

THE SEMIOTIC REVIEW OF BOOKS

VOLUME 11.1 JULY 2000

<http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb>

ISSN 0847-1622

Editorial: The Spell

by Gary Genosko

If I have one regret from my graduate studies, from which I now have sufficient distance, it is that I devoted far too much time to the study of psychoanalysis. It was not so much the critical attitude of the time - reading Freud against Freud — that consumed me in the name of the endless practice of a clever literary criticism, but that many of my colleagues were under the spell of the clinical version, which they wielded as if they held in their hands the truth against my un-lived textual extravagances. Analysis was, for too many, an intellectual lifestyle subsidized by the state and successfully promoted within the university as a pursuit into which only the best and the brightest would be permitted entry.

An excellent text by Todd Dufresne, *Tales From The Freudian Crypt* (2000), is a current example of Freud-bashing (preferable, I think, to the Critical Freud Studies moniker), and the work is annotated with the names of its leading figures, Frederick Crews and Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen. The latter's candid "Foreword" alerts us to the fundamental issue at stake in Dufresne's argument: criticising psychoanalysis is like trying to put out a fire with gasoline — it actually feeds and keeps it alive; or, to use the death talk that Dufresne prefers, and aficionados of horror films will appreciate: if it's [always] already dead, you can't expect to kill it. Borch-Jacobsen puts it this way: "Dufresne is right: let's leave him [Freud] alone" (xi). Sure, psychoanalysis is one unforgettable fire (captured beautifully in Jean-Paul Sartre's (1985) screenplay *The Freud Scenario* with its steady series of struck matches, soot and cigar smoke), but if we just leave it alone it will eventually go out, or away, or as Dufresne will reveal, remain dead.

In what is part Monty Python sketch and part forensic hermeneutics, Dufresne goes about the business of bringing out the Freudian dead. His short first chapter, "Twilight of the Idols," investigates the phenomenon of psychoanalytic followership and transference onto the big names, especially Jacques Lacan. Key contemporary figures in French psychoanalysis such as Francois Roustang have come to ask themselves: "Why did we follow him [Lacan] for so long? (4) Dufresne touches upon all the central issues — the innovations of Lacanism (theoretical and clinical), institutional struggles, and the split between the deep French Freud and lite American ego psychology, an inheritance of Freud's contempt for America. Dufresne relates a horror story in which Lacan's displacement of the ego from the core of the subject, making it an imaginary function that lacks the clarity and distinctiveness characteristically assigned to it in the Cartesian tradition, but perfectly in line with Freud's self-proclaimed Copernican revolution decentering, not man, but the core of his being, entails a gaping hole in the person of the analyst: "According to Lacan, the silent analyst signifies to the patient an empty void, lack, death, the Real." (10) The analyst is a cadaver! Transference onto such a lack is impossible and mastery is a "hollow fiction." This is where things really get ugly. It was on the shoulders of this discovery that Lacan founded his authority and those who followed him fell into the abyss of the master himself in an infinite transference that turned many into "intolerant disciples," binding free spirits and turning former Leftist radicals into "ultraconformist bureaucrats." Psychoanalysis, Dufresne is telling us, brings out the worst in everyone.

Dufresne's central strategy is to provide a detailed historical and theoretical accounting of Freud's controversial and enormously influential late work *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920; henceforth, BPP). Dufresne's Chapter 2, "The Heterogeneous 'Beyond': An Introduction to the Dead and Dying," (13-144) provides a "review and reconstruction, an archaeology of BPP in general, and of the theory of the death drive in particular" (13-14). There are, it seems, many *Beyonds*. Dufresne begins by reviewing biographical material and commentaries on Freud's disruption of his own invention, his own revisionism, actually, with the late addition of the non plus ultra of psychoanalysis, the death drive. Freud himself often expressed ambivalence about this speculative essay, and this also describes how it was received; some finding it simply bizarre, others aligning it with the despair of Viennese culture, or explaining it as a humanistic inheritance of German romanticism (or 19th century biological speculations), perhaps reading the essay through the backhanded or overstated praise it contained or failed to contain for those from whom Freud apparently got the idea in the first place (this list is long). All of this history of ideas seems a bit like a George Romero movie in which a corpse — here in the guise of several young suicides of the psychoanalytic movement, Victor Tausk and Wilhelm Stekel — thrust its fist through the ground, drags itself from the grave, and takes revenge on those who drove it into the ground in the first place, namely, Freud and the psychoanalytic establishment. If this seems melodramatic, Dufresne reminds us that psychoanalysis has a long list of suicides within its ranks with which to contend (32); and, according to the radically anti-sociological nature of the death drive, suicide is an inauthentic act, a bit of Eros, a force of sociality that intrudes on the path of biology that one's life is destined to follow. Even Freud thought this was "extreme." (32)

In the same way that the Monty Python troupe made light of the Black Death with a growing pile of bodies on a cart pulled through a medieval street, Dufresne heaps together all of the *Beyonds* — all the versions of BPP from the Denied, Biographical, Biological, Clinical, Philosophical, and Deconstructive — demonstrating, in the process, the great pile that is psychoanalysis and its literatures, all of which is "perhaps a great heap of nonsense" (27). Perhaps. For Dufresne here and there hedges his bets, reasserting biographical history against theoretical fancies, (28) paying great care to the most tendentious of claims, especially concerning the reversal of causality concerning Freud's cancer and his later texts, especially BPP which was evidence of a sort that he had cancer before it was diagnosed a few years later. While Dufresne lets David Bakan sound less ridiculous than Wilhelm Reich on this point, he ultimately observes the "cancerous absurdity that sometimes claims interpretation" (38). Sometimes. While Dufresne may complain about the absence of biographical history in psychoanalytically-inspired theory, he will later lament, in an inspired section on completely delirious interpretations of psychoanalysis, (39-43) that "the history of psychoanalysis is an abyss from which there is no recourse" (43). Neither history nor theory are positive options.

Fans of Monty Python often know every word uttered in a given sketch and are only too happy to rehearse them, with accents and gestures. Fans of psychoanalysis are only too happy to run through a concept or work and its literature with the same giddy assurance. When Dufresne runs through the metabiological musings and embarrassments of BPP, brilliantly linking Freud's early metapsychology with

his later metabiology, bringing out the connection between death, constancy (quantifiable energy bound and discharged) and pleasure, his goal is to move toward this logical conclusion: "the ideal of constancy signified for Freud the ultimate pleasure of death, that is, the orgasmic release from self" (51). Dufresne carefully investigates all of Freud's significant debts to 19th century psychology and biology, pointing out the problematic psychoanalytic interpretations along the way, with a view to exposing the Freudian view that life is encircled by death: one is not only already dead, but always becoming-dead (57). Life is a catastrophe or, better, it is framed by two catastrophes: birth and death. (61) Not even a funny accent can lighten these proceedings.

While Dufresne is entertaining his readers as he runs through these matters in the manner of a Python fan running through the skits, he is not playing for laughs: the result is a clear picture of the nihilism of a bioanalytically reworked psychoanalysis dominated by the death drive. Even last ditch efforts by Sandor Ferenczi to put a little love back in the psychoanalytic heart were, as Dufresne puts it, "too little, too late" (65).

By the time we get to Melanie Klein's therapeutically ambitious entry into the "untapped field" of child analysis -paternalistically and patronizingly dubbed "women's work" by male analysts - the death drive is interpreted through "its representative, the destructive impulse" (69). In this vision, analysis of the destructive impulse acquires prophylactic power: apparently, child analysis can prevent the development of later neuroses. Dufresne simultaneously exposes the "twisted" lineage of Freud's metabiology and Klein's theory of unconscious phantasy and the "disturbing" fact that child analysis actually sacrificed children for the sake of "the trauma called psychoanalysis" on the altar of the death drive (79). Psychoanalysis is, then, a lose-lose proposition. Anyone who points to its clinical triumphs is hiding a great deal about the unsavory

Contents	Pages
Editorial: The Spell Gary Genosko	1-2
Sigmund Freud: Savant and Charlatan Todd Dufresne	3-5
Remapping Snow's Gulf Chris Westbury	5-7
Mindful Semiotics Robert E. Innis	7-12
Web Site www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb	
Mirror Sites	
Hong Kong	http://obelix.lib.hku.hk/semiotic/semiotic
Austria	www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/srb
The Netherlands	www.bdk.rug.nl/onderzoek/castor/srb
The Semiotic Review of Books is a refereed publication. It is published three times a year.	
Rates	Canada USA Others
Individual	\$30 US \$30 US \$35
Institution	\$40 US \$40 US \$45
General Editor: Gary Genosko	
Associate Editors: Verena Andermatt Conley, Samir Gandesha, Tom Kemple, Sophie Thomas, Peter van Wyck	
Section Editors: J. Adamson, D. Brooks, Chun Wei Choo, Ersu Ding, M.Harkin, R. Kilbourn, D. Lidov, A. Lippit, F. Manjali, D. McLennan, M. Peschl, S.H.Riggins, H. Schwarz, S. Segalowitz, S. Simpkins, Q.S. Tong, A. Urbancic, A. Zeller	
Lakehead Operations Group: Rachel Ariss, Lori Chambers, Todd Dufresne, Tom Dunk, Kim Feddersen, Rick Holmes, Pat Jasen, Mike Richardson, Clara Sacchetti, Gillian Siddal, Pam Wakewich	
Founding Editor: Paul Bouissac	
Layout: Nicole Sutherland, LU Graphics	
Address: Department of Sociology, Lakehead University, 955 Oliver Road, Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada P7B 5E1	
Tel.: 807-343-8391; Fax: 807-346-7831	
E-mail: genosko@mist.lakeheadu.ca or genosko@tbaytel.net	

practices of major figures in the field like Klein, not to mention the founding father himself. There is nothing more extravagant, Dufresne is revealing, than the practice of psychoanalysis.

Dufresne's *Tales From The Freudian Crypt* owes a great deal to the comic book *Tales From the Crypt*, from which he borrowed the title. For psychoanalysis in Dufresne's hands reads like a comic book concerned with horror, a thanatographic delight written not so much for adolescent boys but for philosophers. The great chain of thanatography in which BPP belongs leads us into the "Philosophical 'Beyonds'" of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; and then into the thanatopraxis of dialecticians such as Marcuse and Reich whose "correction" of psychoanalysis made it liberatory, in polymorphous and strictly genital terms, respectively (92). Using the BPP as a measure, however, does not allow Dufresne to fully open the rich field of Freud-Marxism; indeed, passing references to Lenin and Trotsky (92) only beg the question: well, where are Gramsci (on this point see especially Stone 1984) and Althusser? Even Deleuze and Guattari get short shrift here, subsumed under variants of sex politics, a Lacanized Reich.

The connection between Deleuze and Guattari and Marcuse is significant since the idea of liberation in each begins with the liberation of Freud from himself and later from the neo-Freudians. Dufresne provides us with this methodological attitude through Marcuse even if the interpretive road doesn't extend to Deleuze and Guattari, and Lyotard, for that matter. But he does incorporate Lacan in this manner, noting: "the situation with Lacan is similar to Marcuse: both were trying to save Freud from his greatest problems, from his own limitations as a theorist, even as they piled their own pet theories onto his own." (118) Dufresne is ever attentive to this piling operation: it is his own principle of constancy, his own neatly sorted stack of *Tales from the Crypt* comic books. For his object of study (BPP) is, as he says so often, "messy" and this puts him in the camp of Ricoeur whose neatness he admires. (123) Slowly, then, Dufresne is rewriting the classic Monty Python skit: no longer are the bodies simply heaped onto the cart; rather, they are washed and readied for examination. But no matter how much he appreciates Ricoeur's efforts at bringing out the creative dimension of the death drive, he still thinks Ricoeur's work on Freud was "already dated" when it was first published (126.) Dated, that is, like the yellow pages of brittle keepsakes one would never throw away, but lovingly "unpack" once and awhile.

If, for Dufresne, Ricoeur is too neat, then Derrida is a master of slippage, confusion, and uncertainty, which makes his moments of clarity quite interesting by contrast, especially when they are directed as criticisms of others like Lacan, yet apply just as easily to himself (127). Using the hackneyed philosophical metaphor of "unpacking," then, Dufresne's Derrida appropriates a Freud whose typically logocentric metaphysics had a tendency to break out at key moments and defy closure: "Freud's 'originality' is that he was almost deconstructive in his thinking" (133). This is the Derridean variation on the "liberatory" thesis: Freud "is and is not metaphysical" (135). What does Derrida see in BPP? A crypt that reveals "Freud is his own best (or only?) example of the compulsive repetition that he describes in BPP, and imputes to others (e.g., children, soldiers, patients)" (137). BPP is a "self-implicating" text and Freud does precisely what little Ernst does with his string and spool: throw it out — fort — and pull it back — da. Except, of course, Freud is playing a game of provisional loss of authority and regaining mastery with speculation through a strategy of deferral that goes nowhere. A paralysis in which "life is the detour, the deferral, of death" (140). The lesson of the deconstructive fort/da is that Freud was sending messages to himself, to paraphrase Dufresne, sending himself off, deferring an

untimely death, and giving himself a proper death (140). But in Dufresne's striking critical insight, we learn that this is precisely what Derrida does with Freud: "Derrida writes 'Freud' in order to find (him)self; he sends himself on the detour called Freud-psychoanalysis in order to establish himself, deconstruction" (142). And this, Derrida believes, is a duty; but it is ultimately self-serving: "a fine example of having one's cake and eating it too" (142). The only kind of desserts in which Dufresne has any interest are the sort qualified by just. To this end he wonders if deconstruction will ever be as dead as psychoanalysis, which walks the earth like a zombie: "I doubt deconstruction will be so (un)lucky." (144)

In Chapter 3, "The Other 'Beyond'," Dufresne's Freud has arisen. What is at stake is the demonstration of Freud's radically anti-sociological and wildly biological theory, pursued through the combination of the group psychology and metapsychology. Dufresne objects to the orthodox instructions of James Strachey, editor of the *Standard Edition*, among others, for whom the Group Psychology and BPP have "little connection" (146). Dufresne "hinges" the two works by means of the principles of Eros and Thanatos, exposing Freud's "essential biologism."

