here to a metaphysical quarrel between the principle of multiplicity that escapes the charge of non-contradiction and a principle of identity based on the suppression of that multiplicity. Oddly, that very principle of multiplicity that Kristeva everywhere defends operates in much the same manner as the principle of identity." (Butler 1990:89) Yes, perhaps. But Butler drops the question. The insights (or frustrations) which drive theorists of difference like Kristeva to continue to insist upon the principle of difference as a kind of skeleton key for the political, are vindicated in the excruciatingly careful articulation that Deleuze (and Patton) give it. Third, and relatedly, the political links to the affirmation of difference which Patton fleshes out here, clarify and substantiate intriguing but somewhat more confusing claims made elsewhere. I have already mentioned *The Democratic Paradox* (2000). I would add Giorgio Agamben's *The Coming Community* (1993), Diana Fuss' *Identification Papers* (1995), Slavoj Zizek's *Looking Awry* (1991) and Derrida's *The Politics of Friendship* (1997).

The final chapter of *Deleuze and the Political*, "Nomads, Capture and Colonisation," is an extensive analysis of a particular contemporary political problem – coming to terms with Aboriginal land claims and entitlement. This chapter is Patton's reply to the "imperative of pragmatic evaluation" in Deleuze and Guattari. Patton uses a "history and politics of deterritorialization" to read these dynamics. He has often focussed on this one particular political challenge to test the adequacy of Deleuzian concepts like "the nomad," and Guattarian methods like "the nomadological perspective" for their explanatory and directive power. Here, he attempts to recuperate the prerogative of the use of the term "nomad" against two chief criticisms this concept has faced: that it is a colonizing term and that it is anthropologically suspect. I'm not sure that critics will be satisfied by his arguments here. The re-reading of the encounter between colonizers and colonized as the encounter between two different abstract machines, however, does indeed improve upon the strictly historical point of view, in that it highlights new "paths upon which things change or become transformed into something else," thus offering a new map of where the present gridlock might be transformed yet again into something else. This chapter, more than any other, will be satisfying to those interested in the practical upshot of what Deleuze and Guattari offer politically, since it not only specifies an exactly situated set of problems, but takes care to frame them in an empirically and historically precise manner.

In these respects, *Deleuze and the Political* does indeed deliver on its promises. This seems particularly true for political theorists new to Deleuze and Guattarian thought, though it demands a commitment to work extremely hard on the part of that reader. His overall approach is to introduce the new concepts, explain them thoroughly, and weave them into the wider account by revisiting them again and again. While demanding, its rigour practically guarantees the novice will not run off screaming: "jargon!" On occasion, however, Patton does not show the degree of judicious restraint he claims to have been exercising (134) with respect to the concepts he does choose to introduce. This is true of the sudden appearance of "the dark precursor"(39) and the "quasi-cause." (93) Their appearance here is not only jarring for the initiate, but unhelpful for those looking to Patton for his usual deft rendering. Better to have left these out.

Nevertheless, *Deleuze and the Political* sets the bar for what it would take, both on the part of the writer and on the part of his or her to-come audience, to make the case that Deleuze and Guattari, are "profoundly political philosopher[s]" whose work can and should be taken into account by those trained in the Anglo-American tradition of political philosophy vis-à-vis the very kinds of problems (formalism, aboriginal jurisprudence, multiculturalism, hate speech, universalism and representation) which presently logjam more conventional approaches to political thought. Patton's book is the first place to send those who would like to see what "new resources and new directions for thinking the political"(132) contemporary Continental thinking has to offer.

As a framework for seeing some of the limits of Patton's book, I'd like to foreground the question I hinted at earlier. My question is about the limits of working across the Anglo-American and Continental bodies of thought *within* academic discourse in the manner that *Deleuze and the Political* and other books in the series such as Yannis Stravrakakis' *Lacan and the Political (1999)* and Richard Beardsworth's *Derrida and the Political* (1996) are attempting.

Academic discourse is without question one of the social fields in which the apparatus of capture is the dominant rather than the marginally actualized form of virtual machine. Insofar as universities "create homogeneous and measurable spaces ... the drawing of boundaries and the installation of common measures which enable the determination of similarities and differences," (113) they manifest the state-form with their own characteristic forms of violence: isolation from social forces and social movements under the aegis of that same image of thought which underwrites isolation as an "essential condition of the activity of thinking"(5); speaking for others; acting on behalf of others; legitimating what is already known (25). Patton does not speak to any of this directly, but he certainly knows that Deleuze has, and he explicitly reproduces Deleuze's no-holds-barred account of what those claiming to be philosophers must do yet are largely not doing, and so Patton invariably knows that a book of philosophy, too, is part of a problem requiring a qualitatively new response *qua* philosopher.

Against this understanding, we are required to ask anew, retroactively, of the project: what would it take to make a thinker like Guattari systematically intelligible to the dominant body of contemporary political thought, to "establish a uniform space of comparison"(129) without effacing some of the untranslatable features of Deleuze and Guattarian thought? That is, without diluting precisely what seems to be the political features we have just learned to limn in assemblages. How does one refuse the "primary stages" of the apparatus of capture – uniformity and appropriation – while at the same time trying to sidle up to it for the admirable purpose of critical engagement? How does one both keep the right distance in order to ward off appropriation or relative deterritorialization, yet close enough to discover or create the connections, the possible lines of flight between them? On what terms and with what address must one approach the Sovereign in order to draw critical attention toward the zones of undecidability and contradiction inherent in it, and hence to instigate the possibilities of reconfiguration and transformation?

The nomadic qualities of Deleuze and Guattarian thought, and the sorts of effects that these can give rise to (mutual becoming, vectors of deterritorialization, qualitative transformation) *must*, in a philosophical work *about* the political in Deleuze, be present in some (new) way in order to meet the conditions he himself sets on what it means to do philosophy and on what it means to enact the political: it must generate cognitive and critical smooth space in the juxtaposition of radically distinct conceptual frameworks, in the construction of new assemblages. In what "ways" might these be present? Rhetorically? Performatively? Argumentatively? What are Patton's various strategies in these regards?

Consider a hallmark Deleuze and Guattarian concept, the assemblage. With the "assemblage," and the "qualitative" versus "quantitative multiplicity," Patton has built the base for what the political means/involves within their thinking. An assemblage is a multiplicity, a "more or less concrete arrangement of things"(44) having a form, a content and most importantly, a quality. A book is an assemblage. There are two kinds of assemblages, two very different kinds of multiplicity: extensive, molar multiplicities that are organisable and display a stable nature, and there are intensive, molecular multiplicities that are not unifiable, not totalizable and cannot be divided without changing in nature (42). These two kinds of assemblages appear in Deleuzian thought as the distinction between arborescent (quantitative) and rhizomatic (qualitative) multiplicities. The former are "hierarchical systems with centres of signifiance and subjectification" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:16) whose various parts are connected according to an invariant principle of unity. The latter are less determinate objects or regions, defined not by an overarching principle but "by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight ... according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities." (*Ibid* 8) The ethos of becoming-other underwrites new possibilities for life, most effectively realizable through molecularity. A book, qua assemblage, might be fashioned to, and prone to exhibit one quality rather than another. The same can be said for bodies (Ch. 3 &4) for social forms (Ch. 5), for law (Ch. 6).

A Thousand Plateaus, as a book, not only made this case *about* assemblages, but made the case for assemblages, *as* a peculiar assemblage. Although one *could* initiate engagement via the front, and work through to the back, the arguments building from or *about A Thousand Plateaus*, in tandem with the authors' point-by-point multi-directional eco-logic, one could also read beginning and ending anywhere, through any combination of plateaus; an entirely different, yet nevertheless precise, motion (a stroll) always somewhere newly between where they seemed to be headed and where you were. That text was, naturally, deliberate and coherent design on the part of Deleuze and Guattari, who charged: "It is not enough to say that concepts possess movement, 'you also have to construct intellectually mobile concepts'." (Deleuze 1994:122) Patton confirms that "*A Thousand Plateaus* is the realisation of this goal. It does more than simply record the movement to which concepts are subject in the course of the history of philosophy. It creates concepts that are defined by their relations to the outside and hence their capacity for movement and transformation."(17) The complex and unique successes of *A Thousand Plateaus* can be largely attributed to its rhizomatic capacity to induce becoming, in the concepts transmogrifying across plateaus *and* in the intellectual mobility of the reader.

Deleuze and the Political, on the other hand, while an excellent book, is no rhizome. The reader enters the text cleanly, like a trained diver, at the introduction, and with the aid of that introduction, can best approach the first chapter. Having mastered the first chapter, the reader can better understand the second, and the third, all the better to see you with my dear, and so on until the end, when one is released from Patton's chain of reasoning, quite convinced of its soundness. One doesn't emerge with a dizzy head full of mobile concepts in quite the same way, although the mobile concepts from Deleuze and Guattari, rendered intelligible in this relatively molar fashion, perhaps find a line of flight in this rendered molarity, counter-actualizing (109) themselves from their micropolitical incarnations.

Since, as previously mentioned, *Deleuze and the Political* was written with non-Deleuzians in mind, it is doubtful that this particular kind of project *could* have been fashioned successfully as a molecularity, which makes two wonder, again, what (other) effective strategies of micro-resistance/becoming qua book-as-assemblage, might be? This is a complex question, the complexity of which, in a way, Patton's conservative editorial apparatus rhetorically affirms. He reminds us a number of times throughout the book that the nature of anything is "determined by the character of the forces in play around it at any given moment." (56) That "the distinction between qualities of force and those of will to power is not one that can simply be read off the relative strength of the forces in play on a given occasion." (62) And that "[t]o be capable of such variation does not imply a commitment to experiencing it at every opportunity, just as a radical change in the circumstances of a life does not necessarily imply critical freedom on the part of the subject." (85) What these cautions tell us is that any one kind of approach is not itself subversive: some kinds of apparently radical approaches are instantly domesticated and circulate as instruments of the molar while others, unpredictably, disrupt in the desired ways. To borrow from Judith Butler, a typology of book strategies wouldn't suffice for "the political" since "this depends upon context and reception." (Butler 1990:139)

Happily, this question, which I foregrounded here as (if) a matter of textual strategy, emerges in a different guise in the final chapter of *Deleuze and the Political*, and in fact, confirms this cautionary note about molecular vs. molar strategy with a vivid example. Patton's assessment of the qualitatively distinct natures of the social forms that underwrote the settlement of occupied lands in the first place (primitive territorial machine meeting despotic machine) puts us in a position to critically reflect upon the juridical strategies now "available" to Aboriginal people vis-à-vis land title and constitutional rights. The various strategies available to Aboriginal peoples (non-participation, violence, approaching the standard bearer), their limits, the deep conceptual nature of those limits and what each strategy might accomplish could be (perhaps with some sympathetic abstraction) mapped onto the range of options and outcomes available to continental thinkers interested in gaining the ear of Anglo-American political theorists. In that final chapter, having traced the forces, Patton makes his somewhat surprising case for the strategy of approaching the law. He writes:

> The discussion of colonisation and native title jurisprudence ... was not a simple application of the concept of capture to the colonial case, but rather to show that capture takes on a specific legal form in the case of constitutional colonial states, and to suggest that in this context the jurisprudence of aboriginal or native title amounts to a smooth legal space with the potential to alter significantly *both* the rights of indigenous peoples and the constitutional form of those states (134, *emphasis added*).

The book's final recommendation reframes the merits of Patton's own textual strategy. Significantly, it reminds us that the most difficult but ideal orientation of one thing to another is that which is maximally conducive to "double-capture": "… one of the ways in which the powers of an individual body may be transformed by entering into a relation with the powers of another without incorporating or weakening the other body." (54)

The possibility of transformation must be distributed symmetrically across both philosophical readerships. Patton's book, on many registers, exhibits and fosters that capacity in its own ways.

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Notes

1. Patton collapses Deleuze and Guattari into "Deleuze" although the concepts discussed and the sources relied upon (*Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* chief among them) were co-created and co-written. Where quoting Patton, I will not insert "Guattari." Where I discuss them, I'll distinguish whether they were singletons or double-headed twins.

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Better Off Dead

Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change.*
New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

Linda Hogle, *Recovering the Nation's Body: Cultural Memory, Medicine and Redemption*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1999.

By Rachel Ariss

These two works reposition the dead in European political and cultural contexts. While they approach the dead from different perspectives - Verdery from the political and Hogle from the anthropological - both writers recognize, explain and analyze the role(s) of the dead, particularly in their materiality, in modernized national communities. Contemporary North American and European cultures have, over the past few decades, made significant efforts to ignore and/or disguise death, dying and the dead, through various tactics such as institutionalizing the elderly and the dying, using elaborate embalming processes to preserve the dead, abandoning social and public mourning and shunning the grief of the bereaved. This recent cultural avoidance of the dead has led historian Barbara Duden (1993: 9) to comment that: "Above all, there has never been a community that did not cohabit with its dead. But today, socially, the dead are no more. They are deceased. They are ontic has-beens."

Verdery and Hogle resituate specific communities in the context of their dead with strong, well-supported analyses, drawing readers into a world simultaneously within their personal grasp (do we not all have our dead?) and yet, particularly in contemporary mainstream Euro-American culture, beyond reach. Importantly, both writers emphasize the materiality of the dead in their efforts to culturally situate contemporary European uses of dead bodies. This emphasis is in profound contrast to the present and recent historical trend of ignoring death.

This review will consider Verdery's approach to the political roles of the dead through reburial in postsocialist nations, especially Hungary and what was Yugoslavia, in concert with an explanation of Hogle's approach to the cultural (and, to an extent, political) understandings of the dead in organ transplantation procedures in Germany. Verdery's analysis deals with the roles of the dead as once-specific persons who continue to have materiality through bones and corpses; Hogle's analysis focuses more directly on the materiality of dead bodies themselves and the proper place and cultural functioning of use of that materiality, with recognition of their once-personhood operating within debates surrounding use.

Verdery asks specifically about the role of reburial of dead bodies in political change during the postsocialist upheaval in the Eastern bloc. Analysis of the political role(s) of the dead and their reburial is an immense topic in itself, as Verdery comments, requiring attention to "political symbolism; to death rituals and beliefs, such as ideas about what constitutes a 'proper burial'; to the connections between the particular corpses being manipulated and the wider national and international contexts of their manipulation; and to reassessing or rewriting the past and creating or retrieving 'memory'." (3) Verdery begins by illustrating concepts she uses to understand reburial, such as authority and the sacred, moral order and the reordering of time and space. She delimits the scope of her inquiry by dividing reburial of the dead into two groups: the named and famous, and the anonymous dead.

Verdery explains that her purpose for examining the political role of reburial is to enliven the study of political change in postsocialism:

> Where do dead bodies figure in this? I believe they offer us some purchase on the cultural dimension, in the anthropological sense, of postsocialist politics.... They help us to see political transformation as something more than a technical process - of introducing democratic procedures and methods of electioneering, of forming political parties and nongovernmental organizations, and so on. The 'something more' includes meanings, feelings, the sacred, ideas of morality, the nonrational - all ingredients of 'legitimacy' or 'regime consolidation' (that dry phrase), yet far broader than what analyses employing these terms usually provide. Through dead bodies, I hope to show how we might think about politics, both as strategies and maneuvering and also as activity occurring within cultural systems (25).

For the most part, she succeeds in answering these questions. Hogle's purpose is both simpler and broader: "My purpose… is simply to show what is involved in converting human biological materials into usable therapeutic tools in the particular conditions of late twentieth-century Germany." (18) Her approach to this examination illuminates the cultural and political necessities, implications and debates of this conversion, as she:

> … pay[s] particular attention to the way in which various meanings of the body affect and are affected by cultural, medical-technical, and legal practices. Such interactions unfold in unique ways in different settings, even within Euro-American environments that are often presumed to be homogeneous. That is, they can change according to the relation of the state and other authorities to individuals in society and through the addition of new technologies or modified views of old ones. They can also change through attempts to overlay religious, economic and political frames. The interplay between old and new, secular and sacred, technical and cultural has profound implications in terms of who societies allow to make decisions about the rights and protections of bodies, what constitutes violation of or rightful access to useful resources, and how these resources are defined and valued for legal, regulatory, and commercial purposes (2).

