

## SPECIAL TOPIC: AFTER PSYCHOANALYSIS

### What's Next For Psychoanalysis?

Editorial by Todd Dufresne

Already in the 1950s some were proclaiming the twentieth century the "psychoanalytic century." As it happened, they were right. But to which psychoanalysis were they referring? For clearly there has never been one psychoanalysis, as scholars of various persuasions have noted. Even during Freud's life as a psychoanalyst, from 1896-1939, we find a multitude of possible psychoanalyses at work. Freud himself is responsible for this situation, since he changed his views as often as he wished - with or without comment. As for Freud's most gifted followers, such as Otto Rank, Carl Jung, and Sandor Ferenczi, they quite naturally took this important lesson to heart: they made psychoanalysis their own. Of course, only Freud was permitted to do as he pleased without being judged a heretic or "wild" analyst. Only Freud could wander from the path of true psychoanalysis, even if there never was one.

Debate among the many variants or, better, deviants of psychoanalysis - namely, among all of them - has therefore proven interminable. Yet as Sonu Shamdasani argues, interminable debate among competing psychoanalyses has been good for the promulgation of "psychoanalysis." With the Index of the *Standard Edition* in hand, nearly anyone can find ample evidence that the latest fad is sponsored by something Freud once said, almost said, or should have said. Let's just face it: Almost all opinions are possible in the psychoanalytic literature, especially when it is a matter of grounding theories on a surfeit of fictional case studies concocted by Freud and his followers.

That this history is far less scientific than politico-religious is obvious to almost anyone outside the analytic fold. But one still cannot assume such awareness among the many intellectual players of psychoanalysis, let alone among the (as a rule) less educated, practice-oriented therapists. Here's a provocation: How many 20<sup>th</sup> Century theorists, most of whom have some stake in psychoanalysis, would admit that their intricate interpretations have only

fed the politico-religious history of that movement? And another: How many semioticians would see their interpretive work as part of the recent history of exegesis of the divine word of Freud? Such provocations are intended for my colleagues who, through interpretive strategies that seek to repair, complete, or even dismantle some version of psychoanalysis, have to that very extent - sometimes ironically-continuously refashioned the foundation(s) of the movement today. In this respect, to echo something Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen has said, sophisticated partisans of Freud are grateful when intellectuals spin these theoretical yarns, at times beautifully and creatively executed; when they set up psychoanalytic instruction in universities, no matter how critical or, more likely, sycophantic; when they publish yet another article or book on psychoanalysis, no matter how ill-informed or dim-witted; and when a review journal such as the SRB devotes more column inches to the latest thinking about psychoanalysis. And why wouldn't they? Psychoanalysis is not just a theory, but a therapy; and not just a therapy, but a culture; and not just a culture, but a business. The products of intellectual activity are an essential part of this economy; an economy in which many intellectuals remain heavily invested.

Of course, even heavily invested intellectuals, weighing the evidence, critically reflecting upon their own beliefs, can change their minds. They might even catch up to a popular culture that has largely moved beyond psychoanalysis; where Freudian ideas are bandied about, not because people believe them, but where they function as a kitschy short-hand for making a facetious point or generating easy laughs. In short, psychoanalysis is good for the knowing writers and viewers of *The Simpsons*.

So what, then, is next for psychoanalysis among intellectuals? First some consideration as to what we should not do: We should not continue to

churn out more interpretive justifications, each one more delirious than the last, for some variant of Freudianism. The throne is empty, was always empty, and the subjects of analytic discourse should be set free. The prescriptive morality of this position will no doubt make some intellectuals uncomfortable, trained as they sometimes are to suspend judgements of that sort. But any theory that directly impacts people's lives is *already* a moral matter. Failure to face up to this responsibility with thoughtfulness is, I submit, a coward's game - among other things. As for what we could do, I have four contenders for the task. First, we could re-consider the unfashionable views of scholars we might otherwise ignore. For example, post-structuralists could take the time to figure out what scholars like Allen Esterson and Frank Cioffi think about Freud's lies and fictional case histories. Or theorists might reconsider the work of historians, such as Edward Shorter, with whom they do not share a belief in, say, the biological bedrock of medical discourse. Intellectuals usually have good reasons for their views, and it behooves us to understand what they are. Second, theoretical work could be inflected with historical insight. History, such as that provided in these pages by Shamdasani and Horst Gundlach, is often surprising, and it is against these surprises that we can productively trace and even measure our shiny new insights and/or theories. Third, in a spirit of openness, we could provide an avenue for dissenting views, including informed pro- and anti-psychoanalytic views. And so, in these pages, Fuhito Endo argues that psychoanalysis, while not without its problems, is indeed good for something: in the Japanese context, it is good for undermining a fascistic nationalism. And finally, fourth, we could all use more humour and frank disclosure in our work. Unlike Alphonso Lingis' delightful recollection of Lacan contained herein, too much work on both sides of the debate about psychoanalysis is tiresome, humourless, and obscurantist - and symptomatically so. It is lack of humour and candid assessment, first and foremost as it concerns one's own investments in psychoanalysis, that makes rigid dogmatists the scourge of the field.

If these four criteria are any measure, this special issue of the SRB is a model of how to think about psychoanalysis in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Best of all, the contributors to this international effort demonstrate that the investment of deep thought about an old subject can still enrich us all.

Note to Readers: Look for Adolf Grünbaum's candid review of Elisabeth Roudinesco's *Why Psychoanalysis?* in a future issue of the SRB.

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#### Contents Pages

<b>What's Next For Psychoanalysis?</b> Editorial by Todd Dufresne	1
<b>Kojin Karatani &amp; The Return of the Thirties:</b> Psychoanalysis in/of Japan Fuhito Endo	2
<b>Psychoanalysis &amp; The Story of "O":</b> An Embarrassment Horst Gundlach	4
<b>Psychoanalysis Inc.</b> Sonu Shamdasani	5
<b>Facticity, Freud, &amp; Territorial Markings:</b> SRB Interview With Frank Cioffi & Allen Esterson T. Dufresne	11
<b>Deflections: SRB Interview With Edward Shorter</b> T. Dufresne	12
<b>Recalling Lacan: The Unstamped Letter</b> Alphonso Lingis	14

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# Kojin Karatani & The Return of the Thirties: Psychoanalysis in/of Japan

Fuhito Endo

## 1. Returns of the Romantic Discourse of “Japanness”

According to Jacques Lacan, “psychoanalysis in Japan” is neither possible nor necessary; hence his wish to make Japanese readers close his book the moment they open it.<sup>1</sup> This arrogant assertion in the preface for the Japanese translation of *Écrits* is, of course, far from discouraging: Lacanian psychoanalysis, or what is sometimes called the “French Freud,” is no doubt among the most marketable commodities for “high brow” publishers in Japan. We know so well, to our chagrin, that Lacan’s high-handed enigmatic aphorism, while baffling our understanding, nevertheless (or rather therefore) attracts us unfailingly, thus serving as a good marketing strategy. It is the uniqueness of the Japanese language, Lacan stresses, that makes impossible “psychoanalysis in Japan”; a uniqueness that can work to stimulate the self-conscious nationalism of Japanese intellectuals, conservative or otherwise, who tend to feel flattered by any theory that renders Japan exceptional.

Nonetheless, Kojin Karatani, a most radical, bitter critic of the ideology of “Japanness,” is inspired by this preface.<sup>2</sup> What draws his attention is Lacan’s materialistic/linguistic interest in the system of Japanese letters, which, Karatani believes, helps deconstruct any romantic, a-historical discourse of “Japaneseness” - thereby disclosing “the historicity of the *écriture* by which history is constructed.” (Karatani was a close friend of Paul de Man, whose critique of “aesthetic ideology” is notable for its perusal of textual materiality. In a certain way Karatani’s criticism might thus be described as “deconstructive,” yet it must simultaneously be noted that he is extremely critical of the “post-modern,” pseudo-Derridian indulgence in “textual play,” which he sharply distinguishes from de Man’s essentially politico-ideological “close reading”). To repeat, Karatani’s focus is on Lacan’s interest in the materialistic dimension of the Japanese language. They both show especial interest in the “unique” way in which *kanji* (Chinese ideograms) was introduced into Japanese, emphasising the fact that *kanji* is read two ways phonetically [*on*], a reading that is similar to the Chinese sound, and semantically [*kun*], that is, a reading using native Japanese sounds.” Which is to say that “Japanese sound can be directly transferred to the use of *kanji*. In other words, aside from its sound, one can receive the meaning of *kanji* visually.” Karatani is here reminded of Freud’s representation of the unconscious as a hieroglyph, which gives a clue to Lacan’s elusive statement: “in Japanese the distance from the unconscious to the spoken language is palpable.” Lacan’s implication here is, Karatani argues, that the unconscious (= hieroglyph) is exposed in Japanese consciousness, instead of being repressed. Hence Lacan’s declaration that “psychoanalysis in Japan” is not only unnecessary but also impossible. *Linguistically* speaking, therefore, there is neither “the unconscious” nor “repression” that enables Lacan to psychoanalyse the Japanese.

In this context, further, Karatani attempts to explain in a Lacanian terminology “a common phenomenon when one civilization encounters another, more advanced one.” In such cases - the encounter between Korea and China, for instance - “Lacanian castration is the inevitable consequence of intervening in the symbolic order, namely, the world of articulated language (= culture).” Psychoanalytically, the Japanese way of intervening in the symbolic order of Chinese ideograms through *their own native* sounds, rather “unique” an

“encounter,” suggests the absence of complete “castration.” Japanese *écriture* could thus be seen as a historical product of the Lacanian “foreclosure” of primal repression.

Karatani might sound a devoted Lacanian, but he isn’t. His use of Lacan here is highly strategic: to resist the romantic representation of “Japanness” as a product of, say, “the ancient substratum” of “the racial unconscious.” He surveys the ideological manners in which the cultural peculiarities of Japan have recurrently been viewed as “the cohabitation of foreign and native elements” without any serious conflict inside. This was sometimes idealised as “Japanese religious magnanimity” or (in)famously figured as “a reservoir and museum of the Asian civilization.” Of course, the “unique” Japanese way of absorbing foreign cultures should not be attributed to “the depths” of their “collective unconscious” - “the womb of the Japanese earth mother,” as a Jungian scholar puts it. On the contrary, Karatani claims, such “uniqueness” - based on “the cohabitation of foreign and native elements” - is characteristically exposed on “the surface” of the Japanese language: the way of reading/absorbing Chinese ideograms through *its own native* sounds [*kun*]. Referring to Lacan’s materialistic/linguistic approach to the “uniqueness” of Japanese, Karatani thus concludes: “If there is anything on earth that can be deemed Japaneseness, it is this system [i.e., this *kun*].” This is precisely what Karatani means by “the historicity of the *écriture* by which history is constructed.” It is noteworthy that Karatani’s careful distinction between Jungian “depth” psychology and Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis is intended to deconstruct the former romantic discourse by means of the latter verbal/textual approach, thereby revealing the “historical” fact that something “deep” is a linguistic/ rhetorical product of the “surface”/ “*écriture*.”

Karatani is well aware of the possibility that even this sort of analysis, despite its intention, could encourage the ideologues of “Japanness,” effectively reinforcing their discourse in Lacanian terms. It is for this reason that he radically and strategically historicises his psychoanalytic discussion “in the context of the Far Eastern geopolitical structure.” The foreclosure of Lacanian castration - i.e., the primal repression by the Chinese, which made possible “Japanness,” including the “unique” system of the Japanese Emperor - is a result of the simple fact that “Japan has never been ruled by foreign forces, thanks to Korea.” Karatani thus drastically reduces something “Japanese” - whether cultural, linguistic, or political - to the historical, geographical fact that “the Korean Peninsula exists between China and Japan.”

The reason for my focus on Karatani is that, while “psychoanalysis in Japan” is often a “post-modern” fashion on the university campus, his use of Lacan and Freud - in sharp contrast to current trends, and not only in Japan, of which he is highly critical - is clearly motivated by a sense of crisis. Karatani’s psychoanalysis of “Japanness” is an attempt to resist a growing tendency towards reactionary politics in Japan since its economic recession in the 1990s. Quite obviously, what urges him to re-read psychoanalytic texts *now* is a series of actual political events that might be termed “the return of the thirties” in Japan. That said, Karatani’s target is not limited to recent political situations in Japan. His pressing concern is a critique of “Japan’s own condition of modernity within universal modernization.” And this is a concern that extends far beyond any analysis of psychoanalysis in Japan.

## 2. “A Freudian Marx”: the Problematic of Repetition/Representation

In this sense, Karatani’s psychoanalytic re-reading of *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* demands our particular attention, for he re-evaluates this text as a penetrating observation of Freud’s “repetition compulsion” in “a universal model of fascism.” His Freudian examination of Marx is successful enough to foreground “a certain structure” that repeats itself in the 1870s, the 1930s and the 1990s “beyond their periodical differences” - “the repetition compulsion in the political domain” as “the return of the repressed.” To be sure, it is often said that the 1930s are similar to the 1990s, especially in terms of the crisis of global economy and parliamentarism, and in terms of the decisive defeat of the left wing. Yet Karatani’s interest is not in “events themselves, but in the form immanent in them” - namely, “the issues of representation in the parliamentary system and in the capitalist economy, both forming the modern problematic of ‘representation’ par excellence.”

