The War of "Who Is Who": Autochthony, Nationalism, and Citizenship in the Ivoirian Crisis

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Published by African Studies Association
DOI: 10.1353/arw.2006.0098

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Abstract: Over the past four years the Ivoirian crisis has seen as its central dynamic the mobilization of the categories of autochthony and territorialized belonging in an ultranationalist discourse vehicled by the party in power. More than just a struggle to the death for state power, the conflict involves the redefinition of the content of citizenship and the conditions of sovereignty. The explosion of violence and counterviolence provoked and legitimated by the mobilization of these categories does not necessarily signify either the triumph of those monolithic identities “engineered” during the colonial occupation, nor the disintegration of the nation-state in the context of globalization. The Ivoirian case shows the continued vitality of the nation-state: not only as the principal space in terms of which discourses of autochthony are constructed, but also in terms of the techniques and categories that the political practice of autochthony puts into play. While in some senses the Ivoirian conflict appears to be a war without borders—in particular with the “spillover” of the Liberian war in the west during 2003—it is above all a war about borders, crystallizing in liminal spaces and social categories and on emerging practices and ways of life.

Résumé: Depuis quatre ans, la crise ivoirienne a vu s’installer comme dynamique centrale la mobilisation de valeurs autochtones et territoriales venant d’un discours ultranationaliste véhiculé par le parti au pouvoir. Plus qu’une lutte visant à la mort du pouvoir d’état, le conflit implique une redéfinition de la notion de citoyenneté et des conditions de souveraineté. Les explosions de violence et représailles provo- quées et légitimées par la mobilisation de ces valeurs ne signifieront ni la victoire de ces identités monolithiques fabriquées durant la colonisation, ni celle de la dés-intégration de l’état nation dans un contexte de globalisation. Le cas ivoirien démontre la vitalité maintenue de l’état nation, non seulement comme espace discursif principal dans lequel les discours d’autochtonie sont construits, mais aussi en
termes de techniques et catégories que la pratique politique de l’autochtonie met en jeu. Alors que le conflit ivoirien apparaît sous certains aspects comme une guerre sans frontières—en particulier avec le débordement du conflit au Libéria dans l’ouest durant l’année 2003—il est avant tout une guerre à propos de frontières qui se cristallise sur des espaces et des catégories sociales frontaliers, sur des pratiques et des modes de vie émergeants.

Introduction

People of the Greater West,

The current political situation of our country is linked to its recent history lived by the sons and daughters of our tribes. For forty years, misfortune, injustice, inequality and crimes have been inflicted on our tribes.

For forty years the Akans and the despot Houphouët-Boigny, the greatest thief of all time, have fought our tribes without respite. Odious crimes have been ordered and executed. One of our illustrious sons, Kragbê Gnagbé, aka Opadjélé was decapitated, and with him perished nearly 4,000 of our people. A genocide such as this cannot remain unpunished.

Our lands, our most precious possession, were torn from us by force by the Akans, led by Houphouët-Boigny with the treacherous collusion of the Dioula and a handful of our own people.

The people of the Greater West must thus unite around one of their own, Laurent Gbagbo, the reincarnation of Opadjélé. It is through him we shall be saved.

The 24 December 1999, God, in giving the power to one of our sons, wanted to show us the way. Daughters and sons of the Greater West, link hands together, the hour has come for us to be heard. The hour has come to kill the Akans and chase them from our lands. The hour has come to recuperate our land. The hour has come to clean our villages and towns of the Dioulas (Mossi) and the Akans, who are objective allies.

Yes, the hour of grand vengeance has struck. We too want our cities to become capitals like Abidjan, Yamoussoukro and Daoukro.

People of the Greater West, unite, so that power will never leave us again. We must use our guns, our machetes. Get ready. Let us kill for the survival of our tribes, to prevent the confiscation of power.

Union of the Greater West.
This extremely virulent tract was found circulating in Abidjan in April 2004 and then again in the summer of 2005. Echoing the discourses of the so-called Young Patriots, fervent supporters of President Laurent Gbagbo, the tract not only expresses violence toward political enemies determined along ethnic lines, but also makes direct reference to one of the central issues in the Ivorian crisis, that of land tenure and relations between autochthonous and “allogenous” populations. The Côte d’Ivoire, once famous throughout the continent for its peace and political stability, now finds itself teetering on the brink of explosion. Since the failed coup attempt of September 19, 2002, and the division of the country into a rebel-held north and loyalist south, thousands of strangers have been chased from their lands, many killed in the process. While this call to “ethnic cleansing” of villages and towns throughout the central and southwest regions reflects the views of an extremist minority, during three years of war the Front Populaire Ivoirien’s (FPI) map of territorialized identity has become a partial reality, paradoxically reinforcing the very ideology the rebellion claims to be fighting against.

The Gbagbo regime has, as it were, undertaken to “turn back the clock” of Ivorian history (Chauveau 2000), marked during Houphouët’s forty-year reign by determined state policy favoring migration and migrants’ rights and promoting an ideology of an Ivorian “melting pot.” The FPI has revived a long tradition of political opposition based on autochthons’ rights and nativist identity that first emerged during the colonial period and whose construction has been determined by colonial and postcolonial state policies. In this sense, the Gbagbo regime’s accusation that the rebellion is a “foreign terrorist attack” is heavy with meaning. Who is a “foreigner” and who is an Ivorian in the country today? This distinction is at the heart of the conflict, and this debate, perpetually postponed since independence, and exacerbated both by economic crisis and the process of democratization, has become increasingly radicalized over the years of the conflict. Interviewed shortly after the September 19th attacks, the radical Mamadou Koulibaly claimed that he thought the war would be salutary for the nation: “At last we’ll be able to know who is who” (Hoffnung 2002).

In what will necessarily be a cursory attempt to trace the long and complex trajectory of the outbreak of this war of “who is who,” I argue that what is at stake in the current Ivorian crisis is not only a struggle for state power, but also, and more importantly, the redefinition of the content of citizenship and the conditions of sovereignty. This conflict concerns de facto the population from countries that have furnished the majority of immigrants (in particular the northern neighbors of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea), not to mention the Côte d’Ivoire-born children of non-nationals or the huge mass of Ivorians of mixed heritage. Not surprisingly, the conjunction between nativism and nationalism also involves the revitalization of an anti-imperialist discourse directed against the French presence, both civilian
and military, and the demand for a “second independence,” which likewise expresses itself in terms of autochthony. While in some senses the Ivoirian conflict appears to be a war without borders—in particular because of the “spillover” of the Liberian war in the west—it is, nevertheless, above all a war about borders, crystallizing in liminal spaces and social categories and practices. Despite the ongoing ravages of “Ivoirité,” Ivoirian “representations of self,” as Mbembe says, “are edified at the interface of autochthony and cosmopolitanism…. The disjunction and interlinking of a multiplicity of principles and norms is now the rule. It is in the interstices that the central historical action now unfolds. And the occupation of the interstices does not happen without violence…” (2001:16,43).

