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This article appeared in Volume 2 (2) of The Semiotic Review of Books.
Primate Visions: Gender, race and nature in the world of modern science. By Donna Haraway. New York and London: Routledge. 1989. Pp. V + 486. ISBN 0-415-90114-6/ 0-415-90294-0 (Pap.)
Donna Haraway's Primate Visions concerns how and why stories about human nature are made and told in modern American scientific primatology. Many discourses, it argues, create meanings via narratives, then vie for the authority to control or "stabilize" meanings by promoting their stories over others. This authority can influence major decisions about resources and policies, so the stakes are high and competition is fierce. Since anyone can invent a story, gaining authority for a particular one relies on establishing the greatest credibility possible by "grounding" it well. "Human nature" stories have special importance because they authorize much Euro-American cultural and political practice, and the nonhuman primates are a potent resource for grounding them: they provide a telling mirror on humanity because they seem to be at the boundary between human and animal. Among the major authors of these stories are the life sciences, who claim a form of grounding of credibility in objectivity. Scientific stories are said to derive from the "real" workings of nature and the special working of science.
It is precisely this that Haraway's study opposes, arguing that what grounds these scientific stories is less "objective" than their authors suggest. Stories are motivated, created, transformed, and believed because of a wider set of factors than those officially acknowledged. Haraway argues that three covert social forces "outside" official science -- race, gender, and class -- play critical roles in guiding, colouring, and otherwise influencing 20th-century (Euro-) American scientific human nature stories based on primates. Primate Visions thus constitutes Haraway's effort to authorize her own story, offering an analysis of human nature stories in American scientific primatology, told in three periods through representative individuals important in crafting these stories.
This, the "scientific" beginning, was as a period of sporadic and idiosyncratic efforts to collect, live with, or work with primates. Scientific work originated in colonizing nations and perpetuated exploitive relations with habitat nations by both extracting their primates as resources and treating their nationals as inferiors and subordinates. Scientific stories created about nonhuman primates concerned nature as opposed to culture. Innocent of data and in line with prevalent western human mores, they portrayed primate lives as stable and hierarchically ordered. The male-centered nuclear family group was a dominant image. This primate science was funded by private institutions, most controlled by industrial capitalists, and directly or indirectly, it reflected and served their interests. Four figures are traced: Akeley, Yerkes, Carpenter and Altmann. The dates indicate the span of their research years.
Akeley: 1908-46. Akeley, a taxidermist, is included for his "scientific" work and one project -- killing and stuffing a silverback ,gorilla male -- for the American Museum of Natural History. His work confirmed then current images of nature as peaceful and hierarchically structured: man's relation to nature was one of paternalistic, benevolent domination still sanctioned by the "great chain of being"; culture was decadent but could be cured by embracing, nature's peace and purity -- by domination (for animals, killing); and "nature"'s groups realized the idealized male headed nuclear family. Natural science work that authorized this image suited industrial capitalists argues Haraway for they were at that moment facing class war problems. Owners of powerful companies were major funders of powerful companies were major funders of research. Other threads in Akeley's tale include "masculinizing" the stories of his killing gorillas and elephant mauling, and his paternalistic treatment of women and African nationals.
Yerkes-1924-42. A certified scientist (PhD, psychology), Yerkes founded an important laboratory and experimented extensively on nonhuman primates. His interests were cooperation and control, especially the control of nature by mind. His human engineering work was the culmination of his beliefs in laboratories, control, and experiments, and in human modifiability managed by rationality. Managing families and sex, important basic needs, was central. Chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates were of scientific interest in serving humanity, for they were prime materials "like" humans to be shaped rationally to specification. The connections with cultural forces were direct: science-based industries were interested in human engineering to redesign humans for better service, and it was understood that science should serve their needs. Yerkes was prominently involved with several agencies coordinating research in support of science-based corporate industry.