What distinguishes *The 18th Brumaire* from a mere journalistic reportage is, Karatani claims, Marx’s insight into the “inevitable crisis,” or “the unfillable void” of the modern parliamentary system created by the “arbitrary” relationship between the representer and the represented. Marx emphasises that “parties and their discourses are detached from the real existing classes, or rather that the real existing class is a sort of ‘class unconscious,’ as observed by Kenneth Burke, which comes into consciousness only in the discursive domain of the representer.”<sup>3</sup> It was precisely this “arbitrariness”/ “void” between the representer (i.e., “the parties and their discourses”) and the represented (i.e., “the real existing classes”) that turned Louis Bonaparte - “a nobody except for being a nephew of Napoleon” - into Emperor representing all classes. Clearly discernible here is a collective desire (beyond class interests) for an imaginary solution to the crisis of the representative system; an impossible yet necessary drive to fill “the unfillable void,” the “gap” between the representer and the represented.

It is worth remembering that “the hole that the representation or parliamentary system contains is the King, whom the very system has executed and banished.” Of crucial importance, then, is the fact that the representative system, which made Bonaparte the nobody Emperor, was realised by democratic universal suffrage. Having thus argued, Karatani warns us: “Hitler’s regime arose out of the Weimar Republic, from its ideal representative system. And though often ignored, the Japanese emperor-fascism of the 1930s was not the result of a military coup, but gradually consolidated after the realization of universal suffrage in 1927 and the crisis that followed.” Karatani’s “void,” reminiscent of the Lacanian “real” or “lack,” thus makes the modern/democratic system of representation at once possible *and* impossible, while producing a compelling drive for “the directness” of the representer (as signifier) in the manner of Freudian “repetition compulsion.” What matters in analysing fascism is, therefore, not “a mythos descended from ancient times, as advocated by some cultural anthropologist,” but “a lack immanent in the modern system of representation.”

The modern representative system, thus psychoanalytically re-defined, provides us with “a prototype or a matrix of fascism,” which is to say, “a form of Bonapartism.” Theoretically speaking, this term is comprehensive and flexible enough to explain even “what happened in the US in the 1930s” - the political phenomenon in which “Franklin D. Roosevelt, who got unconditional support from both left and right, all parties, all classes, and all ethnic groups, nullified the American

convention of the two party system.” More significantly still (at least to the Japanese), Karatani’s argument is of great use in resisting the discourse of those Japanese revisionist historians who have recently tried to distinguish the politics in pre-war Japan from German fascism particularly on the ground that there was no “Holocaust” by the Emperor’s army. Rather “uncanny” here is the sense of *déjà vu* that Karatani makes us see among Japanese desirous for “the directness of referendum” in order to realise a strong political leadership, caused by their collective exasperation over the lingering recession since the 1990s. Without doubt, his psychoanalytic re-examining of “a universal model of fascism” reminds us of Freud’s famous definition of something “unheimlich” as “the return of the repressed.”

Needless to say, Marx’s text suggests that what produced Bonaparte the Emperor was not only the “void” of the modern representative system, but also the economic panic in 1851. To be more exact, it was due to the latter that the former - the structural “void” of parliamentary system - revealed itself in a scandalous manner that infuriated Marx, as, for example, Jeffrey Mehlman (1977: 14-41) has emphasised. Interestingly enough, Karatani attempts to analyse the capitalist economy also from the perspective of “the modern problematic of ‘representation’ par excellence,” namely, as “a system of representation in which crisis appears as financial panic.” Referring to Marx in *Capital*, he regards money as “the hole” of that system, or the “Being that is compelled by its eternal self-increasing drive, even beyond the will of its owner” - the “nothingness of Being,” as Sartre defined it. It is this point of view, Karatani has repeatedly argued, that essentially differentiates Marx from those “classical and neo-classical economists” who failed to understand the meaning of this “perversion of Monetarism (Monetary System),” therefore seeing money as “just a measure of value or means of payment.” In the case of financial crises, money’s “brutal power of nothingness” exposes itself, making us “rush to grab” it as “a sublime fetish.” Here again I find his psychoanalytic analogy convincing: “money exists as unrepresentable, and people are forced to experience it as such at the times of panic that recur as repetition compulsion.”

Both politically and economically, Karatani’s “Freudian Marx” thus gives us an insight into “a universal model of fascism” as “the modern problematic of representation,” although, as he admits, the financial panic in 1851 (that made Bonaparte so scandalously popular) differs from “the larger scale crisis that recurs in approximately 60 year cycles, accompanying the structural transformation of capitalism-that of the 1870s, 1930s and 1990s” (what is called “Kondratieff’s Wave”). In other words, Marx’s texts thus psychoanalytically re-read allow us to observe “symptoms of what is repeated in the 1870s, the 1930s, and possibly in the 1990s” and, more uncannily, imagine “the as-yet-uncategorized situations that have been developing since 1990.” In each instance the modern systems of “representation,” politically and economically, disclose their inevitable crises, while necessarily producing an almost unanimous desire/drive for an imaginary solution to them.

### 3. The Politicising of Psychoanalysis as a “Philosophy of Representation”

Karatani’s criticism attends carefully to the two meanings of the word “representation,” political and philosophical, “which would have been clear to Marx, writing in German, but which English usage elides” - namely, *Vertretung* and *Darstellung* - in the same manner that, for example, Spivak does in her reading of *The 18th Brumaire* (see Landry 1996: 6). It is from this perspective that Karatani attempts to contextualise Heidegger’s “philosophical” privileging of “the ‘directness’ of

referendum at the total expense of the representative system of parliament.” Karatani writes:

In the wider context, the difference between the congress and the president as representational forms corresponds to an epistemological question of representation: how can truth be represented. On the one hand is the Cartesian doctrine that says that truth can be deduced from a priori evidence. On the other hand is the Anglo-Saxon inclination that truth can exist just as a temporary hypothesis achieved on a case by case agreement between others. Seen politically, the former amounts to saying that the general will should be represented by Being, beyond contradictions between classes, while the latter suggests that the general will be achieved by agreement via discussion. For Heidegger, both are modern thoughts which are *content with represented truth*, and he criticizes them radically. Politically, he denied both president and parliament. For him, truth was something that should be directly presented as Being, either through the poet-philosopher or the Führer. (emphasis added)

Despite (or rather because of) the great philosopher’s impatience with “represented truth,” we have to regard the Heideggerian “revelation of truth, *aletheia*” - his unrepresented, immediate “truth” - as “nothing other than another form of representation, namely, an imaginary synthesis of the contradictorily splitting classes,” “another form” of Bonapartism/fascism. Thus, the complicity between *Vertretung* and *Darstellung* in Heidegger is quite obvious. Here again Karatani’s “deconstruction” is useful enough to subvert the politico-philosophical foundations of Heidegger’s yearning for “*aletheia*” beyond representation: “everything happens within, and nothing happens without, the system of representation. Attempts to get out of it and to grasp the directness beyond mediation are by themselves already representation.” (It is precisely in this context, I would add, that de Man’s “Heidegger’s Exegeses of Hölderlin” should be re-examined [de Man 1983: 246-66]). It is worth repeating here that fascism is nothing but a product of the modern system of “representation,” in spite of or because of its compulsive desire to go beyond representation. When we reconsider the historical context in which Heidegger’s philosophy/politics demonstrated a strong ideological affinity to that of Nazism, it is evident that Karatani’s critique should not be seen as the post-structuralist cliché: the “closure of representation.” Far from a-historical ‘textual play’, Karatani’s reading of Heidegger no doubt functions as a highly effective strategy to reveal the recurring structure of fascism as “the repetition compulsion” in the modern politics of “representation.”

Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, an elegant critic of psychoanalysis, remarks that “I don’t want anything of, or from, psychoanalysis anymore,” crying “Basta cosi!” (in Oakley 1997: 217). He also points out a set of theoretical limitations of psychoanalysis as “a philosophy of representation,” claiming that “even if representation was always present, it wouldn’t follow that there is nothing *but* representation” (224). Given the breezy optimism of the current “post-modern” usage of the term “representation,” his deepening frustration with the “French Freud” is certainly quite understandable (although this does not mean that the intellectual attraction of his earlier work fades in any way). At the same time, however, I would stress a historical fact: there *have repetitively been* certain political situations that call for Karatani’s radical politicising of psychoanalysis as “a philosophy of representation,” historical contexts which make it crucial for us to openly declare: “there is nothing but representation” by way of a counter-discourse to defy the Bonapartist/fascist/essentialist assumption of something *beyond* representation.

Viewed from this perspective, Leo Bersani’s reading of psychoanalysis - especially his celebration of “a certain type of failure in Freud’s thought” (Bersani 1986: 3) - could acquire a new historical significance. What Bersani means by “a certain type of failure” is Freud’s impossible struggle to represent the unrepresentable (*Trieb*, for instance) to the very extent of “the collapse of representation itself” (113). We have to remember here the political climate in which a new paradigm emerged in Freud’s theorisation on *Trieb* in the 1920s and 30s. Put simply, any comparison between the Heideggerian intolerance and the Freudian endurance of the impasse of “representation” - “ever-renewed mediation” (de Man 1983: 260) - would be sufficient to suggest the ethics/politics of the latter’s “textual blockages and representational failures” (Bersani 1986: 115) in representing the unrepresentable. Re-historicising the Freudian “masochistic” suffering of the impossibility of “representation” (to its own textual collapse) in the political context of a collective desire to grasp the directness of “the immediate givenness of Being” (de Man 1983: 256) - this, I would argue, is indeed one of the most urgent tasks of the historiography of psychoanalysis, at least in Japan.

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#### ENDNOTES

1. Almost all of Freud’s and Lacan’s texts are available in Japanese translation. However, many complain (rightly so) that the Japanese *Ecrits* is especially awful. But the Japanese Freud is not so good, either. Probably the most important analytic texts in Japan are Freud’s *Interpretation of Dreams* and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*; Lacan’s *Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*; and Zizek’s *Sublime Object of Ideology*.
2. Since Karatani’s recent text is not available in English, I have cited from two English translations that capture his arguments, and are widely available on the web. They are “The Power of Repression and the Power of Foreclosure: Foucault and Lacan vis-à-vis Japan,” archived at <http://www.karataniforum.org/fl.html>; and “Representation and Repetition: *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* Revisited,” archived at <http://www.karataniforum.org/represent.html>. Please note that these web sites have no page numbers. Karatani’s other texts include, in Japanese, *Transcritique* (2001), *Researchers* (1985), *Language, Number, and Money* (1983), *Introspection and Retrospection* (1980), and *Marx: The Centre of His Possibilities* (1974). His texts in English are *English: Origins of Modern Japanese Literature* (1993), and *Architecture as Metaphor* (1995). For an accessible discussion of Kojin Karatani, see Sabu Kohso, “About the Karatani Forum” <http://www.karataniforum.org/about.html> and “Translator’s Remarks” <http://www.karataniforum.org/sabu.html>. Karatani’s sense of crisis is such that he has recently begun an activist movement called “NAM” (New Associationist Movement). Concerning this, see <http://www.nam21.org/english/>.
3. In this context, Karatani reads *The 18th Brumaire* as a theoretical precursor of Freud’s *The Interpretation of Dreams*, arguing that Marx focuses not only on “dream thought” - “the actual class relations based upon class interests” - but “dream work”: “the process through which the class unconscious is compressed and transferred.” Marx, indeed, describes a chain of events in his text “like a dream.”

# Psychoanalysis & The Story of “O”: An Embarrassment

Horst Gundlach

The past two decades have seen a wealth of publications on the history of psychoanalysis and of its reception in the twentieth century. Psychoanalysis and its impact on Western culture are even the subject of a controversial exhibition “Freud: Conflict and Culture” organised by the Library of Congress and touring three continents in the course of four years (Roth 1998). Yet, these studies have, to my knowledge, overlooked two points critical to the reception of psychoanalysis. First, the word “psychoanalysis” is ill-formed and smacks of ignorance. Second, and this reveals the significance of the first, scientists and scholars in the early twentieth century did note the malformation at once and reacted accordingly. Today, we encounter the word “Psychoanalysis” so often that we regard it as just a technical term which we can look up in any encyclopaedia. Most of us are not aware that the word is an embarrassment.

Things were different a hundred years ago. European science had lost its common language, Latin, during the eighteenth century. Vernacular languages had taken over, but scientific terminology conveniently remained internationally recognisable despite local variations in form, e.g. “psychology,” “psychologie,” “psicologia,” etc. This internationality was a result of the convention that new terms in science were to be coined with either Latin or Greek roots according to the respective word formation rules of these classical languages.

What is wrong with the word “psychoanalysis,” invented around 1895/1896 by Sigmund Freud himself? Pure and simple, it violates these rules: The “o” in its centre is superfluous. The proper form is “psichanalysis.”

Now the details. The first word in the compound “psychoanalysis” is “psyche,” soul, which belongs to the first declension and has the stem “psycha.” The Greek rules for this case are not at all complicated. Here is how to construct compound words: (1) If the word to be added begins with a consonant, you substitute the end “a” of the stem of the first word by an “o”. This produces words like “psychology,” “psychotherapy,” “psychopathology,” “psychophysics,” etc. (2) If the word to be added starts with a vowel, you elide the end “a” of the stem of the first word. This produces words like “psychagogics,” “psichanopsia,” “psichasthenia,” “psichiatry,” etc.

There are, however, cases where a word begins with a vowel only as a result of having lost its initial consonant, digamma, a w-like sound which had vanished in classical times. If the second word belongs to this category, rule (1) applies. The resulting compound will look to the uninitiated like an exception to the second rule but actually is the result of the correct application the first rule. The second word in our case, “analysis,” does not belong to this category and so rule (2) applies, yielding “psichanalysis.” Q.E.D. A hundred years ago, anybody admitted to a university would have learned this at school or at least would have a friend who could illuminate him. So much for the first point, the malformation.