The current revitalization of discourses of autochthony, as Bayart, Geschiere, and Nyamnjoh have argued, is no doubt intimately linked to current processes of democratization and liberalization (Bayart & Geschiere 2000; Bayart, Geschiere, & Nyamnjoh 2001). Some claim that the rise of autochthony as a political category is directly related to the wide vistas opened up by processes of globalization: that a “need for closure” is the flip side of intensified global flux and openness (Geschiere & Meyer 1999). Others see it as a result of the weakening or breakdown of the nation-state in this context. One of the questions that this article will address is the centrality of the colonial and postcolonial state to the process of the construction of autochthony as a political category. Following Geschiere et al., it appears in the Ivoirian case that the explosion of violence and counterviolence provoked and legitimated by the mobilization of autochthony does not necessarily signify either the triumph of those monolithic identities “engineered” during the colonial occupation, nor the disintegration of the nation-state in the context of globalization. Contrary to contexts in which the mobilization of autochthony can be analyzed as supranational, subnational, or “postnational,” “by-passing” the state or testifying to its “weakness” in a context of globalization, the Ivoirian case appears to show the continued vitality of the nation-state, not only as the principal space in terms of which discourses of autochthony are constructed and make sense (fait sense), but also in terms of the techniques and categories that the political practice of autochthony puts into play. The mobilization of discourses of autochthony and nationalism can be seen as a strategy for the redefinition, closure, and control of liminal or mobile spaces and categories. Yet while the relations of power that underwrite autochthony find their roots in the long history of state formation and epistemological structures and techniques of government accompanying colonialism, and while the current context gives autochthony new force and performative power, there is no reason to presume that it is a “winning” strategy (stratégie gagnante) (Foucault 1994:241–42). Geschiere et al. are no doubt right to underline the performative power of discourses of autochthony in Africa, as the Rwandan genocide reminds us. Nevertheless, its phantasmagorical projections and totalitarian ambitions are subjected
to the messy and uncertain logics of struggle and experiences of the self. The project of government expressed in the FPI’s discourse can only be strategic and programmatic—and as such, “it never works” (Foucault 2004:405). This means that we cannot prejudge the outcome, nor reject the idea that “in the long run,” and despite the violence, this confrontation will found “a new imagined community, rather than being a simple mechanism of disintegration” (Bayart, Geschiere, & Nyamnjoh 2001:194).

The Colonial State and the “Search for Autochthons”

The first question that we need to ask when thinking about the revitalization of autochthony is why, in Africa at any rate, does political confrontation so often wear “primordialist” clothing? While this question is by no means new, I think we need to go further than recent discussions concerning the construction of ethnicity and identity by the colonial state. Historians and anthropologists have rightly drawn attention to the ways in which colonial powers constructed a hierarchy of ethnic categories among local populations: how through a variety of techniques (including colonial ethnography), colonial power inscribed, via overwhelming processes of subjectification, primordialist assignations that were in turn appropriated and made performative. While the colonial encounter thus gave rise to a “conversion process,” as Talal Asad calls it (in the sense of induction into modern life) and while, as is always the case in historical change, such a process built on the past, we should not underestimate the nature of the epistemological rupture such a process entailed for the colonized. This “profound displacement” cannot be grasped by tracing the origins of an amalgam (Asad 1996:264). The political contestation of “consciousness” only becomes possible when forms of self-representation are publicly represented as the sign of an authentic identity. Something new emerges, which can be determined by asking “what new possibilities for constituting themselves [did] these subjects now encounter…? Given that there was now a possibility of recognizing themselves as authentic, what part did this new fact play in their constitution?… The changed epistemic structure brought about by the conversion to modernity articulates a new range of possibilities not adequately captured by the simple alternatives of passive reception by subjects or active resistance by agents, of unoriginal reproduction or synthetic originality” (Asad 1996:265).

If colonial power subjectifies natives in terms of primordialist categories whose fundamental logic is one of biological race, we must ask ourselves under what precise circumstances these categories are in turn appropriated and set to work under the imaginary of autochthony, as the sign of an authentic identity. Of course, other forms of categorization and subjectification are operative, but I think it is fair to say that the most powerful, the most overwhelming, are indeed all those assignations that have a
biological form of racism at their heart and operate not only according to the old binary black/white distinction (upon which will be based the principle of indigeneity, autochthony, and the possibility of conceiving of an African specificity, of its radical difference) but that also will form the bases of internal ethnic categorizations and normative classifications, upon which diverse cultural, political, and social attributions will be attached as emanations of a fundamental, genetic, and authentic form. The most striking example of this is of course Rwanda and Burundi, as Jean-Pierre Chrétien (1997) has argued, but one can also recall Lord Lugard’s penchant for the Hausa-Fulani, and his claims that they emerged from a superior racial source. In colonial Côte d’Ivoire, the same sorts of categorizations were operative, with the French policy of creating administrative units based on “pure autochthonous races” for which they spent a considerable amount of time searching. This question merits a much lengthier discussion than these few words here, but to state my view in brief, I do not think it is satisfying to claim that colonial racism is simply “one of power’s lies,” nor a simple and old form of contempt or hatred among races, nor, in Foucault’s terms “a sort of ideological operation by which states, or a class, attempt to displace towards a mythical adversary hostilities which would otherwise be turned on them or which are at work in the social body.” I agree with Foucault when he argues that “it is much more profound than an old tradition, much more profound than a new ideology, it is something else. The specificity of modern racism, that which constitutes its specificity, is not related to mentalities, to ideologies, to power’s lies. It is related to the technique of power, to the technology of power” that is at the heart of the modern state (1997:230).

What is striking are the ways in which these categorizations and distinctions are appropriated and made operative not only in colonial, but also in postcolonial, politics. In the case of the Côte d’Ivoire, numerous studies have examined at length the central role played by the colonial state—and in particular the plantation economy it developed—in structuring civil society and crystallizing forms of political identification (Raulin 1957; Chauveau 1997, 2000, 2002a, 2002b; Chauveau & Dozon 1985, 1987; Chauveau & Bobo 2002; Losch 2000; Dozon 1985a, 1985b, 1997, 2000; Bobo 2002; Zongo 2001; Dembélé 2002). As Dozon and Chauveau (1987) persuasively argue, the plantation economy provided the context in which the colonial state was to “produce” ethnic identity, giving rise to a territorialized and ethnicized definition of citizenship and national identity. It was precisely through the processes of the “ethnographer state” that the opportunities for social mobility and for assimilation—or on the contrary, the possibility of exclusion, violent coercion, or death—were determined. As Karel Arnaut (2004:chap. 3) notes, as early as 1901, Maurice Delafosse explained how the Mandé, settling in northern Côte d’Ivoire and eventually covering large territories, nowhere constituted “the autochthonous element.” Delafosse and other colonial agents following him noted the socio-
economic and “mental” mobility of the Dioula, their political “superiority,” “energetic character,” and aptitude for becoming agents of French trade and civilization. By contrast, the autochthonous peoples of the southern forest belt were considered savage, backward, and ill-suited for productive economic activity.