Carpenter and Altmann-1930-55. These were both critical in shifting emphasis to communication. Carpenter, a comparative - physiology psychologist, was interested in connecting nature with society rather than mind. Importantly, he vitalized field study, emphasized natural social groups, and integrated ideas from diverse fields to create new perspectives on social behaviour. He saw society as mediated by biological forces, especially sex and dominance (with dominance driven by sex). He worked to show this connection by using sociometry and by linking the physiology of dominance with semiotics, via natural systems of signs. World War II intervened and shifted attention from physiological organisms, hierarchy and homeostatic to cybernetic systems, communications engineering, natural selection and stress. These changes reached primatology via Stuart Altmann, a zoologist linked with Carpenter. He reconstrued animal communication as a form of control system and attempted to translate Carpenter's natural semiotic-sociometric analysis into the framework of cybernetic functionalism. (This '50s cybernetics was parent to the cognitive science of the '70s-'80s.) He also showed that sexual behaviour influenced social structures only indirectly, and that male dominance mediated mate selection.
After the war, especially from the '60s on, American primatology's interests expanded and diversified. "Pure" scientific research requiring little social accountability became publicly funded. Money was plentiful and the bases for "disinterested", "objective" science had been laid during and right after the war. Gender at the nonhuman-human boundary took on a key role in stories about human origins. Popularized versions of these stories also flowered. From the '50s to the early '70s, communication and social stability were the dominant theoretical issues; key images were Man the Hunter with the mother-infant pair, stability and communication in the family, monogamy, and pathological social behaviour. About 1975, the search for "universals" vanished in favor of a focus on shifting, strategic individual behaviour and cost benefit analyses "of everything", largely because of funding restructuring, new work in sociobiology, and results of long-term field studies. Discussed in detail in this section are National Geographic, Washburn, Harlow, and multi-cultural primatology.
National Geographic both popularizes and sponsors scientific nature research. Given its funding (Gulf Oil) and its avoidance of controversy, its nonhuman primates special issues are interesting for their images of nature and their claim to "scientific" authority, as if "written by the animals themselves". Such popularized accounts are useful for understanding human nature stories in a society which delegates their "telling" to science. These special issues focus on communication in a period when threats to humanity were perceived as failures of communication and the malfunction of stressed systems. In them, women instead of men approach nature; they succeed in communicating via receptivity versus control, touch versus vision. Misrepresentations, here, as Haraway shows, are particularly telling. Gender stereotyping was common. Goodall, for example, was portrayed as alone, whereas she was accompanied by numerous local workers. Young, she was referred to as a "girl", "Jane"; marriage and a PhD won her "Baroness"; only when older did she merit "Dr.".
Washburn, a physical anthropologist, was important from the early post-war period for his reconstructing of hominid evolution stories. His work used fossils in conjunction with functional anatomy (behaviour prior to form). According to Haraway, the post-war UNESCO-sponsored reworking of human nature as "universal man", in its '50s Declaration of Human Rights, was an image created by biologist and anthropologists. Facing the war's racist atrocities, UNESCO was committed to images of human nature which privileged cooperation, dignity, control of aggression and progress -- in other words, to the modern evolutionary synthesis. Washburn combined these components to craft his "Man the Hunter" story which related hip joint anomalies to bipedalism, which in turn led to a tool-using way of life where tools were hunting weapons for males. This neatly provided scientific grounding for "universal man". Washburn expanded a major programme for a "new physical anthropology" around Man the Hunter, incorporating research on living primates in the mid '50s. He did little direct primate work himself, but had a major impact through extensive graduate student supervision. The Man the Hunter narrative waned by the mid '70s, partly in the face of newer formulations of the sex-gender system.