It is impossible to ignore Freud's claim that life's aim is death. This fundamental belief, Dufresne shows, entails that the growth of the human organism results from external stimuli against which the psychic apparatus protects itself by forming a "crust"; or, as Dufresne puts it in a delightful formulation the accessibility of which is its major strength: "one must be pinched, so to speak, in order to stay awake and grow" (148).

The anti-sociological implications of Freud's metapsychology are first seen in relation to the mother, who turns out to be an agent of Eros, the "abstract force" of society against biology, working against the child's death drive. Society interferes with narcissism: Eros is a group subjectification interfering with the individual's id-driven narcissism (152). This is the revenge of the group psychology. Further, the mother, like everyone and thing external, is secondary and a force: others are external stimuli, not necessarily subjects at all, part of the collective energy known as Eros that restricts the organism's narcissism. Dufresne summarizes the Freudian view in this way: "Death is the essence of an authentic individuality that is denied under the compulsion or threat of a society that demands for every subject a group identity: to wit, a life" (158). This is what makes psychoanalysis, driven by its metapsychology, extreme. The only therapy true to psychoanalysis is, Dufresne concludes, euthanasia (159). Traditional psychoanalytic therapy merely plays at death and this makes it a miserable "piece of sociality" (164). But even this is shown by Dufresne in his analysis of the positive "love" transference to be inhabited by the death drive: "latent, metapsychologically determined hostility toward the self" (177).

The strength of Dufresne's analysis of Freud's metapsychology (he also stages the same argument with regard to the problem of suggestion and the analysand's creation of false memories through the analyst's "bad technique"; 167ff) is that it reveals precisely why it is necessary to leave psychoanalysis alone: its critics are like external energy stimulating its growth, without which it would simply choke on its own waste: "This is a wicked irony for critics who thereby become the greatest propelling force in an ever-expanding economy of psychoanalytic desires" (165). Critics, patients, pupils, everybody, in short, except the father himself, Herr Freud, interferes with the unassailable position of the one absolute narcissist.

In the end, Dufresne honestly counts himself among the critics — the bashers, "we" — whose works have contributed to new growths on a method that has never been open to critique. Still, the last

word is that "psychoanalysis is dead," (186) each new book on the subject is a "grim parody" of the compulsion to repeat, and patients in analysis are making a "grave mistake" because the method never worked and never will work.

These are strong sentiments, indeed. But to what end? The proverbial stake in the heart that finally kills the undead monster is delivered by Dufresne with a gusto and verve not normally found in academic books on psychoanalysis. Dufresne is the vampire slayer of the Freud-bashers. And his demonstrations of the anti-sociological character of psychoanalysis would have us exhume a few intellectual bodies and give them a "proper" burial. Dufresne's argument may be applied to the work of Félix Guattari, for instance. Guattari staked a claim throughout his psychoanalytic career on Eros, on Eros the great enforcer and preserver which coerces narcissist individuals into group relations; after all, Guattari was the French guru of group subjectivity, group Eros, and he used the conceptual tool of transversality in his later work to eliminate the death drive from his brand of analysis (Guattari 1989: 55-6).

Finally, once his tale is told, does Dufresne throw himself on the heap of dead bodies that is psychoanalysis? Unless he wishes to wallow in sociality, take refuge in the group, or break off his courtship of the witch, metapsychology, he, too, must stretch out on the slab. Is his version of psychoanalysis extreme enough? It is not, if we take Jean Baudrillard's (1993: 148-54) approach to the matter. In a few pages devoted to a critique of the death drive, Baudrillard argues that the BPP merely repeats the scientific separation between life and death; in this way, the death drive "domesticates death." Death, Baudrillard (1993: 154) argues, "has no need of the mirror" [of psychoanalysis] and "must be wrested from psychoanalysis and turned against it," eliminating the aforementioned separation and thus invalidating the death drive. Dufresne would undoubtedly respond that this is just another 'beyond' that really ends up asserting Eros over Thanatos in the name of an allegedly authentic social relation. Although he does not explicitly engage with this view in his lively text, he can account for it. And this, ultimately, is the strength of the book: it has a long reach, like the bony fingers of the undead on the pages of *Tales from the Crypt* and *Creepy* magazines, beckoning us to join them.

Gary Genosko, General Editor, SRB

References

- Baudrillard, Jean (1993) *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, Iain Hamilton Grant (trans.), London: Sage.
- Todd Dufresne (2000) *Tales From The Freudian Crypt: The Death Drive In Text And Context*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Guattari, Félix (1989) *Les trois écologies*, Paris: Galille.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1985) *The Freud Scenario*, J.-B. Pontalis (ed.) and Quinton Hoare (trans.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stone, Jennifer (1984) "Italian Freud: Gramsci, Giulia Schuct, and Wild Analysis," *October* 28: 105-2

Sigmund Freud: Savant and Charlatan

Frank Cioffi, *Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience*. Chicago: Open Court, 1998.

Frederick Crews, ed., *Unauthorized Freud: Doubters Confront a Legend*. New York: Viking, 1998.

The almost thirty-year decline of psychoanalysis as a viable theory, therapy, and business can be inversely related to the growing vitality of critical Freud studies during the same period. As signposts on the intellectual landscape, names like Ellenberger, Roazen, Cioffi, Swales, Sulloway, Macmillan, Roustang, Esterson, Crews, and Borch-Jacobsen are emblematic of this vitality. For without forming a unified canon, their works set rigorous standards by which we can measure, often for the first time, Freud and his so-called discoveries. Arguably it is because of them that a century dominated by partisan scholarship, fuelled by ignorance, self-interest, and greed, is finally over.

When exactly the tables turned on Freud and psychoanalysis is unclear, although credit can be given, ironically enough, to Ernest Jones. I say ironic because the publication of his three volume biography of Freud in the 1950s was meant to squash critique under the weight of a comprehensive, definitive, and official work. What happened, instead, was that the biography became a catalyst for sober reassessments of the history of psychoanalysis, beginning with Jones's own account. Perhaps not surprisingly, analysts themselves issued many of the first challenges to Jones's biography. As the lay analyst Theodor Reik is reported to have said of *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*: "It's a good book. But there are two things that Jones doesn't understand. He doesn't understand the Jews, and he doesn't understand the Viennese. Jones is like a porter: he carries your bags but has no idea what's in them" (Dufresne 1996).

Jones had access to unpublished documents and was able to shed new light on Freud and psychoanalysis, but much of the biography is mean-spirited, hagiographic, or just plain wrong. His treatment of dissident analysts, such as Otto Rank and Sandor Ferenczi, is a case-in-point. Their conflicts with Freud in the 1920s and 1930s are cast in terms of pathology, their "failing mental integration" (Jones 1957: 46), while Jones is left sitting pretty - the sad-but-wiser hero of the story. It was immediately clear to informed readers that Jones's condescending and self-serving portrait required major revisions. As a result, we have a tradition of Freud criticism that is loosely divided into a before-Jones and an after-Jones.

The first wave of after-Jones criticism begins, roughly speaking, with Erich Fromm's slim book of 1959, *Sigmund Freud's Mission*, and culminates with Paul Roazen's *Freud and His Followers* of 1975. But Cioffi's early work, along with Henri Ellenberger's 932-page labour of love, *The Discovery of the Unconscious* (1970), easily represents the best of this first wave. Having trained in analytic philosophy (with A.J. Ayer, no less), Cioffi's work is not just a correction of Jones, but a precise investigation of Freud's wayward retrospections and theoretical claims. At the same time, his approach is not blindsided by issues of testability or falsification, as we find in the positivistic interpretation of Freud advanced by Adolf Grünbaum - Cioffi's intellectual nemesis. Cioffi's engagement with psychoanalysis is rather more attuned to the troublesome contradictions of Freud's arguments, the logic of which is not linear. To this end Cioffi consults all of the relevant texts available, carefully weighing Freud's later, sanitized version of events against his original statements. Consequently, his engagement with Freud in the late 1960s and early 1970s was not just years, but decades ahead of its time.

Of course the cost of being untimely is being ignored or misunderstood. Even today apparently sophisticated researchers in the field remain unfamiliar with Cioffi's name, let alone his work. For this reason the collection of his essays from 1969 to the present is an event of the most welcome sort. To begin with, honest researchers will no longer be able to ignore his work, which was squirreled away in far-flung sources. And, best of all, they won't want to: Cioffi's arguments are brilliant, witty, and generally convincing. Without exaggeration, *Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience* (FQP) is the most significant work of critical Freud studies to be published in years.

Two of Cioffi's essays also appear in *Unauthorized Freud: Doubters Confront a Legend* (UF), an anthology of twenty critical works lovingly collected, abridged, and introduced by the scourge of psychoanalysis, Frederick Crews. Published by Viking, the book is intended to counter and correct decades of misinformation about psychoanalysis, beginning topically enough with the Freud exhibition mounted in late 1998 at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. Since the world's most feared critics weren't welcome to participate meaningfully in the exhibit, Crews has taken the critics to the people. The result is a devastating portrait of Freud and psychoanalysis by a diverse group of scholars, from Peter Swales to Stanley Fish, that is impossible to dismiss as mere "Freud bashing" (or worse).¹ "There is," Crews rightly insists, "no team of 'Freud Bashers' at work here" (ix). On the contrary, the contributors provide reasoned and measured arguments proving, I think definitively, what many still refuse to hear: namely, that psychoanalysis is a serious menace based on a top-heavy theoretical edifice, faulty premises, circular and self-validating arguments, methodological laxity, motivated self-deception, bad faith, and lies piled upon lies for more than a century.

1. Who Seduced Whom?

Although mostly forgotten, sometimes conveniently, there have always been powerful critics of Freud and psychoanalysis. As Crews remarks, "In the years before Freud rewrote psychoanalytic history as a fetching Promethean myth, he was received more sceptically than in the six decades since his death" (xxviii). Even before Freud dropped the Seduction Theory in 1897, a date usually cited as the beginning of psychoanalysis proper, there were no shortage of naysayers. For example, when Freud and Josef Breuer published *Studies on Hysteria* in 1895, J. Mitchell Clarke, Adolf von Strümpell, and Eugen Bleuler wrote critical reviews in prominent psychiatric and medical journals. Like many others of that era, Clarke, Strümpell, and Bleuler worried aloud that suggestion may have contaminated Freud and Breuer's findings.

To their detriment, neither Freud nor Breuer worried much about suggestive collusion, since they believed, following Jean-Martin Charcot and the Paris School, that hypnosis and hysteria were primarily organic affairs. As we learn from Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen's important, second contribution to *Unauthorized Freud*, "Self-Seduced," Freud took Charcot's lessons to heart (45-53). Most significantly, Freud (SE 1: 79) echoed Charcot by falsely concluding that hysteria "is of a real, objective nature and not falsified by suggestion on the part of the observer."² As it happened, it wasn't Freud but Charcot's great adversary from Nancy, Hippolyte Bernheim, who criticized the findings of the Salpêtrière and advanced the psychological explanation of hysteria. And Bernheim was correct, as everyone admitted not long after Charcot's death in August 1893.

The implications of this old debate about technique and etiology lends itself to the sort of logical exercise taught in Philosophy 101. It goes something like this: 1. If Bernheim's psychological perspective about hypnosis and hysteria was right and Charcot's organic perspective was wrong, and

2. If Freud was avowedly Charcotian in his views, then 3. Freud, like Charcot, was also wrong. Unfortunately one doesn't necessarily encounter logical conclusions in the psychoanalytic literature, where Freud is simplistically lionized as the father of modern psychology. What is true, however, is a less auspicious fact: Freud escaped the verdict universally reached of his Master's findings. The mechanism for this sleight of hand is the story of the rise and fall of the Seduction Theory, which is to Freud studies what Area 51 is to UFO fanatics: namely, a matter of blind faith.

According to psychoanalytic folklore, Freud replaced his early, objectivist belief in the Seduction Theory with a psychogenic theory of repressed infantile fantasies of an incestuous nature. But this is Freud's own account of events, and we have good reason to believe that he cooked the books to make it palatable for the unaware, gullible, and intellectually starving. The ingredients of this recipe are at the heart of critical Freud studies, including *Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience*, where Cioffi wages battle with Freud and Freud apologists. This focus is no accident, since the future of psychoanalysis is literally at stake in the interpretation of the Seduction Theory.