As Geschière and Nyamnjoh argue, both the freeing up of labor and its categorization and compartmentalization have been essential processes of capitalist development everywhere, and a vital part of the colonial power’s project of pacification and economic exploitation. As they put it, “the see-saw of mobility and fixing has been crucial in setting the stage for the emergence of autochthonous movements and communal violence in recent times” (2000:444). In the Côte d’Ivoire, colonial policy involved a complex process of both mobilizing and fixing labor and populations. Plantations were developed first in the east among the Agni in the 1920s and ’30s, then during the 1940s and ’50s in the underpopulated central and southwest regions, where land was extremely well suited to growing cocoa and coffee. Alongside the French plantations, local smallholders threw themselves into the new economy with great energy, and migrants from the center (Baoulé) and especially the north (Malinké, Dioula, Senoufo), brought into towns to provide labor and services, sought to acquire land themselves. The French also organized the transport of Voltaïques (Burkina Faso) to provide manual labor. In the 1930s a debate about land tenure and national representation had already begun. An indigenous association with Agnis at its head was created—the Association of Defence of Autochthons Interests of Côte d’Ivoire (ADIACI)—and protested to the colonial government about the excessive use of Senegalese and Dahomeans in the administration, asking for their replacement by “evolved indigenes.” They also complained that the Baoulé and Dioula were not content with commercial activities or manual labor, but wanted land, and they called for respect of customary law on the nonalienability of land, even though they had themselves ceded considerable amounts.

The model throughout the southwest was the institution of the tutorat, in which autochthonous stakeholders ceded land to clients in exchange for various social, cultural, and economic payments and services, such as presents, assistance at weddings and funerals, labor, and money. According to Chauveau (2006:219), “In the western part of the forest belt of Côte d’Ivoire, however, the extent of the rights conceded by tuteurs and the corresponding obligations of ‘their’ strangers have varied. In many cases, such transfer rights verge[d] on, or [hid], largely commercial transfers of land—except for the important difference that the commercial aspect [did] not erase the social relation stemming from the ‘gratefulness’ that the migrant (or his heirs) owe[d] to his tuteur (or to the latter’s heirs).” As Dozon (1985a:289) argues, the cession of land by autochthons does not imply prior property rights; rather, from the optic of customary communal land tenure (whose modern terms and representations are set out through
the ethnographer state), it is through the process of cession that the autochthon acquires the status of landowner—thus it is not “I am a property owner, therefore I sell,” but “I sell, therefore I am a property owner.”

Colonial policy thus distinctly favored migrant and mobile populations, even if the explosion of local production far surpassed what the colonial state had intended or even desired. By the late forties, indigenous planting largely outstripped that of Europeans, which survived only through subsidies from the colonial state. The struggle for indigenous planters’ rights and the abolition of forced labor gave birth to the Syndicat Africain Agricole (SAA), which represented principally those interests of wealthy indigenous planters of Baoulé and Agni origin. Under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny, it prepared the ground for the creation of the political party that was to rule Côte d’Ivoire for over forty years, the PDCI-RDA (Parti Democratique de la Cote d’Ivoire-Rassemblement Democratique Africain). In both the SAA and subsequently the PDCI, autochthonous western planters and administrative heads were unrepresented, the majority of the adherents being Baoulé and “Dioula.” From the thirties on in the west, associations were formed, such as the Mutuelle Bété, followed in 1944 by the Union des Originaires des Six Cercles de l’Ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire (UOCOCI), as well as other associations whose social composition reflected regional and ethnic affiliations—Agni, Ebrié, Mossi (Voltaiques). The activities of these associations, which were based in urban centers (particularly Abidjan), perpetuated the links between rural and urban populations and kept alive a territorialized identity among those living in the highly mixed neighborhoods of the city. Over time, the large, mobile northern group—straddling the territories of what would become Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire, and made up of distinct ethnolinguistic groups that nevertheless shared a vehicular language and often religion—came to be known by the generic term “Dioula,” whose signification and valorization would vary over the colonial and postcolonial periods. Esteemed by the French for their mobility, their “civilizational advance,” and their industry, the Dioula in the postcolonial period would increasingly be associated not only with piety and industry (albeit circumscribed to the realm of manual labor), but also backwardness (lack of education, high levels of reproduction, archaic hygiene and health practices) and criminality, especially in urban centers.

Thus it is through these combined processes and activities of colonial ethnography, colonial government, and economic policy that a politicized territorial identity began to take shape. As Dozon (1985a, 1985b) points out, it is through the ongoing presence of strangers and their demands for land that the autochthon not only comes to consciousness of himself as such and reclaims rights (notably, land) conferred by this identity, but also becomes aware of his relatively disadvantaged position, both in his own “home” and also in emerging national politics. Already visible in the 1930s through the creation of the ADIACI, this early crystallization of “civil soci-
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The Postcolonial State: The “Geo-politics” of Immigration and Autochthony

Mbare argues that the moment of independence does not imply a rejection of colonial power’s principal modes of representation or functioning: “When, under the colonial period, the autochthonous discourse on the emancipation of indigenous peoples and their right to self-determination emerges, the relation between leaving barbary and entering civilization does not become the object of a fundamental critique. In the justification of the right of sovereignty and self-determination, and in the struggle for power, two central categories will be mobilised: on the one hand, the figure of the African as a victimised subject, and on the other, the affirmation of his cultural singularity” (2001:24). Pan-Africanism, says Mbembe, is a “discourse of inversion, in which its fundamental categories will be drawn from the myths it purports to oppose and the dichotomies which it will reproduce” (2001:30). Even if the process of rehabilitation involves refusing the distinction in terms of which Africans are determined as inferior on the scale of humanity, this process does not question the fiction of race or the original, cultural difference “based on the principle of repetition (custom) and the values of autochthony” (2001:27).
If we examine those representations produced in the Côte d’Ivoire during the nationalist struggle, we find the same uncritical appropriation of these racial constructions, glorifying cultural difference and the principle of territorial autochthony as the basis not only of self-determination, but also of national belonging, citizenship, and authentic identity. The terms of opposition to the colonial state were perpetuated following independence, not least because of Houphouët’s “French turn” in the 1950s, in which he turned his back on his left-wing nationalist allies and renewed the “colonial compromise” between the French and the migrants. According to the terms of this compromise his group, the Baoulé, had pride of place, but it also involved a political pact between the Baoulé and northern migrants and immigrants. His critics, who invariably mobilized cultural nationalist and nativist arguments against this compromise, developed an extensive literature of cultural nationalism, bemoaning the alienation of Ivoirians under the leadership of the white man’s puppet (Amondji 1988). The renewal of this compromise also left many Ivoirians with the impression of an incomplete or phantom form of self-determination, one in which the principle of autochthony was denied its full expression and which required the advent of a “second independence.”