Harlow's tale is short and not very sweet. He was another psychologist wedded to labs and experiments, especially deprivation ones, with monkeys as models for standardized people. Like all good psychologists of the time, his true calling was the study of rats, but the accident of the burning down of his rat lab led him to primates. The main image created by Harlow, is that of "mother love". In now classic experiments, Harlow orphaned rhesus infants in order to rear them with inanimate surrogate "mothers". He showed that contact comfort, not drive reduction of hunger, was critical to their healthy emotional development. Although his findings were initially seen as freeing women for the work force from the "natural" tyranny of mothering, at the same time they authorized males' appropriating women's roles. If women could replace men at work, men could replace women at mothering.
The section on multi-cultural primatology sketches work done outside Euro-America, underscoring the cultural specificities of American primatology. Japan developed a primatology independently of Euro-American influences, built around their own culture's notions of minimal animal-human boundaries, and of nature as a social object rather than simply being wild. Research included work on provisioning and individual recognition of large numbers of nonhuman primates. Techniques used were long-term and team-based studies and observer-observed "empathy" seen as serving, not destroying, objectivity. Other nations have continued to face colonial problems -- India, because of western use of its monkey exports for nuclear research; Rwanda-Uganda-Zaire, the mountain gorilla "triad", because of the uses of their own nature "parks", nature education and research; and the Malagasy Republic, because of problems with assuring reciprocal benefits from foreign research.
Women's roles in these discourses have been restricted, argues Haraway. The stories have been told more often through them than about them; rarely have they been authors, and when they have, they have been constrained to react rather than create. These constraints have been contested by the reworking of images of woman, notably through the UNESCO sponsored decade for women, 1975-85, and its culminating 1985 conference in Nairobi. This parallels in many ways the 50s reworking of "universal man". Haraway treats feminist workings of images in "female" in scientific primatology, interpreting them in the light of Nairobi considerations. Her focus is on a feminist, not merely female, science -- i.e., science that destabilizes and restructures the meanings and form of the sex/gender system. Primatology affects the meanings of many feminisms since it grounds stories about gender/sex. The gender concept developed around claims about "natural" sexual difference, and part of changing notions of gender involves changing those about biological sex. Influences are reciprocal. Feminist discourse is likewise important in destabilizing narratives in primatology. Haraway considers four feminist women who are scientific primatologists -- Altmann, Fedigan, Zihlman and Hrdy.
Jeanne Altmann is a primatologist (PhD 1979), though she began as a mathematician and developed major involvements with primates in collaboration with her husband (including nearly 20 years of field work). Her use of science focuses on methods and how things are named or categorized. Her first independent contribution to primatology was an influential 1974 critical paper on observational sampling methods. Her image of "dual-career mothering" baboons demonstrates her approach. She foregrounds females by destabilizing male centered accounts of baboon lives, criticizing male scientists' underlying sampling methods. She privileges complexity by showing females as not simple selves, but }jugglers of several roles, and she emphasizes the baboons' agency by including ordinary terms in otherwise scientific descriptions, thus insisting that readers acknowledge them as actors in their own lives.
Linda Fedigan is a physical anthropologist with a PhD (1974) granted for studies on the Arashiyama West Japanese macaques. Of particular interest and central to her work are structural-functional analyses and role theory, concern with observer-observed relations, rejection of sex differences, and criticism of scarcity competition sociobiological models of the world. Her texts are unusually "open" to interpretation in their emphasis on the critical role of observer positioning rather than observed distancing, more typical of physical anthropology. Her image of the world is one full of slack, where what exists may reflect loose constraints plus happenstance rather than right, adaptive fit. This drastically changes the meanings possible for gender, because they can no longer be grounded in adaptive advantage.