So what's all the fuss about? Once the debate about the true etiology of hysteria had been decided in Bernheim's favour, no one wanted to be painted with the same brush that had permanently tarnished Charcot's once golden reputation. Well, almost no one. While cautious researchers counted their wins and losses, Freud invested ever more heavily in Charcot's theories; an under-appreciated fact goes a long way toward explaining why Freud, on the one hand, had complete confidence in his claim that dissociated (repressed, unconscious) memories occasioned by childhood seduction were pathogenic, while critics, on the other hand, routinely shook their heads in disbelief. As Borch-Jacobsen puts it, for researchers in the field "it must have been patently obvious that Freud was simply repeating the errors of his 'Master', Charcot" (47). But blinded by his stunning ignorance of, or disinterest in, the problem of suggestion, Freud continued to dismiss the critics and, in 1896, published three essays outlining the seduction thesis.

In a contemporary remark to his friend Wilhelm Fliess, Freud (CL: 224) tellingly compared his evolving theory to "the medieval theory of possession." To this end Freud posited a relation between "confessions [extorted] under torture" and the "communications made by my patients in psychic treatment" (see also Swales 1989, 1989a; and Crews 1997). He also ordered, and eagerly read, the infamous guide for ferreting out the devil, the *Malleus maleficarum* [*The Hammer of Witches*]. The incredulous Freud says at one point, "I dream, therefore, of a primeval devil religion with rites that are carried on secretly, and understand the harsh therapy of the witches' judges. Connecting links abound" (CL 227). Therapy? It is no wonder the esteemed Viennese psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing declared, during a meeting of 1896, that Freud's Seduction Theory "sounds like a scientific fairy tale" (CL 184).

For indeed it was. In 1897 Freud finally realized that the memories he extorted during 'therapy' were false, an instance of what researchers today call "experimenter's effect." In other words his earliest reports of success were in fact dismal failures.

It is worth mentioning in this regard that, while failure is never opportune, the Seduction Theory debacle exasperated an already delicate situation. First of all, Freud's (1974) professional reputation was still recovering from his foolhardy advocacy of cocaine as a cure for morphine addiction during the 1880s. Second, Freud's treatment of wealthy Viennese women, such as the Baroness Anna von Lieben ("Frau Cäcilie M." of the *Studies*), left many with the impression that he was a disreputable quack, less a physician than a magnetizer or magician (Swales in UF: 31-32).

Cioffi was among the first to understand the seduction episode perfectly: “His critics, it seemed, were right. What a humiliation! Freud now put all his enormous resourcefulness into mitigating, if not entirely evading, this humiliation” (200).

Freud’s evasion of humiliation is otherwise known as the birth of psychoanalysis. For it is with psychoanalysis, the theory of fantasy rather than reality, that allowed Freud to escape Charcot’s depressing fate. Having quietly discarded the Seduction Theory, Freud began to spend his time perfecting what was to become his “Teflon status” (42): the “need to avoid refutation” that, for Cioffi, characterizes psychoanalysis (117; 136). This assessment is shared by many critics today, including Crews who declares in his “Introduction” (xxvii) that classical psychoanalytic theory is “a perpetual motion machine, a friction-free engine for generating irrefutable discourse.” Critics like Cioffi and Crews are right to question the old dogmas, since a close reading of Freud’s texts reveal numerous misconceptions about the Seduction Theory - all of which, not incidentally, were perpetrated by Freud himself. Consider two examples that are discussed by Cioffi, Sulloway, Borch-Jacobsen, and Crews: (1) Freud’s retrospective claim that his early patients produced memories of seduction is simply not true. On the contrary, Freud originally insisted that patients withhold belief in stories of seduction and have no feeling of recollection whatsoever. Freud insisted upon this fact, saying that the scenes of sexual trauma were merely helpful *visualizations*, because it was the crux of his defence against critics who claimed that he had produced false *memories* (Borch-Jacobsen in UF: 49). (2) Freud’s claim that he only reluctantly acknowledged the pathogenic role of sexuality is also false, and for three reasons: he demonstrated just such an awareness of sexuality in his early texts, beginning at least in 1893 (FQP: 43-44; 146; 245); he was intimately aware of the role of innate infantile sexuality as advanced by Wilhelm Fliess (Sulloway in UF: 57-68); and, in any case, the theme of sexuality was already well-established by the sexologists of the 1880s, and was a recognized part of the discourse on hysteria well before Freud’s ‘reluctant’ discovery of infantile sexuality in the late 1890s (cf. UF: 6-7; 45). Once again compelled to stave off the charge of suggestion, Freud falsely invoked the surprise factor: memories of a sexual nature could not have been suggested because they were both clinically surprising and culturally taboo (FQP: 200; 247).

Such is thus stuff of pseudoscience.

Cioffi therefore concludes that Grünbaum and Masson get it all wrong: Grünbaum, for misreading Karl Popper’s work on falsification (among other things), ignoring the ad hoc nature of Freud’s theory-building, and thus believing that Freud abandoned the Seduction Theory for scientifically legitimate reasons; Masson, for peddling the “politically correct” nonsense that Freud was afraid of confronting the ubiquitous truth of child sexual abuse. “Freud’s dereliction in moral courage showed itself,” Cioffi argues, “not in what he abandoned but in what he insisted on retaining: the boast that he could reconstruct by psychoanalytic method ... the lost years of childhood” (206, 244). With psychoanalysis Freud swept suggestion under the rug, and along with it any responsibility he had for his failures. As he put it in 1925, “I do not believe even now that I forced the seduction-fantasies on my patients, that I ‘suggested’ them” (in Borch-Jacobsen in UF: 46; cf. FQP: 203). As Cioffi therefore concludes, “Freud, like the Emperor in the story, dealt with bad news by having the bearer executed” (FQP: 204; cf. Borch-Jacobsen in UF: 52). That bearer of bad news was his patients, each of whom paid the price for Freud’s

careerist disinterest in their emotional well-being.

In fact, Freud never regretted the confusion, let alone the pain and suffering, that his botched technique caused his patients during this period. Always a reluctant therapist, he would refer to his patients as a “rabble” best suited for floating psychoanalytic research (Roustang in UF: 248-259). And Freud never came clean with his critics, either - or especially. Instead, he kept silent about his abandonment of the Seduction Theory for eight years, until the publication of *Three Essays on Sexuality* (1905), having shared his change of heart with Fliess alone. Why does this matter? Because when Freud published his first papers on “psychoanalysis,” readers assumed that the results were still based on the Seduction Theory. And in a way they were, for at least three damning reasons: first, because Freud never abandoned the theoretical utility of his method for naming the repressed, but only the contents of what is repressed; second, because Freud began speaking about “psychoanalysis” in March 1896, more than one year *before* he dropped the Seduction Theory; and third, because Freud was still relying upon the Seduction Theory as late as 1905, when he finally published his purported *clinical substantiations* of the theory in the “Dora” case (Esterson in UF: 150; Borch-Jacobsen in UF: 52).

With the “discovery” of psychoanalysis Freud effectively obscured the fact that it was business as usual - only better. Having lifted a theory of innate infantile fantasy from the speculations of Wilhelm Fliess, there was no more need to worry about the problem of suggestion. So much, then, for the annoying critics of psychoanalysis. And so much for reality, which fell out of the clinical picture altogether from that point onward (see Dufresne 2000).

2. Savant or Charlatan?

Readers of Cioffi’s book may be surprised by the contribution from Grünbaum in *Unauthorized Freud*. For although Cioffi makes a decent case against Grünbaum in his book, repeatedly dogging him for a recalcitrant belief in the possibility of a scientific psychoanalysis, the Grünbaum of “Made-to-Order-Evidence” is hardly less critical about Freud’s claims than Cioffi. Take for example the technique of free association. Freud believed that the problem of suggestion could be side-stepped by interpreting the patient’s associations as a free expression of an internal state. Freud, in other words, claimed that the analyst is a neutral observer because he or she is literally external to the workings of the psyche. Grünbaum, however, debunks the assumption that such associations are in fact free, arguing that they are invariably compromised by preconceptions brought into therapy by patients; by verbal and non-verbal cues, subtle or otherwise, made by the analyst; by the promptings or “intellectual help” (as Freud put it) of the analyst; and by the analyst’s selective sampling from the flow of associations (78-84). Thus Grünbaum’s arguments nicely dovetail with those made in the first section by Cioffi, Sulloway, Swales, Borch-Jacobsen, and Crews.

Just as Grünbaum deflates the pretence of objectivity in Freud’s technique of ‘free’ association, Sabastiano Timpanaro exposes concretely its staggering indeterminateness. In “Error’s Reign,” Timpanaro argues that the associations found in a famous interpretation from *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901) are totally arbitrary, a reflection of Freud’s “zeal for his own theses” (UF: 105). In the analysis, Freud concludes that a travelling companion’s associations to a forgotten word, “*aliquis*,” lead inexorably to the determining fount of his anxiety: the idea that a lover may be pregnant. Yet the forgotten word, Timpanaro argues (97-105), could have been any word in

the relevant sentence from Virgil: “*Exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor*” (“Let someone arise from my bones as an Avenger”). The word “*exoriare*,” for example, means both “arise” and “birth” - either of which, with the slightest imagination, could signify the pregnancy-anxiety attributed to associations with “*aliquis*.” Timpanaro’s counterexamples are instructive: “irrespective of rarefied epistemological debates” about falsification, the fact that any word can do the trick of Freudian determination means that the explanation “has no scientific value” (101).

In the third section of *Unauthorized Freud*, Crews gathers expert examinations of Freud’s case histories and case studies from Allen Esterson (“Dora”), Joseph Wolpe and Stanley Rachman (“Little Hans”), Frank Sulloway (a cross-section), Stanley Fish (“Wolfman”), and David E. Stannard (“Leonardo”). Esterson’s essay, for example, depicts Freud’s mind-boggling irresponsibility with a young victim of sexual harassment, proving yet again that Freud hardly mended his ways in the years following his abandonment of the Seduction Theory (UF: 149-161). In Sulloway’s contribution we are reminded of the incredible fact that Freud neglected to present a successful therapeutic outcome until 1908. Yet even this case, Sulloway explains, has no more merit than the famous “cure” of Freud’s Russian patient, Sergius Pankejeff, a.k.a. the “Wolfman.” For this most celebrated of all analytic patients was in and out psychoanalysis for sixty years. When asked about his experience by an Austrian journalist, Pankejeff confessed that psychoanalysis had been a “catastrophe” in his life. He also insisted that his shocking revelations not be published until after his death, since Kurt Eissler and the Sigmund Freud Archives were paying him what amounted to hush money (UF: 175-185).

That we ever believed psychoanalysis could cure anyone is partly explained by Stanley Fish, who provides a compelling analysis of Freud’s spell-binding rhetoric. His conclusion: the real “primal scene” at work in the case of the Wolfman is “the scene of persuasion” (UF: 199). It is only too obvious that this scene has infected generations of readers, including some of the most self-consciously brilliant literary critics and philosophers. But Fish, like Cioffi and Borch-Jacobsen, is a marvellous exception, someone who demonstrates by example how true sophistication can operate in Freud studies.

The last section of *Unauthorized Freud* contains thoughtful contributions about the “militant exclusiveness” (215) of the psychoanalytic cause: Ernest Gellner discusses the shackling of patients called transference; John Farrell discusses the effects of Freud’s paranoia; François Roustang explores the wicked sectarianism of psychoanalysis; and Lavinia Edmunds presents the tragic story of Horace Frink, once Freud’s favoured apostle in America. Each contribution is worth reading, but Crews has saved the most disturbing of the bunch for last.

Although many will be unfamiliar with Frink’s story, it resonates with other well-known tales of Freud’s inept meddling in the sexual affairs of his followers. Like some other therapists, including some of Freud’s closest adherents, Frink fell in love with a patient who, luckily, was a wealthy heiress but, unluckily, was already married. Just as unlucky: Frink was also married, had two children, and was tormented by depression. Frink was an established American psychiatrist, already 38 years of age, when he began an analysis with Freud in 1921. Freud liked Frink, partly for his dark sense of humour, but also because he was a Gentile who, like Jones and Jung, would help ‘prove’ that psychoanalysis wasn’t merely a Jewish science. Freud also approved of Frink’s mistress, Angelika Bijur, whose money could grease the wheels of his fledgling publishing

house. In this last respect, Bijur had already proven her worth by paying for Frink's analysis with Freud. And so Freud, without even knowing their respective spouses, recommended that Frink and Bijur ditch their partners and get married. Predicting their impending happiness, he threw in an ominous warning that if they didn't marry, the depressed Frink might become a homosexual.

The story gets worse. Although Frink was still battling depression, Freud announced his case complete and sent him back to America to arrange his divorce. Worried about Frink's wife, Freud later issued the following, by now all-too-familiar refrain: "Tell her she is not to blame analysis for the complications of human feeling which is only exposed but not created by analysis" (265). Freud also arranged that the unstable Frink be voted the next President of the American Psychoanalytic Association (APA), which he was in 1923. After two additional mental tune-ups with Freud, Frink married Bijur at the end of 1922. However, Frink began to suffer from guilt in addition to depression, a state that only worsened when his divorced wife died of pneumonia in May of 1923. Long story short: Frink was deposed as leader of the APA, committed himself to a sanatorium on two later occasions, attempted suicide twice, was divorced by Bijur, was remarried, and died a troubled man in 1936. In short, Freud's self-interested meddling ruined three lives and wrecked havoc in a fourth. Understandably, everyone involved in the Frink affair developed a distaste for psychoanalysis. Bijur's cuckolded first husband captured the feeling succinctly in a letter to Freud in 1922, in which he asks: "Great Doctor, are you savant or charlatan?" (267).