In his discussion of the construction of the category of “foreigner” in postcolonial Côte d’Ivoire, Ousmane Dembélé (2002) shows how claims to exclusive local and regional forms of citizenship were integral to the construction of the concept of citizenship in general. The advent of the independent state introduced a new notion of foreigner, against which that of citizen, as articulated in positive law, would be expressed from now on (as opposed, theoretically, to previous definitions of citizenship based on notions of autochthony). However, the relationship between foreigner and citizen continued to be thought of in terms of territorialized ethnic spaces, and an absolutist conception of the foreigner, or stranger, as anyone from outside these territorialized communities was perpetuated. According to Dembélé, “In order to affirm his status as Ivoirian citizen of a local territory (terroir), the autochthon ends up reducing to himself and his group the attributes of the national citizen. This reduction allows him to return to an absolutist conception of foreigner, who is neither a member of his ethnic group nor a national” (2002:161). This conception of citizenship complements the one set out by Mbembe, who argues that it is in the combination of the ideological categories of origins and belonging and the spatial categories of territory and locality that citizenship emerges: defined as “essentially, the possibility of benefiting [from] a home (chez soi); the possibility of excluding strangers from it; the right to protection of and access to a range of collective goods and resources situated in the designated space. In this context, the expression of grievances and complaints, the claiming of rights and the legitimation of struggles over resources are made through the idiom of filiation, genealogy or heritage” (Mbembe 2000:38).

Ivoirians represent immigration as the sign of Côte d’Ivoire’s excep-
tional status in the region, and yet the society’s acceptance of massive numbers of immigrants into its territories gives rise to highly ambivalent discourses. On the one hand, immigration is valorized as both the reason for the country’s remarkable economic success and the sign of its moral superiority—promoting the values of pan-Africanism, fraternity, and generosity, as the national anthem declares. This argument has continued to be mobilized during the current conflict: “What? Ivoirians xenophobic?” they ask. “Who else has opened their arms so wide and with such generosity?” On the other hand, the theme of immigrants’ “rapacity” and “ungratefulness” has increasingly been evoked from the 1990s on. Côte d’Ivoire is indeed absolutely singular in West Africa with respect to levels of immigration and internal migration, with 26 percent of the population currently composed of non-nationals. However, this official figure hides important territorial disparities concerning not only the geographical distribution of these foreigners, but also the demography of internal migration, which is no doubt as decisive in terms of the construction of national identity. Northern populations, such as the Malinké, Senoufo, and Dioula, have migrated massively south, becoming in some cases the dominant population in southern towns, particularly in the southwest, whereas migrants represent only 10 percent of the populations in the north (Dembelé 2002:128). The question of the status of immigrants and migrants has never been resolved, making their self-identification as autochthons by virtue of longstanding residence practically impossible, and implying a refusal on the part of others to recognize the central role they have played in national development. How long before a stranger is no longer a stranger? The position of second- and third-generation immigrants in today’s war is clearly tragic; not only do they consider themselves among the principal architects of Côte d’Ivoire’s economic success and the development of its southern towns and cities, but they have no other “home” outside of the country.

Houphouët and the PDCI have never directly addressed the question of citizenship, and the debate concerning national belonging has increasingly divided the national political space. The failure to accord citizenship rights to immigrant populations, even if they have benefited from some important de facto rights such as the vote, implies in and of itself a consecration of the definition of citizenship in terms of territorialized ethnicity as opposed to positive law. Indeed, until 1972, citizenship could automatically be conferred on any person born in the Côte d’Ivoire regardless of the parents’ nationality. However, in practice, very few naturalizations were granted. The question of citizenship turned first on the status of Burkinabé and Malian immigrants, more than a quarter million of whom arrived in Côte d’Ivoire before independence, some as early as the 1920s. Clearly they fell into a legal void, since neither the states of Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, nor Burkina Faso, upon whose creation legal citizenship depended, yet existed. Second, the southward migration of northern populations of Ivorian, Burkinabé, and Malian origin into regions where they had no cultural or
religious affinity with their hosts created the grounds of an amalgam on ethnicist lines. Despite the fact that northern Ivorians made greater efforts than the Baoulé to “integrate” into their host communities, they were identified along with other non-national northerners in terms of their perceived cultural and religious affinities. Indeed, for many Ivorians, these cultural differences were merely the external signs of what were considered to be, more profoundly, racial differences, in which biological signs (height, facial morphology, skin tone) are the operative modes of identification. Indeed, when describing themselves and other ethnic groups, the term “race” is still popularly used by many Ivorians today.

One of Houphouët’s central state policies—which would fundamentally determine the ways in which ethnicity and autochthony would be politicized under forms of cultural nationalism and would give rise to an opposition focused on autochthons’ rights—was his decree of 1963 stating that “land belongs to those who make it productive.” Until the passing of the 1998 rural land law, unclaimed rural land officially belonged to the state, while customary law considered it the unalienable property of autochthonous communities. Unable to pass a land bill in 1962 that would have consolidated migrants’ position on ceded land, the state tolerated the coexistence of distinct land regimes but used a combination of intimidation and incentive to persuade local populations to allow increasing numbers of migrants to break new land. The state used the existing institution of the tutorat to provide a “cultural” argument for the installation of migrants, putting the accent on the “cultural obligation” to give land to strangers as a sign of “African fraternity.” At the same time, as Chauveau (2006) points out, “up until the 1990s, village chiefs (who at the village level were recognized as state representatives), sous-préfets, district head men, PDCI members of parliament, and PDCI section and village secretaries were the ones in charge of passing on the instructions to receive and accommodate migrants in search of land…. [And] up to the 1980s, the dependence of urban elites and their associations on the clientelistic political system did not allow those most opposed to official policy to debate these questions openly for fear of incurring repression.” As Alain Marie (2002) argues, the very structure of the patrimonial state and its clientelist networks contributes to a sort of “sur-communitarisation,” which in the Ivorian context reinforced identity in terms both of ethnicity and autochthony as the principal grounds upon which access to the state and to resources could be obtained and legitimated.

While enabling a relative degree of rural integration and stability, the institution of the tutorat was nevertheless poor compensation for what was considered illegitimate state policy. Recurrent land conflicts between Baoulé and autochthons marked the first thirty years of independence in the southwest. Less willing than the northerners to participate in the social and ritual obligations of the tutorat, more arrogant in the knowledge that state political power rested on what was essentially a Baoulé monarchy at its
heart, the Baoulé and their political party were the principal local producers of autochthonous ethnicity in the postcolonial period. The most striking example of violent dissension on the grounds of autochthony—which in many ways presaged things to come—was the Guébié uprising in Bété country in 1970 (Dozon 1985a:344–48). In 1967 Kragbé Gnagbé, an urban intellectual with socialist leanings, had formed the Parti Nationaliste Africaine (PANA) which, while theoretically legal under Article 7 of the Constitution, constituted in practice an unacceptable challenge to the sovereignty of the one-party state. Faced with the impossibility of legal representation, Gnagbé and small group of Guébié, Zabia, and Paccolo (subgroups of the Bété) attacked the city hall in Gagnoa in October 1970, hoisting a flag and declaring the succession of the “independent state of Eburnie,” and violently attacking several local state representatives and security forces in the process. The army savagely repressed the uprising (it was claimed that 3,000 to 6,000 were killed, although these numbers are no doubt greatly exaggerated). This incident, called in Bété country the “Guébié genocide,” has remained fundamental in Bété collective memory.