Adrienne Zihlman's PhD (1967) is in palaeoanthropology, (via Washburn). Her dissertation was on bipedalism within the frame of Man the Hunter. Her main work involves Woman the Gatherer. This image stemmed from Linton's arguments against Man the Hunter and in favor of hominization related to lengthening infant dependency tied with increased women's foraging. It suggest the existence of variable-length consort-like relationships over permanent pair bonds, and postulates the first tools as cultural inventions for women's foraging, not weapons for men's hunting. From this image, Zihlman argues for chimpanzee models of several key transitional figures. This generates a different proposal about the process of hominization, one involving gradual, mosaic-like, complex changes rather than abrupt, simple ones. The fate of Woman the Gatherer may suggest why women rarely create stories: dismissal or misreading came from certain men, while a more normal response, came from feminists or women colleagues. The difference suggests social processes rather than scientific rationality.
Sarah Blaffer Hrdy adopts sociobiology, reflecting her studies with DeVore, an ex-Washburn student, and her connections with Trivers and Wilson, insisting that it facilitates female-centered accounts of primate lives. Her work can be positioned within the '70s-'80s sexual politics of reproduction, when images of woman as natural mothers declined, while reproductive politics intensified, culminating in reproductive technologies. Who "owns" female orgasm has been critical because as a pleasurable end in itself, it can authorize images of agency over receptivity. Hrdy argued that the function of female orgasm is as neither byproduct of male adaptation nor essential to conception, but simply as sexual pleasure. In addition, females' capacity for multiple orgasm makes them effectively sexually insatiable; this may have made female life safer, because abundant sex and dubious but possible paternity keep males less aggressive. Hrdy's image offers agency to only some women, because the connotations of female sexual pleasure vary across cultures. It is also an image of male-female differences as inevitable and competitive. Differential egg and sperm size makes females the limiting resource, so female competition over food determines much else and males act in relation to females.
These feminist scientific images are not less socially conditioned than the previous ones. Altmann's "career" mothering suggests white, middle class concerns; Zihlman's model still seeks universals; and Hrdy's story of female diversity comes at the price of conflict and race/class bias. Each of these revisions leaves unsatisfied some of the Nairobi considerations for images of women internationally. Only Fedigan's model seems relatively free of flaws.
Nevertheless, these women's works show strong similarities. Each reflects an established network, yet contests and reworks its images and concepts. All problematize gender by contesting what counts as sex, and use similar moves in trying to de-and re-construct meanings for both. They reject simple and reductionist interpretations in favor of more complex ones, commonly by scientifically discrediting male centered narratives about sex and by showing that, in the face of increased complexity, previously authorized "patterns" disappear. With sex differences disintegrated, gender notions become more clearly founded in power. They insist on portraying their primate subjects as agents with active historical status, not as passive objects. All four open potentials for a wider range of gender possibilities, rather, than creating new solutions to existing problems. Their impact is primarily through women's channels and on newer primatologists. Finally, all four count themselves feminists but insist on working within the frame of science, to promote "good" science.
Ultimately, Haraway reconsiders nature-culture and gender stories as embedded in discourses about difference. The two primate projects sponsored through Stanford in 1962-63 and 1983-84 are used as examples, for they are parallel but represent different networks of primatologists, disciplines, and perspectives. The first, promoting universals and community, produced a sense of antagonistic differences, dominance and competition. The second, taking these as assumptions (via sociobiology), generated instead images of situational specificity, flexibility and cooperation. One important point railside 18 that what is assumed true reveals instead the truth of its supposed (marked) opposite. Another is that, in contexts of social exchange, differences assumed intrinsic to individuals reappear as differences being continuously socially restructured. As well, individual strategic reasoning translates into social intelligence, and so becomes an issue about essential differences bridged by communication.
The view of human nature stores as fundamentally about difference and sameness relocates gender and origin stories themselves. Gender becomes about "kind, syntax, relation, genre" rather than transformed biological sex. As for origin stories, although they reveal society's views on differences, their focus on the past preserves images of sameness in human nature, stability across time and space. However, difference as relating to reproduction and transformation is a key concept, and such differences are the means by which a new self is created. Its essence is not identity with, but difference from its origins. Real meanings of difference concern change, new possibilities, and the future. Real dilemmas about differences are there, not in the past.