Cioffi asks a similarly blunt question of Freud in his most famous essay, "Was Freud a Liar?," and at times in his book flirts with an affirmative answer. But he is generally wary of putting questions to Freud in such a stark, uncompromising way. In his first long chapter of *Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience*, "Why Are We Still Arguing About Freud?," Cioffi rejects the "fake antithesis" that impels us to choose between Freud the savant or charlatan, truth-seeker or liar. For Cioffi, such simplifications only play into the hands of Freudian apologists, who are then able, in apparent good faith, to dismiss as naive and conspiratorial criticism that they don't want to hear. "The sceptic," Cioffi rightly counters, "does not require large-scale lying on the part of analysts to account for the consistent reporting of phenomena now conceded not to occur" (36). So what explains a century of widespread belief in, and misinformation about, the history and theory of psychoanalysis? Cioffi points to experiments in social psychology, such as those conducted by Solomon Asch in the late 1940s and 1950s, which prove that objectivity can be compromised by the coercion and peer pressure of authoritative others. The very same pressures of suggestion, not incidentally, that are evinced in Freud's own practice and in the movement at large, and which are discussed in Cioffi's and Crews's important books.

Unlike much of the literature on Freud, which snuggles up to its subject, these books by Cioffi and Crews are courageous provocations that redeem psychoanalytic studies as an intellectual pursuit. *Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience* is a hard hitting, sophisticated, and much-anticipated book on the history and epistemic status of psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, while the book legitimately represents the development of Cioffi's thought over thirty years, there is no indication of false steps along the way; a stronger editorial hand could have helped the reader avoid the occasional pitfall. By contrast, Crews's *Unauthorized Freud* is a seamlessly pro-

duced book, carefully edited and introduced throughout.

Both books, in any case, are overdue reading for those erstwhile intellectuals, heads buried deep in the sand, who care nothing about facts and, consequently, know little about the troubled history of psychoanalysis. Their uncritical investment in Freudian theory suggests we revisit a forgotten lesson of Philosophy 101. It goes something like this: 1. If critics like Cioffi and Crews are right and Freud is wrong, and 2. If theorists today are avowedly Freudian in their views, then 3. these theorists, like Freud, are also wrong. *Quod erat demonstrandum*.

Todd Dufresne is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Lakehead University. He is editor of *Freud Under Analysis* (1997) and *Returns of the 'French Freud': Freud, Lacan, and Beyond* (1997). His book, *Tales From the Freudian Crypt* (2000), is reviewed in this issue's editorial.

Notes

1 For example, critics of the Library of Congress Freud exhibit have been characterized as parricides, puritans, inquisitors, right-wing extremists, anti-Semites, Nazis, ayatollahs, and politically correct (read ugly) Americans. For an overview, see Crews's "Introduction" (UF: xviii-xxx). Peter Swales has also deposited over 300 pages of documents concerning this controversy in the Library of Congress.

2 Freud would repeat this claim elsewhere, for example, in an "Appendix" of 1896.

References

Crews, Frederick (1997) "The Legacy of Salem: Demonology for an Age of Science," *Skeptic*, vol. 5, no. 1: 36-44.

Dufresne, Todd (1996) Unpublished Interview with David Bakan (July 19).

Ellenberger, Henri (1970) *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry*, New York: Basic Books.

Freud, Sigmund (1888) "Preface to the Translation of Bernheim's Suggestion," In *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (SE), ed. James Strachey, London: Hogarth, 1953-74, vol. 1.

— (1974) *Cocaine Papers*, notes by Anna Freud, ed. Robert Byck, New York: Stonehill.

Freud, Sigmund and Wilhelm Fliess (1985) *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904* (CL), ed. Jeffrey M. Masson, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Fromm, Erich (1959) *Sigmund Freud's Mission: An Analysis of His Personality and Influence*, New York: Grove Press.

Jones, Ernest (1957) *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud: The Last Phase*, vol. 3, New York: Basic Books.

Roazen, Paul (1975) *Freud and His Followers*, New York: Knopf.

Swales, Peter (1989) "Freud, Johann Weier, and the Status of Seduction: The Role of the Witch in the Conception of Fantasy," In *Sigmund Freud: Critical Assessments*, vol. 1, ed. L. Spurling, London: Routledge: 331-358.

— (1989a) "Freud, Krafft-Ebing, and the Witches: The Role of Krafft-Ebing in Freud's Flight Into Fantasy," In *Sigmund Freud: Critical Assessments*, vol. 1, ed. L. Spurling, London: Routledge: 359-365.

Remapping Snow's Gulf

J. Peterson, *Maps Of Meaning: The Architecture Of Belief*. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Just over 50 years ago, C.P. Snow (1949) published a little book entitled *The Two Cultures*. His title referred to the cleaving of the world of ideas into two domains: one inhabited by scientists alone; the other by everyone else who might wish to lay claim to being an educated thinker. The division Snow was writing about was hardly new, and he was not the first to write of it. However, as he pointed out, by the middle of the last century the gulf that separated the two domains was rapidly growing. The astonishing accumulation of scientific knowledge seemed to make it possible, for the first time in history, for a highly-educated person to take a kind of perverse pride in his ignorance of non-scientific matters; to dismiss an interest in such things as an unnecessary weakness. Whatever science couldn't know seemed increasingly irrelevant compared to what science did know: how to decipher the structure of DNA, how to build machines that could solve problems their human creators could not solve, and how to fell entire cities at a single blow.

Since Snow's book appeared, the gulf between scientific and non-scientific thinking has grown. In psychology today, that same gulf is threatening to rend the discipline apart. Many of the hard-science psychologists - those who deal every day with neurons, hormones, brain tissue, microscopes, scalpels, and cannulas - increasingly feel that they have nothing in common with their colleagues who deal mainly in abstracta - the social psychologists, clinicians, cognitivists, experimental computer scientists, hermeneuticists, semioticians, and moral philosophers with whom they have been uneasily sharing departmental quarters. In universities around the planet, the hard scientists are living up to their name, drawing a line that deliberately excludes their erstwhile colleagues in the Faculty of Arts. Increasingly, they are demanding, if not their own separate departments of Neuroscience, Comparative Biology, or Behavioral Science, at least their own floor and their own hiring committees.

A few psychologists - hard scientists or otherwise - view this development with despair. To them, the division of their discipline into the objective and the subjective cleaves our world at precisely the point that is most psychologically interesting. There are important questions that fall squarely into Snow's Gulf, questions that demand answers. How does simple neural tissue sustain our rich phenomenological world? What is the relation between what we see and what exists? What does it mean to be human? Why are we so destructive? How did I get to be me?

Scientists are understandably leery of addressing such grand questions because any answers offered must clearly be speculative and partial. Jordan Peterson's book *Maps Of Meaning* tries to show that this is not the same thing as saying those answers are completely unconstrained - that is, it is not the same as saying we have no idea at all what the answer will look like. If we identify real constraints on the kinds of answer that humans can offer to any question, we also make some progress towards finding an answer to the grand questions. Where might such constraints lie? On one side of Snow's Gulf - the newly-developed side of hard science - there must be identifiable limits grounded in neurobiology. After all, human beings are mammals, with mammalian nervous systems and with all the biological, chemical, and computational limitations to which such systems are inherently subject. Answers to questions about how the world appears

to us, about what that appearance means, are certainly constrained by the hard limitations of our neural wetware.

On the other side of Snow's Gulf, the kinds of answers we can give to the big questions are limited by our ability to compress complex information into coherent narratives. Any answer to our grand questions - any answer that could ever matter to beings like us - has to be both tellable and comprehensible. It has to seem to make a kind of sense. Not just anything does. So, suggests Peterson, if we want to understand the limits on the answers to the big questions, we can try to understand the limits of meaningful narrative. We can try to understand what makes a story seem interesting, coherent, and satisfying.

It is remarkable how little attention has been paid to the connection between these two limits. Clearly, the structure of our brains must to a large extent structure our narrative worlds, just as it structures our perceptual world. Peterson tries to outline the connection between these two limits, narrowing in on it from both sides of the gulf at once. The book-length argument he offers is dense and long. However, the essence of it might be stated in a single aphorism: Action grounds belief. Less pithily, we might say that what we believe is rooted in our need to select behaviors appropriate to our situation. Unpacking the implications in that statement takes some doing.

The argument from neurobiology is perhaps the easier side of the argument to grasp. Peterson lays it out early in his book. The key idea is one that no biological scientist would have the slightest trouble accepting or justifying on evolutionary terms: what is unknown is frightening. Mammals like us, Peterson points out, are built to fear what we do not know, what we do not understand. A little-remarked consequence of this is that what is unknown constitutes a single entity with a single affective valence: "Fear is the a priori position, the natural response to everything for which no structure of behavior has been designed and inculcated. Fear is the innate reaction to everything that has not been rendered predictable, as a consequence of successful, creative exploratory behavior undertaken in its presence, at some time in the past" (57). The dizzying variety of places and things that any single individual (man or mouse) does not understand are in a real sense (for all practical purposes) one single thing. The unknown constitutes the most primitive metaphor or mapping of one thing onto another. It constitutes the most primitive archetype.

Peterson reviews the neural processes underlying this collapse of the unknown into a single category. When a mammal approaches what it does not know, a small almond-shaped organ called the amygdala - with strong links to cortical and subcortical memory circuits - starts firing. That firing underlies a huge shift in normal neural functioning, which is experienced subjectively as anxiety or fear. The only way to escape being continually thrown into this unpleasant state is to transform the unknown into the known.

For most mammals, the only means of effecting this transformation is by directly interacting with the unknown. A mouse or monkey can only familiarize himself with what is novel by actively scouting it out. For most of our evolutionary history, our species was probably no different. If we wanted to understand a thing, we had to interact with it - observe it, touch it, walk on it, taste it. Things had no conceivable separate existence from our experience of them. Anything we had not experienced (directly or vicariously) fell into the category of the unknown. As our store of knowledge of the world increased in size

and complexity, we began to organize it for transmission to others. Part of this transmission was in the form of simple know-how about particular aspects of the world: information such as 'Don't eat these mushrooms or you will die'. Peterson is more concerned with a different, more general method. Human beings began to learn, codify, and share general principles which could be used for turning any unknown entity into a known entity: "we can learn not only the precise behaviors that constitute adaptation, but in the process by which those behaviors were generated we can learn not only skill, but meta-skill (can learn to mimic the pattern of behavior to generate new skills)" (76). Explaining the implications of this transmission of meta-skills forces Peterson to jump to the non-scientist side of the gulf. The bulk of his book is devoted to fleshing out the claim that mythological narrative in all cultures is intended to play the role of transmission of meta-skills for turning the unknown into the known - that it is precisely "the encapsulation of meta-skill in a story that makes that story great" (76). In simplest terms, Peterson (citing and building upon a large body of previous mythological analyses) argues the structure of such great stories always hinges on a character - a hero - who motivates himself to overcome his fear of the unknown by imagining a future in which he will be better off for having done so. With a future in sight as a goal, he is able to formulate a plan of action that might turn what Peterson calls "the Unbearable Present" (now made even more unbearable by its contrast to the imagined goal state) into "the Ideal Future." By definition, such a plan plunges the hero into chaos, since it necessarily forces him to confront what he necessarily fears: the Unknown.

Citing extensively from mythological literature, *Maps Of Meaning* explains how this simple narrative structure is complicated by a great many factors. One complication is that in many cases we do not have access to our own motivations. The hero of mythology, just like you or I, may have "a very narrow window of expressible 'frames of reference' - conscious stories" (88). If the hero is nevertheless able to proceed in his journey through the Unknown, it is because of metaphoric, imagistic processes, whose import and neurological underpinnings Peterson elaborates in some detail. A second complication is that our hero may be influenced by those metaphoric, imagistic processes which have been implanted and cultivated by his exposure to the ritualized, dramatized, analogized, or only partially understood stories of previous heroes. Adaptive process can be codified through such means without necessarily being explicitly expressed (or even expressible) in words. A third complication is that the process of journeying from known to unknown may be recursively embedded, in many ways. One hero may serve as the motivation for the next, with one story setting the stage for a later story. One may today find oneself fighting for justice because a favorite contemporary novelist read Henry Thoreau, who (let us imagine) read about Don Quixote, who found himself fighting because Christian knights found themselves fighting because Jesus Christ found himself fighting because he knew some great stories. And so on. To make things even more complicated, a single narrative (or lived experience) may itself contain multiple adaptive processes recursively embedded within it.

A fourth complication concerns Peterson very much. This is the historically-recent emergence of Snow's Gulf, as a result of the explicit codification of the scientific method. According to Peterson: "Before the emergence of empirical methodology, which allowed for methodological separation of subject and object in description, the world-model contained [only] abstracted

inferences about the nature of existence, derived primarily from observations of human behavior. This means, in essence, that pre-experimental man observed 'morality' in his behavior and inferred the existence of a source or rationale for that morality in the structure of the 'universe' [the known world] itself" (103). The growth of Snow's Gulf reflects the fact that scientific methodology has given man the means to uncouple factual knowledge from morality, which Peterson defines as a body of codified knowledge rooted in behavioral consequences. Our pre-scientific ancestors lived entirely on the ancient side of Snow's Gulf, in a world governed in all aspects by such behavioral consequences. We (especially those of us who have laid stakes on the new side of Snow's Gulf) live in a world governed by facts which are independent of those who know them - a world in which things have, as it were, a life of their own.