Now to the second point that almost every academic recognised the gaffe in “psychoanalysis.” In 1896, Freud introduced his

bungled term into a scholarly world, and that world reacted in puzzlement or with derision. Hardly anybody would bother addressing this trivial matter directly in writing. Instead, the reaction would be more like: “Ooops, is that fellow serious? By Jove, he means it. How dreadful, if this pretentious half-wit could not even fathom the basics at grammar school, there won’t be much of significance he can reveal to me now.” One may surmise that the silliness of the name “psychoanalysis” must have tainted the subject matter. Here are some prominent figures with their reactions: The then nestor of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, rarely employed the word “psychoanalysis,” and if so, then only in quotation marks (e.g., 1911:638). This is foremost a sign of puzzlement at such a wacky word, not a comment on its denotatum. The eminent psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin, a disciple of Wundt, also used “psychoanalysis” in quotation marks only (e.g., 1909:498). It is safe to assume he meant the same as Wundt did. Luminaries like Wundt or Kraepelin would certainly not condescend to correct Freud’s half-baked Greek grammar. That happened inside psychoanalysis itself, and deserves to be treated more in detail so as to demonstrate beyond any doubt that “psychoanalysis” was in fact widely perceived as exhibiting a lack of culture and constituting a cause of conflict.

Carl Gustav Jung is an egregious example. He learned about psychoanalysis while working for Eugen Bleuler at Burghoelzli near Zuerich, Switzerland. He fused his association studies with Freud’s ideas and published as the most glaring example of his enthusiasm a paper entitled “Psychoanalyse und Assoziationsexperiment” (1905/06). This became part of his book *Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien* (1906) - with the excessive “o” duly in place - which he sent to Freud in October 1906, thereby opening an intensive “o”-full correspondence with him (McGuire 1974). In December 1906, Jung started to write “Psychanalyse” in his letters to Freud - it is conceivable that Bleuler who consistently, and even in psychoanalytic journals, was using the word “Psychanalyse” had given his assistant a friendly hint. Freud nevertheless continued the correspondence with his “Psychoanalyse.” In September 1907 at an international congress, Jung kept using an “o”-free “Psychanalyse” in his paper (1908) on Freud’s new teaching. The correspondence between Jung and Freud is a ping-pong game of the missing and the superfluous “o”. In 1909, Freud and Jung embarked on their transatlantic journey to Worcester, America, which gave them ample time to sort out their differences. Jung’s resistance was overcome. After the journey, the repressed “o” resurfaced, and the ostentatious “Psychanalyse” disappeared from Jung’s letters to Freud. As a solace the two correspondents now mainly employed the Greek letters Psi Alpha as uncontroversial abbreviation for the toxic word.

However, the estrangement between Freud and Jung continued to grow and led eventually to their schism in 1912/1913. Jung rid himself of the disgraceful “o” entanglement on the occasion of an international medical congress in 1913 by christening his own system “analytical psychology” and employing “psychoanalysis” to refer only to Freud’s system - in quotation marks, of course.

Wilhelm Stekel was another early follower who became disenchanted and was subsequently expelled from the Freudian circle. When he realised that the word was wicked, he left it to Freud and called his own enterprise “Psychanalyse.” In the 1920’s, together with Herbert Silberer and others, he launched an

American journal named *Psyche and Eros*, an *International Bi-Monthly Journal of Psychoanalysis, Psychotherapeutics, Applied Psychology and Therapeutic Prognosis*, and a German journal, *Fortschritte der Sexualwissenschaft und Psychoanalyse* (Advances of Sexuology and Psychoanalysis). No “o” here, and quotations marks for Freud’s “Psychoanalyse,” of course.

Jung and Stekel had each been installed by Freud as managing editor of a psychoanalytical journal. After their schisms, Stekel appropriated the journal, *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse*, whereas Jung left his *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen*. Freud then tried to clean up the mess by launching yet another journal, *Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse* (International Journal of Medical Psychoanalysis) in 1913, acting as editor himself, and subtitling it the Official Organ of the International Psychoanalytical Association. In the very first issue, the gloomy question of the proper word form was addressed, though in an inconspicuous place: Near the end of the issue, under the heading *Sprechsaal* (consulting room) there is a single page essay on this question, without a separate title, by on Dr. phil. E. Sachs (1913). This is Emilie Sachs, née Pisko, an occasional participant though not a member, of Freud’s Vienna Psychoanalytical Society, recently married to a member of that society, Dr. iur. Hanns Sachs, assisting editor of yet another psychoanalytical journal, *Imago*. It is probable that the chief editor of the *Internationale Zeitschrift*, Freud himself, had asked Emmy Sachs to present the case. She starts by stating that there has been some grumbling about the proper word form and by conceding that it actually should be “Psychanalyse.” But, she continues, nowadays there is no reason to follow the rules of the ancients. The *Sprachgefühl* (feel for the language), she suggests, recommends the form “Psychoanalyse.” The rest of her short paper offers contorted opinions on the way the ancients formed their compounds and presents with exculpatory intent a few malformations of modern times. It would be untenable to claim that she has presented her case convincingly. The *Sprachgefühl* of a young Viennese Ph.D. may be unsurpassed with regard to poetry; international scientific communication, however, might prefer to rely on definite and universal rules. More important – in case any skeptic is not yet ready to concede my two points – she has confirmed under Freud’s supervision and in an official international psychoanalytic organ that the word is ill-formed, debatable, and debated.

Not only future infidels like Jung and Stekel scorned Freud’s inane neologism. Oskar Pfister, the Zuerich pastor, Dr. phil., and lifelong friend of Freud, ridiculed E. Sachs’ apology of “Psychoanalyse” in all editions of his *Die psichanalytische Methode* (1913: 16f.; 1924: 24). Masochistically, Freud bestowed an introduction to this book in which he uses “Psychoanalyse” (1913: IVf.; 1924: Vf.), while Pfister consistently in the same book omits the awful “o”. Pfister himself coined the word “Paedanalyse,” but certainly not “Paedoanalyse.”

Herbert Silberer was admitted to the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society in 1910 and stayed an active member till his death, even though he remained on friendly terms with the excommunicated Stekel. In September 1921, he reviewed Freud’s *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (Beyond the Pleasure Principle) in the distinguished daily Viennese newspaper, *Neue Freie Presse*, “which Freud read faithfully every evening” (Schur 1972:100; Tichy 1999). In the third sentence,

Silberer advised the public that “Psychanalyse” is “linguistically more correct than ‘Psychoanalyse’” (1921: 33). He offered no further explanation. The readership of this journal would not have required one. Freud was not amused, we may assume. In January 1923, Silberer hanged himself.

Ernest Jones, a most loyal follower of Freud, refrained from writing “psychoanalysis.” But he resorted to a different solution to the embarrassing problem. In his days, British orthography relished the use of hyphens. His correspondence with Freud is a farcical ping-pong with Freud writing “psychoanalysis” and Jones “psycho-analysis” (Paskauskas 1993). In his publications, Jones carefully and almost consistently employed the hyphen. In London he founded the “British Psycho-Analytical Society,” the “International Psycho-Analytical Press,” the “International Psycho-Analytical Library,” the “International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,” and the “Institute of Psycho-Analysis” which published the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. And James Strachey, the main translator of the Standard Edition, consistently humiliates Freud by printing “psycho-analysis,” “psycho-analytic,” “psycho-analyst,” etc.

The unwavering hyphen does not serve as an embellishment of a ponderous word, as one might presume today. It is meant to show the impropriety of the hiatus “oa” in the compound word “psychoanalysis.” Examples of this use of the hyphen abound in British scientific literature. Skeptics may very well consider Jones’ choice of title for his paper “Psycho-Analysis and Psychotherapy” (1909/1910): If the hyphen were only ornamental, Jones would have hyphenated “psychotherapy” as well. The hyphen serves as a compromise between the correct and the erroneous and has the advantage, or disadvantage, of being inaudible. It works in writing and in print only. Nevertheless, it safeguards you from Oxbridge mockery.

The international battle of the “o” had different outcomes. The USA received its first heavy dose of psychoanalytical publications after the celebrated visit in 1909 of Freud and Jung. G.S. Hall published their papers and another by Jones in his *American Journal of Psychology* in which the nonplussed public is offered the full range of possibilities, with Freud writing: “... psychoanalysis” (1910: 181ff.), Jung, in a blunt plural form: “Only psychanalyses of the kind that Professor Freud has published ...” (1910: 251), and Jones, sneakily saving his own face: “The method Freud uses ... is that termed by him Psycho-Analysis ...” (1910: 283). The professor prevailed. “Psychoanalysis” is now universally accepted in the USA.

In the UK, there are still inveterate partisans of the hyphenated “psycho-analysis.” A curious illustration of this Atlantic rift is Ernest Jones’ three-volume biography of Freud. Whereas the British edition (1953; 1955; 1957) cultivates the hyphen, the American edition (1953a; 1955a; 1957a) adopts a no-nonsense approach and trims it unless it appears in a proper name like “International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.”

Continental Europe is divided over the issue. In France, after some flirting with the hyphen in pre-war times, it is now toujours “psychanalyse” without the loony “o”. In post-war Germany, Freud’s “Psychoanalyse” has eventually found general acceptance. In Italy, there is a majority for “psicoanalisi” fighting a minority for “psicanalisi.” Spanish prefers “psychoanálisis,” but there is also the odd

“psychanálisis.” Polish has “psychoanaliza,” Croatian and Slovenian “psihoanaliza,” whereas Romanian uses “psihanaliza.” Latin, though rarely used today by the sciences, is still the language of the Vatican state. To counter the growing importance of the vernacular, Paul VI established a papal institution, Opus fundatum Latinitas, for the promotion of Latin and the creation of modern words. This foundation published two neo-Latin dictionaries with the Libreria Editoria Vaticana. The one adopts “psychanalysis, is, f.” as the proper Latin term (Mariucci 1991: 513), the other the linguistically corrupt “psychoanalysis, is, f.” (Lexicon recentis latinitatis, 1997 or internet). Roma locuta est... So much for infallibility.

“Psychoanalysis,” by the way, is not the only howler contrived by Freud. Notorious is his “Narzissmus” (his original German for “narcissism”) which changes the correct stem “narcisso” to the astonishing “narco.” Some scholars today still shake their heads over this barbarism. Some smirk and think of cocaine. Might Freud not have known that the narcissus was so-named for its narcotic smell? Freud’s word, however, makes one suspect that it denotes not Narcissus-like but narcotics-addict-like or narcotics-dick-like conditions. Honouring the rules would help to prevent such communication calamities.

Freud once remarked: “errors that derive from repression are to be sharply distinguished from others which are based on genuine ignorance” (1960: 220). Let me emphasise, my aim is not to decry antiquity-loving Freud as an ignoramus, which would be unreasonable as long as we do not know his motives for coining and holding on to his term despite all ridicule. My point is simply to demonstrate that Freud’s contemporaries, friends and foes alike, perceived the extra “o” in “psychoanalysis” as a trademark of ignorance. Whoever studies the reception of psychoanalysis by its contemporaries should take this into proper consideration.

Words often have an import and a message far beyond what the encyclopaedia tells us, and even a superfluous “o” may have a story to tell.

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“Controversy still abounds in medical, literary, and academic circles over Sigmund Freud. Yet few would disagree that his chief legacy - the psychoanalytic movement - has had an enormous impact on Western culture in the twentieth century,” writes James H. Billington, the Librarian of Congress, introducing *Freud, Conflict and Culture: Essays on his life, work and legacy*, edited by Michael Roth (1998). “Our notions of identity, memory, sexuality, and most generally, of meaning have been shaped in relation to - and often in opposition to - Freud’s work,” adds Roth (4) himself. “Few figures have had as decisive and fundamental an impact on the course of modern cultural history as Sigmund Freud. Freudian theory and psychoanalytic theory inform the ways in which we perceive ourselves and our society,” chimes the jacket cover writer. The statement could not be clearer - whilst one is free to contest Freud’s notion, no reasonable person would contest the centrality of Freud in modern Western cultural history, and the impact of his work upon how we think and feel. If a contemporary *‘dictionnaire des idées reçues’* were to be compiled, this statement of the Freudian legend would feature prominently. It is a prime example of how certain phrases, if repeated often enough, become the synthetic *a priori* of contemporary debate. And yet, recent decades of work in Freud studies, and the history of psychology, psychotherapy and psychiatry have called into question precisely this ‘doxa’. In this essay, I plan to explore some facets of how psychoanalysis came to install itself in such a manner that its autosuggestive appraisal of its own significance achieved such a measure of credibility. For without this, it is not possible to form an adequate appraisal of Freud’s life, work or legacy.

Over recent decades, it has increasingly emerged that the official history of psychoanalysis was created through manifold acts of censorship and selective and tendentious rescripting.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, an increasing amount of historical work has been conducted on non-Freudian psychologies and psychotherapies. Aside from anything else, it has emerged that many of these figures were not the fools and lunatics that Freud, Ernest Jones and other psychoanalysts portrayed them to be. In both these directions, a watershed was Henri Ellenberger’s *The Discovery of the Unconscious*. A problem in surveying the history of psychoanalysis in the twentieth century is that in different countries, it became adapted and reformulated by indigenous folk psychologies and intellectual traditions, and turned into something that has increasingly little to do with Freud’s work, except in name. This problem is compounded by the interpretive bias of much existing work on the social history of psychoanalysis in the twentieth century, namely, its Freudocentrism. Thus in Elisabeth Roudinesco’s (1986; 1990) history of psychoanalysis in France, one finds non-Freudian psychologists and psychiatrists generally characterized as obscurantists who simply failed to see the radical epistemic break represented by psychoanalysis, which she takes as an axiomatic truth.