As Dozon argues, the Guébié incident, while extremely localized and naïve in its aspirations, nevertheless revealed the crystallization of a political identity among the Bété intimately linked to territorial autochthony. As he notes, the fugitive “Republic of Eburnie,” despite its extremely local manifestation, was projected to include all the southern forest peoples (the loose group commonly called Kru—Bété, Dida, Neyo, Bakwe, Kroumen, Guéré, etc.) sharing certain characteristics: precolonial patterns with regard to settlement and political structure; late colonial occupation, a plantation economy founded on smallholding, a territory that attracted tens of thousands of migrants; a socialist orientation and a weak level of representation at the state level. The transition from ethnic or tribal identity to regional consciousness had as its underpinning the principle of autochthony, and in the declaration of a “secessionist state,” this characteristic became the symbolic condition for citizenship. Indeed, Kragbé’s “program” involved not only the tripling of prices paid to planters, but also the departure of the migrants, their presence being conceptualized as internal colonization and their occupation of land as theft (Dozon 1985a:347–48). Since Gbagbo’s rise to power, and particularly since the coup attempt in September, the Guébié affair has been evoked continuously; it was a central theme during the National Forum for Reconciliation held in 2001, and it continues to emerge in discourses and tracts such as the one cited at the beginning of this article. The ongoing political salience of the Guébié incident demonstrates that autochthony does not succeed ethnicity, either temporally or spatially. The rise of regional forms of autochthony does not necessarily depend upon a change of scale brought about, say, by globalization. Rather, regional forms of autochthonous identity can be understood as one projection of a mode of identification in which ethnic particularisms are simply another vehicle: representations of
autochthony in Côte d’Ivoire are expressed on a continuum based on an original assignation whose terms go from the idealized village space or ancestral home to the black race. Indeed, the principle of autochthony itself is productive of increasingly localized and specific forms of ethnicity, since the dual principle of the purity of natural origins (filiation and authenticity) and territorialization tend to their smallest common denominator. It is here, I think, that we can situate not only the ambivalence of autochthony but also its plasticity as a politically effective discourse of exclusion.

The Struggle for the Nation: Democratization, Economic Crisis, and the Rise of “Ivoirité”

By the mid-eighties the edifice of the “Ivoirian miracle” was already crumbling. The decade was marked by the collapse of protectionist mechanisms and international alliances guaranteeing the stability of profit from agricultural production, the growing inability of the state to integrate both local and immigrant populations within a clientelist system now severely strapped for cash, a crisis in the educational system and the formal sector, serious land shortages in the rural central and southwest regions, and the social crisis provoked by the slashing of prices paid to producers in 1989. By the end of the eighties, civil society—including the trade unions, student groups, and political parties (in particular the FPI, formed among left-wing urban intellectuals)—was at the boiling point. Under intense pressure, Houphouët allowed multiparty elections in 1990 and found himself face to face with a certain Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the socialist FPI. The decade of FPI-led political protest that followed—in which the party was to take strong positions against “Ivoirité”—has often led observers to forget one of Laurent Gbagbo’s principal campaign arguments in the 1990 presidential race. Accusing Houphouët of using northern immigrants as his “electoral cattle,” he campaigned against their voting rights as well as foreigners’ “preponderant” role in the national economy (Dozon 1997). The term “foreigners,” as we have seen, was highly ambiguous in this context and open to local interpretation concerning the place of Ivoirian migrants in what was to become the urban FPI’s rural fiefdom. It was at this time that the FPI press began to publish rumors that Houphouët’s prime minister, Alassane Dramane Ouattara (1990–93), a northern technocrat from the IMF appointed in 1989 to apply the World Bank’s austerity program, was in fact Burkinabé.

Houphouët’s death in 1993 was preceded by two years of intense protest on the part of opposition parties, unions, and student groups, whose avant garde came from Laurent Gbagbo’s FPI and the closely associated Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de la Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI). It was in this context of generalized contestation, along with and the emer-
gence of Alassane Ouattara, the first figure in postcolonial history capable of acting as a powerful representative of northern migrants, that Henri Konan Bédié launched the concept of Ivoirité. The exacerbation of ethnicity as a form of political self-identification and contestation went hand in hand with the revitalization of autochthony as the grounds for national belonging, and was elaborated in the “ideology” of “Ivoirité” from the mid-nineties on, thus rupturing the “community of destiny” that had tied together the north and the south from the colonial period.

The first aspect of Ivoirité was the use of legal mechanisms to exclude Bédié’s principal rivals from power, which had the catastrophic consequence of creating, de facto, two types of Ivoirian citizen, those of “pure” Ivoirian origin and those of “mixed heritage.” The electoral code, voted on November 23, 1994, provided for new, restricted conditions of eligibility for elected office. The candidate for president had to be “born in the Ivory Coast to mother and father themselves born in the Ivory Coast” (Obou 2000:57–62). However, the profound echo that the elaboration of “Ivoirité” by a handful of intellectuals had among a large section of the population, and the performative capacity of these concepts, demonstrates that it was more than a simple electoral tactic. “Ivoirité” brings together a series of representations concerning both national sovereignty and the content of citizenship, in which autochthony is the central sign. A study/manifesto published in 1996 by a group of ideologues from the PDCI (the Cellule Universitaire de Recherche et de Diffusion des Idées et Actions Politiques du Président Henri Konan Bédié,” or CURDIPHE) expounded a restrictive and ethnonationalist vision of citizenship: “the individual who claims his ‘ivoirité’ has as his country the Côte d’Ivoire and is born of Ivoirian parents themselves belonging to one of the autochthonous ethnic groups of the Ivory coast” (Touré 1996:46). “It is not being segregationist,” claimed the document, “to want to expose one’s true roots. According to documents in our possession, we can group the ancestors of Ivoirians, or pure Ivoirians, into two groups: the autochthons with mythical origins, the autochthons without mythical origins. According to the table, the 10 March, 1893, at the moment the Côte d’Ivoire was born, the ancestors of all the great ethnic groups were already there.” And finally, “the foreign presence [threatens] to rupture the socio-economic equilibrium of our country. . . . The Ivoirian people must first affirm their sovereignty, their authority in the face of the threat of dispossession and subjection: be it a question of immigration or political and economic power” (Touré 1996:50,21).

Bédié’s concept of Ivoirité profoundly reinforced the idea of territorialisized autochthony as the ground upon which citizenship should be constructed. It also reopened the question of self-determination in the face of IMF conditionality and the ravages of structural adjustment and the continued, although largely diminished, French presence. In this sense, Ouattara was the perfect incarnation of the “danger” facing the “autochthons” of Côte d’Ivoire; he had spent his childhood in Burkina Faso, worked out-
side the country for most of his professional life, and not only was the prime minister who applied the World Bank’s austerity program, but also had been the assistant director of the IMF itself. From 1999 on, Alassane Ouattara became, almost despite himself, a highly charged, larger-than-life symbol concentrating intense and contradictory passions on his person (Konaté 2002). As one FPI supporter of northern origin asserted following the violence against the RDR during the presidential elections of 2000, “If they don’t say that Alassane is Ivoirian, I don’t see who can make reconciliation work. If Alassane isn’t Ivoirian, we’re not Ivoirian either. Gbagbo isn’t going to back down, and the people of the north aren’t going to back down” (Vidal 2002:252).