The behavioral consequences marking the bounds of the knowable world for our ancestors were sometimes extremely restrictive, imposing strict limitations on what could count as 'known' and therefore as acceptable. An important part of Peterson's project is to analyze how shared understanding of these limitations come to define cultures. The rise of the boundaries defining cultures allowed for the rise of tyranny, intolerance, xenophobia, and war, as those culturally-defined limits of the known came to be experienced in just the same way as natural limits of the known: because they were marked out by fear and anxiety.

However, there was, Peterson argues, also one positive aspect to such a morally-bounded universe: it was experienced as meaningful. The manner in which we conceive of 'meaning' is, Peterson insists throughout his book, deeply rooted in codified behavioral information. In mythological terms, trying to sever that link is to follow the path of one of the most dangerous archetypes, to which Peterson devotes his final chapter: the eternal adversary, hostile brother, and cruel tyrant; in short, the devil. Such severance amounts to succumbing to the sin of pride, by living according to a belief that one's own abilities - unchecked by the codified wisdom of ancestors, unconstrained by concern for consequences - are wholly sufficient for understanding how to proceed in life. Peterson argues at length and with passion that such a belief is not, as it may appear, the logical extension of the hero myth - the hero as ultra-capable loner, unconstrained by anything other than his own abilities. It is rather a perversion of the hero myth that can only end with a spiral descent into the decadent chaos of meaninglessness. If you need an example, think of how the Unabomber's personal project was received by society at large. Even as he travels on his mythic journey, a genuine hero necessarily exists because of and for a larger group whose existence has made it possible for him to venture out. The existence of such a group grounds and dignifies his journey. It makes that journey possible, worthwhile, and comprehensible.

Summarizing the gist of this sprawling book hardly does it justice. Peterson's passion for relevant work on both sides of Snow's Gulf is evident, and the book is richer in neurological, mythological, literary, and philosophical summary and analyses - helpfully buttressed with diagrammatic and chapter summaries - than can be conveyed in just a few pages. Indeed, its richness at times presents an impediment to understanding its complex argument. Weighing in as it does at nearly 500 dense pages, this is a book that demands from its reader a good proportion of the passionate devotion that obviously went into its construction. In a preface as unexpected in this kind of a book as it is moving, Peterson explains

in detail where his own passion for his topic comes from. Peterson began the work that eventually lead to this book as a form of self-therapy, to overcome a crisis of faith he experienced which left him with nightmares, compulsions, and a horror of living in a world as close to the brink of self-annihilation as is our modern world. His study of psychology was motivated by his need to understand how the world - and himself - had come to be.

This personal passion of its author informs all aspects of *Maps Of Meaning*, and lends the book a rare and compelling force among academic works. In his preface, Peterson approvingly cites Jung's (1976) claim that: "The very fact that a general problem has gripped and assimilated the whole of a person is a guarantee that that speaker has really experienced it, and gained something from his sufferings. He will then reflect the problem for us in his personal life and thereby show us the truth." Neuropsychology and mythology are demanding and often dry subjects that are difficult for a non-specialist reader to tackle. Few readers can come to Peterson's book with the appropriate knowledge, since he tries to tie together subjects that are usually considered far apart, and rarely successfully conjoined (sure, Carl Jung tried - but scientists who can read Jung with understanding are rarer than Snow's poets who can cite the Second Law Of Thermodynamics with understanding). Peterson makes strong demands on his reader to understand both mythology and (to a lesser extent) neuropsychology. His own clear passion, and his insistence on the importance of such multi-disciplinary understanding and the importance of his argument, will push readers from both sides of the gulf to make the extra effort to comprehend what the other side has to offer.

No book of this scope can hope to give the final word on its subject matter. The questions it addresses are too big. The answers provided by any single author can only point to paths which each reader must go on to explore. It is interesting to see how strongly Peterson's viewpoint dovetails with and extends the viewpoints of others who have tackled similar questions. *Maps Of Meaning* enriches and extends the ideas laid out, for example, by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). Like Peterson's book, *Philosophical Investigations* attempted to lay out how the apparent structure of the mind was conditioned by cultural and historical variables, and explain why rules for interpretation cannot be cited as the final ground of meaning, but themselves stand in need of explanation. Wittgenstein was interested in (although sceptical of) both neuropsychology and mythology. I suspect he might have appreciated Peterson's book as a rightful "heir to the subject that used to be called philosophy" (Wittgenstein 1958: 28). Peterson's ideas also resonate fruitfully and in profound ways with Gregory Bateson's (1972) cybernetic/ecological understanding of mind. Bateson emphasized that we need to think of information as an active transformation of a perceived difference. For Bateson, differences that make a difference (his definition of a 'bit' of information) are error activated, insofar as they are perceived to exist by an organism only in situations where they hold a behavioral relevance. This belief led Bateson to conclude, much like Peterson, that the complex human inner world is built largely on the perception of similarities between abstracted descriptions grounded in behavioral relevance. Peterson makes a few brief passing references to Wittgenstein, but none to Bateson, suggesting that the similarities may reflect some genuine convergence of views on a tricky topic, rather than simply a lineage of intellectual influence. Peterson's book enriches and extends the viewpoints of these and other

predecessors. How does simple neural tissue sustain our rich phenomenological world? What is the relation between what we see and what exists? What does it mean to be human? Why are we so destructive? How did I get to be me? These questions will be posed again and again as long as humans live. Answers will be told and re-told. None will ever satisfy all critics. The answer Peterson has worked so hard to outline in his book satisfies me, because it deepens and extends my understanding of what it means to ask and answer these kinds of questions. It reminds me why they are vitally important, even if our most powerful question-answering tools - the tools of science - cannot address them.

Maps Of Meaning tries to build a bridge across Snow's Gulf by treading through some of the most unstable, impenetrable, and delicate territory in that gulf - the territory of Meaning. No scientist who understands the matter can doubt that Meaning is destined to forever escape science's amazing toolbox. All that matters to us as living human beings will never be expressible only by reference to our physiological structure and its lawful neurophysiological state transformations. The subjective experience of those states as meaningful is deeply shaped by the cultural milieu in which the human neurophysiology is placed. If we are to understand what it means to be human, why we experience ourselves the way we do, then we will certainly need to understand what properties our cultural milieu has, what constraints it imposes on our own experience, and why. *Maps Of Meaning* is a big, bold attempt to show us that those properties are not simply random or of 'merely philosophical' interest just because they fall squarely on the ancient side of Snow's Gulf. It is an attempt to explain why an understanding of those properties need not be 'mere' story-telling. Effective story-telling, Peterson insists, is never 'mere'. It is a vital element to understanding who we are, and why our brains deliver the world to us in the way that they do.

Chris Westbury is currently a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Psychology, University of Alberta. His current research is in the area of language processing and the computational analysis of words and nonwords.

References

- Bateson, G. (1972) *Steps To An Ecology Of Mind: Collected Essays In Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, And Epistemology*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Jung, C. G. (1976) *The Structure And Dynamics Of The Psyche*, Bolligen Series XX. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Nietzsche, F. (1966) *Beyond Good And Evil: Prelude To A Philosophy of the Future*, W. Kaufmann (trans.). New York: Vintage Books.
- Snow, C.P. (1959) *The Two Cultures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953) *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell
- (1958) *The Blue and Brown Books*. New York: Harper.

Mindful Semiotics

David Lidov, *Elements of Semiotics*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.

I.

The goal of David Lidov's engaging, nuanced, and sophisticated book is to review "foundational options in the construction of a semiotic theory" and to furnish us with an "arrangement of distinctions regarding signs" (251). This arrangement of distinctions makes up the 'first cut' of Lidov's analytical scissors: the decomposition of the plenum of semiosis into its constitutive units and the putting of them into an intelligible pattern of relations. Lidov aims to delineate a "system of technical usages" that, formally, make up what he is calling elements (11). The guiding idea is to always keep in mind just what difference a semiotic approach, in the various spheres of possible applications, would make. "What sorts of phenomena will we understand better in the perspective of semiotics than we could without it?" (37). The 'second cut' of Lidov's analytical scissors, accordingly, is into a wide, though primarily illustrative, field of phenomena that both benefit from a semiotic perspective and reveal the limits of a purely semiotic analysis. Lidov, without going into acerbic philosophical detail, resolutely rejects the notion that we are enclosed in some sort of "semiotic jail" or "prison house of language" (121), that there is no 'outside' to the spiral of semiosis. Lidov's central thesis is that the "fundamental phenomenon" for semiotics is the field of "fluctuations of sign consciousness" (8). Semiotics is the study of the "ubiquitous activity of interpreting signs" (13), a position which clearly indicates, at the very outset, a confluence of semiotics and hermeneutics. And just as hermeneutics arises out of failures to understand, or breakdowns in understanding, so semiotic consciousness "simply emerges from our spontaneously heightened sign consciousness as an extended and structured occasion for signs to reflect (on) themselves" (24).

Lidov's main objective is to "track the principles which lead from simple to elaborate signs" (44). Sign use - or semiosis - for Lidov "pertains to consciousness exclusively" (97), which "is a scramble" (97). But semiosis is a "component of conscious experience but not the whole of it" (118). Affirming at one and the same time that "semiotics is not a part of psychology" (125) and the undeniable existence of a "simmering soup of thought" (125), Lidov wants nevertheless to draw his study of "mental life out of psychology and back into the world of signs" (85), a public and intersubjectively shared world. The basic idea, which is fundamentally Peircean, is that the mind and mental life, whatever else they may turn out to be, are at least, for semiotics in its distinctive task, invested in external media. The logic of these media becomes the logic of mind in so far as it is involved with signs. The 'scramble' of consciousness is defined by a complex 'web' of sign-factors and experiential components that give it a distinctive felt 'quality' at every moment. Consciousness itself is a phenomenon that, to different degrees, is accessible at every moment. Its structural scaffolding is so connected with its contents that its 'appropriation' and thematization is a constant challenge. Lidov thinks of consciousness as a dynamic field of 'presencings' and as the 'place' of semioses. It has no clear boundaries, indeed, no greatest upper bound, if we take seriously the recursive nature of reflection on consciousness.

Consciousness, which is not to be thought of as a 'thing' or 'substance,' is full of 'items.' An item is "anything we attend to" (98), certainly as broad and as neutral a notion as we can imagine.

Items, in this sense, belong to the “foreground” (98) of consciousness and emerge as figures out of a ground. Semiosis can be thought of as a kind of figuration or itemization of consciousness. The first term emphasizes the processual nature of semiosis and consciousness. The second term emphasizes the work of segmentation that comes from ‘acts of attending,’ in the way, say, Iris Murdoch or Simone Weil used the notion of ‘attending.’

There is, on Lidov’s analysis, no a priori limitation of what can be an item: anything that is, or can be, attended to -- or from -- is an ‘item,’ in the sense defined. Sign-factors, the proper and distinctive object of semiotics as an analytical and self-reflective discipline, are par excellence items in consciousness (99). The equality of all items in consciousness, Lidov thinks, devalues the often drawn distinction between formal and instrumental signs (99), because, as Lidov sees it, consciousness blends internal and external phases in its awareness of items (100). There is, in short, no essential difference between our awareness of tools and instruments and our awareness of signs. The ‘internal-external’ contrast is ultimately of no importance for semiotics - or for semiosis. It is to be supplanted by a creative extension of the type-token relation. The issue for any sign-mediated conscious act of attending is the stabilization of a unity: an idea - the idea of a bicycle, say - functioning as a focal item, can tie together (synthesize or subject to a rule) “a disparate group of external experiences” and thus label or ‘bind’ the stream of experiencings. This is a classic, realist, position on the constitutive nature of concepts, where external experiences are ‘tokens’ of the ‘type’ encapsulated in the concept. However, in a powerful and illuminating observation, Lidov notes that an actual physical bicycle can be used to tie together and control the “myriad images I have of it” (100), that is, it may, functioning as a sign, exemplify what a bicycle is. Signs are not ‘substance’ or ‘things,’ but anything that is used in a particular way. The ‘idea’ of a bicycle and the bicycle itself are both signs, ‘items’ in consciousness. Here is a kind of pansemioticism in potentia but not in actu. Signs ‘are’ not; they are ‘taken.’

Lidov wisely makes no attempt to ‘define’ consciousness, since it is not clear that all the phenomena we include under the rubric of ‘consciousness’ are able to be subsumed under an essentialistic definition. ‘Consciousness’ is a kind of analytical primitive for Lidov, synonymous with ‘presence’ or ‘attending’ or ‘noticing.’ It encompasses our awareness of our bodies as felt centers of movement and expressive gestures, sensory consciousness of impressions and experiential qualities, consciousness of the development and unity of a musical theme, consciousness of the meaning of a sentence or a text. These are all instances of ‘consciousness.’ What we are conscious of defines consciousness and its types and patterns. Mind - as the place of semiosis - is, to use Lidov’s formulation, invested in signs. It is to signs and their configurations that we are to look to understand what consciousness is. Consciousness ‘is’ a function of what we are attending to and the means we are using to attend to or ‘access’ it. Each distinct form of consciousness for the type of semiotic theory Lidov is concerned to develop is a distinct way of accessing meaning created through investment in an item or complex of items functioning as a sign or system of signs.

II.