There have been many attempts to explain the rise and apparent success of psychoanalysis through appealing to supposedly wide scale transformations in Western society, such as secularisation, crises of authority, the family, the self, sexual conduct and so forth. Such explanations work backwards, assuming that there must have been some prior condition to which psychoanalysis was the preeminent remedy.

As a result, psychoanalysis is credited with bringing about wide scale transformations in twentieth century society. Historical contingencies are converted into supposed necessities that consequently require deep rooted explanations. Thus Nathan Hale (1971) explains the rise of psychoanalysis in the United States through positing (interlinked) crises of the somatic style in American psychiatry, and of civilized morality in the culture at large, which psychoanalysis supposedly answered. Such accounts tend to be overexplanations which provide insufficient differential criteria for the ascendance of psychoanalysis over other approaches, as Hale’s first point could just as well explain the rise of any psychogenic therapy, and the latter, any variety of sexology.

There has been a pervasive failure to grasp the extent to which psychoanalysis featured as part of larger psychotherapeutic and psychogenic movements, and that by political operations which have yet to be sufficiently traced, it came to stand in for these, as if it alone was responsible for the transformations that took place. Not only Freudians accord Freud the lead role in transforming Western culture; the same view, though with the opposite conclusions, is often maintained by critics of psychoanalysis, such as Frederick Crews (1995), for whom Freud appears as the major villain responsible for the ills of contemporary psychotherapy. Before being able to assess what impact psychoanalysis may actually have had on twentieth century culture, it is necessary to reconstruct how it managed to gain more currency than contemporaneous psychotherapies.

In contrast to the market driven accounts, Frank Sulloway proposed a supply side model. Following Ellenberger, Sulloway argued that the Freudian movement erected an elaborate heroic legend around Freud, which was indispensable to the rise of psychoanalysis. In addition, he claimed, psychoanalysis was misrepresented as a pure psychology, and its biological roots hidden. This, he claims, had the effect of shielding psychoanalysis from the effects of the repudiation of its nineteenth century biological sources. It is questionable to what extent this issue substantially contributed to its success, which, broadly speaking, was most marked in the humanities, the general public and private practice psychotherapy. The disciplines where this would have had particular bearing, such as psychology and biology, were ones where psychoanalysis never really made significant and lasting inroads anyway. Sulloway (1979) argues that the Freudian legend functioned through “*legitimizing* the special and hard-wrought nature of psychoanalytic truth; by *nihilating* the achievements and credibility of Freud’s critics; and by offering a built-in *therapy* to explain defections from the movement” (487). But how did the Freudian legend take such a hold? I maintain that it was primarily through the effectiveness of its institutional apparatus, rather than through theoretical or therapeutic innovations, that psychoanalysis came to install itself in contemporary culture.

The end of the nineteenth century saw the rise of hypnotic and suggestive therapies, and it was in this context that psychoanalysis arose. It has increasingly become clear through the work of Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Léon Chertok, François Roustang and Isabelle Stengers that Freud and subsequent psychoanalysts consistently downplayed the legacy of hypnosis in psychoanalysis, and were mistaken in proclaiming a grand epistemic break with the era of hypnotic

and suggestive therapies. As Freud’s contemporary Auguste Forel (1906) commented, “since the introduction of the doctrine of suggestion one reads at the end of the praises of a large number of vaunted new remedies, ‘Suggestion is excluded.’ It is in just such cases that a purely suggestive action is most probable” (314).

Hypnotic researchers generally clustered around the rival hypnotic schools of the Salpêtrière under Jean-Martin Charcot and at Nancy under Hippolyte Bernheim. There was widespread public debate concerning the nature and power of suggestive influence. For Charcot, hypnosis was a pathological condition, which was only found in cases of hysteria. What Charcot described as ‘grand hypnotisme’ followed three stages, each of which had distinct physiological characteristics: catalepsy, lethargy and somnambulism. At the Salpêtrière, Charcot used hypnosis to study the underlying architecture of hysteria; because he claimed it was a pathological state, he was not interested in its therapeutic applications. The latter were the main focus of the Nancy school, where hypnosis was deployed in a hospital and an outpatient clinic. Contrary to Charcot, Bernheim simply characterized hypnosis as a heightened state of suggestibility, akin to sleep, and claimed that anyone could be hypnotized. He championed the therapeutic application of hypnosis and suggestion, which became widely practised. The term psychotherapy came to be used interchangeably with hypnosis.

How did one gain instruction in hypnotic techniques? In 1886 Auguste Forel, the director of the Burghölzli asylum in Switzerland, visited Nancy after reading Bernheim’s book, *Of Suggestion*. There he was initiated into the practice of hypnotism by Bernheim, who gave practical demonstrations (Forel 1937: 167). Forel was overcome with astonishment at what he witnessed, and on his return, set up shop as a hypnotist. His account of his ‘training’ in hypnotism is mirrored by many others during the same period (including Freud). The ease by which individuals could set up as hypnotists contributed greatly to the rapid spread of hypnotic and suggestive therapies. This open model of instruction meant that individuals could see how particular hypnotists worked, and see the patients that they wrote about. In his preface to his *Hypnotism, Suggestion, Psychotherapy: New Studies*, Bernheim (1891) wrote: “Those of my colleagues who retain some doubts, either because they have not seen my case or because they know about them only incompletely, display a wise and scientific skepticism. But if they are willing to visit my clinic, they will find here the continuing demonstration of the facts that I report” (ix). This public accessibility to the clinical material - which was also practised by Charcot - was held to ensure the scientific nature of the enterprise.

It is still a widespread belief that the in-depth investigation of individual lives, with a particular accent on sexuality, was an innovation of psychoanalysis. It is important to grasp this was already a feature of hypnotic therapies. Forel (1906) advocated an individualising approach:

One must gain the full confidence of the patient by affection and intimately insinuating one’s self into all sides of his mental life; one must sympathize with all his feelings, get him to relate the whole story of his life, live it all over again with him, and enter into the feelings of the patient. But one must naturally never lose sight of the sexual aspect, which differs so enormously according to the kind of person, and which may form an actual danger... It must be understood that it is

not sufficient to follow the usual stereotype medical control, which consists in paying attention to the discharge of semen, or coitus, and pregnancy; but it is necessary to take into consideration carefully all the higher regions of the intellect, mood, and will, which are more or less connected with the sexual sphere. When this has been carried out, one has to map out the proper definite aim in life for the patient, and start him on his way full of energy and confidence. (242)

In situations where hypnotic suggestion ran into difficulties, Forel commented:

As soon as I notice that a person remains uninfluenced or does not obey well any longer, I ask him, 'What is it that is exciting you? Why don't you tell me what you have got on your mind?' And this question, asked in a friendly but definite tone, rarely fails to elicit a positive reply. The patient notices that I have recognised the cause of the failure at once, and almost always confesses it. I can generally reassure him thereby, and, in consequence, attain what I am aiming at. (201)

Forel's recommendation strongly resembles what Freud would later call the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis, to speak whatever came to one's mind, and the 'analysis of resistances'. Freud was certainly familiar with this work, as he reviewed it.

Jacqueline Carroy (1991) has made the important observation that in the hypnotic literature, suggestion functioned as a heterodox, umbrella term, which, as well as imperative suggestion, included paradoxical injunctions and interpretations (179-200). Following Carroy's observation, if one studies psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic cases in the twentieth century, one finds that 'interpretation' functioned in a similarly catch all manner. Whilst the theoretical account of practises changed considerably, the same was not the case in the practises themselves, and under the rubric of interpretation in the psychoanalytic literature, it is not hard to find some of the best examples of authoritarian directives.

A protracted war broke out between the Nancy and Salpêtrière schools. Bernheim (1880) questioned the ontological status of the states demonstrated by Charcot; rather than revealing the nature of hypnosis and hysteria, he claimed they were artifacts, produced by Charcot's suggestions (145). Bernheim argued that Charcot's demonstrations lacked any replicability outside the specific environment that nurtured them; what impression of replicability they possessed in the Salpêtrière was an illusion, due to a process of somnambular imitation. To Bernheim's charges, Charcot (1887-88) replied by insisting on his impartiality and objectivity as an observer, and likened himself to a photographer who simply presented what he saw (107).

Freud, who had attended Charcot's lectures in the winter of 1885, was anxious to defend the objectivity of Charcot's observations, and pointed out the consequences that ensued if Bernheim's view was correct. Freud (1888) writes:

If the supporters of the suggestion theory are right, all the observations made at the Salpêtrière are worthless: indeed, they become errors in observation. The hypnosis of hysterical patients would have no characteristics of its own; but every physician would be free to produce any symptomatology that he liked in the patients he hypnotized. We should not learn from the study of major hypnotism

what alterations in excitability succeed one another in the nervous system of hysterical patients in response to certain kinds of intervention; we should merely learn what intention Charcot suggested (in a manner of which he himself was unconscious) to the subjects of his experiments - a thing entirely irrelevant to our understanding alike of hypnosis and of hysteria. (77-8)

Freud's defence of Charcot went beyond the particular theories that the latter advanced: it was a defence of the possibility of discovering an objective symptomatology from clinical investigation, which would be independent of the situation of derivation. The validity of such an epistemology was critical to his enterprise. Freud correctly pointed out the consequences which would ensue if this position was abandoned: the hypnotist could generate whatever symptomatology they liked, and the study of this process would reveal nothing other than the arbitrary process by which different nosographies or disease entities could be produced. Whether this would tell us nothing about the nature of hypnosis though, is another matter whatsoever.

The position Freud was at pains to ward off was precisely the conclusion taken by William James in 1890. He argued that the properties attributed to the trance, such as by Charcot and Heidenhaim, were actually products of suggestion. The peculiar nature of the trance state was the manner in which it took on any properties attributed to it, varying in concert with theories about it. James (1918) trenchantly points out the pitfalls that this held for the possibility of deriving an objective account of hypnosis:

Any sort of personal peculiarity, any trick accidentally fallen into in the first instance by some one subject, may, by attracting attention, become stereotyped, serve as a pattern for imitation, and figure as the type of a school. The first subject trains the operator, the operator trains the succeeding subjects, all of them in perfect good faith conspiring together to evolve a perfectly arbitrary result.

With the extraordinary perspicacity and subtlety of perception which subjects often display for all that concerns the operator with whom they are en rapport, it has hard to keep them ignorant of anything he expects. Thus it happens that one easily verifies on new subjects what one has already seen on old ones, or any desired symptom of which one may have heard or read. (601)

Similar arguments had been advanced by the Belgian philosopher-psychologist, Josef Delboeuf. He stated that, in addition to the well-known influence of the hypnotiser on the hypnotised, the influence in the reciprocal direction was critical. The subjects, generally the first or paradigm case, trained the experimenter and influenced his methods without his realising it. This set up a template, as the experimenter reported his results to his disciples who 'replicated' them. It was this circuit of reciprocal influence which gave rise to the hypnotic schools, each monopolising special phenomena (see Delboeuf, 1886: 152-3).

Delboeuf and James claimed that it was impossible for the experimenter to situate themselves outside of the field of effects of the suggestive influence they were attempting to objectively study. Their critiques suggest that the respective hypnotic schools had become veritable influencing machines for the generation of evidence.<sup>2</sup> The fact that different traits could be paraded forth as constituting the essence of hypnosis and appear to gain confirmation from

other practitioners indicated that the mode of institutionalisation was itself subject to the effects of hypnosis and suggestion, which couldn't be neutralised. For Delboeuf and James, the conflicts between the various schools were insolvable, for they each could point to evidence that supported their particular theories. They were all 'correct' - in that they could all point to cases substantiating their theories - but this only served to cancel out the universal status claimed for these theories. What was called into question was the possibility of a clinical methodology to provide the basis for a general psychology.

It was in 1896 that Freud first put forward the term psychoanalysis in the course of his papers proposing the so-called seduction theory, which stated that every case of hysteria was caused by a seduction in early childhood. The circumstances which surrounded Freud's proposing and subsequently abandoning the seduction theory have generated a great deal of controversy, which is too extensive to review here. On the one hand, Jeffrey Masson and various feminist critics have contended that Freud's seduction theory was actually correct, and that in abandoning it through cowardice, he had in fact betrayed the patients who had told him of their abuses. By contrast, other critics, such as Allen Esterson and Frederick Crews, have contended that Freud had actually fabricated the evidence for his initial theory. Esterson concludes that Freud did not recount stories of infantile seduction, and what Freud claimed to be such were actually analytical reconstructions which he had foisted on them (Esterson 1993: 28-9).

Moving away from this dichotomy of real vs. fabricated, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen has put forward a reading of the seduction theory which has important implications for the understanding of the generation of evidence in psychoanalysis. Taking his cue from the contemporaneous criticisms made by Freud's hypnotist colleagues, Borch-Jacobsen (1996) claims that it is more plausible to admit that "his patients actively responded to his suggestions, "reproducing" all the scenes that he expected of them (38). Consequently, he argues that: "Freud did not change his mind for lack of clinical 'evidence'. Quite the contrary, he had plenty of it... the 'influencing machine' that he had put into motion was working *all too* well, so well that he could no longer believe in the stories he had extorted from his patients" (39-40).<sup>3</sup> The significance of Borch-Jacobsen's argument is that it suggests that Freud fell precisely into the errors that Delboeuf and James would have predicted. The problem was not the lack of evidence (or the necessity of fabricating the evidence) but a surfeit of evidence. However, whilst Freud subsequently modified his theories of hysteria and the neuroses, he remained committed to the view that the clinical encounter could provide an objective evidential basis for a general psychology. There are further implications of the perspective outlined by Delboeuf and James. For their remarks suggest that the question of the rise of psychoanalysis is not to be explained by the supposed adequation of its theories to a preexisting reality (such as presupposed by sociohistorical explanations), or indeed, their plausibility; but in its capacity to create conditions which made favourable the generation of particular forms of conviction.