While Bédié and his party may have been the originators of “Ivoirité” as official state ideology, Laurent Gbagbo and the FPI’s project of “refounding” the nation on nationalist lines was not developed merely as a response to political imperatives. Rather, Gbagbo appeared as the spiritual son of Kragbé Gnagbé, positioning himself and his party as the legitimate spokesmen for the aspirations and interests of the “autochthons.” As a historian, Gbagbo had already displayed an intellectual interest in defending the idea of Bété autochthony, attempting to show in his work that the Bétè, contrary to what many European ethnographers had claimed, had not in fact migrated from Liberia, but were among the original peoples present from time immemorial on Ivoirian territory. His vision of territorialized ethnic spaces, as well as techniques of government for controlling and producing them, was clearly stated in 1998, when he claimed that the violent land conflicts opposing autochthons and strangers had “nothing to do with ethnic problems, they are technical problems and should be treated as such,” going on to suggest that the northern zones could be developed “according to a rational programme which would fix autochthonous farmers in their zones” (La Voie, January 8, 1998). His political platform—which promised greater sovereignty for the Ivoirian state with respect to international capital and conditionalities (implying a rupture of the privileged postcolonial contract with the French), better control over the population (particularly with respect to immigration through new and modern forms of identification), universal schooling and medical insurance (projects which all involve massive processes of census-taking and inscription of populations)—shows that his political project depended upon a significant increase of administrative state power and control over the population.

The 2000 presidential elections, which saw Laurent Gbagbo elected under “calamitous conditions,” as he put it, were marked by unprecedented violence in which attacks against northerners and immigrants by FPI youth and gendarmes were justified by their supposed support for the RDR, whose youth had taken to the streets demanding new elections (Vidal & LePape 2002). Speaking about the events a few months later, one FPI militant of northern origin lamented that as a northerner, he and his people would be obliged to join the RDR: “I’ll never be able to say that I’m not
Dioula. It’s not written on my forehead “FPI”… Me, in my heart I’m FPI, but people treat me as RDR. You see, that’s the whole problem… No one distinguishes anymore. You’re from the north, you’re Malian, it’s the same thing, once you wear a long boubou, you’re from the north. They attack everybody.” However, he considered the amalgam between foreign and Ivoirian northerners partly of their own making, showing the profound ambivalence nearly all Ivoirians have toward immigrants and the perceived importance of creating criteria for determining autochthony. “‘They’ve done everything so that no one can tell them apart, Ivoirian Dioulas and foreign Dioulas. It’s a problem: amongst themselves they can’t identify one another…. Foreigners came and moved in next to the Dioula from here. They were clever. They had ideas in the back of their heads. When they arrive, they pray together, do everything together. The guys say: we want the Ivoirian national identity card, they give it to them, and then they say they’re Ivoirians. It’s total confusion…. It’s because the Ivoirian Dioulas don’t make the distinction that everyone says now: you, you’re Dioula, you’re a foreigner” (Vidal & Le Pape 2002:242).

During the first two years of the Gbagbo regime, the cleavage between pro-FPI and pro-RDR populations continued to grow in the schools, the universities, the rural areas, and the army. The latent nationalism of the FPI became state policy and was echoed with increasingly xenophobic and radical accents by pro-FPI youth and student groups in Abidjan. Those in the army thought to be sympathetic to the RDR were downgraded, and following a witch hunt in response to an apparent coup attempt in January 2001, many young NCOs joined those soldiers in Ouagadougou exiled since 2000 under General Gueï’s junta. The amalgam between northerners and immigrants intensified. In the southeastern town of Bonoua (which, not incidentally, is also the home region of President Gbagbo’s extremist wife, Simone), following a violent altercation between Abouré youth and the allogenous northern population, a group of young Abourés held a meeting on January 22, 2001, during which a document was drawn up and submitted to the municipal and traditional authorities. Along with prohibitions on mixed marriages, extramarital relations, and the building of mosques, the document stipulated, among other things, that all strangers must register with a photograph; that no shop, stand, or other commercial space may be used by strangers for any type of commercial activity; that no stranger may engage in any commercial transport activity; that two male strangers of the same sex are prohibited from occupying the same room; and that strangers must clean the streets and drains and pay a yearly head tax of 5000 FCFA to the royal court (Le Patriote, January 30, 2001). At the Forum for National Reconciliation, held between October and December 2001, Jean-Yves Dibopieu, Charles Blé Goudé’s successor at the head of the FESCI, said the following in his declaration on behalf of the organization: “The FESCI demands that foreigners stay away from Ivoirian politics, since they’ve already got their hands on our economy. We want to tell Ivoirians
not to have a complex about being treated as xenophobic, as is commonly accused. They want to trick us so as to invade us. We must even acclaim xenophobia at the present time, since it is a normal and natural sentiment. Yes, brother Ivorian. Being xenophobic is good” (FESCI, Forum de Réconciliation Nationale, October 9, 2001).

The War of “Who Is Who”

This war, it’s a war of identification. The Minister of State—rest in peace—Emile Boga Doudou, wanted us to be able to identify all the Ivorians. That caused a general outcry, ’cause there’s lots that are foreigners, Malians and Burkinabè who came here. They’ve been here for such a long time, they managed to have the same documents as us, even the same birth certificates as us. Those people, they’re the same ones who are opposed to identification. Because it’s a problem for them. Because in the new formula of identification, when you go to get your card, you have to tell them the name of your village, so they can go and find out if you’re really from that region. Because if I take the case of our Dioula brothers, when they arrive, as soon as they find a city like Yamoussoukro and they settle there, have children there, do everything there, they don’t return to their country of origin. And then they say they are Ivorians. We saw that it isn’t right, that we have to be able to tell who is Ivorian, who isn’t Ivorian. That’s why they’re making war on us. (Interview in Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2006)

For the political leaders of the Forces Nouvelles, longstanding collaborators of Laurent Gbagbo throughout the 1990s, the turning point was not principally the question of xenophobia, or Ouattara’s nationality, or the victimization of northerners by state security forces (even if exclusion from the army was the principal motivation of the exiled soldiers who organized the military rebellion), but the FPI’s program of national identification. The first thing their forces did once they had taken towns and cities in the northern part of the country was to destroy national identity records and state registries. When travelers presented the new “receipts” given out from the time the identification process had begun in the summer of 2002 at roadblocks in rebel-held territory, rebel soldiers often fell into violent rages, destroying the documents and menacing or physically attacking the individuals. When questioned about their motivation for joining the rebellion, many young recruits cited the national identification operation. As one traditional hunter (dozo) put it, “I joined the rebellion because the Malinké have been here since the twelfth century, and soon they’ll be giving us a foreign resident’s card to be able to live here” (interview, March 2003). Indeed, during the peace talks held at Linas-Marcoussis (France) in January 2003, the principal demands of the leaders of the rebellion were the abandonment of the national identification program in its current
form, the revision of the constitutional conditions of presidential eligibil-
ity, a revision of the 1998 land law, and a new law on the naturalization of
longstanding immigrants.