Although Lidov offers no definition of consciousness, the rest of his book is resolutely definitional. The definition of the sign is funda-

mentally Peircean, but with “consequential differences” (104): (a) its basis is ad hoc psychological categories rather than ontological categories (i.e., first, second, and third do not appear), (b) the interpretant is not considered “necessarily” to be a sign, and (c) the dynamic object is not considered to be essential to a properly formulated semiotic theory. Opting for a Peircean foundation for the “schema of the sign” does not eo ipso set it in irreconcilable opposition to Saussure’s differential model based on an extrapolation from structural linguistics, which in fact Lidov treats even-handedly and insightfully. The tracking of the paths from simple to elaborate signs involves a general schematization of signs and then the development of a series of distinctions and categories that ‘modulate’ or ‘torque’ the general schema, depending on the phenomena that are provoking the investigation. The general schematization has both a stipulative and a descriptive dimension, while the following out of its various ramifications or branchings leads Lidov to furnish us with stimulating and novel systematic comparisons of different genres of sign. This, he clearly shows, is one of the main tasks of semiotics. Lidov’s book oscillates creatively between two poles or foci: the descriptive or analytical and the comparative or methodological.

Lidov’s actual definition of a sign comes rather late in the book. “A sign-complex (‘sign’ for short) is a triplet of three distinct factors. The factors of a sign are items in consciousness” (103). These conscious factors or items are, unsurprisingly, three of the (five) Peircean factors of semiosis: representamen, object, and interpretant. The ‘interpreter’ and the ‘ground,’ which Peirce explicitly differentiates as essential to the constitution of a semiotic event, are implicit in Lidov but not thematized in the definition. The conscious interpreter is the ‘place’ where representamina are brought into conscious relation with objects by means of interpretants. These three factors effect the relation of representation, which Lidov considers, resolutely and most convincingly, as a “relation in consciousness” (7). Semiosis, carried out by the construction of sign-complexes and our existential investment in them, is a phenomenon of consciousness qua tale. Any item of consciousness whatsoever, functioning as a representamen, “evokes and constrains an interpretant of the object” (104). The ‘material phase’ of an external representamen is a vehicle, since the representamen must be ‘carried’ or ‘invested.’ When the representamen is internal, the material phase is an image, broadly understood, certainly a distant echo of Peirce’s insistence on the role of ‘mental diagrams’ or schemata.

The interpretant is defined in orthodox Peircean fashion: it is the “factor of the sign that instantiates, or realizes, the relationship of the representamen to the object” (107). Lidov, in spite of his belief that the notion of the interpretant is “probably Peirce’s most original contribution” (92), deviates from Peirce here in that rather than taking over the Peircean schematization of interpretants into emotional, energetic, and logical, he distinguishes an immediate interpretant, a responsive interpretant, and then a “seven-league-boot interpretant” (108-109). The immediate interpretant, on Lidov’s reckoning, is “intrinsically tenuous,” always involving “a supplement or some redundancy.” Although he does not refer in any systematic way to Peirce’s notion of the time-binding character of consciousness as a sequence of self-appropriating interpretants, Lidov does affirm that “the interpretant is drawn out in time. Often a sign allows a range of interpretants” (109). The object -- the thing-meant -- is, on the first cut, divided by Lidov into the immediate object, which is something in the mind, some-

thing that can develop, and the construct, “the object of a sign that is not firmly linked to a distinct and influential dynamic object” (106), a notion that in the last analysis he wants nothing to do with.

Lidov opts (though not exclusively) for a division of signs that is fundamentally Peircean, with the terminological substitution of ‘terms’ for Peirce’s ‘symbols’ in the differentiation of sign-types. But the book is not organized around this well-known and exhaustively commented on division. For Lidov, icon, index, and symbol are “aspects” of signs rather than ontologically distinct sign-types. Iconic, indexical, and symbolic elements co-occur in different weightings in the various sign-complexes produced and interpreted in intrinsically labile semiotic activities. Because sign-situations are “evanescent” (104) the focus of Lidov’s analyses is the sign-situate, that is, an item that is a sign “only when situated as one,” not the sign-designate, that is, an item that is a sign “even if idle or misused” (90). Lidov is, as noted, concerned with signs in use. Indeed, while Lidov clearly admits that “Peirce’s semiotics is ... the most elaborate, audacious, inventive, and grand that we have” (87), his book is by no means either another commentary on Peirce’s texts or a systematic application of Peirce’s schema in order to show its comprehensiveness and heuristic fertility, which he nevertheless clearly and forthrightly admits in word and deed.

This is exemplified in his discussion of the ‘contexts’ of the three factors of the ‘sign-complex.’ The contexts of a representamen is its medium and its structural environment. But Lidov points out that many different types of things are called a medium: a material, or a grammar, or a technology, a vagueness, he notes, that is perhaps “more useful than obstructive” (109). The chief orientation of a comparative semiotics is to be found here in the comparison of media, the guiding principle of which is that “in general, a sign system or a pattern provides the structural contexts of its elements” (109). This is clearly the syntactic component of a sign-system, which functions as a field. The context of an object is its world. Lidov distinguishes, from the semiotic point of view, two worlds: the world the object was extracted from, albeit with the help of signs, and the one into which the sign inserts it (109). Designation is the semiotic work of extraction. Modality marks the sign’s power to determine a new context for the object. This polarity between designation and modality is a permanent feature of semiosis and one of the distinguishing marks of human mentality as invested in the work of signs. The context of an interpretant is a perspective. “A group of signs may be interpreted in a way that expresses a unity (be it of feeling, of attitude, of situation, of argument, or whatever). These share a perspective” (110). Lidov connects the notion of a perspective with a remarkable passage from Peirce dealing with personality:

[P]ersonality is some kind of coordination or connection of ideas. Not much to say, this, perhaps. Yet when we consider that, according to the principle that we are tracing out, a connection between ideas is itself a general idea, and that a general idea is a living feeling, it is plain that we have at least taken an appreciable step toward the understanding of personality. This personality, like any general idea, is not a thing to be apprehended in an instant. It has to be lived in time, nor can any finite time embrace it in all its fullness. Yet in each infinitesimal interval it is present and living, though specially colored by the immediate feelings of that moment. (Peirce 1972: 213)

To have a perspective, and to know one has a perspective, is to be a person in the deepest sense of the term. A person is a living time-bound perspectival feeling-process. A person is marked by a definite qualitative feel of each pulse of

consciousness. Lidov goes on to say that we perceive perspectives, but it seems to me to be better to say that perceiving, as continuous pulsings of experience, is itself perspectival and is felt as such, and that we can reflect, by means of a new 'perceiving,' on our perspectives. This avoids the loss of perspective as a category and also pinpoints the self-augmenting and self-reflecting nature of perception and consciousness.

Lidov claims that the third factor of a sign could be a rule rather than an interpretant. "All the plausible interpretants of a designated sign, when it is launched into a sign situation, are governed by its rule, and they form a class. The rule defines the class; the interpretants are the members of the class" (111). Lidov is very astute when he writes that "we note a tendency for consciousness to provide its own supplement to the rule, true interpretants if weak ones" (111). More puzzling perhaps is his contention that "the interpretant is simultaneously essential and superfluous" - it is "something more" that is added in consciousness when the mind employs a sign. It amounts to "grasp or understanding" (112). Following his insistence on the importance of consciousness Lidov correctly writes that "it is only the awareness of a sign that allows for the differentiation of meaning from effect" (112). I am not sure, however, that Lidov has quite understood - or at least put sufficient value on - the significance of Peirce's notion of the energetic interpretant, thinking that Wittgenstein's analysis of 'non-mindful' behavioral and automatic responses is sufficient. Lidov takes it as essential that "the interpretant must be conscious" (112), a position with which I can certainly agree, but that certainly does not mean that it must be thematically attended to or operatively reflected upon. We can prethetically live through, and consequently be conscious of, our actions and bodily movements without making them focal and an action can in this way be a true 'interpretant' of a sign-situation.

Although sign-complexes and forms of consciousness are, I noted, correlative for Lidov, and semiosis is a phenomenon of consciousness exclusively, it is nevertheless a "component of conscious experience but not the whole of it" (117). This means that consciousness as semiosis has vague and complex boundaries that constantly shift. As a result, representation, the *Urakt* of semiosis, is "one part of the larger whole of experience" (117). Since not all items of consciousness are signs - unless taken to be such - "thought develops signs where there were none" (117). A radical consequence of such a position for Lidov is that there are no unconscious signs and that sign-complexes attain stability within constantly shifting boundaries of semiosis. The unconscious, as Lidov sees it, has no semiotic relevance as a field of interpretations. It is interpreted, but not interpreting, and we are related to it as we are related to the external world. Strangely enough, Lidov contends that "perceptions as such are not signs, even though he also wants to hold that "every species has its own way of constructing an objective world" (118), a thesis that has become central to certain powerful semiotic theories such as those of von Uexküll, Cassirer, and Thomas Sebeok. As Lidov puts it, "normally, the resultant object is a true substitute for the sensations that it replaces, the output of their input, not their sign" (119). There are exceptions when this does not hold. But, we may ask, with Peirce, Cassirer, and others, what if "appearances" are structured semiotically (see Innis 1994)? Later, in his discussion of 'features,' Lidov seems to give back what he has just taken away. A feature, as he puts it, "is a sign factor component that is atomic in a given perspective; that is, it is an element that we do not want to regard as a combination

of subelements. The vocabularies that some combinatorial systems depend on in turn depend on a combinatorial vocabulary of features" (134). Does not perception, as conscious process, treat the existential properties of its objects as indexical features? Lidov seems to admit this himself, which brings him very close to Peirce's position on the semiotic structure of perception itself.

III.

Beyond the fact that Lidov accepts the basic lines of the Peircean semiotic schema, however, is the question of why he prefers it to the schema derived from Saussure's structuralist project. Structuralism, according to Lidov, views semiotics as a "map of differences" (133) with semiosis as the actual mapping of differences. But, as Lidov sees it, pure difference does not exist (133). Difference is always positive because it is always in situ. Peirce's representamen "may comprise positive qualities and positive facts, not just empty 'difference'" (91). What, then, is the alternative to reified difference? "A more particular conception of articulation" (133). Furthermore, "the purely systematic view of language implicit in Saussure's opposition of signification and value can be overlaid on other kinds of signs to only a very limited extent" (52-53). This point is also connected with the issue of conscious qualities, with the feel of signs, of qualia as essential to signs. At the same time "the systematic study of differences within any medium is a potent analytical tool whether or not such a perspective can survey the whole territory" (53). In short, "Saussure gave us a practical model of signifiers but only a vague conjecture about signifieds. The practical model finds wide application outside language. Indeed, his main ideas about signifiers are no more linguistic than they are musicological or anthropological. They belong - as he proposed - to semiology or semiotics" (56). Peirce and Saussure, it appears, can sleep in the same room but not in the same bed. They are, in fact, assigned to beds of different sizes. Saussure's great discovery is of a model of signifying structures that, generalizing from linguistics, "most dynamically connected the philosophy of signs to the concrete data of culture" (46). Strangely enough, in criticizing Saussure's conception of the sign, Lidov asserts that it is "inadequate to give us a handle on the behavior of signs in mental life. What it leaves out are the angles. The sign is biased. Representation is of something as something" (85). This is, then, the great role of the Peircean 'interpretant,' a much more powerful notion than Saussure's global category of a 'signified.'

As to Saussure's model of the signifier, however, Lidov acknowledges its power and indicates its range of application. A theme that runs throughout his book is that "reference and structure compete" (62). In aesthetic signs, for instance, we find that "any sign takes on aesthetic function to the extent that it is regarded as an end in itself. Whether this happens or not is ... a question of social norms" (60). This involves the simultaneous foregrounding of "internal structural arrangements within the sign" and the "positioning of the sign with respect to cultural systems of value" (62). Structural analysis stresses three factors: heightened artifice of symmetries of all sorts, departures from stylistic norms, and transformation of the sign's logical character. The cultural perspective, for its part, "stresses the relativity of aesthetic valuation" (63). Lidov is especially strong in his brilliant structural analyses which belong to the comparative dimension of his book. But the analyses are structural without being structuralist in the strict sense and they also rely on tools taken from functionalism.

Functionalism, exemplified in the Prague

School and in the work of Mukarovsky and Jakobson, "might be said to extend Saussurian structuralism from langue to parole" (65). Lidov thinks that the various functions are referential functions (65) and that in the last analysis functionalism does not so much extend as contest "the division of langue from parole" (65). But Lidov is not satisfied with the results so far, which he calls an "ad hoc method ... of parsing the social situation of the sign," but not a new conception of the sign itself (65). Functionalism's greatest power for him, it seems, is in analyzing the aesthetic. It does so because, like structuralism, and unlike Peircean pragmatist semiotics, it offers us a "generalized understanding [of] how parts relate to wholes within sign factors" (89). Structuralism, with its functionalist continuation, has to do "with our consciousness of order and organization" (129) and in this sense it must be seen as "an unfinished project" (129). It is, however, a supplement to pragmatism not an alternative to it. But the permanent influence of structuralist and functionalist concerns is clearly seen in the nuanced comparative aesthetic analyses that make up a large part of Lidov's book, where 'the signs of art' are subjected to a most insightful analysis and flesh out and give bite to the scheme of elements, the construction of which is the main task of the book.

IV.

I cannot reproduce the delicacy, detail, and concreteness of Lidov's presentation and argument. I must restrict myself to drawing attention to some representative positions which exemplify the valuable 'take' on semiotics that Lidov has constructed.