Hogle divides her work into two parts. The first is a broad-ranging discussion of historical cultural meanings of the body in Germany, including its specific cultural construction under the Nazi regime as well as funerary and medical practices regarding bodies at death; the political implications of the rise of legal concepts of bodily integrity and how recent publicized uses of the body reveal both old and new conceptions of the relationships between the body, technology and the state. Set against this backdrop, the second part develops connections between the medical, technical and bureaucratic practices of human tissue procurement, including the interplay of international issues, infrastructure and local practices.

Several themes run through both works, all of which are based in the materiality of dead bodies through reburial or reclamation of body parts. Reanimation, regeneration and cultural/national identity and territoriality, are found in both authors' works and are two of the most recurrent themes. I will focus on these two. Both writers, as I explained above, address themes and issues beyond these. Importantly, Verdery addresses the reordering of space and time in worlds that have undergone dramatic, rapid changes. Hogle considers representations of values in various medical and legal protocols in the treatment of death and dead bodies, and the struggles between each set of values.

Reanimation and Regeneration

Verdery's argument is that the reburial of dead bodies reanimates, as well as legitimizes, new political regimes. Included in Verdery's initial sketch of the politics of reburial of the famous dead are the fates of various statues as symbols of particular famous person's bodies. While she acknowledges the differences between these representations of the dead and reburial, she explains that they do symbolize a specific person's body, and tearing down the statues reverses the timelessness that being concretized in a statue assigned to that body (5). This provides a broad parameter for her detailed discussion of the reburial of famous bodies.

The list of famous bodies being accorded reburial through the early 1990s in postsocialist Europe is astounding. Among the list of eighteen famous corpses who made international trips in the postsocialist era are composer Bela Bartok (from New York to Budapest) and composer/politician Ignacy Jan Paderewski (from Washington, D.C. to Warsaw) (13); Verdery also lists several important national figures who undertook journeys for reburial within their own countries (such as Hungary's communist prime minister in 1956, Imre Nagy), as well as some corpses who have made several trips at various points in history. While many were reburied as signs of renewed honour, some were demoted: "Communist mausoleums sent out eviction notices, as did the Kremlin Wall." (19)

The reanimating power of these corpses is largely in the injection of some aspect of sacredness or quasi-religious meaning to the new political authority, as well as in the conflicts over them. Such conflicts can elevate, in some contexts, "politics" to "morality" or an expression of the "moral truth" of an historical event (38). Many of the returned and rehonoured dead were musicians and composers living in exile; some were participants in earlier political regimes, through diplomacy or journalism; others had royal connections. Reburial as political reanimation is especially effective in relation to the suppression of or denigration of religious activity in the Eastern Bloc, as Verdery points out: "A religious reburial nourished the dead person both with these religious associations and with the rejection of 'atheist' communism. Politics around a reburied corpse thus benefits from the aura of sanctity the corpse is presumed to bear, and from the implicit suggestion that a reburial (re)sacralizes the political order represented by those who carry it out." (32)

Verdery's primary example of political reanimation through reburial is the repatriation of Bishop Inochentie Micu from Rome to Blaj, Transylvania in present day Romania.

The story of Bishop Inochentie's reburial encapsulates all of the themes in Verdery's work, and I will explain his life and his historical political efforts in some detail here. Bishop Inochentie was born in 1692, during a power struggle between the Catholic Habsburgs and the mostly protestant nobles and szekles (populus). Both sides made efforts to religiously convert the Orthodox, Romanian-speaking people, despite their status as serfs, for political purposes. Verdery describes Inochentie's life against a detailed explanation of this power struggle. Inochentie was born to one of the few Orthodox, Romanian-speaking free peasant families. He was educated by Jesuits, and eventually became a Greek Catholic bishop accepting the pope in Rome as the head of his church. Today, Bishop Inochentie is historically important to all Romanians, Catholic, Orthodox or atheist. He argued for an end to serfdom, which had been the Habsburg promise for conversion to Catholicism (62-3) and later, as this promise was not fulfilled, expanded his argument to political rights for all Romanians. For over forty years he petitioned the Habsburg court, beginning the Romanian national movement. Bishop Inochentie was exiled and fled to Rome in 1744. He continued his political activities and wrote often about returning home. He died in Rome and was buried there in 1768.

Bishop Inochentie's 1997 reburial is largely about the Greek Catholic church's attempts to strengthen its presence in the post-communist Romanian political landscape as a community deserving national recognition. Under communism, the Greek Catholic church had been dispossessed, its priests imprisoned and membership forcibly absorbed into the Orthodox, or official, church in 1948. Verdery's analysis of the struggle between Greek Catholic and Orthodox clergy over Inochentie's bones before his reburial in 1997 is compelling, and well-situated both in Romanian church politics and the massive efforts of various Christian (especially fundamentalist protestant) churches to evangelize the postsocialist world (80-82). Although Inochentie's reburial was claimed as political reanimation for the Greek Catholic church, it can only be said to have been partially successful:

> By monopolizing Inochentie, the Greek Catholics had narrowed his embrace. To rebury an ancestor is to create a community of mourners… .
>
> In reburying him as *their particular* ancestor, Greek Catholic churches limited the meaningful community of living and dead to their own congregation (90).

In this way, then, Bishop Inochentie's power to reanimate Romanian politics was tempered.

The roles dead bodies play in reanimation and regeneration in Hogle's work are quite different. As part of her backdrop to present day procurement and transplantation of human tissue, she explains historical European attitudes to death and dead bodies. Medieval northern Europeans believed that the soul did not fully leave the body until after it had decomposed. Corpses were understood as active – it was believed that a murder victim's body would bleed if the killer was present. German law allowed this as evidence to convict for murder until the late 1600s (32). Dead bodies were also seen as healing agents: the warm hand of a corpse could cure epilepsy, and human blood was a common curative (38). Some doctors requested judges to allow them to collect the blood of people about to be executed, for medicinal purposes. Analyzing these and other attitudes about dead bodies over time, Hogle theorizes:

> I suggest that the unresolved questions of animation in the body allows for the possibility that a lingering vitality, when transferred to the user, had regeneration capability … the value of the material as a curative agent may have depended more on the belief that organic human matter was still animate than on specific biological or medicinal properties of the tissue. In the process, the transfer of a human vital force could be seen as a parallel process to resurrection – the 'gift of life' as we say today (40).

Today, the reanimation potential of transplanted organs in Germany is treated as "natural." In contrast to the U.S., where drugs and invasive high tech means are used to sustain donor's bodies to preserve organs, German management of donor bodies is negligible and low tech: "Organs and tissues are maintained in a natural state meant to sustain the ability to animate and regenerate life in the recipient." (159) Further, Hogle explains that many Germans she interviewed refer to personhood as "cellular" (41) in that every part of the body is an aspect of one's personhood. For Hogle, the medieval idea of continued animation loses its "quaintness" where it intersects with ideas of bodily personhood. It is at this intersection that regeneration through post-mortem transplant can be promoted as a "gift," or decried as exploitative.

Animation and regeneration thus move their way through both the works of Verdery and Hogle as a bodily life force or as a method of community establishment. These are two very different manifestations of "reanimation." That they both find their sources in dead bodies, however, permits reading them together.

Identity and Territoriality

In both Verdery's and Hogle's books, the treatment and social position of dead bodies are claimed and interpreted as support for national and ethnic identity and re-identification projects. In Verdery's work, the identities claimed for the anonymous dead are, through the kinship claims of their living relatives, used to establish territorial rights. In Hogle's work, questions of identity are only loosely related to territoriality – they deepen in the face of what sort of state the new united Germany will become.

The struggle to establish the Greek Catholic community as an important national and patriotic Romanian identity centred on claims that Bishop Inochentie Micu was a Greek Catholic hero and manifested itself in who would have control over the reburial of his bones. In postsocialist Yugoslavia, the struggles regarding identity surround the reburial of anonymous dead found in mass graves: "they have reburied with much ceremony thousands of plain citizens found scattered in various unmarked burial sites – persons whose names are known only to their family, friends and neighbours." (97) The social identification with those found in mass graves (initially along political lines, and later, along ethnic lines) is the first step towards asserting an ancestral and undeniable claim to territory. Verdery, in contrast to her chronological approach to the story of Bishop Inochentie, weaves the recent, the near and the far historical past into her analysis of the role of the anonymous dead in postcommunist Yugoslavia.

The anonymous dead play such a large role here, Verdery suggests, because they have remained a significant part of daily life for all of the ethnic communities: people have strong beliefs about proper burial and social connections to the dead and visiting grave sites is a common activity. With recent wealth in the area, ceremonies and buildings surrounding grave sites became more elaborate. Requirements to pay rent for grave sites to the state have been in place since the days of communist Yugoslavia; additionally, desecrating enemy graves has been a recurrent tactic since WWII (97). Finally, "it is also the land of political corpses without number, lying in limestone caves, mass graves and other sites all around the landscape … the skeletal inhabitants of limestone caves were the first troops mobilized in the Yugoslav wars. They were mobilized for a campaign to revise recent history." (98-9)

This revision was aimed at the massacres which had taken place on all political sides in WWII, public knowledge of which was suppressed under communism. The 1980s, with the weakening of Tito's regime, provided an opportunity for those who knew where their relatives were buried to exhume and properly bury their dead. The materiality of this process is emphasized in the way bones were removed, bagged and passed along lines of villagers, who were visibly moved by physical reconnection with long dead friends and relatives. Several such exhumations were televised. This emotional process was manipulated by nationalist politicians and the WWII political categories assigned to killers and victims devolved to ethnic categories with kinship as the thread connecting reburial with ethnically-based territorial claims:

> … graves laid out a geography of territorial claims and of personal commitment to those claims; for in these places 'our' dead were buried. Retrieving and reburying these nameless bones marked the territory claimed for a greater Serbia, one that found its dead in the soil of most other republics. We might say that these corpses assisted in reconfiguring space by etching new international borders into it with their newly dug graves (102).

Fighting in the late 1980s and 1990s between ethnic groups resulted in similar massacres and mass graves. Several of these have been opened and the victims reburied. Old martyrs and new echoed and reinforced the ethnic divisions and territorial complexities of these divisions in the reformulation of new states from post-communist Yugoslavia. For example, in the Dayton agreements, Muslims and Croats argued for continued access to their graves in organized Serb territory. Serbs, on the other hand, dug up their ancestors and took them away.

These reburials, while they re-establish community and launch territorial claims, also, Verdery argues, "*narrow* and *bound* " community. She comments that while "Bosnia's Muslims used to go to the burials of their Serb or Croat covillagers and vice versa, for instance, that is no longer possible. Burials bring people together, reminding them of the reasons for their collective presence – relatedness – but that relatedness has now become ethnically exclusive." (108) While the context and political effects are different, this recalls the particularizing of Bishop Inochentie as primarily a Greek Catholic rather than a Romanian or even global figure.

Verdery continues to explore the relationships between kinship with the ancestors and the territoriality of the new states, emphasizing how this reorders time as well as space. She asks readers to deepen their understandings of political and social conflict by engaging with the role of the dead:

> In post-Yugoslavia, the terrible displacement of persons, the tortures and murders, the devastating inflation, and so on surely indicate that the cosmos is out of joint. Among the things people know that produce such misery are the vengeful souls of the improperly buried and of ancestral spirits inadequately tended. Without claiming that this interpretation 'explains' what is happening in Yugoslavia, I believe these ideas deepen our appreciation of its dead-body politics by exploring matters of affect (115).

Verdery's work has engaged with the role of the dead on several levels, providing both a deeper understanding of the territorial aspects of postsocialist politics and a broader perspective on political upheaval and change.

Hogle's engagement with identity is found in the competing sets of values informing different approaches to legal and medical treatment of death and dead bodies. In the early 1990s, Germany was in a struggle to reidentify itself as a united country. What would a new Germany become, after the rapid dismantling of the political boundaries between West and East? Hogle analyses the new German identity found in national debates over which values, regulations and practices should be put into place to govern post-mortem organ transplant.

This debate is haunted by the spectre of National Socialism. Throughout the 1920s, scientific metaphors were used to explain the disruption of German society, which was an immediate effect of WWI, as well as the longer term changes of industrialization and urbanization. Biological thought began to be applied to German society, rather than to individuals (47). Building, in part, on this, the Nazis promoted and established a vision of a healthy German society as a fit body. Individuals, therefore, must be healthy and fit in order to be part of this strong social body. Those who were disabled or chronically ill were seen as damaging the social body. Thus, these people were left to die, and later, "euthanized." (49) Simultaneously, the individual body which was seen as healthy and fit for the social body was a "German" body. Jews, Gypsies, communists and homosexuals were all seen as unfit, and further, as contaminating. They, too, were segregated and programmatically killed. Hogle explains the connection between the social body and national identity:

> The popular nationalist slogan *Blud und Boden* (blood and soil) strengthened the connection between German heredity and homeland-as-body. Biological metaphors were linked with notions of belonging and rootedness to German lands. In this way, racial hygiene became a material way of forging a national identity. *Germanness* was defined with medical criteria that excluded outsiders and 'primordialized' insiders (48).

Medical research was encouraged as part of the National Socialist program to improve the health of the social body. But this research was based in using the individual bodies seen as waste, living and dead, as experimental resources (49). Needless to say, there was no consent sought, no regard for risk to "subjects" and often, flimsy or absent scientific bases for very invasive and cruel experiments. Body parts were also used to make everything from soap to lampshades (54). Thus, national identity and the good of the social body are inevitably linked with inhumanity towards individual bodies in German history. Moreover, a significant part of this linkage is found through medical-scientific research and viewing dead bodies as "useful" objects.

Hogle discusses the immediate post-WWII reaction to the degradation of particular individual bodies as "unfit" for the German social body: the passing of the 1949 Basic Law, which protects personhood, physical well-being, bodily integrity and individual dignity. The values embodied in these laws have been strictly interpreted over time, resulting in, for example, very severe penalties for disturbing the dead, defacing grave sites or disrupting funerals and strict limits on abortion (61-2). This reflects a different German valuation of bodies: the dignity of individual bodies can never again be subject to the "health" of an imagined "social body." Hogle comments: "In postwar laws, the body persists as a political icon, but now as a recovered body. It demonstrates the repentance of the state and the restitution of pre-Nazi protections."(91) Both the Nazi regime and the 1949 Basic Law can be understood as illustrations of Verdery's fundamental point: "political transformation is often symbolized through manipulating bodies." (28)

Thus, the debate over post-mortem transplants and the issues that accompany it such as defining death (brain-death), how consent should be obtained, how the body is to be handled throughout and afterwards, are always informed by relatively recent, extreme abuses of individual bodies by the state. German identity is now found in restitution for the past, manifested in protecting the individual body from indignities.

Following this historical analysis of how dead bodies are treated and a discussion of recent legal approaches and debates surrounding post-mortem transplant, Hogle turns to the "elaborate medical and nonmedical infrastructures" (103) necessary to both procure organs and perform transplants. Her ethnographic work is detailed, including observation of organ procurement co-ordination, organ removal surgery and detailed interviews with transplant surgeons and organ procurement co-ordinators. She also discusses the organization and politics of Eurotransplant, the Europe-wide organ procurement co-ordination group. Hogle's analysis here will be of interest to readers investigating the culture of organ transplant, German medical bureaucracies and politics, as well as medical-scientific cultures.

Questions of identity are raised in two areas: amalgamating East and West German transplant practices and construction of the identity of the donor.

Organ transplant was organized differently in West and East Germany. East Germany had a centralized system, while the West was organized regionally. East German law also gave physicians the right to decide whether or not to use bodies to supply organs – the families were not even informed of the use (69). While there was no law in West Germany, physicians generally asked families for permission to use organs. In amalgamating the two systems, West German practices dominated.

Records show that the former West receives more organs from the former East than vice versa (118). Western surgeons complain that eastern organs and removal practices are poor, however, and sometimes refuse to take an organ based more on its region and clinic of origin, rather than on information regarding the donor or the organ itself (169). This echoes recent experiences of industrial production in the former East since amalgamation: the East is a marginalized supplier to a wealthy West (118-119).