Freud's theories would arguably not have been any more known today than those of Delboeuf, had he not gathered around him a group of followers. In 1902 a small group consisting of Alfred Adler, Max Kahane, Rudolf Reitler and Wilhelm Stekel began to hold regular meetings with Freud. Others soon followed. The

proceedings were not harmonious. Freud (1914) commented:

There were only two inauspicious circumstances which at last estranged me inwardly from the group. I could not succeed in establishing among its members the friendly relations that ought to obtain between men who are all engaged upon the same difficult work; nor was I able to stifle the disputes about priority for which there were so many opportunities under these conditions of work in common. The difficulties in the way of giving instruction in the practice of psycho-analysis, which are quite particularly great and are responsible for much in the current dissensions, were evident already in this private Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society. (25-6)

Part of “difficulties in the way of giving instruction” stemmed from the fact that Freud had published little concerning the technique of psychoanalysis, and moreover, was not utilising Bernheim’s open model of instruction.

One member of this society, Fritz Wittels (1924), paints an unflattering portrait of Freud’s intentions in calling these meetings:

Freud’s design in the promotion of these gatherings was to have his own thoughts passed through the filter of other trained intelligences. It did not matter if the intelligences were mediocre. Indeed, he had little desire that these associates should be persons of strong individuality, that they should be critical and ambitious collaborators. The realm of psychoanalysis was his idea and his will, and he welcomed anyone who accepted his views. What he wanted was to look into a kaleidoscope lined with mirrors that would multiply the images he introduced into it. (134)

A few years later, the situation changed. Freud heard from Eugen Bleuler, Forel’s successor at the Burghölzli, that his work was being studied there. It was with the entrance of Jung and the Zürich school that the psychoanalytic movement could be said to have really become international. Freud (1914) subsequently recalled: “The only opportunity of learning the new art and working at in practice lay there. Most of my followers and co-workers at the present time came to me by way of Zurich” (27). The ease with which individuals could gain instruction in psychoanalytic techniques in the Burghölzli was similar to Bernheim’s clinic in Nancy, and led greatly to their dissemination.<sup>4</sup> The Burghölzli was a University Clinic, thus courses took place under the auspices of the University of Zürich. Jung’s 1909 summer semester lectures were titled “Course on Psychotherapy with demonstrations.”<sup>5</sup> Indeed, for psychiatrists interested in psychoanalysis, Zürich, and not Vienna, was initially the instruction centre of choice. As Ernst Falzeder (1994) notes, a large and impressive number of significant figures in dynamic psychiatry, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis either worked or visited the Burghölzli (172).<sup>6</sup> This gives some indication of the critical role of the Burghölzli in instigating the development of a psychogenic orientation in psychiatry.

As this has been generally attributed solely to psychoanalysis, it is worth dwelling upon this, as it arguably forms a template for what occurred later in other contexts. The pivotal text in this regard was Jung’s 1907 *On the Psychology of Dementia Praecox: An Attempt*. This has traditionally been viewed as consisting in the first major application of psychoanalysis to the psychoses. As I have argued elsewhere, Jung’s approach was far more closely linked with the

abnormal psychology of Pierre Janet and the subliminal psychology of Théodore Flournoy, than with psychoanalysis (Shamdasani 1996). It was Jung’s political affiliation with psychoanalysis that led to this text being perceived as a psychoanalytic text. There were numerous developments in a psychogenic direction in psychiatry and psychotherapy at this time. In the former, the Swiss Adolf Meyer, who had studied with Forel and later sent many individuals to study at the Burghölzli, played a pivotal role in the United States. It was the unique mode of organization of the psychoanalytic movement, and the professional identity that it conferred, that enabled it to stand in for these wider developments.

In September 1907 a “Freudian society of physicians” was founded in Zürich. The following year Jung organized the first psychoanalytic conference in Salzburg. At the same time, he proposed the establishment of an international journal. His plan was to form an amalgamation with Flournoy and Claparède’s *Archives de Psychologie* and Morton Prince’s *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*. It was only with the collapse of these negotiations that it was decided to independently found a psychoanalytic journal. These initiatives would possibly have had the effect of integrating psychoanalysis with developments in abnormal psychology and subliminal psychology in America and Switzerland. The following year, the first psychoanalytic journal, the *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen* was founded, with Jung and Bleuler as editors.

In the associations experiment conducted at the Burghölzli, the positions of subject and experimenter were readily interchangeable. It was in this context that psychoanalytic explorations initially took place. Mutual dream analyses took place, and Abraham Brill recalls that at the Burghölzli, his dreams were analysed by Jung and Bleuler. Brill (1944) attributed the genesis of the institution of training analysis to these practices (42).

In 1907, Sándor Ferenczi visited Jung at the Burghölzli. Toward the end of his life, Jung recalled that he “trained” Ferenczi in psychoanalysis, but that unfortunately, Ferenczi “remained stuck with Freud.”<sup>7</sup> This may well have been the first explicit training analysis. If so, it is somewhat ironic that it was not conducted by Freud.

The open model of instruction practised at the Burghölzli greatly contributed to the spread of psychoanalysis. However, it quickly came into collision with the closed feudal structure which Freud was establishing. In the first decade of the twentieth century, psychoanalysis attracted increasing interest among doctors and psychiatrists. Instances where individuals partially corroborated psychoanalysis proved extremely problematic for Freud. Psychiatrists such as Ludwig Frank and Dumeng Bezzola (both students of Forel) supported Freud and Breuer’s cathartic treatment against Freud’s subsequent development of psychoanalysis. In 1910, Freud published a paper entitled “‘Wild’ psycho-analysis” which addressed this situation. He began by recounting an anecdote concerning a middle aged divorced woman suffering from anxiety who had consulted a physician unknown to Freud, who had told her that her anxiety was due to the lack of sexual satisfaction, and suggested avenues by which she could procure this. The physician attributed this advice to the theories of psychoanalysis. For his part, Freud repudiated the physician’s advice as having nothing to do with

psychoanalysis. Ironically, as Martin Bergmann (1997) points out, Freud had himself made the same recommendation a few years earlier in his paper “Civilized sexual morality and nervous illness” (75). This suggests that what was more critical was not the specific practice in question, but the fact that the physician was completely independent of Freud.

Freud contended that psychoanalytic technique could as yet not be learnt from books, but only from someone already proficient in it. He (1910) went on to state:

Neither I myself nor my friends and co-workers find it agreeable to claim a monopoly in this way in the use of a medical technique. But in face of the dangers to patients and to the cause of psycho-analysis which are inherent in the practice that is to be foreseen of a ‘wild’ psycho-analysis, we have had no other choice. In the spring of 1910 we founded an International Psycho-Analytical Association, to which its members declare their adherence by the publication of their names, in order to be able to repudiate responsibility for what is done by those who do not belong to us and yet call their medical procedure ‘psycho-analysis’. For as a matter of fact ‘wild’ analysts of this kind do more harm to the cause of psycho-analysis than to individual patients. (226-7)

In this statement, Freud was militantly opposed to psychoanalysis freely entering general medical practice as an auxiliary psychotherapeutic procedure - not out of some concern with safeguarding the public, but with safeguarding psychoanalysis. In retrospect, Freud (1914) stated:

I considered it necessary to form an official association because I feared the abuses to which psychoanalysis would be subjected as soon as it became popular. There should be some headquarters whose business it would be to declare: ‘All this nonsense has nothing to do with analysis; this is not psycho-analysis.’ At the sessions of the local groups (which together constitute the international association) instruction should be given as to how psycho-analysis was to be conducted and doctors trained, whose activities would then receive a kind of guarantee. Moreover, it seemed to me desirable, since official science had pronounced its solemn ban upon psychoanalysis and had declared a boycott against doctors and institutions practising it, that the adherents of psycho-analysis should come together for friendly communication with one another and mutual support. (43-4)

At the Nuremberg congress, the International Psychoanalytic Association was founded, with Jung as the president. The idea for the association had been proposed by Ferenczi. In 1911 Wilhelm Stekel (1911) proclaimed:

We all have the need to feel that we do not stand alone, and that we belong to a large school, whose followers are spread over the whole Earth. Each single one of us stands against a world of opponents, and must assert himself against the scorn and mockery of the opponent... *We know that the future is ours*. One cannot work and create alone without the acknowledging resonance of fellow men. One must build up one’s faith from the faith of others. This is the deep meaning of the psychoanalytic congresses, which have become for us a matter of heart. (36)

As historians have established, the notion of a ban or boycott against psychoanalysis belongs to the heroic legend of psychoanalysis. Indeed, it was due to the increasing isolationist policy of psychoanalysis vis à vis medicine and psychiatry

that Eugen Bleuler resigned from the IPA in 1911. In one incident, the psychiatrist Max Isserlin was not allowed to attend the psychoanalytic congress in Nuremberg, which Bleuler found unacceptable. Freud had also requested Bleuler to break off relations with two leading psychiatrists who were critics of psychoanalysis, Alfred Hoche and Theodore Ziehen. On 4 December 1911, Bleuler (1912) wrote to Freud, "The 'who is not for us, is against us', the 'all or nothing', is in my opinion necessary for religious communities and useful for political parties. For this reason I can understand the principle as such, but I consider it harmful for science."<sup>8</sup> Bleuler wrote to Freud that instead of seeking contacts with other sciences, psychoanalysis had isolated itself with barbed wire.<sup>9</sup> Somewhat overstatedly, though with some justice, Alexander and Selesnick (1965) argued that without the dissension which led Bleuler to resign, the subsequent isolation of psychoanalysis from the universities and medical schools would not have taken place (1-2).

During this period, the question of how one could become a psychoanalyst underwent critical changes. In 1909 in reply to the question as to how one could become a psychoanalyst, Freud (1909) stated, "by studying one's own dreams" (33). As noted above, the following year, Freud added that one also needed to be in some form of contact with someone proficient in psychoanalysis. In 1912 Jung put forward the recommendation that every prospective analyst had to undergo an analysis, arguing that success in analysis depended upon how far the analyst had been analysed himself. To be analysed was the only solution: "There are doctors who believe that they can get by with a *self-analysis*. This is Münchhausen-psychology, with which they will certainly remain stuck" (Jung 1912: §449, trans. mod.). Ernest Jones read this passage as direct attack on the unanalysed Freud (Jones to Freud, 22 July 1913, Paskauskas ed., 1993: 212). Jung compared this necessity with the formal requirements of surgical training: "Just as we demand from a surgeon, besides his specialised knowledge, a skilled hand, courage, presence of mind, and power of decision, so we must yet expect much more with psychoanalysts an extremely serious psychoanalytic training of his own personality, if we wish to entrust a patient to him" (§450, trans. mod.). Jung's suggestion was quickly seconded by Freud, who counted it as one of the merits of the Zürich school (Freud 1912: 116). It was insufficient simply to be a doctor or psychiatrist to practise psychoanalysis. Whilst claiming that psychoanalysis was a medical technique, further qualification was required. In terms of current practices in psychotherapy, this was a striking departure. It would have been unthinkable to have established the hypnotic treatment of the physician as an essential training requirement. Indeed, on his return from the psychoanalytic congress at Weimar in 1911, the American neurologist James Jackson Putnam stated in a talk: "Then I learned, to my surprise and interest, that a large part of these investigators had subjected themselves, more or less systematically, to the same sort of searching character-analysis to which their patients were being subjected at their hands. It is fast getting to be felt that an initiation of this sort is an indispensable condition of good work."<sup>10</sup> Freud (1912) provided the following rationale for the analysis of the analyst: "It is not enough for this that he himself should be an approximately normal person. It may be insisted, rather, that he should have undergone a psycho-analytic purification and have become aware of those complexes of his own which would be apt to interfere with his grasp of what the patient tells him" (116). It is fair to suppose that such psychoanalytic purification was not simply a

question of ensuring that practitioners were 'ultra-healthy', but that their self-understanding conformed to psychoanalytic theory. The training analysis was the only means to assure the transmission of analytic knowledge, through ensuring that the 'self-knowledge' of the prospective analyst developed along proscribed lines, so that one had attested to psychoanalytic truths in one's own life and hence would be capable of 'replicating' them through the lives of others. In 1914 Freud wrote to the American psychiatrist Trigant Burrow, who had been analysed by Jung, "If you make it possible to come to me for analysis, you will certainly be more important to me than any patient. Every student more is to me a guarantee for the future and an assurance for my own lifetime."<sup>11</sup>

Jung's suggestion has had an overpowering effect, not only on the subsequent organization of psychoanalysis, but on modern psychotherapy as a whole. Indeed this requirement forms one of the few if not the only common denominator in the plethora of psychotherapeutic schools. His suggestion took place at a crucial juncture. On the one hand, it took place at a time of bitter disputation in the psychoanalytic movement. The discussion of diverging theoretical perspectives had largely broken down, to be replaced by attempts at mutual diagnosis and pathologisation. Secondly, in 1909, Jung had resigned his post at the Burghölzli and taken up full time private practice. Whilst his own practice appears to have thrived at this time, and his wife's sizeable fortune gave him a high degree of financial security, the institution of training analysis became critical in providing a financial base for private practice psychoanalysis, and making it an attractive professional proposition.