First, Lidov, in spite of his love of the musical and plastic arts, resolutely holds to the distinctiveness, indeed superiority, of language as a semiotic system. While he admits that the differences between language and other signifying media are "not all black and white," it appears, nevertheless, that language is not only "unique in its capacity to define its own terms" but that sentences, the carriers of human utterances, "seem unique in their capacity to designate aspects of a situation and combine them" (148). The referential function of language is encompassed by the work of designation, analysis, and modality. Designation, as Lidov uses the term, involves the indexical component of a sentence, the hooking of the complex linguistic sign onto a part of the world 'outside' of itself so as to 'extract' it and 'mark' it off. Analysis is exemplified in the division of the fundamental units of the 'marked' experiential continuum into the three basic categories of agent, action, object. Modality is an internal function of the sign. Modality is an interpretant that "assigns the object to a world" (149). The 'modal' object of a sentence, on this analysis, would be the "proposition it expresses and its context is a world: a world of existing fact, a world of desiderata, a world of obligations, a world of necessities, a world of hypothesis, and so on" (150). There is no limit to modal worlds nor is there a "universal vocabulary for modes" (150). Moreover, it is the "capacity to encode designation, modality, and semantic analysis with precision" that is sui generis for verbal signs. "No exact equivalents to these appear outside language. No other medium sustains the contrasts of designation with denotation (the indication of a class rather than an individual). However, once teased apart, these ingredients of verbal reference turn out to play roles, albeit often more vague, in nonverbal semiosis" (150). This vagueness is not to be construed as a sign of weakness, however, as if forms of nonverbal semiosis are poor relatives of verbal or linguistic forms of semiosis. The point is that the

self-reflective and self-analysing nature of language enables us both to highlight its distinctive features and to read off the features that it shares with all other sign media. The choice of a signifying medium will condition the actual form that these three kinds of reference can take.

Second, the stable result of verbal semiosis is a text, the labile result being a conversation or dialogue, assuming, that is, reciprocity of voice, which relations of power do not always allow. Lidov formulates Foucault's great lesson as teaching us that "there are very few domains of discourse in which language furnishes all the signs in play" (176). Texts display a permanent tension found in all semiotic constructs to which Lidov also grants the honorific of being 'texts,' even if they are not language-constituted *stricto sensu*: a tension between grammar and pattern. Grammar attaches a semiotic work to society. Pattern individualizes the work. Grammatical structure is not the same as the structure of a particular work. "A grammar for assembling texts is a set of rules that governs the text's constituents and their relations by reference to categories" (154). Parts of speech, types of steps in dance, classes of chords in music belong here. These categories and the rules for combining them or selecting them are known *a priori*. When a combination realizes a grammatical rule we have a form: sentence, syllogism, still-life, musical sonata, standard types of plot, and "perhaps the standard press conference" (154).

While 'categories' and 'forms' define grammar, 'units' and 'sets' define patterns. Individual texts are characterized by distinctive patterns. "A pattern is a concrete ad hoc arrangement of constituents that establishes relations of similarity and contrast" (154). These take two forms: sets, which are "paradigms' determined by similarity and contrast," and units, which are "syntagms' determined by similarity and contrast" (154). Here is a clear reference to the two-axis theme of linguistics (paradigmatic and syntagmatic) and the parallel notion of an axis of selection and an axis of combination. Lidov points out that we cannot predict pattern. Pattern is discovered by induction or abduction. It is known only *a posteriori* and "develops from perceptions of symmetries of all kinds: repetitions, variations, and transformations and contrasts" (154). Examples of pattern are the rhyming of words in a poem, thematic motifs in a symphony, distribution of colors on a canvas, and so forth. Set is to pattern what category is to grammar. Understood in this way, Lidov is certainly right in holding that there is no prior blueprint for pattern which can work within grammatical constraints or contradict and escape such constraints. This is also why pattern is so often connected with the aesthetic (157). But at the same time, as Lidov points out, "the role of grammar and pattern in the plastic arts is more fragmentary because visual articulation structure is so widely various" (156). There can be, in other words, no 'language' of art except in the most attenuated sense of the term. Which does not mean, however, that art works are not sign-complexes, in the sense defined. It is just that the sign-object-interpretant triad is not torqued according to the logic or model of language. Lidov is utterly convincing here, especially in his insistence on the close connections between perception and semiosis as exemplified in art.

In the course of discussing the issue of closure and autonomy in connection with the well-known distinction between open and closed texts, Lidov remarks that the issue is "tied to [a] fundamental question in epistemology: Is our own experience, as whole, open or closed?" (171). Although Lidov resolutely tries to reduce the philosophical component of his book to a minimum, this is one of those (big) philosophical problems that he cannot quite manage to avoid.

His treatment of it is suggestive, short and sweet, and correct. He points out that "our objective worlds are plural, contradictory, interpenetrating, and in part unstable" (172) in that sign-complexes accomplish the world-building work of designation, analysis, and assignment of modality in radically different ways. "The worlds engendered by immersion in texts and grammars control our perception of experiences external to them. In a sense, texts act like theories" (172). We dwell in theories and interpret the world in light of them. But we can also step outside any given theory and view it from the outside. We use it to refer while ascribing to it at the same time its own autonomy. In the same way, with texts and complete semiotic systems we can be both inside and outside them. But what we can do with texts and systems we cannot do with our own minds. "We cannot see our own minds from the outside" (174). Consequently, "semiotic closure is tenuous" (174). Our encounter with any text involves our ascribing a "syntactic diagram" to it, but "complex texts do not fully yield to neat diagrams, and this is crucial" (174). Complex texts establish "grounds for competing interpretants" and hence establish a discourse. In this way "the text becomes an image of thinking. Discourse embodies the movement of thought" (174).

I would like to cite a representative passage bearing on this theme to illustrate the richness and acuity of Lidov's project.

A text offers us a world when three conditions are met:

(1) it must capture attention but be too complex to be comprehended readily in its details and organization;

(2) it must suggest closure - the associations among its parts must suggest that they belong to a consistent scheme in which they define each other by similarity and difference or by grammatical relations; and

(3) the text or grammar must not actually yield to the unitary diagram that it seems to promise. These three characteristics are also characteristics of the 'real' or 'everyday' world to which we are referring our comparison:

The world is complex and absorbing; it seems to have unity or at least continuity (which is close to unity); yet we can't quite make out what the unity and articulations are. The loose ends and leftovers create conceptual instabilities that are the representamen of the life of thought, the buzz of unprocessed experiences around the edge of our articulated objective world (174).

To understand the world and to understand a text is to enter into a dialogue, where we answer both world and text with counterwords. "Where semiotic worlds collide, they enjoin dialogues" (177).

Third, Lidov has an extremely interesting, but not altogether unproblematic, discussion of what he calls 'processive signs,' which encompass ritual, symbol, and art. The sign-complexes that constitute these central domains of semiosis are situated within the great polarity of structure and reference that is one of the constant themes of his book. To the degree that sign-complexes foreground their structure and thus become more internally elaborate "they tend to lose or loosen their hold on their objects" (128) and in that sense become more 'opaque.' To the degree that they tighten their referential hold on their objects they become more 'transparent.' In ritual, symbol, and art "the axis of opacity and transparency doubles back on itself ... for these may be so opaque as to seem beyond interpretation and at the same time so involving as not to call for any" (181). Processive signs are signs with a special aura, "signs that are absorbing, salient, problematic" (181). They are signs that deal with the processes of feeling, processes of consciousness. The pivot of Lidov's analysis is that there is no rigid distinction between items in consciousness and processes in consciousness. "A feeling can be taken as an item" (182). A process, as Lidov is using the term, "involves a sustained engagement in environment, orientation, feeling, and/or disposition" (182). It is precisely that en-

agement that is a sign factor in the processive sign. Accordingly, Lidov offers the following definition of a processive sign. It is a "sign in which the representamen, the object, or the interpretant is a process" (182). Such a notion allows Lidov to schematize processive signs in three ways:

(1) process as representamen gives us ritual,

(2) process as object gives us symbols,

(3) process as interpretant gives us works of art.

In ritual one participates, either as actor or as witness, in an action with which one identifies. "Participation establishes a situation, an orientation, and a feeling, which is to say that it induces a process in consciousness proper to the ritual" (182). A ritual, a time-defined representamen, is coercive of feeling or behavior. It is the fact of experiential immersion that marks rituals. "In ritual, there is no substitute for personal presence. Presence permits a process to be engaged, and that process represents whatever the ritual represents" (183). A symbol, as Lidov is using the term, is "a sign that does not merely indicate or designate its object but also involves us in a feeling or disposition affiliated with its object" (183). Lidov parallels here the deep and vital work of the theologian Paul Tillich. In fact, his analysis also parallels the work of Michael Polanyi in his last work, *Meaning*. Flags, tombstones, and other such objects, for example, are symbols in that they evoke sets of feelings and attitudes, such as a "sense of belonging and loyalty, of death and horror, and of romance and madness" (183). In short, the symbol "specifies a whole field of experience as its object" (183). Symbols "entrain" a dense penumbra of associations and dispositions. A symbol does not merely designate this penumbra. It engages it (and its contents). "The symbol actually provokes a sample of the experience it refers to" (183). Artworks induce us to sustain a perspective by casting us into it. "The perspective sustained is an interpretant-process" (184). A work of art, in this schema, strives to heighten our perception of the work "as a structured sensuous material," heighten our "imagination of its object," and assimilate us to "the viewpoint toward the object induced by the work" (184). Art engages and merges perception, imagination, and 'viewpoint' as three "dimensions of experience" (184). Lidov notes that this scheme works best when we can identify an object of the representation. But even when the object has been removed, say, in a non-figurative work, it is still parasitic upon a prior representational form or scheme. In this sense art works display in perspicuous fashion the "eradication of reference with the elaboration of structure" that is intrinsic to semiosis and is one of its constitutive principles (185). Even in the absence of the object a work can suggest how it would relate to an object if there were one.

Rituals, symbols, and art works, as sign-complexes, so engage us that they provoke and sustain "a continuous experience." Ritual does so by the controls of perception "entailed by the conditions of presence at a sign situation" when they "compel a structured conscious experience" (186). A symbol depends on the interaction between a sign and a base of knowledge. While a symbol can be a relatively simple, unified vehicle - sun, moon, flag, stars, circles, squares, serpents, etc. - it is "attached to a rich network of cultural lore" (186) in which we have embodied or invested ourselves. The symbol immerses us in this network. While art works certainly control perception and immerse us in rich networks of socially shared meanings Lidov in the last analysis pinpoints "the opacity of the vehicle itself" as the mark of aesthetic signs

which, by reason of its structure, and not by reason of any recondite object, 'defamiliarizes' our experiences. We are directed to the vehicle itself and not what it refers to, in two directions: (1) "toward reconstruction of structural coherence" and (2) "toward immersion in sensation" (186). We meet once again the "fundamental antithesis of structure and reference" (186) that marks sign systems of all sorts. Lidov insightfully points out that art works, while being embodied sign-complexes, depend upon a "continuous material surface" that furnishes the "background of sensorial continuity" which is the normal prerequisite condition for the "unmarked state for aesthetic engagement" (187). This is the port of entry into the kingdom of "sensory qualities" (187). The artist in constructing the art work is marked by the "ability to create continuity" (187), which can be present in many forms: undercoating in oil painting, the steady tone of the musician, the "relaxed flow" of the drafter's hand, and so forth. It is in comments such as these that Lidov shows his geniality and mastery. It also indicates the rootedness of Lidov's semiotic elements in the lived structures of experiencing.

In spite of my substantive agreement with the thrust of Lidov's distinction between and analysis of ritual, symbol, and art, I think they are best thought of as 'aspects' of processive sign-complexes where it is the weighting of the various sign-factors that marks off something as primarily ritual, symbol, or artwork. I find the schematization forced and really not in accord with Lidov's own refusal to reify sign-types. As *classification*, I find the schematization inadequate. As *phenomenology* of the work of sign-complexes, however, I find it stimulating and cogent.

Fourth, Lidov's comparative orientation allows him to throw sharp light on topics the full explication of which would take complete studies in themselves. He points out that natural and artificial languages are not so strictly and definitively distinguished. Indeed, games can be assimilated to artificial languages. They involve a demarcation of a playing field (a ludic space) and an articulation of the moves allowed (194). Pure notation systems, which Lidov first discusses with Nelson Goodman as dialogue partner, are rare and are exemplified in musical notation: pitch and rhythm are clearly notated, while the conductor's beat is a nonnotational model for a symphonic performance. And theories are, on Lidov's reckoning, models for their objects. Lidov, in the Peircean mode, emphasizes the 'iconic' character of models. A sign-complex is a model if: (1) we can construct the representamen from a "vocabulary of known elements and known relations,"

(2) the representamen makes the object known by means of resemblance,

(3) the relation between representamen and object is not indexical (197). Diagrams, accordingly, aspire to the status of models (197). Their function is to make all the parts of a system able to be regarded simultaneously, even if the clarity of diagrams is, as Lidov astutely observes, more sensorial than logical and even if we frequently use diagrams "to make our ideas look better than they are" (198). At the same time the feeling of control of an object domain that attends our use of graphs leads to "free play" (198), as do all formal systems. A formal system as invested in a graph can be used as a notation (199), with graphs such as tree graphs and net graphs being considered models of mental diagrams, which are not immediately available. The important and fertile implication that Lidov wants to draw is that "different sorts of comprehension of sense are suggested for melodies and sentences in adapting these differ-

ent models" (199). Tree graphs model the comprehension of sentences while net graphs model the comprehension of melodies: both types of graphs are attempts to model boundary and region hierarchies, whether situations and actions that are proper to narratives, or states and transitions proper to melodies and flow charts. On all these topics Lidov is a laconic and insightful guide.