Another interesting aspect of identity in transplantation is found in the contrast between German management of the donor between brain death and organ removal and American management of the donor. In America, the donor becomes constructed as a person: both the quality of the organs and the quality of the person as a donor are measured. Hospital forms for organ donation include questions about whether the deceased had been in jail or traveled outside the U.S. There is also a section on "social history" which Hogle found included comments such as "$5,000 found in car," and lengthy reconstructions of donor personality and family relationships including who visited at the hospital and how they behaved (146). Days of high tech management and organ testing may precede organ removal (158), and despite the initial construction of personhood, donors are referred to as "the heart" or "the kidneys" prior to organ removal (147). In contrast, the German system records minimal data about the deceased: name, age, sex, weight, size, and cause of death (153). Most organ removals take place within eight hours of declaration of brain death and there is very minimal organ testing, technological management or handling of the donor body prior to organ removal (158).

The American connection between personhood and donation and the identification of donors as giving, caring persons who continued giving to others even in death, is absent in German post-mortem transplant rhetoric. Hogle explains:

> Because there is only minimal contact with the body and little information collected about the donor, German donors never become known as

> individuals with histories. A donor simply never becomes a person. This is key because in Germany a person cannot be perceived to die in order for someone else to live. Thus, while the organ can "live on" as described in transplant rhetoric, the person must not (159-60).

Identification of the donor is circumscribed and prevented, then, by the identification of the German state with "stark images of power and inhumanity," (187) particularly in connection with medical uses of bodies.

In both works dead bodies are critical vehicles for the expression of political identities and moral values. In Verdery's work, rightful claims to territory are built on grave sites. Although territoriality does not figure as large in the identity-building aspects of Hogle's work, territoriality lingers in definitions of which organs are "better" for transplant. The re-identification process brought about by the unification of the two Germanys necessarily continues repudiation of Nazi approaches to the nation as a "social body." Germany was not understood as an integrated society until National Socialism - a time that most Germans wish had never happened - and any new nationalism under reunification must continue to repudiate the Nazi past (188).

Both Verdery and Hogle have engaged with a subject that is largely ignored and in some ways, almost taboo in large parts of Western (and Westernized) society: dead bodies. Using this lesser known pathway, both writers have asked about the place of the dead in specific communities and the meanings assigned to them. While this path diverges into different locations for the dead in these communities, Verdery and Hogle have described and analyzed these locations with skill and in depth. Neither author has been stopped by disciplinary boundaries around political science (Verdery) nor anthropology (Hogle), making both works accessible to diverse constituencies. Verdery's work covers wider ground, emphasizing the role of the dead in providing insight into major world political events. While Hogle's focus is somewhat narrower, it is nonetheless rich in its historical and current analysis of the cultural place of dead bodies in Germany. Nadia Seremetakis (1991: 14) has commented that the institutions of death, (either burial and reburial or organ donation procedures and practices) "function as a critical vantage point from which to view society." Verdery and Hogle have, in their respective ways and towards their own ends, used this vantage point well.

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Film Theory and Enunciation

Francesco Casetti, *Inside the Gaze: The Fiction Film and Its Spectator*, trans. by Nell Andrew with Charles O'Brien. Preface to the English edition by Dudley Andrew. Introduction by Christian Metz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.

Francesco Casetti, *Theories of Cinema, 1945-1995*, trans. by Francesca Chiostri and Elizabeth Gard Bartolini, with Thomas Kelso. Revised and updated by the author. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999.

Warren Buckland, *The Cognitive Semiotics of Film.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Warren Buckland (ed.), *The Film Spectator: From Mind to Sign.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995.

By Bart Testa

Francesco Casetti's *Inside the Gaze* is the translation of the author's *Dentro lo sguardo: il film e il suo spettore*, published in 1986. Its core chapter appeared in 1983 as "Looking for the Spectator" in *Iris* 2. In 1989, *Dentro lo sguardo* was rendered in French as *D'un regard l'autre: Le film et son spectateur*. That edition included a collegial introduction by Christian Metz, in the English edition, "Crossing over the Alps and the Pyrenees. . . ." Metz does not allude to the strong criticism directed toward his Italian colleague in his final book *L'Enonciation impersonnelle* (1995), the conclusion of a dialogue Metz conducted with Italian semioticians running since the middle of the 1960s. No full translation of *L'Enonciation impersonnelle* has appeared. However, Warren Buckland's anthology, *The Film Spectator: From Sign to Mind* includes its eponymous first chapter and it is set beside "Face to Face,"[1] an essay compressing Casetti's theory of enunciation. This anthology of translations, *The Film Spectator,* is now partnered with Buckland's expository account, *The Cognitive Semiotics of Film,* which includes a chapter on the Metz-Casetti exchange.

I started by scanning the publishing history behind the books under review in order to indicate two points developed in the first part of this review. First, there has been a delay of more than a decade between initial publication of these texts and their translation, and Buckland's expository book. Second, despite its seemingly restricted, even technical role, as a semiotic model of cinematic narration, enunciation has a storied career in film semiotics.

In the 1970s enunciation provided focus for both "text semiotics" in cinema and what today is termed "film spectatorship." From the start, which is to say in the later 1960s, when film semioticians took over Emile Benveniste's seminal formulation (1971: 205-215), enunciation presented myriad challenges to film theory. Benveniste's original model dealt with natural language, specifically with *parole/discours*. He sited the process of producing *discours* in the speech situation involving persons using verb tenses and he analysed special signs – personal pronouns, and adverbs — that function as indices of place and time. These specifications are doubly rooted: in natural language and the real-time/place of persons who meet and talk. Film semioticians adopted enunciation to cinema's highly flexible audio-visual representations of time and space and applied it variously: to model the production of cinematic texts; to analyse as narrational mediation between cinema's codic virtuality and filmic textual cinematic concretion; or, to model viewers' placement (e.g., "subject positioning") within the circuitry of cinematic representation.

No application of enunciation to cinema passed without controversy. In a review of the applications to cinematic narration, David Bordwell concludes that the challenges of transferring enunciation from Benveniste's linguistic model to the audio-visual art of cinema has never been resolved: "because a film lacks equivalents for the most basic aspects of verbal activity, I suggest that we abandon the enunciation account." (1986: 26) Bordwell's conclusion was retroactive. As far as English-language cinema studies was concerned enunciation had disappeared from its agenda by the 1980s. Controversy over enunciation arose because the complicated roles it played in film criticism overburdened the concept before film semiotics had resolved basic theoretical problems. Critics deployed enunciation, for example, as a criterion to distinguish films that seem to occlude or to foreground *discours*. Semioticians of discourse analysis described classes of indicators ("shifters," for instance) that articulated the self-reference operations of enunciation and differentiated such utterance as *discours*. Film critics mingled this analysis with the modernist concept of self-reflexivity (or self-reference) and with ideological critique. Especially at *Cahiers du Cinéma*, critics proposed to make ideological differentiations between "classical" and "progressive" [film] texts (Comolli and Narboni 1969) on the basis of whether films revealed their discursive properties. The criterion served in distinguishing mainstream narrative cinema, which supposedly erases enunciative marks and poses as *histoire* (unmarked "story"), and therefore positions the spectator passively in receiving a film, from "avant-garde" (or "modernist" or "progressive") film texts that foreground *discours* and hence activate a more politically critical spectator (Silverman 1983: 3-52; 194-236).

It is notable, given the ideological role that enunciation therefore played in film theory and criticism, that Muscio and Zemignan lately credit Casetti's work on enunciation because "he has continued certain trends and brought into play an innovative thrust." (1991: 23) Their praise is astonishing in its ideological neutrality. It leaves us to ask whether Casetti does assume the "technical " attitude toward enunciation they attribute to him and, if so, whether it is creditable. Another question Muscio and Zemignan leave us to ask is if Casetti successfully continues, revisits, or recasts a topic in a manner that transforms its storied reputation in cinema studies. Whether and how a viewer participates in a film's "text productivity" or acts as peripheral bystander to a spectacle – and this is the base line of alternatives at which Casetti sets the problem — can never, hypothetically, cease to be an interesting question. However, the methods Anglophone film scholars have used to configure the issue have, for a decade now, disconnected the question from enunciation. Its currency in film theory has run down to the point where Bordwell frankly calls for abandoning it altogether.

The original dates of publication of these books under review run mainly through the 1980s. Film semiotics as a whole, and not just enunciation, was then in eclipse in Anglophone cinema studies. The translations and commentary Buckland offers are a slender bridge over a yawning generational silence about semiotics of cinema. He belatedly seeks to reconnect Franco-Italian research to the Anglophone reader: *The Film Spectator* provides sample texts, *Cognitive Semiotics of Film* provides exposition. With his two books under review, Casetti has now reached substantial English translation but he is the only Continental film semiotician to have done so in a decade. Moreover, his door into Anglophone cinema studies was opened by scholars like Dudley Andrew (who provided a preface, while his student Charles O'Brien co-translated *Inside the Gaze*), whose attitudes toward film semiotics range from lukewarm to hostile. American dialogues with Casetti have been courteous but without signs that his writings place semiotics back on the cinema studies agenda.[2]

While the topic of *Inside the Gaze* is *not* influential, Casetti's theory is *not* enunciation as it appeared in the 1970s. What is the right context in which to read Casetti, then? *The Cognitive Semiotics of Film* situates Casetti and Metz's critique of him within Continental semiotic research that Buckland takes still to be contemporary. The validity of his contextualisation faces obstacles. First, the texts in question are no less than twenty years old. Further, behind Casetti lies Italian film semiotics. Buckland's book makes a case for contemporary relevance of the work he explores because it manifests the rise of cognitivism in French film semiotics that he places in counterpoint to American film studies' contemporary (i.e., 1980s-1990s) engagement with cognitivism, as exemplified by Bordwell (1986) and others. Casetti does not fit snugly into either group of researchers. Italian semioticians do not ordinarily make direct appeals to cognitive theories. Instead, since the 1960s, and spearheaded by Eco (1976), Italians turned toward Peircean semiotics. They argued, from the onset of Italian film semiotics (Eco 1977) against what Pasolini called the image's "irrationality,"[3] and that Barthes (1977:15-31) and Metz (1974a: 3-15) held back from visual semiotics – the photo-filmic image as "phenomenological" object. The Italians followed Eco in developing an "iconic" semiotics (under the rubric of "pansemioticism") and in regarding the photo-filmic image as a "semiotic object." (Muscio and Zemignan 1991)

The Italians accept an aesthetic object that is heterogeneous with respect to language whereas Metzian film semiotics enfolds the image in quasi-grammatical signifying architectures designed from models of structural linguistics and materially manifested in narrative editing and its supplements (like sound), while denying the film image itself possesses a language-like character. The differences in approach between French and Italian semiotics provided the occasion for the famous debates between Metz and Eco conducted in the mid-1960s (Moretti 1998: 66-68). This occasioned Eco's severing of semiology and semiotics and led to his suggestion that the latter, meaning the Italian approach, would be a "translinguistic" domain that could encompass "artistic'" (that is, pluricodic or heterogeneous) texts. French film semiotics would remain tied to structural linguistics and Metzian film semiotics would not cross into the territory of non-verbal languages. The principle difference that the severance entailed was that Italian semioticians utilized aesthetics to study iconism and this led Gianfranco Bettini and Eco to tilt toward Peircean semiotics and to claim that film images possess a plurisemiotic dimension. The main consequence is that Italian film semiotics shifted from large-scale taxonomic studies (Metz's thrust) to analysis of the production of meaning (or semiosis). Eco's concerns with the nature of semiotic communication and the Italian regard for communication as a social function meant that aesthetics, communication and interpretation retain mutual currency in Italian film semiotics and generate a set of problems quite different from the French emphasis on narrative film analysis. In France, the eventual recession of structural linguistics, Metz's original base, led to a further divorce between semiotics and communication once the spectator's subjectivity came to be seen through the lens of psychoanalysis. The consequent differences, still apparent in the Casetti-Metz debate, were pronounced by Bettini who cast enunciation as communication, embedded "in the signifying materiality of the text, in the zones occupied and formed by the audiovisual material that, dynamically, produces there a series of acts of signification." (1979; cited in Muscio and Zemignan: 29-30)

Italian semioticians, then, developed early a critique of French semiotics bound to linguistic structuralism and did not need to discover cognitivism as an alternative theoretical base twenty years later. The Italians likewise developed a principled immunity to post-structuralism that is nowhere more evident than in Eco's *The Limits of Interpretation* (1990). The complicated "transalpine" semiotics history suggests why Italian critics were quarantined from some of the headiest theoretical fashions of 1970s film theory. This same history allows plausible reasons for Casetti's emergence as a late "innovator" with respect to enunciation and for him potentially coming into some kind of mediating dialogue with American film theory. This could have been Buckland's case for including Casetti in *Cognitive Semiotics of Film* but, as a promoter of cognitivism everywhere, Buckland does not make it. However, Casetti does make a case on his own behalf in his *Theories of Cinema, 1945-1995*.

Post-Structuralism's Challenge to Film Semiotics

On the matter of French developments, *Cognitive Semiotics of Film* has much of value to offer. The post-structuralist impulses that took over film semiotics in the 1970s, giving rise to influential Lacanian-Althusserian film theory, generated powerful schools of *interpretation*. These impulses spread semiotics throughout Anglophone cinema studies. The post-structuralist movement also had the effect of expending film semiotics' reserves of methodological patience, conceptual modeling, analytical precision, and its solid base in structural linguistics. Post-structuralism, which had a good long run in cinema studies, both promoted and dissipated the semiotics project in the Anglophone film academy. To take a signature instance directly involving enunciation: post-structural semiotics in French film theory was exported, largely through translations and the expository efforts of the journal *Screen*, into English-speaking film study where, among other things, it became the theoretical armature of feminist film criticism (a process documented in the American feminist journal *Camera Obscura*). Laura Mulvey (1975) reconfigured post-structural film theory to feminist critical themes and semiotics was directed into interpretation. In particular, enunciation was reformatted and "gendered." The narrative cinema's point-of-view shot figuration, which always figured prominently in discussions of enunciation, became, following Mulvey's detours into a psychoanalytical etiology and feminist iconology, the "male gaze." Its object became the "to-be-looked-at-ness" of women on screen. In this reformatting of enunciation, film semiotics served as necessary scaffolding and was then removed, rather than elaborated; what arose was a critical practice of a different kind and no longer film semiotics.

Few Anglophone scholars after 1980 directed attention back toward the base that had underwritten such developments, namely Metz's classic formulations (1974a).[4] Fewer still, until Buckland, asked what had happened afterwards inside French film semiotics. Had there been a fork in the road? Was post-structuralism a deviation veering off from film semiotics, or had post-structuralism properly absorbed film semiotics? The conventional answer in Anglophone cinema studies takes the second option and is today often called "contemporary film theory." It is a quasi-mythical label that enfolds the manifold of theorizing that sprang forth in the wake of post-structuralism. Inside this construct, Metz's intense production of the structuralist phase of "code semiotics" is an obsolete canon but the site from which contemporary film theory arose. Represented this way in many encyclopedias and compendia of film theory (Mast, Cohen and Baudry 1992; Stam, Flitterman-Lewis 1992), Metz's "first semiotics" is cryogenically preserved. A similar fate eventually befell post-structuralist film theory, and contemporary film theory ended its run by the late 1980s. Its half-life today can be attributable largely to the efforts of its opponents, American film theorists committed to cognitivism and analytical philosophy (Bordwell 1988; 1989; Carroll 1988; Allen 1995; Allen and Smith 1997). They regard contemporary film theory as an academically installed consensus. That is true enough but it is a consensus undefended when attacked. Embarrassment attended Noël Carroll's "Address of the Heathen" (1982: 89-163), a lengthy and radically corrosive review of Stephen Heath's *Questions of Cinema*, when none of the erstwhile enthusiasts for Heath's exemplary post-structuralist approach to film offered more than token defense. Subsequently, Carroll consolidated his position to the extent that he and Bordwell could declare an era of "post-theory" (Bordwell and Carroll 1996) with a good measure of confidence.