In the summer of 1912 Ernest Jones proposed to Freud the formation of a secret committee to secure the future of psychoanalysis. On 30 July he wrote that Ferenczi had expressed the wish that "a small group of men could be thoroughly analysed by you, so that they could represent the pure theory unadulterated by personal complexes, and thus build an unofficial inner circle in the Verein and serve as centres where others (beginners) could come and learn the work" (Freud-Jones 1993: 146). This group, Jones wrote, would be like the "Paladins of Charlemagne, to guard the kingdom and policy of their master" (149). Freud responded favourably to the idea, and the committee was set up. The other members were Karl Abraham, Sándor Ferenczi, Otto Rank and Hans Sachs (see Wittenberger 1995). A significant absence was the then president of the IPA, Jung. Indeed, Andrew Paskauskas (1988) has argued cogently that the secret committee played an important role in instigating the split between Jung and Freud. In 1914, Jung and the Zürich school formally left the IPA. The Zürich psychoanalytic society became the association for analytical psychology, and the nucleus of Jung's own movement.

After the hiatus of the second world war, the institutionalisation of the psychoanalytic movement spread rapidly. At the Budapest congress in 1918, Herman Nunberg, who had been an assistant physician at the Burghölzli, proposed that every prospective analyst had to undergo an analysis. Nunberg's proposal was not accepted, due to the objections of Otto Rank and Victor Tausk (see Nunberg and Federn 1962-75: xxii). In the following years, the Berlin Institute, founded in 1920, began to formalise its training structure. The Berlin society had been founded

by Karl Abraham, another 'graduate' of the Burghölzli. In 1924, a training analysis of four months became a requirement, and further, the approval of the training analyst was required for the candidate to continue with the training. Siegfried Bernfeld recalls that many members felt the need for analysis, but were reluctant to reveal their secrets to a local analyst. Thus Hanns Sachs was invited from Berlin for the analysis of analysts (Bernfeld 1962: 464). It was at the Berlin society that the triad of personal analysis, supervised analysis, and seminars was established, which became the basic template of all psychoanalytic institutes. In 1925, at the psychoanalytic congress in Bad Homburg, the requirement that every prospective analyst had to be analysed was passed.<sup>12</sup>

The secret committee played a critical role in controlling the development of psychoanalysis. Ernst Falzeder (1994) notes that the Berlin, Budapest, London and Vienna Institutes "were headed by the members of the Secret Committee, who thus exercised not only 'political' control over the course of the psychoanalytic movement, but also direct influence on the trainees" (175). The purpose of the secret committee was to ensure the survival of psychoanalysis, and to protect against dissidence. In the case of departures from orthodox psychoanalytic theory, two broad patterns emerged: on the one hand, outright expulsion of dissidents, and on the other, a form of in-house crisis management, in which the new departures were sanctioned as legitimate modifications of psychoanalytic theory. What is striking is that the issue of whether a particular theoretical development was seen as a secession or as a legitimate outgrowth was not primarily dependent upon how far the ideas were from psychoanalytic theory; indeed, as the institutions became more secure, more latitude was permitted. Ironically, in many respects, the heretical positions developed in turn by Adler, Jung and Rank and others are, in many respects, more congruent with mainline analytic theory today than what was then judged to be orthodoxy. Their ideas have been recycled and reincorporated within analytic theories, but without acknowledgement. It is this process that has enabled psychotherapists to continue to officially call their practices psychoanalysis, and for the profession to survive, despite the fact that Freud would have in many instances denounced them as heretics. The main vehicle by which this control was effected was the training analysis. James Lieberman (1985) notes that when Otto Rank's work was judged to have departed too far from psychoanalytic orthodoxy, he was denounced as mentally disturbed by Brill, dropped from the American Psychoanalytic Association, and those he had trained had to resign or be reanalysed by an appropriate analyst (xxxii).

It was through the training enterprise that psychoanalysis prospered from the 1920's onwards. The formation of a psychoanalytic training system, detached from medicine and psychiatry was crucial in the survival of psychoanalysis, and contributed greatly to its success in comparison with other forms of psychotherapy, as no other school had established a comparable system. By comparison, it was a full twenty years later that formalised training in analytical psychology was established, with the formation of the Society for Analytical Psychology in London in 1945. In 1936, the British psychologist William McDougall (1936) lamented:

I have realized too late that I might have done much more for my chosen science, had I from the first spoken with a less modest voice. It seems to me probable that, had I at the outset put forward my views in a more self-assertive and clamant fashion, I might have been acknowledged as the leader of a powerful and perhaps dominant school of psychology; instead of remaining a well-nigh solitary outsider playing a lone hand; I might even have 'put over' the type of psychology which I believe to be most nearly true, and to be indispensable for the advance of all social sciences. For, in psychology, far more than any other field of science, the prestige and authority of a like-minded group would seem to be essential to the success of any theory or system. (v)

For McDougall, the public success of psychoanalysis was not due to any inherent therapeutic or theoretical superiority - far from it - but from the particular mode of institutional organization that it adopted, and the consequent suggestive effect on the wider populace. Without this, the Freudian legend would have been ineffective. It was the effectiveness of the institutional structures of psychoanalysis that gave it public visibility, such that cultural debates about the new psychology were nominally cast in the idiom of psychoanalysis. In the hypnotic period, a linkage was established between the development of therapeutic and experimental practises and widespread public debate concerning the nature of influence and the hidden reaches of the mind. In many respects, psychoanalysis simply became the new idiom under which these societal concerns were framed. This is far from saying that it inaugurated them. Thus one finds late nineteenth century popular representations of women falling prey to the powers of nefarious hypnotists being replaced by early twentieth century depictions of their falling prey to the wiles of psychoanalysts. In addition, the institutional prominence and public visibility of psychoanalysis led many individuals to become associated with it, who may have regarded themselves as having a different orientation, such as the Harvard psychologist and student of Jung, Henry Murray. As John Burnham (1967) accurately noted:

In the United States Freud became the agent not so much of psychoanalysis as of other ideas current at the time. Psychoanalysis was understood as environmentalism, as sexology, as a theory of psychogenic etiology of the neuroses. Likewise when Freud's teachings gained attention and even adherents, his followers often believed not so much in his work as in evolution, in psychotherapy, and in the modern world. (214)

It is the misunderstanding of the nature of these substitutions that has led to the prevalent vastly overinflated view of the significance of psychoanalysis in twentieth century culture. In his recent history of the formation of psychotherapy in America, Eric Caplan (2001) argues that the sheer concentration on Freud has "grossly distorted our understanding not only of the history of psychotherapy but also of the history of psychiatry in the United States" (151). He cogently demonstrates that the "allure of psychoanalysis derived in large measure from the unprecedented combination of popular and professional enthusiasm for mental therapeutics that existed at the time of its introduction in the United States," by which time "psychotherapy was already integrally woven into the fabric of American culture and American medicine" (151). Thus he concludes that in this regard, Freud stood on the shoulders of Elwood Worcester, Samuel McComb and the Emmanuel movement. I have argued here that it was the success of the novel institutional - as opposed to theoretical - form in which psychoanalysis organised itself that enabled

this misperception of the historical significance of psychoanalysis to take hold (see also Taylor, 1999). The psychoanalytic institutes provided the motor for the Freudian legend.

If the establishment of the psychoanalytic training system played a crucial role in the establishment of psychoanalysis, it was also an unstable matrix, as it could easily become adapted to any theoretical model. This has indeed been the case, and hundreds of psychotherapeutic schools have adopted the same institutional structure to propagate their therapies and generate evidence for their theories. The success of these rival schools, adopting the same institutional structures as psychoanalysis, whilst making them more accessible, has in a large measure contributed to the beleaguered state of contemporary psychoanalysis.

Finally, if the institutional apparatus of psychoanalysis, as I have argued, succeeded in creating conditions which made favourable the generation of conviction in the truth of psychoanalytic theory, one is left with the question of how to evaluate such attestations. One does not have to look far to find copious testimonies as to the efficacy of psychoanalysis, by patients, and those former patients turned analysts. On the one hand, in psychoanalysis, only the analyst's account is accorded any epistemological status. Secondly, many aspects of psychoanalytic theories have built in features which discount the possibility of taking anyone's testimony at face value - even if they speak of the benefits of psychoanalytic therapies (hence the favourite exemplar of contemporary psychoanalytic research is the infant: a subject incapable of verbal testimony and of contradicting analytic constructions). More seriously, rival psychotherapeutic schools - ranging from Jungian analysis to past-life regression therapy - also have ample 'evidence' in the form of first person testimonies, and if one accepts one form of such evidence as valid, no clear differential criteria exist by which to reject other forms. The prevalent epistemology of psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic systems has been to assert the fundamental realism of psychological theories; though supposedly derived from the clinical encounter, they remain independent of them, and can be taken as veridical accounts of general human functioning. Far from a lack of evidence, the problem appears to be the excess of evidence - for any theory imaginable. Contemporary psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic training institutes, as Delbouef and James long ago demonstrated apropos hypnotic schools, appear to be machines for the generation of new forms of self-evidence. What is notable about such testimonials is that they are not simply reports by subjects of particular events befalling them, but reports in which the subjects themselves attest to having undergone a transformation. In this sense, they are akin to the reports of religious experiences, such as those studied by James. One awaits an anthropology that could undertake a comparative study of these new forms of psychological experience (see Shamdasani, forthcoming).

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#### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>See Borch-Jacobsen and Shamdasani (2001); Falzeder (1996); and Swales (forthcoming).

<sup>2</sup>For an articulation of the ontology of such a notion of the ‘fabricated real’, see Borch-Jacobsen, (1997) and Bruno Latour (1996).

<sup>3</sup>See his “Postscriptum 1998” in Borch-Jacobsen (2002).

<sup>4</sup>Ernest Jones (1959) recalls a visit to Paris in 1908: “I had greatly hoped to be able to work under Janet at the Salpêtrière, but although he received me kindly he explained that he always worked alone and had no student assistants” (175). One can only wonder what the effects on the subsequent history of psychoanalysis would have been if Janet had taken Jones on as a student.

<sup>5</sup>Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen an der Hochschule Zürich, Staatsarchiv, Zürich.

<sup>6</sup>On the development of the psychoanalytic profession, see Falzeder (2000).

<sup>7</sup>Jung/Jaffé protocols, Bollingen collection, Library of Congress, Washington, p. 331.

<sup>8</sup>Bleuler to Freud, 4 December 1911, Freud collection, Library of Congress, Washington.

<sup>9</sup>Bleuler to Freud, *ibid.*, 1 January 1912.

<sup>10</sup>James Jackson Putnam, “What is Psychoanalysis?” Putnam papers, Countway library of Medicine, Boston.

<sup>11</sup>Freud to Trigant Burrow, 19th June, 1914, Sigmund Freud Collection, Library of Congress.

<sup>12</sup>In his report, Max Eitingon (1926), another ‘graduate’ of the Burghölzli, stated that this suggestion had first been made

by Nunberg in 1918 (131). Clearly, it was not deemed proper to acknowledge that it had actually been made by Jung six years earlier.

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## Facticity, Freud, & Territorial Markings: SRB Interview With Frank Cioffi and Allen Esterson T. Dufresne Russell Square, London, 14 June 2002

**SRB:** What good has psychoanalysis done for interpretation in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century?

**Frank Cioffi:** For people who practice interpretation it has done them a lot of good, since it gave them a template on which they could model their utterances. As far as helping us understand the phenomena being interpreted – if you are so reactionary as to believe that there is something to understand, and that we can’t just say whatever we like – I think psychoanalysis has probably done more harm than good. We’ve had more stupidity, more silliness, than we’ve had insight.

**SRB:** In 1973, you delivered your now famous BBC lecture, “Was Freud a Liar?” In that lecture on the seduction theory you provide convincing reasons for concluding that Freud was in fact a liar. However, you resist this conclusion. I’m wondering if in 2002 you are finally willing to embrace this conclusion.

**FC:** I’m still not sure that Freud deliberately lied about the seduction episode. I’ll tell you what happened. In a review I wrote before that lecture, I actually said that Freud was lying. But then I read an account of Bertrand Russell’s explanation of how he came to say that he never advocated preemptive bombing of the Soviet Union, when there was ample evidence to the contrary. Being a great admirer of Russell, I accepted his claim that he had forgotten. In turn I began to think the same of Freud. That’s why I became reluctant to say that Freud lied about the seduction episode. That said, there is ample evidence that he lied on many other matters. So Freud was a liar! He may not have been lying, in 1926, when he reminisced about the seduction episode and said something that was uncontroversially false – for example, as it concerns the controversy over whether his patients actually related to him memories of having been molested as infants. But there is one thing about which there is no controversy. It’s unequivocal. He said at the time, in 1896, that he did not base his conviction that they had been seduced on anything that they admitted or confessed. Now, he couldn’t in later years admit that this was the case, that it wasn’t based on what they said. Why? Because the seduction stories were in fact based on the same kind of material that he was using for the Oedipus Complex theory. If Freud had said that he made up stories that seemed to make sense of the patient’s symptoms, then he would have been faced with the criticism: ‘Well that’s what you were doing in 1896, when you got the story completely wrong’. So obviously he couldn’t admit that, for too much was at stake.

On the other hand, I’ve heard some people say that Freud was a psychopathic liar. Certainly not. He hated lying. It disturbed him to lie, but it was absolutely necessary if he was to make his way in the world.