National identity records and the question of “usurpation” of citizen-
ship have been a national obsession since the early 1990s, with the intro-
duction of the foreign resident’s card by the Ouattara government. The
FPI’s program differs from previous attempts to create reliable, unfalsifi-
able national identity records in its methodology and its conception. Moti-
vated both by electoral calculations (national identity as the factor in deter-
mining voters’ lists) and ideological conviction, the FPI’s policy involves
the clearest consecration in the history of the country of the principle of
territorial autochthony as the grounds for national identity and citizenship.
The enrollment of individuals in the exercise could result in their receiv-
ing a foreign resident’s card instead of a national identity card (Al
Moustapha, Radio et Télévision Ivoirien, August 18, 2002), even though a
separate process of enrollment of foreigners for their resident’s cards was
to have been undertaken. The cost of the foreign resident’s card was high
(35,000 FCFA for ECOWAS, and 300,000 for other nationalities) and, in
total contradiction to ECOWAS and UEMOA regulations, the law provided
for hard-hitting penalties against those who were unable to produce the
appropriate documents, including heavy fines and expulsion. The
announcement of these policies only served to reinforce the impunity with
which security forces harassed northern populations, often destroying their
documents in the process. The parliamentary commission set up to deter-
mine the operation’s procedure claimed that since every Ivorian had a vil-
lage of origin, the best way to know who was Ivorian was for each citizen to
return to his or her village of origin to acquire the identity card.9 Abidjan
was not to be considered a “village of origin” except for those belonging to
the Ebrié ethnic group, “historical” autochthons.

Protest over this extremely onerous, exclusionary, and anachronistic
method led to the adoption of a procedure that enabled the individual to
establish the card in his place of residence, but with the obligation to cite
local witnesses from his “village of origin” who could testify that either the
applicant or one of his parents was indeed originally from the village in
question. Local commissions were to be established, involving dignitaries
such as traditional chiefs, land chiefs, members of leading families, and
political parties, to verify the claims of autochthony. Decisions had to be
unanimous, and receipts were to be issued until verification could be
effected. Séri Wayoro, director of identification at the Opération Nationale
d’Identification (ONI) explained the Operation’s notion of “village of ori-
gen” thus: “The village of an Ivorian, it’s firstly from the ancient Côte
d’Ivoire…. Authentically [sic], people were sedentary, they stayed on their
homelands, where their parents, their elders and ancestors were born.
That’s what we consider as a village, the place where a person finds mem-
ers of his family at their origin, before the urban phenomena” (Le Patri-
ote, March 21, 2002). In the face of growing outcry from the opposition, Wayaro stated unambiguously several months later that “whoever claims to be Ivoirian must have a village. Whoever has done everything to forget the name of his village or who is incapable of showing he belongs to a village is a person without bearings and is so dangerous that we must ask him where he comes from” (Notre Voie, July 28, 2002).

What better illustration of the “re-enchantment of tradition,” “the rehabilitation of authentic origins and belonging,” and the idea that there can be no identity without territoriability, as described by Mbembe? Here we find clear confirmation of Mbembe’s notion that “the territory par excellence is the locality, or the village; the ‘chez soi’ which includes the home, inherited land and where social relations are reinforced by a common genealogy and a cultural matrix (real or imaginary) which anchors the civic space” (2002:36–37). The inanity of such a program goes without saying in this historical context marked by mobility, urbanization, and mixed ancestry. Nevertheless, the war waged by the Gbagbo regime against “dangerous persons without bearings” is all too real, as is the violence committed by the rebellion’s soldiers and recruits.

Within six months of this war of “who is who,” the southern populations had returned from the north. When it came to political enemies, the rebellion appeared to follow the policy of “take no prisoners.” In the “cours communes” of Abidjan, veritable ethnic melting pots, neighbors eyed one another with suspicion, speaking in whispers. A reign of terror had taken hold of the city, with the infamous “death squads” roaming the streets after curfew, army officials encouraging citizens to report “suspicious activity” to telephone hotlines, and the destruction of poor neighborhoods and slums. Northerners in popular neighborhoods were subjected to regular roundups in which they were stripped to the waist, relieved of their documents, and carted off in trucks like cattle. It was not uncommon to drive by a naked corpse on the side of the road in the early morning, hands tied behind the back and a bullet in the back of the head. In what seemed like a form of collective madness, the only voices that made themselves heard were those of the “young patriots” filling the streets and neighborhoods with patriotic rallies, and the nationalist media, all screaming hate-filled insanities daily. As an observer present during this period, I was absolutely stunned by the daily escalation of events. On the one hand, it seemed that each new violent statement or act was an isolated event, one option among several, whose occurrence had nothing self-evident about it. On the other hand, the unfolding of events gave the impression of following an inexorable and terrifying logic, against which nothing could be done.

Three years later, while the reign of terror had become more sporadic or cyclical, the situation was one of radical opposition between two diametrically opposed camps, with the majority of the population fearfully watching from the sidelines. On the one side, a protean rebellion occupying the north of the country, supported by the major opposition parties
grouped together since 2004 under a loose coalition, the G7; and on the other side the Gbagbo regime, supported by the “patriotic galaxy,” a nebulous group of youth organizations and militias largely controlled by power holders at the presidency and in the FPI. While theoretically all working together in the reconciliation government put in place after the peace talks in Linas-Marcoussis and Accra, these two camps confronted one another in a zero-sum game of winner takes all. The loose and fragile G7 coalition has been attempting to project the image of a “republican response” to the political crisis brought to a head by the rebellion, an ambition seriously compromised by its alliance with armed rebels and its intransigence vis-à-vis Gbagbo. The Gbagbo regime, in an increasingly minority position, has from the outset refused any form of political compromise likely to weaken its grip on power. It proceeds with its program of ultranationalist radicalization via a vast propaganda apparatus, whose central themes are the values of autochthony and national self-determination and parallel forms of control, surveillance, and violence, most notably via informal militias and paramilitary forces. These forces have become the principal popular relays of ultranationalist and xenophobic government discourses, as well as the principal agents of the state’s functions of surveillance, propaganda, and violence.

Youth, “Young Patriots,” and “Self-Defense” Militias

The great majority of the principal actors in the current crisis are direct products of the same matrix of violent contestation that was formed in the schools and universities around the FPI and the FESCI throughout the 1990s (Konaté 2003). Many of the young noncommissioned officers who led the attacks—the rebellion’s political leader Guillaume Soro, and Gbagbo’s “young patriot” leaders—were all active participants in the initiatives designed to wrest power from the PDCI and its barons. The role of the youth in spearheading the confrontation over citizenship and national belonging should not be underestimated. This group, a liminal category par excellence, is the principal victim of the socioeconomic crisis. The current war provides a formidable opportunity for the renegotiation of their status, and the vital role they are playing constitutes nothing less than a small social revolution.