The contemporary low point of film semiotics might, however, prove opportune. Casetti's project of "restarting" a discussion of enunciation – which sounds more correct than "innovation" — might even be an indirect effect of "post-theory." Certainly Casetti's "pragmatics" approach to enunciation fits the tendency that Bordwell and Carroll term "piecemeal theory," a technical problem-solving approach to theorizing about cinema. For his part, Buckland is persuaded that an opportunity for film semiotics lies in the rise of cognitivism. The received wisdom, that Metzian film semiotics founded contemporary film theory, is a partial truth at best. Buckland widens the perspectives by taking up study of French semioticians of film who joined Metz (Dominique Chateau, Michel Colin, François Jost, Roger Odin, André Gaudreault, *et al*) but did not follow him into post-structuralism.[5] Buckland shows them reconfiguring the "first" Metzian semiotics by moving out into cognitivism. The texts assembled in *The Film Spectator* indicate the cogency and high quality of the enterprise and its striking independence from contemporary film theory. Buckland's expositions make a further case for the theoretical depth and sustained direction of this semiotic work. *Cognitive Semiotics* is the story, propelled by Chateau, Colin, and by Roger Odin, of how the base of Metz's model of narrative film, established in his formulations between 1964 and 1974, was retained by French film semioticians as enduring "taxonomic" discoveries (embodied famously in the *grande syntagmatique*, closely reconsidered by Colin) and refitted to models stemming from Transformative Generative Grammar. Metz's initial theoretical base, structural linguistics, which seemed to offer promise of a homogeneous formal logic of cinema, comes to be replaced by models derived from Noam Chomsky and his school. One strength of *Cognitive Semiotics* lies in distinguishing the schools of cognitivism at work in this writing (1-55), another is in detailing its grammatical principles and applicability to film semiotics (77-140) and another is Buckland's focused following of the thread rewoven by French film scholars. In his commentaries, which expand on the story, Buckland proceeds through a careful account of the models adopted and the way the adoption of cognitivism to film semiotics occurs. The path taken was different from that of the American scholars like Bordwell, Thompson, and Branigan. However, the road toward comparison lies open.

Casetti's Revisionist History of Post-War Film Theory

It looks at first to be another, if also unusually detailed, theory textbook. However, Casetti's *Theories of Cinema, 1945-1995* offers a revisionist account and develops a distinct argument, at least to a reader willing to tease it out from the author's prolixity. An update and translation of his *Teorie del cinema, 1945-1990* (1993),[6] its treatment of post-war film theory departs from most English-language surveys (Lapsley and Westlake 1988; Stam 1998). This departure comes in several stages. The familiar custom is to model histories of film theory as a set of sharp ruptures, for example, between André Bazin's realist film aesthetic – taken as final phase of "classical theory" - and Metz's film semiotics – taken as the foundation of contemporary film theory. In most film theory histories, high-relief theoretical positions do noisy battle. The older ones crash and burn, the newer ones prevail. Casetti mutes the war stories and listens to a quieter continuum of research underneath. Instead of localized "realist-contemporary" oppositions Casetti discerns wider differences between "aesthetic-essentialist" theories and "scientific-methodological" theories.[7] He depicts the shift from one *set* of theories to another as cumulative rather than conflictual. There are battles represented in his account, but lasting consequences come of tectonic shifts of method rather than the eruptions of theoretical polemics. While producing a veritable cascade of too-fragmentary expositions (i.e., Albert Laffay and Galvano Della Volpe, Jean Mitry, Alberto Abruzzese, Edgar Morin, Pierre Sorlin, etc.), Casetti nonetheless conveys to an attentive reader developments percolating underneath well before bubbling over into debates.

Casetti's procedure is also a prejudice, and a covert argument. He gives preference to methodological theories by granting them teleological accumulation. Method develops continuously; theoretical "positions" seem epiphenomenal. Theorists who famously take energy from the political or ethical currents of ambient film culture - as did the morally galvanized Bazin and Kracauer in the 1950s, and the politically electrified *Cahiers du Cinéma* and *Screen* theorists did after 1968 – diminish in size. In this account, the high-water mark of film realists' critical influence, the 1950s and early 1960s, was also a period when their base disintegrated and the floor was laid for structuralist semiotics of cinema. Readers of Metz, so conscientious in recapitulating his precursors, may find Casetti's account unremarkable in this respect. Nonetheless, the decision to decelerate film theory should be taken seriously. Underlining modulations at work well before Metz does show "scientific-methodological" territory expanding, its terminology hardening into ordnance, and its imperialism rising toward that moment when film semiotics capitalizes on the differentiation between "aesthetics" and "science" to form a new film theory paradigm.

It follows that Casetti exploits the diversity of the period of Metz's "first semiotics." What Metz derived directly from structuralism was the ideal of a logical design of narrative cinema's code (hence this is the period of "code semiotics"). When he defines its project in 1964 with "Cinema: Language or Language System?" (1974a: 31-91), a new problematic is being born. Metz's ideal of the homogeneous cinematic object instanced by the narrative code prevailed, and it displaced "aesthetic" theories; semiotics of the cinema quickly, for example, demoted so-called "impressionist" film criticism that one read in *Esprit*, *Cahiers du Cinéma*, *Sight and Sound, Film Quarterly,* or *The Nation* beneath a new academic genre: the semiotic film analysis. The narrative code subsumed the unresolved problematic of the film image into an ideal structural object, the homologous cinematic paradigm, or *syntagmatique*. Metz's realized *grande syntagmatique of the image track* initiated a fresh cycle of debates and research, including Metz's own further work into textuality, systems and codes, and then into enunciation (1974b). Having so many precursors, Metz had interlocutors, too. In his dilation of film semiotics' theoretical moment, Casetti includes Italian semioticians, who did not accept Metz's abandonment of the film image, or its exclusion as a semiotic object, or what Della Volpe called its "conceptual-rational" force and that Eco elaborated as the "cinematic code." It was the denial of the film image as a semiotic object, as noted earlier, that brought Metz into debate with Italian semioticians who "elevated the aesthetic object to the rank of semiotic object while…[they] underlined the constitutional heterogeneity of the artistic object." (Muscio and Zemignan 1991: 26) Two traditions of film semiotics sprang from this basic disagreement.

Metz also found successors. Not all these follow Metz into post-structuralism and Casetti accordingly follows his chapter on the "first semiotics" with a chapter on cognitive and Gestalt theories that, at first, moved only along the edge of film theory debates. It is here, in this second stage of his book's covert argument, that Casetti's history dovetails with Buckland's project. Casetti's scope is wider than Buckland's but his argument is diffusive. Psychological theories of perception and image processing, besides psychoanalysis, belong to very diverse eras of film theory. Early Gestalt models served Munsterberg (1916/1971) at the dawn of narrative cinema, Arnheim (1934) at the threshold of sound films, and Merleau-Ponty (1948/1964: 48-62) at the first stage of the European art film. Cognitivist theorists of the 1980s and 1990s seem to appear, then, along a broken but historic continuum of film theory. Casetti can point, for instance, to Jacques Aumont's *L'Image* (1990) as belonging to the long lineage without paradox or distortion; indeed, Aumont's book is an important work of synthesis. Casetti can, then, discern cognitivism on film theory's horizon in many places and site it early within film semiotics as well with Sol Worth's efforts to bring Chomsky into semiotics of cinema (1969). Without really saying so, Casetti is proposing a widened, catholic cognitivism complementing the narrower-band *Cognitive Semiotics of Film*. Of course, Casetti, writing in the 1990s, is aware that the American branch of cognitivist film theory had become more than a little triumphalist.

To appreciate this scale of Casetti's second major move in his book, it is only necessary to note that he delays, and for fifty pages, discussing what theory historians habitually rush to explain, namely, how Lacanian psychoanalysis completed Metz's film semiotics. Although he delivers an adequate exposition of post-structuralism's various strands, he intently then goes on to write *past* post-structuralism for hundreds more pages. What does he do with all these pages? Several things, but the most consistent use of them – and this is the third stage in his argument — arises from his belief that film semiotics research is tangent with narratology. This is a notion Metz licensed at the start of film semiotics but that his post-structuralist successors resisted.[8] Casetti takes narratological work to be more than just tangent with modern film theory and this marks his main departure from the Italian school. This is also the main direction in which Casetti extends film semiotics and it reaches toward his own moment as an enunciation theorist.

In its post-structuralist phase, film theory became adamantly anti-narrative. Critics in the 1970s regarded narrative as the Gargantua that devoured cinema on behalf of bourgeois ideology. Theory's task is to expose the digestive mechanism (Burch 1969; McCabe 1985; Heath 1981; Mulvey1975) and that entails writing a good deal about narrative in cinema, but the spirit of this "political modernism" (Rodowick 1994) was overall as defamatory as it was analytical. Carroll (1988) argues that film theory developed an essentialism in the 1970s that, no less than Bazin's realist "ontology of cinema," inclined to totalize narrative cinema as an ideological apparatus (in the Althusserian sense) that bent the film medium to political purposes. To defame "dominant" narrative cinema, and to pose against it the small voice of "avant-garde" filmmaking instanced by Godard and Straub-Huillet, was one important way to attack the totality of cinema as a bourgeois-patriarchal institution.

Jean-Louis Baudry's (1980) apparatus theory exemplifies such tendencies. Baudry develops a genealogy of cinematic "illusionism." For example, he places the cinematic "long take" firmly inside the originating bourgeois visual model of pictorial illusionism, Renaissance perspective. Baudry argues that a film viewer always suffers from incomprehension of the material conditions behind filmic illusion, even in cases like Dziga Vertov's *Man with a Movie Camera,* when a film's project is to enucleate its own construction. In contrast to historians of film theory who hasten to explain Baudry's position as the proper outgrowth of Metzian semiotics (i.e., the "cinematic code" gains its ideological genealogy), Casetti diffuses that account by devoting numerous pages to writers, like Nick Browne and Edward Branigan, who seek to deal with finer points of narrational and point-of-view procedures. In fact, he devotes almost as many pages to them as he does to Baudry, or to the "suture" theorists Jean-Pierre Oudart and Daniel Dayan who, with Baudry, defined the theoretical parameters within which enunciation was discussed in the 1970s.

Browne and Branigan are interested in narration as a complex procedure of filmic articulations that guide narrative "comprehension." (Branigan 1992) What they take from Metz is the modeling of cinematic codes as narrational procedures and they devise a pragmatics of narration as their topos. It follows that Browne's (1982) analysis of John Ford's *Stagecoach* bears little resemblance to *Cahiers du Cinéma*'s collective analysis of the same director's *Young Mr. Lincoln* (in Browne 1990). Oudart and Dayan, like Baudry, contribute models of viewing a narrative film as a matter of "subject positioning," drawing on Lacan's mirror stage. Using this psychoanalytical model, Oudart and Dayan theorize cinematic narration as an oscillation apparatus that moves the viewer between "plenitude" (fullness of the image) and "lack" (the anxious threat of the "reverse field") that can only arrive at alienation and fetishization.[9] In contrast, taking it that the spectator enters into the film-text actively, Browne analyses a point of view passage from a sequence of *Stagecoach* in detail to demonstrate the narration's "distribution" of the viewer's plural identificatory attachments, and the viewer's gradual comprehension, modulated by both "fields" in a shot-counter-shot/point-of-view montage array, of a subtle dramaturgy.

Differences between suture theory's model of effects of image reception and film editing and Browne's micro-analyses of a film's narrational unfolding illustrate the divided ways that film theory regarded narrative processes. If apparatus and suture theories underwrote denunciation of narrative filmmaking, in doing so they also predetermined how enunciation developed in post-structural theorizing and allowed little need for film analysts to converse with narratologists making fine-grain distinctions among narration procedures in which viewers became participants in cinematic representation. Writers like Browne and Branigan did hold these conversations, and sought to analyse the viewer's *activity* in processing visual images as/into narrative information.

Casetti inserts his discussion of Browne and others out of historical order, backdating them by almost a decade to underline a lineage of film analysis that started with Metz.[10] Casetti undeniably distorts strict chronology to imply that post-structuralism is a deviation from film semiotics and not its destined outcome. This is the third stage of his covert argument, and the place where the polemical intent of Casetti's history of film theory comes into plain view, or at least relatively plainer view, since the truth is that Casetti remains reticent to the point of obscuring the point of his discussion. His implied claim, nevertheless, is, at a minimum, that narratology is as valid a resource for film theory as psychoanalysis, a position that held little sway in the period of post-structuralist theory, though this was changing by the early 1980s. What directly connects Casetti to Buckland's *Cognitive Semiotics*, and that allows him to be grafted on to a branch of cognitivist film theory, more than the interpolation of Browne or inclusion of Chateau and Corin, are some of Casetti's other insertions, for example, Worth's early attempt to graft Chomsky onto film semiotics.

Theories of Cinema, 1945-1995 shows that the later career of film semiotics is not as limited or as linear as it is portrayed by the standard received history. This has methodological consequences beyond the academic nicety of refining film theory's history.[11] Cinema studies is concerned with cinema as a general phenomenon. From time to time, the academic study of film has faced threats of methodological incoherence because of its outward topical plurality. One crucial juncture of the kind came in the late 1960s when the then-emerging discipline required a method and theory in order to clear confusions, borne of enthusiasms for film, and become founded as an academic enterprise.[12] Semiotics appeared just at this fateful moment to promise cinema studies an organized "scientificity." We can readily cull such an historical thesis from the early chapters of *Theories of Cinema, 1945-1995*. But the book's later chapters also speak to a similar problem today. Semiotics appeared as a breakthrough for cinema studies because it promised to unify a new cultural science. Casetti takes this as a given and elaborates on it. Semiotics then suffered in the 1970s what Casetti terms "dispersion" ; quoting Gian Piero Brunetta, he further suggests semiotics suffered from "theoretic consumerism." (144) The methodological weakness of the theoretical pretensions of the 1970s was obscured by the proliferation of theories and by political urgency, but eventually post-structuralism threatened cinema studies with a new incoherence, particularly when it began to mutate into "postmodernism." (Bordwell and Carroll 1996: 3-68) Casetti's *Theories of Cinema* is, in this light, a history whose intention – however thickly overwritten by the author's prolixity – is to project semiotics as an ongoing and cogent methodological development. There is still a semiotic through-line that compensates for the confusions wrought by the aftermath of contemporary film theory. The book particularly changes our picture of Metz. Metzian semiotics is not framed as a cryogenically frozen episode, or as a springboard for theory after the mid-1970s. Metz's "first semiotics" seems again the crucial interval that has been mistakenly abandoned, or misrecognized, as the origin of post-structuralism. *The Cognitive Semiotics of Film* makes the same point and does it very well within its specific purview. *Theories of Cinema* opens wider to disclose film semiotics not just as an interval between two moments, "aesthetic" theory and post-structuralism, but as a nexus for ongoing, even continuous developments that have been largely ignored but that reach down to the present. This historical account validates Casetti's emergence as a restarter of the application of enunciation to film.

The Return of Enunciation

But does *Inside the Gaze* advance the Metzian problematic of film semiotics? Is Casetti's reconsideration of enunciation the right gesture? Metz responded very critically to it and the utility and rightness of his model of enunciation remains in question. In *Theories of Cinema*, Casetti writes: "The 1970s witnessed fierce criticism of both the dominant forms and the very concept of representation." In the 1980s, he says, representation came back, and "to study its current purpose ... to unmask representation" was now *added* "an interest in its forms." (*Theories* 272-273) The both-and attitude, typical of Casetti's reluctance to take a stand, undermines interest in film analysis he claims is renewed by Aumont and Vernet and which shapes the context of his own work. Enunciation returns, Casetti is certain, but where and with weight does it return? His short answer is that enunciation returns us to the site of cinematic representation, what Casetti will boldly insist is no different from cinematic "communication," which decisively puts him on the opposite side to those who deeply suspect the "very concept of representation."

Although much shorter, it is no less a prolix and confusing book than *Theories of Cinema*. Yet one thing is clear about *Inside the Gaze*: Casetti's enunciation is not the post-structuralist edition of the concept re-costumed nor does it serve to defame narrative cinema. Metz himself makes the first aspect this clear when offering a compressed chronology of developments in his preface:

> Enunciation ... was first studied from a psychoanalytical perspective. It was in the 1970s, on the heels of issue 23 of the journal *Communications*,edited by Raymond Bellour, Thierry Kuntzel and myself. The Freudian approach, while it concerns the film's text and its internal modes of "figuration," also had an additional effect – quite understandably – of making film theory more sensitive to the psychological position of the spectator. Here is the spectator, oscillating between belief and disbelief, between awareness and oblivion in front of the spectacle, between complete alertness and a state of reverie, a very particular reverie, piloted by real perceptions.
>
> But we had to wait until the following decade, the 1980s, for filmic enunciation to be approached from a more formal, more "linguistic" (or more pragmatic), angle. Here again, the classic problem of the marks of enunciation was taken up. That is, the issue of perceptible traces – visible or audible in the cinema's case – left by enunciation along certain points of the enunciated (*enoncé*) during its emission.Cinematographic narratology has moved forward most notably with the work of Marc Vernet, André Gaudreault, François Jost, Edward Branigan, David Bordwell, André Gardies, and with contributions by the trio Lagny-Ropars-Sorlin. From narrative analysis one inevitably slides into the study of enunciation (Metz in Casetti 1996: xi-xii).