V.

It is, however, in his comparison of music and visual art that Lidov truly excels. For Lidov the arts quite generally are "the true laboratories of the great human project of sign making" (191). Repudiating the all too facile opposition between the musical and the plastic - the arts of time and the arts of space - Lidov insists on the much more semiotically informative fact that we "can acknowledge hierarchy of content, perspective, and suggestions of designation and modality in both" (191). Two major questions arise for the semiotic treatment of art. First, "How is the signifying structure equipped to entrain, designate, or generalize various objects?" Second, "How does it constrain and elaborate their interpretation?" (191). The signifying structure of art works shares with artificial languages and games a 'playful' delimitation of means which promotes "musement." Lidov speaks of the "discipline of the signifier by limitation of means" (203). Such limitations - proper to artifice, models, graphs, and notations - attribute text structure to their objects and thus belong to a class of conceptlike representamina. These representamina are to be distinguished from holistic representamina which resist 'articulating' their objects. Unarticulated inflections, as in paintings and performances, are "more holistic than formal graphs and notations, but they include conceptlike aspects" (203). In art - but not just in art - there is a continuous axis of "complex mixtures of conceptlike and holistic elements," and signs are not to be divided into two sharp classes. While it is true that "conceptlike representamina facilitate play" by allowing us to be immersed in a "closed and insulated world" of "playful inventions" (204), it is also true that "you cannot play with the whole universe at once. To play requires focusing, and a closed, artificial world assists that focus" (204).

Lidov's 'take' on the visual arts can be summarized in the following way, some of it traditional and some of it relatively new, especially in terms of emphasis and weighting. Works of visual art have a double appearance: the visual vehicle, the appearance of the formed material, and the visual scene (Langer's virtual object). A picture, for example, is legitimately thought of as a composition and a text, though it is not modeled on language. It combines, to be sure, size, shape, color, texture. But visual art has no "universal articulatory framework" (206), and there are no universal grammatical or pattern schemata. In this sense the visual arts are the great domain of visual novelty, making appear in a continuously variable stream "the relations among perceptual aspects" (205-206) as well as novel forms of depiction, which is the "most characteristic relation of reference for visual art" (207). Nevertheless, isomorphism between representation and object is to be rejected. The substitution of a grammar of depiction for a grammar of vision makes possible the "understanding of pictures as signs" (209). Lidov is especially good at pointing out that a picture sign can have three objects:

(1) the depicted object, which can also be a state of affairs, proper to 'representational' art, which is subject to multiple grammars,

(2) the stipulated object, which is the object referred to when a depicted object itself becomes a representamen of another object, for

example, halo, gallows, balance as representing sanctity, death, justice - certainly a blend of symbolism and convention, and

(3) the inflectional object, a concept that covers a large range of phenomena.

Inflectional objects are holistic elements: illusions, color dynamics, distortion, synaesthetic values, color warmth and color distance. "In general, the inflections of pictures are representamina of nonvisual objects - such as feelings - which we may call, collectively, the inflectional objects of the picture" (209). Non-depictive painting focusses our attention on inflectional objects, the 'reading' of which differs greatly from the 'reading' of depictions, inducing, in Lidov's opinion, a kind of entrancement.

Lidov maintains a firm grip on the dialectical tension between a picture as a text and the picture as a whole or holistic unity. A picture has a "more or less unitary overall object (the scene)" and, "for any one reading, a more less unitary significance, its interpretant as a whole" (211). Lidov in this way throws off hints and insights on every page. Pictures can clearly signify more than they depict. Pictures depicting events can have component figures that are not events and in this sense are like, on the one hand, words in a sentence and, on the other hand, parts in a whole. The inflectional unity is an emergent property, a unifying quality, as Dewey so perspicuously showed in his *Art as Experience*, which Lidov could have exploited to the benefit of his argument. "A picture as a whole encompasses the arrangement of all its inflections as a unity" (212). Balance emerges out of the perception of 'reciprocities': of weight and counterweight, tension and countertension, structural features that are not rooted in categories but in magnitudes. The fusion in artistic texts of conceptlike elements and holistic elements leads to "a conception of feeling" and "the feeling of concept" (212), a genial and important formulation. The distinctive feel or quality of a painting - or sculpture, for that matter - is the interaction of inflection and depiction.

Turning to music, which is Lidov's professional field, we find him once again tracing the intricate relations between semiotic and non-semiotic aspects. Lidov illuminatingly applies the semiotic triad to the analysis of melody. The melodic representamen is compounded of discrete parts, revealed in pattern analysis and foregrounding disjunct entities and a hierarchy of regions, and of modulating continuities, revealed in grammar analysis and foregrounding rising and falling conjunct intervals and a hierarchy of boundaries (216). The pattern of disjunct elements is highly articulate and assists us to reify the melody (216). It reveals the unique vocabulary of the melody. The modulation hierarchy is like waves on a lake. Conjunction is identified by us perceptually "with continuity and with processes in consciousness rather than items" (216). It is this double character of the melodic representamen that "prepares us for the surprising complexity of its references" (216). The motional object of music is rooted in proprioceptive knowledge, which Lidov discusses with reliance on the stimulating work of Pierce and Pierce. "We may interpret the melodic reference to motion as the expressive behavior of a subject" (219). This involves an ascription of subjectivity, of a persona, to music or to a musical theme (219). Lidov thinks of a melodic shape as "encoding two simpler, simultaneous contours" (219), which are ultimately the rhythmic and the pitch structures. We are presented in the musical line with a constant tension, played out in the perceiving body, between effort and momentum. Rhythmic and pitch structures are in constant dialectical relationship, with acceleration

and deceleration of rhythm playing against rising and falling pitch (221). As to the musical interpretant, Lidov points out that not only motion but also emotion has an essential affinity with music. While the recourse to emotion is, as Lidov says, “no shortcut to understanding music” (221), he does want to sustain the thesis that in spite of the vagueness of the notion of emotion and its confusion at times with mood and sensation, “it remains a fact that music can indicate qualities of feeling and that qualities of emotion are a salient subclass of these....Music represents specific characteristics of movement that are indices of emotion” (221), that is, really connected with them in a Peircean and Deweyan sense.

Connected where? In the body of both performer and perceiver of the music. Lidov performs an invaluable service to the semiotic community by his rich and allusive appropriation of the work of Manfred Clynes on ‘sentic,’ which offers support for what Lidov calls the “gesture hypothesis,” one of the most stimulating ideas of his book. Music, for Lidov, arises in gesture, embodies gesture, and gives rise to a distinctive gestural shape or ‘sentic form’ in the perceiver. A gesture, in Lidov’s formulation, is a “single, molar unity of expressive bodily movement or posture. One single gesture has no parts that are experienced by the actor or perceiver as volitionally distinct, that is, as the products of distinct impulses” (222). One gesture, while not compound, is nevertheless complex, according to Lidov. Lidov distinguishes between the articulation of the gesture (which body parts do what) and the inflection of the gesture, which is determined by its rhythm, “its profile of force” (222). Gesture I, as he calls it, both accepts cultural control and is subject to notation. Gesture II is biologically determined and incapable of notation, “subject to cultural modification only in that it can be contextualized, facilitated, or inhibited” (222). Here is where the presentation and defence of Clynes’s position on sentic forms enters the discussion. Clynes’s main point, as understood by Lidov, is that expressive patterns “converge on a shape that is distinct for each of several different emotions but the same for most people” (223). These shapes are sentic forms. “Sentic shapes are temporal patterns of fixed duration that describe the growth and decay of muscular effort (and momentum)” (223). Music, on this analysis, is a sonically embodied sentic form, a position extremely close to Susanne Langer’s as developed especially in her *Feeling and Form*. Only such a position, thinks Lidov, permits us “to address a variety of issues that otherwise would be intractable” about the types of meaning music can have. In spite of the ‘physicality’ of its analyses it avoids being a push-button theory even if it focuses on an “indexical component of artistic expression” (226). The expressive quality that marks any musical realization is connected to the precision of the innate gestural form that defines the intensity of the expression (226).

Sentic forms are in principle “incapable of notation” (226). Inflections of musical performances are not in the score, just as inflections of dance are not in the Labanotation. Something slips through the net of formal notations. “Just as with musical notation, what we are inclined to call the quality of movement is not caught in the sieve of formal notation” (227). In all the arts - and even in casual communication - Lidov clearly establishes that we are dealing with two planes or streams, “one bound up with conceptlike structure, subject to playful manipulations, and one bound up with inflection, subject to inhibition and release” (227). Lidov thematizes the streams as analogous to ocean currents that mingle and interact without fixed boundaries. Lidov in this way is able to

throw a penetrating light on the issue of emergent properties or emergent qualitative values in art. His thesis and theme is that “in art holistic elements are framed and manipulated so as to become conceptlike; conceptlike elements are transformed and inflected to convey holistic inflections” (230). Art evolves, consequently, on two planes: a plane of composition and a plane of inflection. Composition deals with pattern and grammar in so far as they are amenable to notation. Inflection encompasses unarticulated elements that “have a character dependent on their exact shape” (230) and are subject to continuous graphing (but not notational graphing). The role of inflection is to account for “accurate realizations of the same score” (230). But these realizations do not have to be identical. Indeed, they cannot be. The upshot is that “what is most magical and mysterious in art is the intertwining of expressivity and conceptualization” (230).

The semiotic relevance of the body and the ‘deintellectualization’ of art is given a clear and precise treatment in Lidov. Lidov shows the heuristic fertility of Clynes’s work beyond the sphere of music. “It seems that we comprehend spatial relations, time relations, and force relations in part by projecting body images” (231) - as in moving lines and colors. “We project our own feelings into the objects or events that evoke them readily if those events or objects embody expressive physical inflections” (231). Lidov thinks that the gesture hypothesis is more suggestive than Goodman’s notion of metaphorical exemplification. In the case of Michelangelo’s *Pietà*, for example, Lidov traces its power to the provoking of subliminal mimicry and it appears that we “project the feeling resulting from our own muscular tensions onto the sculpture as a sort of illusion” (231). In brilliant analyses of the Funeral March in Beethoven’s *Eroica* and of the Joseph window in Chagall’s Jerusalem windows Lidov enriches the semiotic frames that he has been so much at pains to develop in the course of the book. The analyses are most indebted to Clynes and the main theoretical or semiotic point is to show that “the relations of conceptualization and expressivity in art are infinitely variable” (247) and that semiotic theory is not “wedded to particular interpretations” (248).

VI.

Lidov’s book offers in more ways than I have been able to indicate a direct and nuanced survey and discussion of these foundational elements and a demonstration of how they are to be used in concrete semiotic analyses. It establishes a subtle network of concepts and distinctions and it displays with admirable clarity and scope their consequences for the ubiquitous activity of interpreting signs. Although I am not sure that he has done himself an unequivocal service in downplaying the philosophical premises and implications of semiotics, he, no doubt, did so in order to offer a common platform for readers of different philosophical persuasions. While by doing so he has managed to avoid certain types of controversy about philosophical method and subject matter, they nevertheless might be intrinsic to semiotics as such. Those who want extended philosophical discussions will have to look elsewhere. As will those who are more concerned with the social role of signs. Moreover, Lidov’s book is not a book of exposition nor is it a primer. Yet its directness must not be confused with simplicity. The focusing on elements is by no means elementary and the level of discussion is resolutely high. Indeed, his book presupposes a degree of sophistication and familiarity with the background discussions that challenges the reader on every page. It occupies, in fact, a valuable middle ground between being an initiation and being for the initiated.

At the end of his book, in a compact and clear-headed discussion of education, Lidov argues that “education is the primary locus for the maintenance of sign systems and texts” (261). Proper education, dependent on ‘discipline,’ needs “manageable packages of signs” (262). The expert teacher’s job is to match students with the right-sized projects and in this way lead them out of themselves. Creativity in its authentic, non “flabby,” sense arises in interaction with sign systems and texts, in the opportunities to “encounter structured works” (264). Education in the elements of semiosis and the elements of semiotics is the task Lidov set himself in this book, which is part of his own self-confessed project of fighting, both in his life and in his professional career, to maintain “well-structured texts” (267) and to offer us a manageable package of signs about signs. In short, his book is written for all those who eschew fads and “who appreciate the importance, complexity, and privileges of elaborate semiosis” (267).

Robert E. Innis is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Lowell. His books include *Karl Bühler: Semiotic Foundations of Language Theory* (Plenum 1982), *Semiotics: An Introductory Anthology* (Indiana University Press 1985), *Consciousness and the Play of Signs* (Indiana University Press 1994). He is currently preparing *Forms of Sense*.

References

- Clynes, Manfred (1989) *Sentic: The Touch of the Emotions*. Introduction by Yehudi Menuhin. Bridport, Dorset: Prism Press.
- Dewey, John (1934) *Art as Experience*. Critical edition: Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987.
- Innis, Robert E. (1994) *Consciousness and the Play of Signs*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press
- Langer, Susanne K. (1953) *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art*. New York: Scribner’s.
- Peirce, C.S. (1972) *The Essential Writings*, E.C. Moore (ed.), New York: Harper.
- Pierce, Alexandra and Roger Pierce (1989) *Expressive Movement*. New York: Plenum.
- Polanyi, Michael and Harry Prosch (1975) *Meaning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press