Primate Visions clearly involves a deconstruction of scientific work about primates, and Haraway is better qualified for the job than most. Her interest and work on primates date from the late '70s. She has a rich scholarly background in biology, history of science, feminist theory, history of consciousness, and the critical study of colonial discourse.
Less clear is exactly what work was deconstructed, and to what end. The opacity stems partly from Haraway's writing style, which has been identified as characteristically deconstructionist. The text's language is thick with metaphor and specific terminology. The book is dense and contradictory in style, and disjointed in organization. As an outsider to this particular discourse, I frankly found the reading tough going and the sense often hard to follow. Given the variety in reviewers' readings (there are by now some 30 of them), I gather that my experience was not unique. These writing conventions seem to have done more to obscure Haraway's story than to communicate it. I consider this a major misfortune for the book.
The book has been read as both a deconstructionist history of modern American primatology and as advocating the view which reduces scientific knowledge to mere social invention. As far as I can tell it is neither, nor was it intended as such. Haraway's treatment of primatology is intentionally and explicitly more limited. Her interest in human nature stories touches only a portion of scientific primatology, albeit a pervasive and important one. She tells her tale through some dozen individuals, while emphasizing that scientific primatologist number near a thousand and are an essentially heterogenous lot. Finally, her deconstruction focuses primarily on socio historical factors "outside" science. Her view of "scientific" knowledge is, equally explicitly, not one of mere social invention. Though, her precise view is hard to pinpoint: "One story is not as good as another' (p.331), and, "... to stress a political condition of possibility is not to reduce science to another set of social practices" (p.335).
Haraway's target in this deconstruction is not primatology itself: Primates, yet again, constitute merely the ground for contesting other issues. Her targets are rather science, human nature and origins stories, and differences. For science, her aims are to reveal the limits and impossibility of its "objectivity" and to consider some recent revisions offered by feminist primatologists. For the scientific human nature stories, showing their political and cultural situation leads to viewing them as essentially about western concerns with differences. Her culminating remarks concern how dilemmas about difference might better be construed.
My sense of what the book is about came after struggling with what appear as three particularly puzzling problems -- the approach of dissecting a small, odd set of individuals, the focus on "outsider" at the expense of "insider" forces, and leaving readers with little sense of possible solutions to the problems raised.
1. What meanings can be drawn from deconstructing these individual primatologists is unclear, especially since Haraway provides no direct explanation for her selection and the pattern is obscure. For example, Akeley is barely even a scientist, let alone a primatologist. Certainly, the individuals chosen were important players in crafting "scientific" stories about human nature and origins; but, so were a lot of others. One possibility -- itself a criticism that imperils the sense of the text's larger meaning -- is that the choices reflect Haraway's own network contacts (e.g. Rodman, 1990).
2. Haraway favors "outside" over "inside" analyses to highlight socio-historical specificities of scientific change. This cut intentionally relegates to the background discussions of both scientific objectivity, and at the same time science's internal politics. Although Haraway does trace some of this, mostly in anthropology, her treatment is not systematic. For example, Yerkes' and Harlow's devotion to labs, experiments, and control reflect, in blatant "physios envy" form, mainline psychology at the time. So do deprivation experiments, Carpenter's comparative-physiological combination, and Harlow's work on curiosity (which, incidentally, contributed to destabilizing images of organism passivity in favor of agency). Not explored is the question of why control over these stories rested with different disciplines at different periods.
This backgrounding also minimizes the role of notions of scientific "objectivity" itself in crafting stories, so that it appears close to negligible. The manoeuvre, a reactive one, makes for two problems. First, playing down science this extensively has probably facilitated dismissal by unsympathetic readers, who relegate her and her book to the view that scientific knowledge is nothing but social invention (e.g. Carmill, 1990). Second, in using this manoeuvre, she offers readers no sense of how she does see the balance between insider and outsider forces.