We should start with what Casetti takes enunciation to be. Although overly elastic given what his book will accomplish, Casetti's version of enunciation is not heterodox. He brings enunciation back to Benveniste's linguistic model and back to the issue of discourse. Enunciation is an act, Casetti remarks, "by which a person uses the possibilities of language to realize a discourse; it performs the shift from virtuality to manifestation." He accordingly applies *three* features to film: enunciation allows a film (1) "to take form and manifest itself"; (2) to present itself as text and to offer this specific text; and (3) to offer this specific text in a specific situation (*Theories* 155).

Cinema is a virtuality that, through enunciation, is actualized as a filmic text. Enunciation explains how "cinema" turns into a "film." This is enunciation as "text production." What lies ahead of the virtual and the realized, however, are the two further features Casetti attributes to film and these are *Inside the Gaze's* chief concern: first, a relationship between a set of possibilities *and*, second, the choices that lead to *every* realization of a film in its situation of "speaking" with the spectator (240). This relationship is not an empty channel or a matter of a textual arena with the viewer on its periphery. Rather, the realized filmic text "marks the appearance of elements that do not exist in the virtual dimension." These are an *agency*, and *an address to the spectator*, and a *specific time and place the spectator occupies*. Casetti models these elements on the "speech situation," and he equips them with "persons" and personal pronouns that have their direct filmic analogues.

One set of differentiations involving enunciation that figured in the 1970s, between texts that openly bear the signs of enunciation (*discours*) and those that cause them to disappear (*histoire)*, carry over into Casetti but with a crucial modification. In the 1970s, the distinction was used to differentiate types of films, whereas when Casetti again distinguishes *discours* and *histoire*, he means moments of films that manifest themselves in the act of representing and those moments that represent the world directly (*histoire)*. These distinctions Casetti condenses into "three main elements": *constitution* (or construction), *situation* (or placement), and possible *self-referentiality*. Casetti expends much of *Inside the Gaze* unfolding this set of condensed definitions and analyzing specific moments of their manifestation. However, he is chiefly concerned with the latter two and with proposing formal cinematic usages, and his applications through analysis-exemplifications of sequences (never whole films), to develop a schema whose torsion of combinations and permutations fill out the book.

As he says of the collection Metz cites above, *Communications 38* (1983) represented the new round in enunciation studies in the 1980s and it reopened the discussion of cinematic enunciation in a linguistic register. Casetti's discussion of this new initiative clarifies some general practical points of his own position. He believes that these writers follow Jean-Paul Simon (*Theories* 240-242) who analyses passages in the Marx Brothers movies where enunciation seems to tear the fabric of the *énoncé*.[13] Groucho's famed asides to the viewers, for instance, do not occur as given by the closed fictional world but announce themselves as "something the text produces" *for* the viewer. When signaling to the viewer with his wisecracks, Groucho calls attention to her absence from the screen. Casetti associates such passages with those moments in Hollywood backstage musicals wherein the situation of the film viewer is aligned (ordinarily through montage) with the perspectives of intradiegetic audiences watching a song and dance number. He takes these moments to be the places where the enunciative process leaps into the foreground and becomes distinguishable. In principle, however, such moments are of a piece with a film's textual production as a whole. At *every* moment a film, he claims, "directs its looks and voices beyond the limits of the scene toward someone who presumably ... has to collect them and answer back." ("Face to Face," 122) The issue is the *degree* of explicitness and not distinguishing *kinds* of films. His discussion of *Bitter Rice*, which opens *Inside the Gaze*, is quite similar but is interesting in a further respect because Casetti shows that those moments when the enunciation reaches beyond the limits of the scene are inevitably folded back into the *énoncé*. This, he claims, is even true of Godard's *Vent d'est*, usually accorded the status of a film of fully developed *discours* and the very model of modernist self-reflectivity. As the discussions of *The King of Marvin Gardens* and, later, *The King of Spain* and, later yet, of *Citizen Kane* proceed, Casetti develops gradations of different degrees and subtypes of enunciative activity, but never are types of films, much less evaluations of them, set upon these distinctions. The simple fact is that whereas some films do, for a moment, address the spectator directly, or seem to, these instances are swiftly folded back into the diegesis, the *énoncé*. A second point follows: self-referentiality (or reflexivity) is not an "avant-garde" exclusive, but is a potential feature of any unexceptional film no matter how fleeting such moments might be. Groucho's aside is not fundamentally different from the actor's address in Brakhage's avant-garde film *Blue Moses*. The same device appears in the teenaged protagonist's asides in *Ferris Bueller's Day Off*, in the wisecracking baby (voiced by Bruce Willis) in *Look Who's Talking*, no less importantly than it does in Sally Potter's feminist film *Orlando*. The direct-to-camera testimonies woven through the satire-thriller *To Die For*, the proliferating addresses-to-the-camera of Denys Arcand's *Stardom*, or John Travolta's opening monologue on the sorry state of Hollywood action films at the start of *Swordfish*, itself a self-consciously mediocre specimen of the genre, all share the same discursive properties as *Vent d'est*.

Casetti develops his point about continuity of enunciation through Bettini's claim that every film operates between two poles, one of which is an "ordering principle" that causes the film to cohere within its diegesis. This pole pertains to enunciation as a basis for textual production. The other pole is the film's "immanent destination," (*Theories* 240) the spectator. What distinguishes Groucho's asides, or Travolta's monologue, is that the tug between the two poles becomes noticeable, accounting for a temporary "tear" in the *énoncé*, and the viewer's presence is felt, even recognized. Casetti claims, however, that in every film the "source" and the "addressee" are woven as "traces of a film's generation" – a set of marks in the formal processes (like point-of-view editing figures, for instance), but some films can also "offer both the actual author and the spectator a ... true symbolic prosthesis." (242) *Inside the Gaze* largely concerns a typology of usages and textual correlatives to them, which provide either such "marks" or such "prostheses." The reason Casetti offers for developing this position is that "the film offers itself to sight" and that the practical (even material) "segregation of spaces" (in Metz's phrase) is overcome by narration which, for Casetti, is operatively equivalent to semiosis in film. The viewer actively constructs what she sees: she selects some details of the image and overlooks others, secures gaps in information by filling in material, through inference, that the film allows but does not provide. The filmic text becomes a site of suggestions that, to a greater or lesser degree, the viewer must complete. Moreover, enunciation never appears as such nor does the subject that it implies. Enunciation can only be seen in the *énoncé* – recognized through fragments ("a series of indices internal to the film"). These fragments (or indices) Casetti organizes under the term "the gaze." The gaze organizes a perspective, a place, a point of view, a pivot around which to organize images and sounds and give them coordinates and form. The gaze, then, is a category of formal operations and the gaze does not appear as such but is indexical in the sense of pointing or indicating. Hence, when we want to put a person in the place of the gaze, an enunciator, Casetti does not mean an author who issues a set of statements but a set of textual-visual operations. The gaze is not exactly some optical point of view – and that fact will entail making a whole typology of operations - but is "linguistic," the "sign of a linguistic operation" roughly equivalent to a "voice" and an indicator of subjectivity (*Inside* 19). However, the gaze does entail camera location or, more broadly, the ideal position of an observer witnessing the scene projected on the screen. So, Casetti (19-20) concludes:

> These alternatives have profound roots: before referring to either a technical installation or a hypothetical position, point of view emerges at the very moment when the enunciation undertakes its own *énoncé* as an object to be transmitted, by orienting the *énoncé* toward a point different from where it was constituted, and thus establishing within its very center an appropriation and an address.

The *énoncé* is constituted somewhere, and now it is constituted at another point, and this entails a double activity: the subject of enunciation divides into an enunciator and an enunciatee. The subject of enunciation exhibits itself more or less openly (as in Groucho's asides) and installs itself in the *énoncé*. It can delegate its work to figures in the filmic text, whether a character or a camera movement, and there is no fundamental difference between those examples where enunciation is openly expressed and those multitudes of film passages "where *énoncé* no longer calls attention to itself but becomes preoccupied with its own contents." (21) So, while there are cases of "enunciated enunciation" when a character looks directly into the camera, cinematic events can and most often do pass beyond the "enunciative frame" to what Casetti terms the "environment" made up of the whole filmic text. Hence, Casetti does not make distinctions that place *histoire* and *discours* in opposition but instead produces a schema of relations the filmic text establishes with the viewer, and to these he assigns pronoun-functions, in effect positions of filmic-narration relations.

In his discussion of the Casetti-Metz debate, Buckland regards enunciation to be a problem Metz casts differently than Casetti. Bettini's smooth "polarity" that Casetti takes over does not apply in Metz's discussion. The blunter difference, however, involves the status and role that linguistic analogy holds. Metz retains enunciation when theorizing the problem of reflexivity in film, and reflexivity is likewise how Metz designs his model of "norms of filmic comprehension." ("Impersonal," 114) But Metz rejects the linguistic analogy that Casetti applies to cinema when he attaches personal pronouns to kinds of cinematic arrangements and shot-types. Metz also rejects the "communication" model that leads Casetti to place "persons" in the circuits of cinematic communication. Casetti and Buckland both rightly suggest that we need to review something of Metz to understand how the differences arise and operate.

In Metz's best-known formulations, which treat cinematic codes, he works as a "taxonomist" of cinematic virtuality. His subject is the semiotic preconditions that permit cinematic textual objects, individual films, to be fabricated and understood. In his astute discussion of Metz's *Language and Cinema*, Casetti observes that in his theorizing of the "singular textual system" (i.e., an individual film taken from the analyst's point of view) Metz changes tack. He devises a method to deal with the filmic text that does *not* coincide exactly with how Metz sets up the potential signifying elements a film might use. In other words, between his "code semiotics" and his "text semiotics" there is a methodological gap that Casetti finds more significant than most commentators have. When Metz develops his taxonomy of codes, he proposes structural orders of codes, and levels and arrays of subcodes. When treating films in their singularity, however, Metz, the taxonomist of codicity recedes and a dialectician of textuality emerges. A filmic text is not an ordered selection of codes, for Metz, a singular structure that deploys codes by execution and combination. Unlike Bettini, Metz does not postulate an "ordering principle" that orchestrates codes and, *a fortiori*, enunciation never takes the role of providing it. Instead, Metz argues that a textual system arises as an operation that transforms codes through their mutual competition, or what Metz calls "displacement." (1974b: 99-105) It is displacement – dialectic among subcodes comprising a code's regional virtuality - when a film achieves concretion that gives rise to its textual system. Metz regards this process as filmic writing.[14]

Casetti takes it that in placing a conflictual idea of filmic writing beside his structuralist modeling of cinematic codes (e.g., the *grande syntagmatique*), Metz opens a division in his film semiotics. Instead of thinking structures/codes (modeled on *langage*) being simply utilized in a singular filmic utterance (a text's *parole*) – a model of a virtual-to-realized progression straight through selection to cinematic realization - *Language and Cinema* passes into what Casetti regards as a "second semiotics" (sometimes termed "text semiotics"). Given Metz's divided theory, Casetti discerns two options: the first posits "tangentially infinite productivity." This option is instanced by Marie-Clair Ropars's adaptation of a theory of film writing in her analyses and her discovery of "the ascent of the unstoppable motion of signification." (*Theories* 146) The second option is "to define the film texts as a coherent, complete and communicative entity,"(147) an option likely to be exercised by film analysts who come under the influence of Eco, and especially *The Role of the Reader*, as Metz himself comments (*Inside the Gaze* xii). Once again the Italian semiotics connection produces a difference in approach.

When Casetti takes the second option as his own he argues that its validity stands on two bases: one, the "internal maneuvers" (Bettini's "ordering principle") a film has at its disposal to produce textual coherence, despite the "material diversity" of cinema and, two, the "contributions of the spectators who shape the meaning of what they see." (147-148) For Casetti, cinema is not only a communication medium; a film's textual coherence depends on the spectator's activity. This already implies that "text semiotics" and enunciation must be coincident. He seems to argue in *Inside the Gaze* that the later is to be privileged because the film must not only originate from an "intending entity" but must also be directed toward a "receptive entity." He provides no developed separate account of "internal maneuvers" in his book; though it is a book that entails a good deal of formal analysis, *Inside the Gaze* offers no theory of film form per se. Casetti allows for considerable seesawing between the text's authority and the viewer's completion. His intention is to put a *person* in place to engage and even fulfill the film's work. For instance, he contrasts "person" with the "silhouette" that "the text creates within the interior of its own limits." (*Inside* 10) And though he accords equal validity to both projected silhouette and person, no balanced model emerges in sufficient relief from *Inside the Gaze*. And though he says that he believes in both a spectator who is "an individual of flesh and blood" and a "symbolic construction" of the film text, and claims that they will interact, he does not explain how these entities are interactive beyond what a reader of *Inside the Gaze* must construe as the film's invitation to act as its "receptive entity." Casetti does outline two methodological approaches potentially relevant to an account of interaction. One he terms the "generative approach" that "delineates the operations by which a text comes to be constituted" and an "interpretive approach" that delineates "what the recipient has at his disposal to unveil the text's meaning." (*Inside* 12) The former approach takes it that the text constructs the receiver, the latter that the receiver constructs the text. Admitting that both approaches cannot be taken together – they would be contradictory - Casetti still insists that one can shuttle between them. He himself does not shuttle between them, or at least not clearly or sufficiently enough to suggest a balanced approach. The twinned approaches have a further shortcoming, namely ambiguity, in that Casetti seems to take the "interpretive approach" to involve interpretation (of meaning, one assumes) while *Inside the Gaze* says virtually nothing about how a film viewer might "read" a film for its significance in the course of receiving the ways its diegesis and the behavior of its elements are constituted.

It is the basic project of Casetti's book to theorize the viewer receiving the film text and completing it and the formal means the film itself deploys to elicit and position that reception and activate completion of the filmic text. In his account, it is obvious, Buckland says, that Casetti "models his theory on speech (on face-to-face conversation)" and on communications (*Cognitive* 52). And so, Casetti constantly elicits deictic concepts from linguistics and elaborates on them through film-language analogies: his enunciation model speaks of *I, you, he*. The film is speaking and the person who watches it communicates with it mutually. Buckland's commentary on the Metz-Casetti debate understandably, then, takes reflexivity as the crux: the film must speak its own presence to the viewer in Casetti's model and acknowledge the viewer's presence to it, as happens in spoken communication. As mentioned above, Metz "implicitly models his theory on writing," says Buckland, and he "reject[s] all deictic concepts (concepts that designate how film is oriented to its contexts of production and reception)." (*Cognitive* 52) Metz rejects such a "communications" model of the film text and does so consistently. In 1964, he expressly rejects "intercommunication" of the film image and viewer when differentiating film codes from *langue* (1974a: 75-77). When his accent later falls on filmic writing, Metz pushes yet further away from analogizing cinema through communicative speech in favour of a strict sense of textuality. From this position comes Metz's sharp criticism of Casetti for using linguistic concepts of the speech situation in order to theorize enunciation in cinema. What effects do these divergent models have on enunciation and reflexivity?