**Allen Esterson:** I think there were certain details in Freud’s later explanations of the seduction

episode that indicate he must have known that he wasn’t telling the whole truth. I’m not talking about what he was writing in 1925, but some of the things he said in 1905. Those remarks were clearly divergent from things he wrote the papers in 1896. I certainly agree with Frank that, by 1925, he probably convinced himself about a certain way of seeing the seduction theory. But I think that, in his first retrospective reports, he modified what had actually happened in order to make a good story. No doubt Freud deceived himself a great deal of the time about what actually happened. But, once again, there are some things in his first retrospective reports that are so discrepant with the things he said in 1896, that he must have known that this wasn’t the whole truth.

.....  
“Some readers of Freud are so bloody sycophantic they make me sick – and no less so that they are counted among the most distinguished intellectuals in our culture.” FC  
.....

**FC:** I would say that the really interesting question is not whether or not Freud lied, but rather: Why is it that intellectuals who pride themselves on being tough-minded, including those Freudians trained to confront painful truths, keep repeating the traditional account of the seduction episode? This was quite excusable 25 years ago, because people hadn’t gone very carefully over the texts. But now the material in the public domain makes it absolutely clear that we cannot accept what Freud said at the time. It isn’t just that he was inconsistent in his statements. There are also internal inconsistencies. For example, Freud says that these patients have been abused in the most atrocious ways, for example, saying that they have been anally penetrated. At the same time he says that when these patients remember the episodes, they claim that they thought nothing of it at the time. But how can a child being anally penetrated think nothing of it? Some readers of Freud are so bloody sycophantic they make me sick – and no less so that they are counted among the most distinguished intellectuals in our culture. Roy Porter, a universally praised medical historian who recently died, refused to consider the idea that the traditional seduction accounts are false. Instead, his recent (posthumous) book continues to repeat conventional material about the seduction error. This is, of course, an ironic situation. People are supposed to emancipate themselves from idealization, and yet hang on to untenable idealizations about Freud and psychoanalysis. The truth is that the psychoanalytic movement as a whole is one of the most corrupt intellectual movements. It is rotten with political jockeying – and it is rotten with untenable views being repeated because of personal relationships and career considerations.

**SRB:** Given both of your critiques of Freud and of Freud Studies, what remains, if anything, to be done in the next twenty years as it concerns psychoanalysis?

**FC:** We still need to explain how it is that the best and brightest and in our culture have refused to employ the normal methods of intellectual enquiry when it is a question of Freud. The greatest mistake you can make is to think that the present critical dispensation toward Freud is the result of the scholarship of the last 20 years. Evidence that psychoanalysis wasn’t a *bona fide*

enquiry has been available for at least fifty years, through a scholarly scrutiny of Freud's own writings. Nothing very exciting is needed to realize this – no hidden letters, no secret relations with the sister in law, and so on. So the fascinating question is why. I would venture that it is partly because Freud has had an enormously beneficial influence, a liberating influence, on 20<sup>th</sup> Century culture. For example, we were able to use completely bogus arguments about the baleful affects of sexual repression to get people to ease up, not be so censorious, about other people's sexual lives. That's a great plus. It's a pity that they had to use a phony theory of the neuroses to accomplish this end, but this end is a desirable one nonetheless.

**AE:** I agree. But it's extraordinarily hard to answer why people have often accepted as factual things for which there is no basis – accepting things, presumably, because others accept them. In the face of this I think there is still a job to be done correcting old misconception about Freud that just won't die. I see myself still trying to refute fallacious arguments until the correct picture is more broadly known.

**FC:** One of the reasons Freud has such a wide constituency, is that he has an uncanny knack for being on both sides of almost every question. For example, you get people saying that Freud's greatness consists in his emphasis on the material basis of neurosis. After all, sexuality is something physical. Freud emphasized carnality, and therefore Freud is going to be antipathetic to anyone who wants to sweeten the pill of life, and who wants to side with Jung when dealing with ideas, and so on. On the other hand, there are people that say that Freud despised medical materialism. Thomas Mann says that Freud's greatness consists in saying that what we call disease is really something that people *do*, not something that happens to them. And Freud is on both sides of this argument. So how can he lose?

**SRB:** In retrospect, what mistakes have you made in your reading of Freud and psychoanalysis?

**FC:** The great mistake that I made, in the first fifteen or twenty years of my dealing with Freud, was that I was over-influenced by Karl Popper and this notion of testability. It's complicated to say why I went off testability, but I can simply say now that it isn't the open sesame that I once believed. Among the many reasons is this: If you look at the formulations that people embrace, when they give you an account of why they think Freud made such a great contribution to human understanding, you will find that it's impossible to say that they are untestable. They're not clear enough to be testable. They are really mantras, things that people repeat and get satisfaction out of repeating, because it makes them think they have their finger on something deep in human life. I've just given an example of that: the statement that illness is something that people do, not something that happens to them. Analytic philosophers, of whom I am one, have disgraced themselves in the way they have repeated this remark. If you stop and ask them a very simple question – in what sense is a depression something that people *do*? – the question has never occurred to them. It's not that they don't have an adequate answer. It's that the thought has never occurred to them that these mantras, which they keep wheeling out from time to time when they are in a celebratory mood, have to be translated so that we know what they are actually saying. In what sense is an illness like depression, something that a person is doing?

**SRB:** What pet peeves do either of you have about interpretation of Freud in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century?

**AE:** I am certainly amazed that, when some people read case histories, they presume that they have factual information about what actually happened in the analysis. What we are actually getting is just the analyst's account of an interaction with a patient. Obviously we have no real idea of what the patient did or thought, and so we have to rely upon what the analyst is telling us. In this respect, Freud often gives the impression that the material is taken directly from the patient. But when you examine it more closely you can see that this was not what happened at all. Thanks to Patrick Mahoney, we know from the one example of original case notes that Freud didn't destroy – namely, the notes for "Rat Man" case history – that he misrepresented many things about what actually occurred in order to tie up the material he did have into a nice story. So when we have this rare instance where we can actually compare the case notes with the published material, we find that we cannot trust Freud.

So I find it fascinating that, over the last century, so many people took Freud's case histories quite literally. And like Frank, I would be interested to know why. Why weren't more people wondering if things really happened the way Freud described it?

**SRB:** What advice do you have for the readers of *The Semiotic Review of Books*?

**FC:** Semioticians need to be more reflexive, and ask basic questions. What is somebody doing when he or she interprets? Why do people interpret? What is the satisfaction they get out of it? One unfortunate kind of interpreting is just a process of naturalizing the cultural artefacts that surround us in our own world of intellectual loyalties. If we are Marxists, then we will put a Marxist gloss on it. If we are feminists, then a feminist gloss. If we are Freudians, a Freudian gloss – and so on. But I don't think we are doing anything essentially different than what a medieval Roman Catholic was doing when he said that the three-leafed clover was a manifestation of the trinity. The interesting question is: Why was he doing that? If you ask that question, then you are on your way to understanding why Marxists, feminists, and Freudians are doing what they are doing. I would ask these intellectuals to consider the following comparison: ethologists say that when dogs are urinating they are not *really* urinating, but are marking an area as belonging to them. They are placing their mark on something. That, bluntly put, is precisely what I think intellectuals in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century have been doing when they interpret material: they have been lifting their legs and marking the material as belonging to Freud, or to Marx, or to Melanie Klein, or to whomever.

Frank Cioffi, recently retired, is Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kent at Canterbury. His works include *Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience* (1998).

Allen Esterson, recently retired, was Lecturer at Southwark College in London. He is the author of *Seductive Mirage* (1993).



## Deflections: SRB Interview With Edward Shorter

**T. Dufresne**

**University of Toronto, June 18, 2001**

**SRB:** How fair is it to emphasize the many non-scientific impulses in the history of medicine, such as class and gender?

**Edward Shorter:** It's part of the history, so it is certainly not unfair. The history of medicine isn't just the record of scientific accomplishments, each of which is more bold than the last. It is also a tale of the frailty of human knowledge when confronted with the inexorability of disease. Like everyone, physicians are deformed by their own gender, social class, personal histories, and the cultural tradition in which they find themselves. All such considerations deflect them from the path of true science, but are a part of the social history of medicine.

**SRB:** Are you at all interested in recent feminist and post-structuralist theoretical discourses, for example, concerning subject positions?

**ES:** No, I think it's a waste of time. It gives me the hives.

**SRB:** You are certainly interested in the role of naming and rhetoric, and language more generally, in the history of medicine. I am thinking of your discussion of institutional name changes, when insane asylums began to be called "nervous" clinics.

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*"The realist says that gay men and women are born homosexual. The nominalist says, 'Baby, until we got a name for it, you ain't it'. I believe in the realist position."*  
.....

**ES:** The change was the result of the horrible fear that patients had for anything psychiatric, since that meant to them evidence of degeneration. Parents worried that they wouldn't be able to marry their daughters off if it were known that there was psychiatric illness in the family. Nervous illness, by contrast, affecting the physical nerves of the body, and was seen as less inheritable, much more the result of happenstance. So it was more acceptable to have your problems labelled 'nervous' or 'neurological' rather than 'psychiatric'.

**SRB:** As a nominalist of sorts, I am certainly intrigued by your comments.

**ES:** In the history of homosexuality, for example, there are two positions: the realist and the nominalist. The realist basically says that gay men and women are born homosexual, and that it is not the culture that encourages them. The nominalist says, 'Baby, until we got a name for it, you ain't it'. I believe in the realist position, and think the nominalist position has grossly distorted the history of sexuality. I hope you don't find this personally offensive, but I think you are on the wrong train.

**SRB:** No, of course not. But you certainly do recognize the power of words to shape a culture, including our illnesses.

**ES:** Sure. Naming things has an enormous subjective value. But in the history of sexuality and also in the area of psychiatric illness, the question is this: Does the orientation or illness predate the name? The realist position is that it

certainly does. I believe that people had biologically based psychiatric illness long before psychiatrists came along to give them names.

**SRB:** What about the DSM? How does it happen that we go from a very small manual about recognized mental illnesses to what is now a very thick manual?

**ES:** Arthur Kleinman once said that 90% of the diagnoses on the DSM-III don't exist; that they are simply artifacts devised for reasons of insurance. I think that's true! But at the same time I don't disparage the nosological enterprise of trying to differentiate and clearly demarcate distinct psychiatric illnesses. I agree that the DSM series has failed to do this very well, and has become like a runaway express train. But the basic impulse is a reasonable one. Just as we subdivide and classify the diseases of the chest, why not do the same for illnesses of the mind and brain? Well of course we can. But the creators of the DSM have ended up with a wildly inappropriate set of classifications, and glued themselves to a method that will almost surely lead them into the desert, namely, the consensus method: bringing a bunch of experts together around the table and encouraging them to compromise. Such compromises might be great for the social dynamics of the group, but as a scientific exercise, the results are garbage.

**SRB:** I can sympathize, up to a point, with the realist perspective concerning biological illness. But isn't the situation much looser when it comes to psycho-somatic illness?

**ES:** It is looser, because the role of cultural moulding is so heavy. Cultural moulding in schizophrenia or major depression isn't that dramatic. But with psycho-somatic illness such moulding dominates the script, dictating to the patient what is and isn't a legitimate symptom. In turn the patient's mind sees to it that legitimate symptoms are produced. As the cultural sense of what is legitimate changes, the kinds of symptoms a patient presents change as well. Nobody wants to be told that it's all in their mind.

**SRB:** So you reject nominalism as it concerns biological illness, but not psycho-somatic illness?

**ES:** No. Whether you call it neurasthenia, depression, or the lights, the symptoms are basically the same. People are tired all the time, may be weepy, have a sense of dejection about their own accomplishments – this has always existed, no matter what you call it, although today we call it major depression.

**SRB:** You do say, in *From Paralysis to Fatigue* (1993), that the symptoms change in the different eras.

**ES:** Right. The same underlying impulse to somatize exists, has doubtless existed through the ages, and is doubtless neurogenic or biologically based. Only the expression of it is determined by cultural moulding.

**SRB:** When, in your work, you argue that there was a 'massive duplicity, a century-long deception, about professional views of nervousness' – just how intended or conscious was that deception by practitioners?

**ES:** The use of the term nervous and nervousness was originally designed for public consumption. These were psychiatrists, and they knew perfectly well what psychiatric illness was and, to them, disorders of the mind could be divorced from disorders of the nerves. So calling it nervous

illness, and themselves nerve doctors, was really public relations, something to make the patients feel better, something to draw them in during a time of highly competitive medicine. Later this distinction between public relations, spin control, and what one actually believes, does become effaced a bit – and it becomes effaced when we get to the DSM-III and after. By contrast, the vogue for nervousness in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century was, I think, more duplicitous, more a matter of spin control.

.....  
“*It is an intolerable interference for bioethicists, whose background is philosophy, to wave the red flag about ‘lying’ - even though it might help patients.*”

.....  
**SRB:** Does that spin control go on today, although we may not yet be able to see it?

**ES:** It certainly goes on when doctors tell patients that their problems are a result of an imbalance in their serotonin metabolism or their norepinephrine metabolism, because even though the drugs they are given may affect these neurotransmitters, the real problem almost certainly lies elsewhere – in the chemistry of the brain. Psychiatrists today are still very uncertain about what the real problem might be in biological terms, but they tell patients about imbalances because it is reassuring. Pills can then be prescribed to control serotonin, and the patient goes away happy. But the psychiatrists who paid attention to what they learned in psycho-pharmacology don't believe that at all.

**SRB:** This reminds me of your discussion of the placebo effect in *Beside Manners* (1985), where you decry the use of serious drugs as placebos.