3. Haraway's treatment leads to the critical problem of science's ideology of objectivity, but she offers readers little sense of directions for solution. She does present several feminist attempts to reform science, but dismisses most as either bypassing the problem or generating solutions which still fall in some way. Although I do not want the problem to appear neatly closed, I would have appreciated reading Haraway's views, as someone who has studied the issue in considerable depth.
My own efforts to resolve these problems in fact constitute my understanding of the puzzle of her book and its story.
Her choice of particular individuals for discussion makes sense when centred on women because it reflects a mode of analysis, contrasting "paired opposites" or counterparts, and because it supports Haraway's own views on science. Haraway chose women primatologists who each acknowledge and practice a modern form of feminism yet remain devoted to science and its reform. Many of the earlier figures chosen make sense as a sort of counterpart of these women. For example, Harlow acts as a foil for-Hrdy's reproductive politics, and Goodall accounts for National Geographic and perhaps Akeley. Other similar pairings can be found, e.g., UNESCO's support in the '50s versus '80s, or the primate projects in the '60s versus '80s. This method, based on difference, appears to constitute one of her central means of both creating and deriving meanings. These women conjoined with their scientific primatology of origin thus established a contrast for reflecting the qualities of each. At the same time, these women set the stage for arguments to salvage rather than reject science. In my reading, they are the anchor for the book's story.
In fact, Haraway herself, through this book, instantiates each of the features she claims for her women primatologists. In contesting meanings, she, like them, destabilizes earlier male work by foregrounding females. As she advocates, she uses difference to open ways for new meaning.
Haraway does have a clear view on scientific objectivity (Haraway, 1988). I believe from my own analysis that it was absent on purpose, placed in the scheme of widening possibilities rather than creating solutions. Haraway favours reworking scientific objectivity into a form acceptable to feminists rather than rejecting it outright. Her proposal to solve the problems of science and objectivity that she has laid out is a "successor science" characterized by "partial perspectives". A preferable successor might be one insisting on situated knowledge, that is, one identifying the observer's perspective. Her proposal for "partial perspectives" is a recognition that, while there can be no complete separation of observer from observed, at the same time there can be no complete identity. This successor science also incorporates recognition that targets are themselves active participants living in time, recognition of a commitment to faithful accounts of a "real" world that does involve input from targets of study, and incorporation of this revised view in the institutions of science. In insisting on target agency, she favours images of "conversation" but not of "discovery". Her reference to a "real" world does not represent a return to realism, where the world is resource, but involves some version of the world as active subject.
Although I think the book was not about primatology itself, turning the deconstructive eye on primatology has importance in identifying its special status and problems as a science. The nonhuman primates, as entitles, are perhaps among the most vehemently non-static and interactive. This, and the ready incorporation of primates into stories about humans, make primatology particularly susceptible to the sort of "wish fulfilment" that concerns Haraway. These considerations emphasize the particular care necessary in scientific story-telling about primates. They also serve as reminders of the same problems which exist, perhaps in less blatant form, in other sciences.
At some levels both arms of her agenda about science -- tracing the pervasive roles of race sexclass, and then showing faults in science's "objectivity" stance are rather shop-worn. For the latter, concern about scientific epistemology is not a new invention of deconstructionists. In psychology, for example, similar issues have been debated for decades and whole academic societies are devoted to studying psychology in its historical context (see Shames, 1990; Stam, 1990). Many scientists already realize that their methods cannot offer the objectivity Haraway defines, but do offer some means of widening our views a little, beyond our current selves.
At other levels, the book offers intriguing views of how these socio-cultural forces operate. Most interesting to me were pictures of how feminist women primatologists operate within these constraints and how they promote change. For solutions to objectivity, I personally favor Haraway's reform over rejecting science, and I grant her resolution authority because of her work "inside" science. Haraway's proposal for"partial perspectives" is, however, neither unique nor altogether radical. It proposes features already institutionalized in some areas of science: e.g., observer specificity in cultural anthropology, and observed agency plus observer observed interaction in psychology. Any coup lies in convincing the more extreme elements in both groups, scientists and deconstructionists.