Because of their joint history in film theory, reflexivity and enunciation tend to overlap and this question remains relevant today. Both concepts guide film analysis to indicate how films go about the process of foregrounding the production of their significance, and of opening themselves to a viewer's comprehension, and this is identified with *discours*. Films, like classical Hollywood narrative films, that do not seem to open themselves in this way, parade themselves as *histoire* – as "story" without discursive marks, without marking a point of emission - supposedly lack a reflexive dimension. On this account, *discours* must be regarded as a deliberate gesture a film makes. Enunciation is an *act* a film performs and not a condition of cinematic textuality. The joining of enunciation and reflexivity in this way arises from enunciation's assignment to double role in both accounting for how a text actualizes the virtualities of the cinematic codes *and* of offering an orientation toward its internal meaning-production to the viewer. In practice, many critics sever these roles, however, and do not integrate reflexivity and internal articulation as a matter of theory. They use self-reflectivity as a critical criterion. However, neither Casetti nor Metz may be counted among critics who differentiate films in this fashion. Casetti's claims that the viewer completes the film utterance prompted by the internal organization of enunciation a film performs indicates that films enunciate as a matter of course, by their nature as narrating artifacts. So far Metz concurs, and refers, for example, to any film as a "filmic text." Metz, however, uncouples the double role of enunciation - textual production and reflexivity – from linguistic analogy and from communication.

Buckland finds this uncoupling worked out in Metz's (1982) "Story/Discourse (A Note on Two Kinds of Voyeurism)." The distinction between *histoire* and *discours*, which Metz seems to accept, would seem to make deixis fundamental since, in a basic sense, *discours* means signs of emission. However, Metz precludes deixis because of the way he construes cinematic specificity on material grounds. In a very influential formulation, Metz associates *discours* in visual arts with voyeurism matched with exhibitionism, and *histoire* with a voyeurism that misses its meeting with the exhibitionist. *Discours* means the exhibitionist engages in a relay of looks with her beholder. In theatre, performer (exhibitionist) and spectator (voyeur) can recognize one another because two "looks" are co-present in the same physical situation. Theatre is a particular kind of "speech situation" defined by the co-presence of performer and spectator, however formalized and therefore weaker theatre might make the situation in comparison with two friends talking on a street corner.

The cinema situation is fundamentally different. Metz (1974a: 4-15; 1982:1-87) posits a radical "segregation of spaces" between the film viewer and the screen as a material condition of cinema. The film performer is recorded and production completed before the spectator sees the film. The cinema situation is inherently voyeuristic: we look into a diegetic world that cannot look back. The situation is inherently non-communicational. The viewer-voyeur in a movie theatre cannot expect any recognition from the screen because the exhibitionist is materially absent. Lana Turner struts her stuff in a midriff-bearing two-piece for John Garfield's benefit in *The Postman Always Rings Twice* but Turner will never be an exhibitionist to me. This is likewise true of Groucho or Jean-Pierre Léaud in Godard's *La Chinoise*, or Liv Ullman in Ingmar Bergman's *Persona*, films often cited as examples of cinematic *discours*. These performers are absent when making asides to the film spectator or directly addressing the camera. There is no deixis in a motion picture. The object of the voyeur's gaze cannot be self-reflexive in the sense of deixis – meaning a dedicated set of signs that situate the exchange between two persons — because films know nothing of the spectator's presence.

Metz characterizes narrative film as normatively *histoire* for it does not possess deictic markers and is a spectacle unaware of being watched. The cinema is "monodirectional." ("Impersonal," 145) Metz writes: "The spectator who is present but does not manifest his presence in any respect" – because a film will never (can never) respond to him (150-151). "Traces" of its semiotic production are another story, and so films can be *discours* but only in a different fashion. Reflexivity does occur in film, but its thrust is inward: the text bends toward itself and self-recognizes its principles of composition.

Metz sees the filmic text as any film when examined from the perspective of the analyst. He does not regard reflexivity to be a special case nor does he petition special devices to account for *discours*. Rather it is a quality of filmic textuality that can be brought to light by analysis. In "Impersonal Enunciation," Metz substitutes two other categories to account for reflexivity, metalanguage and anaphor. Metalanguage is the necessary capacity of a language to refer to itself. It is not an autonomous instrument or special feature of language. Buckland uses the example of the sentence, "You should never say 'never'." The first appearance of "never" belongs to object language, which denotes states of affairs outside language while the second refers to language itself, which is what metalanguage does. The difference lies in the denotative function a word performs, and, here in the second instance, the reflexive function and not a special feature of the word "never." Metz applies the same principle to film: "Cinema does not have a closed set of enunciative signs, but refers to one potential function of all textual features." ("Impersonal," 147) Many ordinary types of cinematic construction can have enunciative purposes – for example subjective framing. In this perspective, Hitchcock's *Rear Window* is not radically different from Michael Snow's avant-garde film *Wavelength*. Nor is it potentially less self-reflective *discours* than *La Chinoise*.[15]

Likewise, Metz poses anaphor as an alternative to deixis. Using the sentences "John is ill. He will not be coming to work today," Buckland describes anaphor as a reference made to information already contained in an utterance. Deixis refers to relations between linguistic signs and the real context of speaking. Anaphora are not dependent on the moment of speaking but are features of *writing* and signs internal to a text. They are contained within the utterance without referring to the context of the act of communicating and without requiring special signs. For Metz, then, reflexivity in film is a compositional choice a filmmaker makes in constructing a film text, and not a puncturing of cinema's normative situation, which assigns "absence" to the film spectator.

The influence of Metz's typology in "Story/Discourse" on post-structuralist film theory cannot easily be overestimated. The model of cinematic voyeurism proved powerfully suggestive to feminist critical themes, for example.[16] But, more important is the suggestion that the spectator, because he is not involved in a communication, can be understood as holding a subject position on the other side of the screen where the point of entry into the filmic space lies along a "phantasmic" pathway of the camera's work. For this reason, Metz argues that the viewer's real "identification" in cinema is with the camera. For this reason he repeats, contra Casetti, if anyone speaks "I" in film, it is the viewer, and not the film text.[17] In contrast, Casetti posits that the film says "I" to a viewer "*you*," the addressee of the image-discourse, and from this base Casetti creates a set of permutations, which we examine below. Casetti proposes a kind of democracy of participants on both sides of the screen who collaborate in making the meaning of a film. The 1970s theorists see cinema as a kind of dictatorship of bourgeois illusionism. Classical narrative film seems to efface its own figuration, turning *discours* into *histoire*. The world seems to "tell itself" and this sustains the "classic realist film text" with all the imposture processes of ideological "naturalizations" (Barthes 1972) that entails. In the ideological critiques developed by *Cinéthique* and *Cahiers du Cinéma* (*Theories* 185-197), this process came to be seen as an ideologically complicit machinery of illusion. The "modernist" (or "progressive") film seems necessarily to behave itself like a semiotic analysis of cinema because it acts to unfold discursive properties into open view and the path enunciation takes into reflexivity also forms a kind of resistance to the cinematic dictatorship of *histoire*. The modernist film text "writes" itself and the viewer "reads." The notion of the filmic text, often used this way, distinguishes films like *La Chinoise* that brought into view its self-constructive processes as an enunciative feature.

The reason why enunciation, constructed on such a distinction, once took an important place in film semiotics is clear. It explains how, through internal formal procedures, a filmmaker might qualify or even contradict the ordinary illusionist bond between the viewer and the screen's representations by calling attention to the internal torsions of the film text. From this arises as well the "grammar" of the viewer's relations to what was on-screen (i.e., angle of view, mediation of the look through point-of-view, and so on) that builds up textual forces, and permits even a commercial narrative film (i.e., *Peeping Tom*, *All That Heaven Allows*, *Dance, Girl, Dance*, etc.) to become a "contradictory text." So, despite the fact that cinema lacks a special class of enunciative signs, enunciative acts are available to any filmmaker who seeks to break the bonds of the "classic realist text." On Casetti's account, a film is not a closed and autonomous entity, and this changes the interpretation of enunciation, as well as its critical currency. A film seems to be set up in a deictic relation to the viewer, always opening the way to cinematic communication, and so enunciation proper seems to be a condition of narrative cinema itself. Reflexivity becomes a shared activity of viewer and film under quite ordinary narrational conditions.

In his characteristic fashion of suggesting that concepts succeed one another in ascending order of truth, Casetti claims there have been two models of the spectator. The first is the spectator as *decoder*. This is the implied figure of film semiotics that Metz makes room for when he refers to the viewer's "principle of deciphering" the multiple codes and subcodes and their dialectic in the film text that are opened up by film analysis. The decoder can likewise become a decipherer of a text's reflective aspects. The difference of *Wind from the East, La Chinoise* or *Wavelength* from ordinary narrative films is that each promotes, even forces deciphering, not that it opens lines of communication. Just the same, the viewer seems always a figure positioned on the outskirts of filmic representation casting her gaze into the segregated space-time fabricated on screen; indeed the stronger sense of fabrication that these films engender and their exclusion of the viewer from an illusionary world are both positive critical values. The second and, Casetti believes, successive model, is the spectator as *interlocutor*. This figure, he says, begins to appear variously in literary theory through Barthes' writings on the reader (Barthes 1975), German reception theory (Jauss 1982), Lotman's virtual reader (1977) and, closer to Casetti, Eco's *The Role of the Reader* (1984) and Bettini's *Tempo del Senso* (1979). Casetti's purpose is to secure this newer, yet once-again linguistic (and literary) model to film semiotics and to demonstrate its operations. In his criticism, Metz inevitably argues that Casetti runs into the familiar problem of analogizing linguistic (and literary) concepts into cinematic models.

In comparison with the exclusive role enunciation has often played in contemporary film theory, Casetti is uncommonly generous toward the spectator. He claims the film viewer's "point of view" is always the other side of the "point of view" that organizes events on screen. Casetti's metaphorical use of "point of view" is complicated, as we saw above. It means something like the common sense of "perspective," but he constantly implies that a shared kind of viewing of screen events is entailed. In any case, his model takes the viewer's point of view as necessary weaver of the film's threads. The film is an "organism submitted to and influencing its context." So, it directs itself to "someone who can be expected to show signs of understanding, a subtle accomplice to the character that appears on the screen, a partner who can be given a task and who will carry it out in good faith." (*Inside* 5) This model of enunciation, so closely bound to Casetti's "interpretive approach," necessarily shifts the viewer as it does the object of study, film, when the *interlocutor* appears.

The Situation of the Spectator

The question then becomes: How does the spectator cross the barrier of the screen? On material grounds, Metz denies that the viewer ever does so. Casetti's broad answer is that the film *invites* the spectator into its operations. Slightly less broad, one could say that for Casetti film is not only a material medium, which implies its completeness as a technical apparatus, but is as well – and crucially – narration and narration, Casetti believes (as do many American cognitive narrative theorists) is never itself complete but only to be completed. Although he offers assertions, Casetti provides no sufficient argument for such a position (as does Bordwell [1986]). We are left to construe, on the basis of his observations discussed earlier, that he would be ready to do so. Instead, Casetti focuses the question procedurally: How does a film say "*you*"? With this way of posing the problem, saying that a film opens "in itself a space ready to receive whomever it is addressed to," Casetti invokes the theory of deixis, which he calls "categories of person." When Casetti begins by analysing some examples (e.g., *Bitter Rice*, *Marvin Gardens*, and *Vent d'est*) where the film seems to address the viewer as *you* directly, he discovers that, in fact, films do not really do this. As each sequence develops, it happens that the direct address has been made to some belatedly revealed internal diegetic presence, and has thus been folded back into the *énoncé*. Such passages represent cases of characters looking directly at the camera and breaking a famous taboo of conventional cinema and Casetti regards these passages as "metadiscursive." But he fits them into a scheme which is not discontinuous because "a film bears permanent marks of enunciation" that "accompany the film all along its development," and the viewer is one of these marks. So, even taboo-breaking is no reason to exile the "metadiscursive" to a zone of special discursive acts (reflexivity as an avant-garde gesture); this taboo-breaking takes us to the centre of enunciation as the constantive act any narrative film performs as a film. This is why his scheme concerns *degrees* of explicitness with respect to enunciation, rather than kinds of films.

The basic typology of *Inside the Gaze* is a four-part schema of shots that correspond to associations *I, you, he*, and their combinations and permutations. This schema is set out with respect to positions of the camera. What Casetti terms "equilibrium" is the filmic utterance itself (so, *he*), which corresponds to *historie*. It consists of what Casetti terms the "objective views" that narration itself provides. But, because these objective views presuppose an enunciator (an *I*) and a destination (a *you*, the interlocutor), their presences still remain implicit and operative even when the film is, by definition, presenting unmediated shots of the diegetic world. Next is *interpellation*, when *I and you* meet through a direct address, as happens in the opening of *Bitter Rice* or *Swordfish*. Here the spectator is "set aside" - a *you* "installed opposite the *I* combined with a *he*," the on-screen character. The third type is "*subjective shot*" – the proper optical point of view editing figuration – composed of (at least) two moments, the first showing a character's act of looking and the next the viewer being shown what the character sees (the order of these can be reversed). Here the *he* of the discourse and the *you* (the viewer) become tightly aligned. The fourth type Casetti terms an *unreal objective shot*, drawing his example from a Busby Berkeley-choreographed passage from *The Kid from Spain* in which dancers form one of Berkeley's famous abstract patterns shown from an extreme high angle. Casetti says, it is as if "*You* were *I*" because the viewer surrenders a plausible realistic perspective on the spectacle to assume an unreal but objective position occupied by the camera rather than by an on-screen character. Buckland (*Cognitive* 63) provides a helpful diagram of Casetti's basic typology so far:

Shot (or View)	**Addressee**
Objective	Witness
Interpellation	Spectator set aside
Subjective	Identification with character
Unreal Objective	Identification with camera[18]

Casetti regards it as unproblematical that films can shift among these enunciative registers from moment to moment. It is one of the improvements of his model over suture theory that he regards no whole film to be organized on one modality of enunciation. This flexibility, however, introduces other problems. Even his analyses grow complex and, as he proposes to explain passages and show how a sequence of shots allows us to experience cinematic address, his typology nonetheless remains strictly bound to his typology of *shots* correlated with pronoun correlates. Rather than modeling a film's narrational discourse, or textual system, Casetti restricts himself to one-to-one associations between localized cinematic configurations and personal-pronoun analogies. A complex set of analytical problems arises with a film like Hitchcock's *Rear Window* that thwarts such associations. Here the palpable co-presence of "Hitchcock, the enunciator" (to use Bellour's phrase) and the (optical) point of view of the protagonist and the identificatory engagement of the viewer are modulated programmatically, and with comparative simplicity.[19] Yet, the film's enunciative process eludes ready application of Casetti's model. It is characteristic of, but hardly unique to,[20] Hitchcock's cinema that the text's reflexive "interpretive" posture and the constitution of the viewer are complexly interwoven. But how the two phenomena are to be aligned is made harder to grasp, not clarified, by *Inside the Gaze* without considerable guesswork. There have been various successful solutions, like Branigan's (1992), dealing with these analytical problems to render uncomfortable comparisons one might make with Casetti's principle analytical chapters, "The Figure of the Spectator" and "The Place of the Spectator."

In a narrative film, Casetti says, we find characters and we hypothesize an originator of the diegesis, which we often take to be an author or implied author. Sometimes characters and author diverge, however. There are three basic levels Casetti devises to map this divergence. In a first instance, the viewer encounters an explicit narrator and we can take its "commentary" to "qualify as faithful incarnations of the agent which organizes the film's images and sounds." (35) In this case, the viewer-enunciatee encounters a unified discursive whole, and the implied authorial figure is "metadiegetic." There is also a kind of figure who acts as an internal origin of events and their representation. This figure is what Casetti terms the enunciator and the *you*, the enunciatee, corresponds to that *he*. I would suggest (following Branigan, who concurs with Casetti on this modeling) that we encounter both figures, the authorial "originating agent" and the enunciator, at the start of Rear *Window*. In fact, *Rear Window* is a useful example because it redundantly opens with three similar sequences that provide roughly the same story information but each passage speaks from a different level of narration (Branigan), or figuration of the enunciation.

The first sequence is a series of images, accompanied by theme music, and overlain by the film's credit titles, showing views of the courtyard where the subsequent action takes place. The second sequence is a series of crane and dolly shots that explore the courtyard again, accompanied by local sounds, and then enters and tours the apartment of the sleeping protagonist (played by James Stewart). The third sequence, following a fade, shows portions of the courtyard a third time, now as interposed shots intercut with medium close-ups of the awakened protagonist glancing through his windows while talking on the phone. This is an occasion for him to complain about his situation and to provide exposition (an adventurous photojournalist, he has broken a leg on a job and is temporarily confined to a wheelchair in his studio apartment) while his glances off-screen prompt the intercut long shots of his neighbours across the courtyard that the previous passages surveyed. These shots are now taken from his point of view.