**ES:** There is a very serious placebo effect at work here, which in psychotherapy is called suggestion. Instead of giving sugar pills to patients suffering from chronic pain, they are given drugs that have a powerful pharmacological action. This is seen as the only ethically acceptable way of not lying to the patient. The drug probably won't have much impact on their symptoms, but at least people can believe that this is real medical therapy and not just some blasted sugar pill.

**SRB:** Doctors no longer have the cultural authority to prescribe such placebos.

**ES:** I think it is an intolerable interference in the doctor-patient relationship for bioethicists, whose background is in philosophy, to wave the red flag about such 'lying' – even though there's a good chance it might help the patients.

**SRB:** Reading your work, I am often struck by the financial details you discuss. For example, in your *History of Psychiatry* (1997) you speak about how the need for psychiatrists to have private practices led to the expansion of psychoanalysis.

**ES:** Psychoanalysis became the keystone of private practice, although only about 10% of private practitioners engaged in analysis. But psychodynamic doctoring really came to dominate psychotherapeutic approaches in private practice.

**SRB:** How much of a deflection is finance in the history of medicine?

**ES:** Money was a very powerful incentive to get

psychiatrists out of the asylum and into a mainstream practice, where they would re-join the rest of civil society – and make a lot more. At the same time, patients demanded psychoanalytic treatment. So you could say they were just fulfilling legitimate consumer desire. The analysts, even in their best days, didn't make as much as neurologists or cardiovascular surgeons. So if they chose psychoanalysis it was for other motives than material gain. Economic motivation has a role to play, but it isn't the full story. If you over-emphasize economics, you couldn't explain why anyone ever went into psychiatry. Even being a Park Avenue analysts never compared with other specialities on that street.

**SRB:** Except that many practitioners of psychoanalysis could never have succeeded in those specialities.

**ES:** But they were all medically qualified. If they didn't go into ophthalmology residency, I don't think it was because they were incompetent or inferior, but because they were attracted to analysis for other reasons.

**SRB:** In *Before Freud*, Gosling argues something that seems to me counter-intuitive: namely, that neurasthenia was not limited to the upper classes in America, but was in fact a regular part of a doctor's working class clientele.

**ES:** It's just that many of the physicians that wrote about neurasthenia happen to have had upper class practices. But it doesn't mean that neurasthenia is limited to the upper classes, any more than it would mean that only the upper class today suffers from depression!

**SRB:** Aren't certain illnesses the privilege of the rich?

**ES:** Neurasthenia is not a good example, because it is just another word for depression. Take, rather, the sofa cases: women who took to their beds and remained there for years. That was indeed a disease of rich women. Normal women couldn't afford it. Who would run the family? Who would go out and help make a living?

**SRB:** I have always entertained what may be a comforting illusion: namely, that lack of money at least keeps indulgent illness away; that the working class may in some ways be healthier than the upper class.

**ES:** If anything, the working classes are less hardy, because their health isn't as good as the health of the middle class, and because they don't care for themselves as well. But working class people are just as subject to depression as any other class.

**SRB:** Let me push this a bit more. In *Beside Manners*, you discuss the transition from the traditional, to the modern, to the postmodern patient. You seem to imply that working class patients have neither the time nor the desire for self-reflection, which is more characteristic of the middle classes. You don't see a connection between this heightened capacity for introspection and, say, the rise of the postmodern patient?

**ES:** I'm not sure if this is an argument I would want to pursue very far, but clearly patients who develop lots of insight are sometimes able to shed psycho-somatic symptoms. That is, there is an inverse relation between insight and somatizing. At the same time, as a real proposition, almost no one with a major psycho-somatic illness, regardless of social class, has any insight at all. They all believe that it is totally organic.

**SRB:** How did Freud manage to escape the appearance of malpractice, given, in retrospect, the clear indications of suggestion in his practice?

**ES:** Good question. Why hasn't psychoanalysis, today, been the object of massive class action law suits on behalf of all the patients mistreated by analysts for conditions that we now recognize to be amenable to pharmaco-therapy? Or those illnesses, at least, that we know were not psychogenic? For example, Tourette's Syndrome: for many years these patients were treated by psychoanalysis, the most inappropriate treatment possible. Even today it's a mystery to me why the Tourette's patients of analysis haven't banded together to sue the American Psychoanalytic Association, or individual analysts, for all the mischief they did.

It's a similar situation with Freud, as you say. Why wasn't he sued? First of all because nobody got sued for malpractice in those days. The concept was scarcely visible on anyone's radar. Second, because a lot of people believed in this stuff – especially in the middle classes – right up to the 1970s, and on both sides of the ocean. So naturally a malpractice suit would have been thrown out by a middle-class judge or middle-class jury. They all believed in the doctrine of psychogenicity based on unconscious conflicts, and so by initiating legal action you would have been a laughing stock and wasted your money as well.

**SRB:** I was thinking of Freud's malpractice in the more general sense.

**ES:** Well, the academic establishment did call him on it, and never did stomach psychoanalysis. They remained much more biologically-oriented, and didn't believe at all in infantile sexuality. But academic psychiatry is quite different from community psychiatry. In community psychiatry you have to make your money based on what people will pay you. If patients start to believe this stuff, then you better do it – or you won't have any patients.

**SRB:** Given that somatizing is a regular part of everyday life, what does it mean to speak of simulated or even faked illness?

**ES:** There is a spectrum of self-insight. People who have 100% self-insight, and still somatize, are really faking it. People who have zero insight, and somatize, have a major psychiatric problem. In other words, there is a smooth continuum that goes from malingering to hysteria, and where you are on that continuum depends on the amount of self-insight you have.

**SRB:** I am curious about your statement, in *From the Mind Into the Body* (1994), that the explanation of suggestion is really just a "black box." Why is the charge of suggestion a non-explanation?

**ES:** Nobody knows what the psychological mechanism of suggestibility is: either you are suggestible, or you aren't. Nobody really knows why. It has a genetic component, as some research demonstrates, but that's only part of the story. How you open holes in the black box is still very much a mystery. Today, in the neurosciences and in psychiatry, psycho-somatic illnesses are almost as much a mystery as they were a hundred years ago. Nobody knows why they happen. It's clear that women were more subject to them than men. There is, as I said, a positive family history that makes you more likely to be a somatizer. But beyond those parameters, the whole business is a scientific quicksand. Physicians who get into it tend to vanish from the radar.

**SRB:** Given your own interest in the biological perspective in psychiatry, I am curious to hear your thoughts about the biological Freud.

**ES:** I think it is very easy to over-emphasize the biological elements in Freud's thought. Some of his partisans now, retrospectively, try to get psychoanalysis off the hook by saying that Freud recognized the bedrock of biology in his work. Freud said that maybe once in his life. The entire intellectual structure of psychoanalysis presupposes psychogenicity – that mental illnesses arise as a result of the action of the mind, as a result of unconscious conflicts. Freud's followers have always been fiercely opposed to the biological approach in psychiatry, and to psychopharmacology. So even though Freud passed on the idea that there may be something biological to be investigated, the whole analytic enterprise has been relentlessly hostile to biology.

**SRB:** I certainly see a lot of biology in Freud's work, both before and after 1897.

**ES:** He doesn't really resume these ideas after 1900.

**SRB:** Sure he does. The late texts, beginning with *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), are full of biology. Take a look at *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), which recalls the phylogenetic fantasies of *Totem and Taboo* (1912).

**ES:** But that speculative physical anthropology owes nothing at all to neurochemistry or brain biology. He had no interest in neuroanatomy, and there was no neurochemistry in his time. He had no interest in genetics, and later psychoanalysts have relentlessly denied the influence of genetics. So saying that Freud was interested in phylogenesis doesn't make him a biological psychiatrist.

**SRB:** I think that he kept the biology as an implicit foundation for his work.

**ES:** Lots of things may be implicit. Freud studied as a biologically-oriented neurologist, and not as a psychiatrist. So it's unsurprising to find isolated eruptions of interest in his work in neuro-biology. For example, he saw a lot of neuro-syphilitics, where the biology of their complaints was clear. And Freud never claimed that all psychiatric symptoms were psychogenic. However, his followers in particular resolutely turned their backs on neuro-biology, psycho-pharmacology, psychiatric genetics, and anything else that has remotely organic seed.

**SRB:** In your essay on Freud's "Anna O.," you attend carefully to the social and cultural context which made her symptoms possible. For example, you attend to her Jewish identity. How dangerous is it for an historian to emphasize such details?

**ES:** I think the Jewishness of Freud's milieu helps us explain the extraordinary number of people who believed they had something wrong with them. A kind of mental and physical hypochondriasis was built into the Jewish culture of Eastern Europe, and had been there for hundreds of years, and it's interesting to see its periodic manifestations. Nerve doctors like Freud were able to capitalize on that sort of anxious self-preoccupation by telling women that they had hysteria, or men that they had neurasthenia – where in fact there was nothing wrong with them. I believe that the majority of Freud's patients were normal, that their illnesses were socially cultivated, and were to some extent iatrogenic, as Freud, searching for the unconscious roots of their behaviour, managed to convince them that they had medical illnesses.

To what extent are these considerations anti-Semitic? I don't think they are any more anti-Semitic than talking about the problems of American blacks under slavery, or problems of Polish miners in Minnesota. Canada and the United States are a patchwork quilt of ethnic groups, and each group has its own characteristics. Probably each ethnic group has its own characteristic illnesses and patterns of health seeking. To say that this is somehow 'anti-' that ethnic group is absurd. So I don't see these considerations as dangerous at all. It is rather an obligation that academics have to tell the truth, and not to pander to social prejudices.

**SRB:** Sure. But it can be easy to mistake the description for a prescription.

**ES:** Too bad! My advice to the reader is to deal with it.

**SRB:** In your book, *From the Mind Into the Body*, you devote one section to ethnic characteristics – but then only speak about Jewish identity.

**ES:** It's a short book! I could have written about other ethnic groups, but I had spent all this time studying the Jews of Vienna and that was the ethnic group that I knew about.

**SRB:** I'm not trying to suggest anything untoward, but am simply interested in any possible reaction you received from such passages.

**ES:** None that I'm aware of. But there was a significant German reaction to my *History of Psychiatry*. And, yes, some Germans deplored it as being anti-Semitic simply because I talk about these matters in a frank way. The Germans, of course, are totally unable to consider these issues with any kind of objectivity at all. So when they encounter such objectivity on the international scene, they shrink back in horror. I was reproached several times by German book reviewers for what they perceived as anti-Semitism. Incidentally, the German translation was made by a Jewish woman, who later told me that she would have been horrified by any hint of anti-Semitism, and would never have translated the book. She certainly didn't see it.

**SRB:** Did you respond to your critics?

**ES:** Somewhat, yes. I had a nasty little exchange with a Swiss psychiatrist, and the Swiss Psychiatric Association, over the whole issue of Max Müller and whether or not he himself was anti-Semitic. Müller was a very distinguished Swiss psychiatrist, who flourished in the 30s, and he made some absolutely coruscating remarks about Jewish colleagues, referring to them as typical Eastern European Jews. I said, in a footnote of the *History of Psychiatry*, that this was anti-Semitic, and the son, Christian, went through the roof when he saw it. In response, he managed to convince the Swiss Psychiatric Association, of which he is a leading member, to file a condemnation of me and my book. (Later an article appeared in a Swiss Jewish weekly that was sympathetic to me and critical of Müller and the Association.) So I have indeed had my fingers burned on this anti-Semitism issue – and in a very surprising way.

**SRB:** Elaine Showalter has said that she required bodyguards after publishing her work on hysteria, and received death threats from supporters of chronic fatigue. How have you fared with your critics?

**ES:** Over the years, I've had a fair amount of hate mail. And I've had people demonstrating outside my lectures. However, this has not deterred me from pressing on. I'm sorry that these people don't like my work, but we are paid to be academics. That means we should try to find out the truth, whether it's universally popular or not.

**SRB:** Why is the work threatening?

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*“As people lose interest in psychoanalysis, there is less and less curiosity about its history.*

*And who cares?”*  
.....

**ES:** There are people suffering from diseases of the month, such as fibro-myalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome, multiple chemical sensitivities, who have a huge psychological commitment to their diagnoses, and cannot stand to hear people say that the problems lack organicity and are due to somatization. In short, they have built up their

entire lives on the fiction of organicity. So that's why they react so furiously when someone like myself comes along and, while recognizing their suffering, nonetheless doesn't go along with the diagnosis.

**SRB:** What is the future of academic research in the history of medicine, and in psychoanalysis in particular?

**ES:** The history of medicine is really a growth field, probably where immunology was in the 1950s. The field is ready to just explode in the firmament of the humanities and social sciences. It's a field that has something very new to say about the human condition. As for the history of psychoanalysis, I think it's going to die out. As people lose interest in psychoanalysis in the real world, there is less and less curiosity about its history. And who cares?

**SRB:** And for academics?

**ES:** I'm not discouraging the legitimacy of work on the history of psychoanalysis. But it is striking that, for decades now, nobody has had anything

really new to say about the history of psychoanalysis – because there hasn't been any new texts.

**SRB:** There are letters.

**ES:** Well, they don't turn up very often. But, *grosso modo*, the texts people cite today are the same ones they were citing in the 1960s. This is not a field moving forward on the basis of new evidence. I think the history of psychoanalysis will come to have roughly the same interest to other investigators as the history of astrology has to us now.

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## After the Future -- Today

***“It remains for the future to decide whether there is more delusion in my theory than I should like to admit.” Freud (1911)***

***“The curious fact makes itself felt that in general people experience their present naively, as it were, without being able to form an estimate of its contents; they have first to put themselves at a distance from it — the present, that is to say, must have become the past — before it can yield points of vantage from which to judge the future.” Freud (1927)***