A final issue appears with the pairing of this book and its reviews. Primate Visions has received normal reviews as well as dismissals and misreadings, suggesting once again social over rational processes. In the larger view, this exchange represents one battle in the deconstructionist attempts to destabilize science and other traditional scholarship in the arena of scholarly wars over the power to control meaning. To destabilize effectively, deconstruction must itself establish the authority of its moves. Its authority vis-a-vis science is therefore worth examining.
Deconstruction developed within disciplines such as philosophy, literary criticism, textual analysis and feminism, in discourses about human affairs. Their targets of study, humans, have special features -- animacy and culture (supposedly, uniquely). As cultural beings, stories believed have effects on what we are, remain and become. These discourses are also reflexive: author, subject, and target are identical. Moreover, they have tended to background what is not human as an undifferentiated resource with no real identity or voice. In contrast, many sciences take targets which are non-human, sometimes not even animate, and move the nonhuman to foreground; discourses do not necessarily directly concern human affairs. Sciences are also dedicated to drawing the "real" world and to methodically validating the images they create. As such, their discourses are different, though more in degree than in kind, from those where deconstruction developed.
This raises the question of how deconstructionist ideologies and methods apply to science. Methods, like facts, carry facets of their driving theories and ideologies. In other circumstances, blanket application of methods across disciplines has been seriously criticized. Psychology has reaped major problems from its appropriation of "objective" laboratory experimental methods from the physical sciences, ignoring how different targets and issues require modifications. Haraway's deconstruction of primatology may work well because primatology's targets of study are animate and (grudgingly) "proto"-cultural, and because she focused carefully on discourses that do concern human affairs. Interestingly, her concluding view is a tempered one: that social factors constrain rather than determine scientific stories. Other disciplines where deconstruction seems to have "taken" include the humanities, psychology (notably social), sociology, anthropology, and even archaeology: there tempered positions like Haraway's seem favored. In the Physical sciences, its impact seems to be much less (Searle, 1990). Dissecting this variation in exchanges across the sciences could spotlight the culprit -- process, pig-headedness, or power politics. So as not to spoil Haraway's pattern, I offer the problem but leave the solution open.
Cartmill M. (1991). "Book review: Primate Visions" International Journal of Primatology 12(1), 75.
Haraway D.J. (1988). "Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial knowledge." Feminists Studies, 14(3) 575-599.
Rodman P.S. (1990). "Flawed vision: Deconstruction of primatology and primatologists." Current Anthropology 31(4) 484-486.
Searle J. (1990). "The storm over the university." New York Review of Books, Dec. 8. 34-42.
Shames M.L. (1990). "On data methods and theory: An epistemological evaluation of psychology." Canadian Psychology 31(3) 229-238.
Stam H.J. (1990). "The epistemology question in psychology." Canadian Psychology 31(3) 218-219.
Anne Russon is a primatologist currently an Associate Professor of Psychology at Glendon College of York University (Canada) and previously involved with computers and mathematics. Most recently she has been collaborating with B. Galikas on observational studies of imitation and tool use in ex-captive orangutans under rehabilitation in Kalimantan Indonesia. She has conducted observational studies of social development in nursery-reared infant chimpanzees and their counterparts infant humans. Publications include "Patterns of dominance and imitation in an infant- peer group" in Ethology and Sociobiology (1991) 13 55-73; "Direct care giver intervention in infant peer social encounters" in American Journal of Orthopsychiatry (1990), 60 (3) 428-439; and "The development of peer social interaction in infant chimpanzees: Comparative social Piagetian and brain perspectives in Language and intelligence in monkeys and apes"; "Comparative developmental perspectives," S.T. Parker and K R. Gibson (eds.) New York: Cambridge University Press 1990.