The first passage, which includes the titles, consists of Casetti's "metadiegetic" narration, since it includes the names of the film's makers, etc., that we can take as originators of the film as a whole. The second is the (strongly) implied enunciator with the camera conjuring up the story space, inside and outside the protagonist's apartment, and visually providing expository information that subsequent segments will elaborate. The third, in Casetti's words, "personifies a 'second' point of view at the interior of the *mise en scène* – the 'second' in the sense of alternative and subordinate." (35-36) This second figure, the protagonist, is an "infra-diegetic narrator" unlike the previous two figures because he is entirely confined to the story space of the film. He is not a "full delegate" of the enunciation since his power to prompt shots from his perspective can be revoked, can be made to alternate with objective views, etc. With the appearance of this infra-diegetic narrator figure, the film's discourse becomes "plural" and potentially "fragmentary." In fact, we could, a bit fancifully, regard the first dialogue of Hitchcock's protagonist to be his fractious protest against the undesired situation in which the author and enunciator have placed him, and the three sequences taken together perhaps initiate the divergence between the protagonist "Hitchcock, the author" and "Hitchcock, the enunciator." Now, this is a film in which "Hitchcock" is unusually reticent, and the divergences from the protagonist are not numerous. Nonetheless, they remain notable and are strategically placed in what follows, as always with this director's films.

Casetti remarks that the two types of narration, the enunciatory and the infra-diegetic, will always find some way to unite either through *coordination* or *subordination*. While the enunciator loans the infra-diegetic narrator a capacity to narrate portions of the story, the power can be revoked at any time, as commonly happens and in Hitchcock's films often pointedly, as in *Psycho.*[21] In *Rear Window*, the coordination is overall very close throughout what develops into a murder investigation the protagonist conducts from his apartment. A similar but more complicated case is Siodmak's film noir, *The Killers*. After a prelude, which includes a murder, the detective Riordan enjoys a highly coordinated relation with the enunciator. The characters he interviews in order to piece together the plot behind the murder that opens the film are clearly subordinate to Riordan. They provide narrative information through dialogue and flashbacks.

Casetti errs in suggesting that such arrangements are "a fully 'dialogical' set of relations." (37) Branigan more correctly models the arrangement as "levels" in a hierarchy that allows film narration to shift discourse up and down a scale of enunciative platforms according to degrees of points of origin; i.e., deeper into, or further out to the edge of, the diegesis, beyond which a final narrational determination awaits, with the "meta-discursive" text-making process. Despite allowing for subordination or coordination, Casetti does not, at first, seem to recognize middle ranges between "dialogism" and "absolute homogeneity." There is a lingering "binarism" behind his democratic "dialogism." Under suggestive (and mounting) pressure stemming from his practical applications, however, the middle range grows and becomes dense with distinctions. A flaw in his exposition is that Casetti never systematizes their relations.

When he applies his pronoun-analogues to his shot typology in the chapter "The Place of the Spectator," he joins his first four-part diagram (rendered above by Buckland) to a pronoun model to generate a set of permutations. Following on his discussion of the gaze examined earlier, he calls these the "*four gazes*," and begins with the *objective shot,* "an immediate recording of the facts," and says that here "the enunciator and the enunciatee exist at a level of perfect equality, finding support in a point of view which reveals only what it cannot hide: the *énoncé*." And so, "facing a self-evident *he, she, or it* are an *I* and *You* which are understood without being explicitly present." (47) Here the viewer is a witness. Second is *interpellation*, which "destabilizes" the previous equilibrium. Here a character "gazes" but does not see, because her glance looks toward us, a blind field containing someone unseen. It is the spectator. Therefore, the viewer has no certain role to play in the exchange. He is there acknowledged but "without assuming any precise role." The character looking at the camera "figurativizes" the enunciator (i.e., stands in for the *I*) but the reverse field occupies only an "ideal" point of view. To complicate matters, Casetti holds an expanded sense of *interpellation* beyond the example of the gaze directed at the camera, to such matters as voice-overs that address the viewer, to any case where the *I* comes to be figured in a diegetic character, as occurs in *The Neverending Story*.

In the case of the *subjective view*, the character does not "gaze" but sees only what is shown, in the reverse field of the point of view figure. This is a gaze "without intention," says Casetti. This is difficult to understand since there are no more intent gazes in cinema than the proper point of view shot. The viewer here assumes the role of a character. However, "the conjunction no longer occurs between character and enunciator [as in the look into the camera], but rather, between character and enunciatee in a syncretism achieved through a single act (*I* make both *you* and *her* gaze) as a juxtaposition of two shots or two 'objective' moments neither of which, taken separately, are capable of revealing neither enunciator or the enunciatee." (49)

The pronoun analogues so far:

Objective view: "*you and I, we gaze*"
Interpellation: "*she (he) and I, we gaze at you*"
Subjective view: "*I make you gaze, you equally as her*"

The last type in this scheme, the *unreal objective shot*, receives a more elaborate treatment, because here "the activity of the enunciator and enunciatee are foregrounded, imposed in an obvious manner."(50) For Casetti, apparently, in an even more obvious manner than he had previously reserved for *interpellation* (like Groucho's asides), these are passages, often just single shots, where the camera assumes a position that cannot be motivated by a witness (as if the spectator were present at a scene) or a character's position in the fiction's spaces. Only a camera can occupy an extreme high-angle shot, as in Casetti's example from *The Kid from Spain*. (Hitchcock's high-angle shot ending the UN sequence from *North by Northwest* or any number of the arabesque camera movements from Brian De Palma's films would serve as well) Here, "the enunciator and the enunciatee announce their complicity with each other… 'what you see, thanks to me, is that I alone am able to see: thus *we see*'." (50)

The point of this exercise, which can be taken as Casetti developing a typology to register how pronoun "propositions" are made by cinematic address, is to explain how the four various shot types "activate the audio-visual discourse" in various ways of saying "*you.*" They all make an invitation to the viewer to cross to the screen and take up a position, a pivoting perspective on the spectacle, and they engender an interlocution with the spectator. But they perform another function as well. They anchor images and sounds to "a single point." What is the importance of such a single point? Using an odd expression, Casetti refers to "blocked" and "blocking" structures. He explains that images have to find a structure and these modes of address operate as the context in which "textual fragments" are bound. There are two reasons why this is necessary. The first is that an image must be found along a trajectory between the enunciation as a whole and the viewer, and so images must be placed at a certain discursive point. The other reason why they are "blocked" through mode of address is that one option precludes the others: an enunciative option, say the *subjective shot*, has been exercised and it organizes the shot array. Thus types of shots seem to organize whole passages, at least to the level of the subsequence. This is Casetti's rough equivalent to Metz's concept of "displacement" that we discussed through Casetti's commentary above. One assumes, or guesses, that certain editing figures common to narrative films, like the *alternating syntagma* (also termed parallel editing), are likely to be folded into the *objective view* since no character can enjoy the privilege of simultaneously occupying two spaces.

Casetti now uses this model to indicate how (1) the relation the viewer is "propositioned" to assume and (2) how the attitude the viewer will take is shaped to the images shown in any passage set up by filmic constructions and (3) how it produces kinds of epistemological interlocution that Casetti terms "seeing," "knowing," and "believing." (*Inside* 69-71) Point of view, in Casetti's expanded notion of it, becomes, by the alchemy he terms the "geography of the spectator," a grammaticalized kind of epistemological participation for the film viewer. For example, in the case of the *objective view*, and taking Wyler's deep-focus framing (in *The Best Years of Our Lives*, for instance), the viewer enjoys "freedom" to scan screen space, assuming a neutrality toward the "factual" aspects of the scene with no one there to enunciate, or rather to figurativize, the viewer's scanning action. Such seeing is "exhaustive," the knowing "diegetic," and believing "solid." How, though, did the viewer come to be there before this scene? (55) Simply, the gaze that originates the scene directly – and equitably – goes directly to the one who receives it. There is no figurativizing of the actions of the enunciator and enunciatee. The second segment of the opening passage of *Rear Window* is such a passage; it surveys the situation, which is a simple one of a courtyard and an apartment. The enunciator and enunciatee share in the scan across and around the courtyard and the protagonist's apartment.

On this account, there is no need to evoke the aesthetic mystique of deep focus[22] for the *objective view* to be operative. A mobile camera is neutral in *Rear Window* no less than Wyler's static deep framing in *The Best Years of Our Lives*. This is useful to note because we can go further, says Casetti, and offer two sets of correlated-competing possibilities in "interpreting" the proposition being put to the viewer by the *objective view*. The first two are these: *realism*, where the facts in the representation gave rise to this scene; or *theatre*, where meaning has been produced by a figuration (I think he means of space and figure placement, true of Wyler's film). The second two are: *narrative functionality* "nourished by pure diegesis;" or, *liberty*, which extends the invitation to explore the world *presented* on screen. *Realism* goes with *liberty* as *theatre* goes with *functionality*. The correlations already suggest a viewer inclining toward kinds of epistemological participation, kinds of knowing and belief. How might these alternatives be resolved in theory? At the moment, says Casetti, they cannot be, but he writes:

> [W]hat interests us most is the slope of the destination: what is affirmed is an intelligence ready to act but not to show itself; an ideal spectator elicited and implied by all the details of the scene entirely open to her, but hidden in relation to this scene; a *witness*, we have proposed, who tries to hold her place and, once having done so, will not abandon it (55).

It initially seems odd that *Rear Window* opens the way it does, with a triple redundancy, given the norms of efficient narrative economy associated with the name Hitchcock. After these initial passages, the recurring scans of the courtyard will be repeatedly associated with the protagonist's perspective, and become increasingly purposeful and narratively functional. Yet, the oddity can be explained, just as Casetti suggests, in that, once a viewer has accepted the "proposition" of Hitchcock's opening (which, unlike Wyler's passage, is neither theatrical nor functional in the first instance) as a kind of liberty to see without the protagonist's perspective, she never wholly abandons that sense of independent witness. *Rear Window* can – and does – strategically default to the *objective view* and never without consequences for the viewer's interpretation of the film's plot and significance at various stages of its unfolding. Moreover, even when this is not occurring (in fact it happens seldom), Hitchcock's prelude propositions the viewer to maintain, and never to abandon, a certain reserve toward "identification" with the protagonist's perspective. This sense of a layering of pronoun propositions is not exactly the way Casetti proceeds. As his detailed discussion of Lang's *Fury* shows (67-73), Casetti's analyses find alternations and perhaps completions but find no stratified simultaneities in enunciation, which is to say, no hierarchies in the narrational process and, surprisingly, little room for a viewer's divided loyalties. This likely precludes his account of enunciation from aiding analysis of a whole film since, beyond a certain point tracing alternations, and the ensuing complexity of their interactions, make analytical description impossibly unwieldy.

The second example – and Casetti cycles through all four of his shot types – is *impossible objective view*. In *Gone with the Wind*'s often excerpted crane shot over the Atlanta railway station filled with the Confederate wounded and dead, or Hitchcock's resort to inserting an aerial shot during the "gas station" attack in *The Birds*, there is, Casetti observes, a sudden "expansion of the visual field" that exceeds the tasks of providing narrative information. Putting aside the problem of determining when a camera movement or position exceeds narrative function, Casetti argues that the crane shot arises from the point of view of the enunciator who "fabricates it." What distinguishes such a shot from the *objective view* is that the enunciator and enunciatee are figurativized and the *énoncé* reveals its technical armature. *Gone with the Wind*'s crane shot is palpable as a technique; Hitchcock's high angle shot in *The Birds* is an open display of "special effects." In such shots the "spectator is led to identify with the machine in operation rather than a detached and exterior eye." (57) For this reason, Casetti regards *impossible objective views* as another type of "metadiscursive" knowing for the viewer, and that "believing" is in this case of self-referentiality correspondingly "absolute." (71)

In the case of *interpellation*, the viewer becomes involved in a paradox. An alternation between objective views and direct address to the camera "punctures and supports the narrative." (59) Casetti chooses the "Hoe Down" passage from a musical, *Babes on Broadway*, where the interpellations come fast and furiously but they are very brief, almost percussive in effect. One wonders if the same paradox applies to Groucho's asides or to *Bitter Rice* or *To Die For*. One wonders, too, how *interpellation* can be said to "support" the narrative when breaking the taboo of looking into the camera seems only to "puncture." His example, like others he uses for this mode of address, entails a quick folding of direct address back into another mode. Here, as usual in his examples, *objective views* enfold the interpellating shots he cites from the "Hoe Down" number. Another type can do the enfolding too. In *Swordfish*, a "bullet time" montage follows Travolta's interpellative monologue, which is a contemporary instance of an *impossible objective view*.[23] The value of such passages for Casetti is that when cinematographic representation becomes self-conscious, it is the film's self-construction that is figurativised. Not surprisingly, this is a privilege of interpellation that Casetti associates with a discursive type of knowing, and therefore, with self-referentiality. However, believing here is correspondingly "relative" because it suppresses figurativization.

The protagonist of *Rear Window* does not just spy on his neighbours, he uses binoculars and then a large telephoto lens. Both are, at times, briefly pointed toward the camera. It is commonplace in discussions of this film centering on such passages, to point to its self-reflexive features. They do "puncture and support" the *énoncé* as Casetti suggests, and surely figurativize the film's self-construction. These moments also puncture the narrative because they wrench us from our unselfconscious absorption in the plot's intrigue to attend to our own voyeuristic acts of watching when the active presence of prosthesis of intent looking heaves into our view. The passages also support the narrative, however, because the plot could not continue if the protagonist did not keep looking (and the neighbours fail to notice him doing so), and looking ever closer, which his vision aids allow him to do. However, which type of enunciative operation are such passages within Casetti's framework? The lenses provide a kind of *impossible objective view* because they reveal close-ups of the neighbours and expose a mechanical armature, like the crane shot in *Gone with the Wind*, though in this case the effect is to narrow and concentrate the visual field. They constitute *interpellation* because they entail a gaze toward the enunciatee. Casetti might also explain that they form part of a *subjective view* because they are point of view constructs linked to views of the apartments across the courtyard and because the protagonist is doing the looking. So, we have laid out before us three possibilities. Casetti does not seem, so far, to provide a satisfactory criterion for distinguishing or combining his own types, as this example from *Rear Window* attests.

Casetti uses another Hitchcock film, *Vertigo*, to develop his account of the *subjective view*. If, as we have seen, he indicates that *impossible objective* and *interpellation* tend toward the discursive/metadiscursive, in this case, "[b] y showing images seen through a character's eyes, the film depicts the point from where it is understood… figurativizing its own destination… [and] the enunciatee becomes confused with a component of the *énoncé*, acquiring the status of observer…the presumed spectator of the film merges into a character, adopting the latter's perceptive faculties, movements, and attitudes." (61) Some of the claims here are uncertain. In the example taken from *Vertigo*, the terror of falling from a great height is restricted and shared by the protagonist and the viewer but there is no sense that we are "confused" with him since we are seated comfortably while he is dangling over an alley. In *Rear Window* things are more complicated. For one thing, the protagonist, like us, remains comfortably seated and watchful. Nonetheless, we may not become confused with any part of the *énoncé* – we can reserve our perspective - nor wholly take on the protagonist's "attitudes." In *Rear* Window we do recognize that he is the dominant figure of our reception of the film and, in some senses, we do share the film's destination and become as perturbed as he when his progress toward a solution of the murder mystery is postponed.[24] And, in *Vertigo* Casetti could find strong examples of what he calls confusion in the immensely redundant passages during which the protagonist secretly follows the heroine around San Francisco, falls in love and then loses her, unaware that she is masquerading as someone else. In this case, the deception he experiences becomes our own until, in a sudden enunciatory shift to the woman's perspective, our deception (but not his) is exposed.

The solution to such "textual" distinctions does not appear in Casetti's scheme in the way we have just extrapolated. We may generally wonder if working with his models depends on the analyst's discernment. The fact that his detailed analyses are convoluted and depend on Casetti's own considerable discernment thickens this suspicion. In the discussion of "The Geography of the Spectator," Casetti adds another layer, the last to be discussed here. Casetti loosens his binds between spectatorship and his pronoun propositions by addressing filmic space (63). He writes: "[A] gaze can also put the scene at a distance to be considered in terms of the manner of existing as much as its content." (64) A viewer sees what has already been seen, and seen by someone else. In these cases, the *you* arrives at the *énoncé*. There is considerable variation as to what can happen when this occurs and Casetti terms the complex of possibilities "aspectualization." The schedule of "aspects" becomes complicated in Casetti's permutational style of exposition. But here we can at least isolate the four terms he uses — *dimension*, *order*, *limits* and *status* – and the binary organization of their corresponding usages.

Dimension concerns the scope of the image. Is it wide and full or enfolding and fragmented? Order concerns how one lends hierarchy to the elements in the film frame. Do they protrude or recede? Limits concern enframing itself. Does it involve off-screen space? Status concerns whether the scene shown is complete (as in a tableau in *Eden et après*, *Barry Lyndon,* or *Late Autumn*), or does it happen as it is being shown (as in *Rules of the Game*, *Asphalt Jungle* or *The Passenger*)?

Casetti says that this schedule provides a "direct link between the act of reception and the form of the film's space." (65) A possibility, pertaining to *status*, is that enunciation is organizing as it goes and "it confirms the *you* as its prolongation and extension." In this case the film's "self-offering" is "truly superimposed" upon textual "self-construction." (65) Another possibility is that the eye of the viewer sees a reality already constructed and autonomous and models this world through its own acts. In this case, one obtains "an authentic geography integrating the representation as well as its addressee." In the *objective* configuration, the viewer is a silent witness and faces such a neutral space. In the *impossible objective* configuration, the viewer is embodied in the camera (i.e., the mobile spectator) encounters a "modulatable" space. In *interpellation*, the viewer is implicated but held at a distance for space hangs on "a radical opposition between off-screen and on-screen fields." (66) This space is "asymmetrical" unlike the previous two. The *subjective* configuration meets a non-homogeneous space because of "a powerful degree of focalization." Such a space is "appropriated."

"Only just completed, the above analysis leaves open a number of questions," writes Casetti. These he develops through an elaborate analysis of a passage from *Fury*. This leads him to make a semi-final correlation, which is schematized below (71).

	Seeing ———	*Knowing* ———	*Believing*
Objective	Exhaustive	Diegetic	Solid
Impossible Objective	Total	Metadiscusive	Absolute
Interpellation	Partial	Discursive	Relative
Subjective	Limited	Intradiegtic	Transitory

There are several issues one might raise with Casetti's model, not the least of them unwieldy complications that his layered analytical applications to individual films seem to provoke in *Inside the Gaze*. They complicate further rather than clarify what is, in fact, a very suggestive and well-founded typology. The basic problem with it is that Casetti devises no instrument to move from one type to another smoothly in analysis (in effect, in any demonstration) and this is borne out by the ballooning complexity of his own analyses, which deal with only small fragments of films.[25] In some important ways, then, his account of enunciation remains unresolved even in his own terms, which even this lengthy review has by no means exhausted.

Intractable Problems with Casetti's Model

The problems with Casetti's model that Metz frames come down to a more fundamental issue. Metz casts them as three objections: anthropomorphism, artificial use of linguistic concepts and the transferal of filmic enunciation into real communicative relationships ("Impersonal," 151). The anthropological error lies in confusing situations with personalities. For Metz, a film may set up a "target" but this is not precisely the same as an enunciatee (or addressee). When a film is shown, Metz agrees, we may assume the presence of a viewer but the filmmaker is not there. The filmmaker and the filmic utterance did have an encounter, in the making of the film; the viewer only has her encounter with the text. There is no *you* or *I* present. Casetti sets out for enunciative poles "that call for embodiment." In fact, says Metz, the *film* is the enunciator, the film as the source (of significance) of acting (on the spectator), of an activity with an orientation. So, "what the spectator faces, what the spectator has to deal with, is the film." (150) Casetti's anthropologising leads him from "the first person of the verb in language" to positing his enunciator as a type of person involved in some exchange with the viewer. The slide lands into confusion between "[t]wo heterogeneous orders of reality, a text (that is ... a thing) and persons." (151) The misapplication of linguistic concepts is, then, that Casetti assigns personal pronouns to agents when in fact, "the 'enunciator' is incarnated in the only available body, the body of the text, that is a thing, which will never be called on ... which is not in charge of any exchange with some You." (150) Film does not permit two personal "presences" because the author has vanished behind the production and "the spectator, who is present, does not manifest his presence in any respect because the film can never respond to him." (150-151)[26] The error is the familiar one encountered in enunciation theories of film: Casetti's false analogy between natural language exchanges and cinematic representation, which leads him to confuse the cinema situation with real language communication. Metz's further criticisms detail the subordinate features of the basic cinematic situation with respect to point of view, the role of dialogue, etc. Buckland draws out the systematic differences in this summary:

> Casetti models film on the immediacy and symmetry between filmic enunciator and addressee, as in a dialogue. Metz argues for the mediate and non-symmetrical nature of relation between filmic enunciator and addressee – as in writing. This relationship is non-symmetrical because one of the functions of writing is to dispense with the presence of the enunciator... . Similarly, Metz dispenses with the filmic enunciator because of the way he conceives the realities of the filmic medium – it resembles a recording activity and permanence of writing rather than the immediacy and impermanence of speech. More specifically, Metz conceives film as a particular type of writing, namely *histoire*, which Benveniste defined by its absence of deictic markers (*Cognitive* 67).

Buckland goes on to point out that Metz regards cinema to be a medium that "can only orient itself to its own internal spatio-temporal relationships." (68) A film can articulate to the spectator its "text-as-act" but this enunciation, adds Metz, "is always enunciation on the film … it does not give us any information about the outside of the text but only that the text carries in itself its source and destination." ("Impersonal," 40) This last point is an odd one to make, since Casetti does not, in fact, even suggest that there is any "information" exchanged between spectator and film that is outside the text. His whole account concerns the exchange that occurs in a communication circuit between the film and the viewer who share a situation exclusively constituted by watching a film. Although he seems to find it sufficiently devastating that he does not come to Casetti's defense at all, Buckland is unsatisfied with Metz's critique and tries to develop a "non-linguistic" deixis of his own drawing from gestalt and cognitive theories. This effort is barely sketched and scarcely suggests Casetti's elaborate schema. But, what is more arresting is that Buckland regards Metz's critique of Casetti to preclude film analysis. The way he runs his argument is clear in the following:

> It seems to me that Metz's theory of impersonal filmic enunciation is an enunciative theory implicitly based on the premises of deconstruction – most notably, the inherent indeterminacy of texts. The evidence is his refusal to consider relations between the text and its extra-textual contexts of production and reception, as well as in the way he reserves some of Casetti's deictic formulas, thereby rendering them indeterminate (*Cognitive* 73).

Casetti might well agree with Buckland judging from the section of *Theories of Cinema* when he discusses two possible tendencies in Metz's later "textual semiotics" and assumes that one more directly arising from it does incline toward "indeterminacy"; he calls it "tangentially infinite productivity." However, it is difficult to take Buckland's supposedly more direct evidence seriously. In structural analysis, the point is (Buckland explains) to model a structure whose effects are perceived whereas the structure that determines them is not perceived. The problem with the method is that "it diminishes the text, reduces it to a preconceived structural grammar." (73) The modernist text is often valued because it produces '"discrepancies" which prevent it from reducing to a structural grammar.

There are two problems with Buckland's view of Metz. First, Metz is not a thoroughgoing structuralist, as Casetti shows in *Theories of Cinema*, but only in the parts of his semiotics when he seeks to establish the cinematic code. He becomes another kind of analyst when dealing with single textual systems. There, it seems to me, Metz leaves ample room in his theory for reflexivity of texts and ways in which they might therefore reflect on their own construction. He hardly diminishes the text and, in fact, Casetti insists that Metzian "text semiotics" makes the textual system much denser than allowing for some unifying principle to control its productivity. Following in the path of Eco, Casetti's enunciation theory seeks, among other things, to control textual productivity, blocking its excessive (or "infinite") semiosis and bringing it into the circuit of communication. To suggest Metz is a deconstructionist, or at least that *Language and Cinema* affords the prospect of a kind of indeterminate analysis is nonetheless different from suggesting that Metz's refusal to accept a theory of "extra-textual contexts" makes him a deconstructionist. The different problem, which Casetti opens up following the line of Italian film semiotics, is that Metz does not consider the text's system to be built on a communicative principle of internal coherence because the film viewer is its destination and completion; therefore, the filmic text opens communicatively toward interpretive acts. What remains murky is the question of whether and, if so, how, a text has to be opened – whether through some version of deixis – to a viewer's "embodied" response in order to possess a cogency of its textual system and whether that communication is hypothetically amenable to analysis and/or interpretation, or comprehension of explicit referential meaning. Casetti insists his is a semiotic model of communication but develops no model of interpretation. Judging from his own often tangled sample analyses, *Inside the Gaze* is no model of film analysis that helps anyone to discern that hypothesized principle of internal coherence relevant to a whole filmic text.

But Buckland makes the truly unjustified leap, it seems to me, when he claims that "Metz's deconstructive position foreshadows" some one like Judith Halberstam (1995). Her discussion of *The Silence of the Lambs*, Buckland's example, concerns how the film might be interpreted, how its themes and attitudes might be secured critically. Halberstam proposes no systematic analysis of the film and seems rather to be reporting on how communities of spectators (the film was once controversial) regard the film and how, in light of the historical development of the film's reception context, it becomes extremely difficult for a critic to provide a convincing interpretation of the film. This is not Metz's subject in "Impersonal Enunciation." Nor is Halberstam's problematic related to deconstruction. In any case, this is not the only way to construe the issue of "extra-textual contexts," which is not the same thing as the situation of the film viewer in cinema's communicative circuit or the status of enunciation, which are among Metz's themes in "Impersonal Enunciation." There is, in fact, nothing in Metz's critique of Casetti that precludes a full analysis of the text of *The Silence of the Lambs* that at the least opens it to interpretive debates. Metz may well allow for "extra-textual contexts" even without theorizing them. However, and this is the difference that matters in the critique of Casetti, Metz refuses to place these external "contexts" inside the fabric of the film text as a matter of their enunciation. Buckland's discussion raises the question of whether the critic might do better with Casetti when approaching *The Silence of the Lambs* than with Halberstam.[27] *Inside the Gaze* suggests that one would, but that the process of doing a full job of it would be cumbersome, and that, at least, indicates that Casetti has restarted a dimension of Metzian film semiotics after all.

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Notes

1. Published originally in French as "Les Yeux dans les yeux," *Communications* 38 (1983): 78-97.
2. In this regard see Andrew's neutral "Preface" to *Sub-Stance* 51 (1986): 3-7, a collection of Continental film criticism which he edited, and which includes an essay by Casetti (1986: 69-86). Andrew takes the view that these essays represent new initiatives in film analysis but he makes no mention of the systematizing that film semiotics entails in connection with such analysis.
3. Pasolini (cited in Muscio and Zemignan 1991:24) writes: "The linguistic instrument on which cinema is based is therefore of a more or less irrational type." The instrument Pasolini means is the film image. The essay "The Cinema of Poetry" is translated in Lawton and Barnett (1988).
4. See, however, *Enclitic* 5/2-6/1 (Fall 1981-Spring 1982) which includes an interesting assessment of Metz's code semiotics by David Bordwell (125-136) and its relationship to film-history research into cinematic styles, an area where in fact Metzian semiotics exerted a subtle and continuous influence through the 1980s.
5. Metz's contribution to post-structuralist film theory, *The Imaginary Signifier* (1977/1982), had immense influence and prestige.
6. Although the University of Texas edition does not mention it, the first version of the book, published as *Teorie del Cinema del Dopoguerra a Oggi* (Milano: Bompiani), dates from 1978. It seems that Casetti has rewritten the book, then, at least three times.
7. Casetti also introduces another category he terms "field theories," by which he means miscellany, like sociology of film.
8. Exceptional in this respect is Raymond Bellour, who preceded Metz in combining semiotic "code" analysis and psychoanalysis in his studies of passages of Hitchcock's films (1979/2000) and this should be mentioned because while Bellour is perhaps the best known of Metz's younger colleagues in Anglophone film studies, he is not the most typical.
9. See Silverman (1983) for expositions; also see MacCabe (1985).
10. But which Metz recognized, as he does in "Crossing over the Alps and the Pyrenees," xi-xii (Casetti 1998).
11. Nonetheless, as a contribution to the current trend to enrich the history of film theory overall, alongside the work of Abel, Rossen, Carroll, and others, Casetti's book is to be valued. Making "denser" accounts of film theory's past makes it a more flexible and useable tradition of reflection on cinema.
12. It is impossible to portray any sense of this confusion in a short note, beyond indicating that, in the late 1960s, McLuhanism, auteurism, Bazinian realism, a variety of aesthetic modernisms, cybernetics, the existing variety of "classical film theory," the extant histories of cinema, communications theory, all clamored to define the discipline of cinema studies. Gene Youngblood's *Expanded Cinema* (1970) conveys the hyperbolic variety of these theoretical enthusiasms, which Youngblood shares.
13. J.P. Simon, *Le Filmique et le comique* (1979).
14. On the problems of subcodes and displacement, see Bordwell (1992) who suggests an empirical history of film practices that can isolate select subcodes in their periods of predominance (for example the subcodic choice of cutting or panning to reframe an action on screen in the late 1920s). John Mowitt takes a much dimmer view of the prospects of resolving what he regards as basic contradictions in Metz's theory of filmic writing (1992: 151-153).
15. Of course, the manner of self-reflectivity will differ in each instance. *Rear Window* continually introduces figures of and dialogues about voyeurism to suggest the situation of the film's viewer. *Wavelength* may be said to materialize some features of camera work, and especially the zoom lens, and their effects on cinematic space, while *La Chinoise* works closely with framing, frontality and sound-image relations and the effects that arise from the systematic limitation.
16. Because Lana Turner cannot look back, according to Mulvey (1975), it is her definition to appear in a film as a "to-be-look-at-ness," though Mulvey departs utterly from Metz when she argues that the viewer does his looking through John Garfield, who carries the look of the camera with which the viewer identifies into the diegesis by means of his point of view and it solicits the viewer's identification in gazing upon Ms. Turner.
17. Metz elaborates his analysis of the camera-I relation in *The Imaginary Signifier* (1982).
18. Casetti's own diagram of his schema (*Inside* 71) is more complicated.
19. Compared, that is, to *Citizen Kane* or *Last Year at Marienbad*, Oliver Stone's *JFK*, or other films of similar narrative ambition.
20. For example, the Canadian director Denys Arcand has consistently used parallel plotting and crosscutting to sever or sharply qualify a viewer's tendency to associate with any character's perspective.
21. In *Psycho*, the character Marion Crane is almost perfectly coordinated with the film's enunciation during the first forty minutes, that is, until a murder abruptly terminates her role. While this is a very dramatic example, it is completely commonplace for films to shift away from character narrators at will.
22. Casetti's use of Wyler recalls that Bazin's account of deep focus framing in the director famously possesses all the mystique of his aesthetic realism. Hitchcock's mobile camera in *Rear Window* has no such aesthetic reputation.
23. "Bullet time" montage consists of a series of staggered still images shot with an array of cameras arranged in multiple overlapping angles and controlled by computer. It first came into feature film use with *The Matrix* (1999).
24. Indeed, Hitchcock, the enunciator, intrudes exactly at moments when the protagonist's investigation into the murder seems to be derailing, notably for a montage sequence that boldly leaves the restriction of the hero's apartment and assumes perspectives impossible to any character.
25. See Casetti (1986) for his discussion of Antonioni and Hitchcock, which are clear and contained analyses that indicate that he feels no compulsion to apply more than a portion of his model to deal with particular films.
26. Metz does not consider the possibility of other persons being involved in the cinematic situation, such as the testimony of real people in a documentary, where the vanishing act of the film's maker might well be beside the point when the sole conveyance of the message of a political prisoner or an Andean explorer is the film before us and we already know that these persons have disappeared, before a firing squad or an avalanche.
27. This question is unanswerable here but *The Silence of the Lambs* is not in fact a film of complex enunciative design. However, even a glance at Halberstam's consideration of the film suffices to indicate that her concerns (the postmodern horror film) do not speak to those of Metz or Casetti.

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