The “young patriots” are most highly visible in the streets of Abidjan, where, under the direction of extremely popular leaders, veritable stars of the pro-Gbagbo media, these die-hard Gbagbo supporters have taken the streets by storm. This movement, in all its organizational, sociological, and ideological complexity, is doubtless the most emblematic expression of the Gbagbo regime’s evolution during the war; with neither a powerful army nor solid international alliances, the regime has used a process of paramilitarization of its youth to impose its political order through terror, and an
ultranationalist radicalization in order to legitimize its resistance to any form of external interference. The “Alliance des Jeunes Patriotes pour le Sursaut National,” led by the self-styled “General” Charles Blé Goudé, was born just after the attacks of September 19, 2002, as a movement supporting the government in its resistance against the assailants from the north. Benefiting from extremely generous presidential largesse, this movement managed to mobilize hundreds of thousands at rallies held in Abidjan in the first few months of the conflict. While the first rallies were attended by people from every political party, region, and age group, the increasingly ultranationalist, xenophobic, and pro-FPI discourse very rapidly discouraged the participation of more moderate populations and militants from other parties. Stigmatizing in the most virulent terms a whole range of “enemies” (the rebels and neighboring countries—in particular, Burkina Faso and their nationals) as well as the rebels’ supposed external supporters (principally France, but also the U.N.), the young patriots rapidly became central political actors in the crisis. They also developed into urban militia forces working for the regime, charged with surveying the opposition and denouncing “suspicions” or “enemy” behavior, controlling popular neighborhoods, and creating a climate of terror throughout the city, even assisting at times the famous “death squads” responsible for numerous disappearances and summary executions. From early 2003 on, squadrons of youths—heads shaved, clad in t-shirts and khakis—could be seen running and doing drills in every neighborhood in Abidjan. In January 2005, the infamous Groupement Patriotique pour la Paix (GPP) was involved in extremely violent confrontations between local traders and transporters enraged by the constant racket, violence, and extortion inflicted on them by the militiamen who had taken up illegal residence in a girl’s boarding school. Several days later, a shootout between the GPP and students from the police academy left three dead.

These informal associations have been organized on a national level and are engaged in a process of establishing “grids” throughout southern cities and towns, enabling the least compound and its occupants to be identified and watched, even going as far as painting marks on some compounds. It was these associations that were instrumental in the identification of opposition militants during the demonstrations of March 24–27, 2004, which ended in the killing of some three hundred opposition marchers, many of them in their homes. This movement is growing, but it is also increasingly divided. As time has gone on, the “patriotic galaxy” has become increasingly schismatic, giving birth to a multitude of groups led by petty chiefs fighting for the monopoly of the patriotic label and especially the presidential largesse that accompanies it. As in the case of the rebellion, its internal divisions not only serve to weaken the movement, but also, and more dangerously, to radicalize it. Already in 2003, Charles Groghuet was chillingly clear about the GPP’s mission:
National reconciliation is not going to happen with these divisive accords, you can count on me. All these RDR and MPCI ministers who are around Gbagbo are looking to kill him to finally take power. We’re going to liberate Côte d’Ivoire; we want to tear Côte d’Ivoire away from the sons of immigrants who want to take everything away from the Ivorians. We know that it’s Alassane Dramane Ouattara, that son of immigrants, who opened the door of Côte d’Ivoire to his foreign brothers to invade us. . . . The GPP has relations with senior military officers, we confirm it. We will not allow our country, full of strong youths, to accept the new form of colonisation that France wants to impose on us. . . . We aren’t fighting for a political party, even less for an individual, even if he is the President of the Republic; we’re fighting to clean Côte d’Ivoire of its sons of immigrants and their spokesman, Alassane Dramane Ouattara. (Soir Info, June 3, 2003)

The rural south and southwest have also seen the rise of “patriotic” movements, “self-defense” groups, and militias. In the early months of the crisis, “self-defense” groups were developed, as a form of “patriotic resistance,” in every southern town and village after members were publicly recruited by the regime. These informal patrols, composed of young autochthons, were rapidly organized with the help of local officials into hierarchic organizations. In many localities, one now finds highly structured village associations of “rural young patriots,” complete with president, treasurer, and posts linked to activities such as security, fundraising, and mobilization. These groups are part of a loose national network, and often receive visits from the national “patriotic leaders” on tour. At times, groups coordinate their actions on a regional level. This process of politico-administrative organization is accompanied by the registration and identification of volunteers, as Chauveau and Bobo observe: “All possess an identity card proving that they are patriots serving their country, with their names, age and village of origin. These cards are used as laissez-passer on instructions given by the Préfet [local state administrator]” (2003:20). With the encouragement of local authorities and regional dignitaries with important positions in Abidjan, groups of “young village patriots” have created a climate of terror in which strangers (northerners, Burkinabé, but also Baoulé) are chased off their land, which subsequently is seized “legally” by local big men. In this process of expropriation, the youth use violence, but they also pose as defenders of a “tradition” which they accuse their elders of having abandoned. Thus they reaffirm not only their autochthonous rights to land but also their growing ascendancy vis à vis the older generations.

Beyond self-defense groups, regional militias made up exclusively of young autochthons have been constituted via networks leading from the president to local state officials and army officers. These groups also served as fighters proper during the war in the far west near the Liberian border. Both the rebellion and President Gbagbo recruited Liberian forces, resulting in a spillover of the Liberian war onto Ivoirian territory (Ero & Marshall
The Front de Libération de Grand Ouest (FLGO), a militia composed essentially of autochthonous Guéré youths, was recruited to fight alongside the national army (FANCI) and anti-Taylor forces, which were, through Gbagbo’s support, to constitute the new Liberian rebel group, Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), in 2003. The Ivoirian rebel groups MPIGO (Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest) and MJP (Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix) were themselves largely composed of pro-Taylor Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters. Between November 2002 and May 2003, battles led by Liberian protagonists set fire to the west, with fighters on both sides committing atrocious acts of killing, torture, and rape. The confrontation between Ivoirian Yacoubas, fighting together in the MPIGO and the MJP with their Liberian Gio “cousins,” and the Guérés, loyal to Gbagbo and forming a common front with their Krahn “cousins” from MODEL, provoked a deadly interethnic conflict among autochthonous populations who had always lived together peacefully.

Yet even more deadly has been the conflict between Guéré and northern Ivoirians, Burkinabé, and Malians. Motivated by a politics of xenophobia, the desire to avenge the hundreds of Guérés tortured and brutally murdered by the rebellion, as well as the hope of appropriating strangers’ land and harvests, a systematic policy of targeting and murdering northerners has provoked a spiral of revenge and counterrevenge that continues to claim victims, despite the creation of a demilitarized “confidence zone” by U.N. and French forces. As Boubacar Diallo of the U.N. agency OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) noted, the “confidence zone” is a huge misnomer: “Not a week goes by without us being told of people being killed or of other serious human rights violations” (BBC World Service, February 8, 2005). The massacre of more than eighty villagers in the area of Duékoué in late May 2005 is the latest episode to date, and risks to derail the fragile accord hammered out by Thabo Mbeki in April 2005. In comparison to all the violence in the west, what is singular about this situation has been the complicity of state security forces and the active participation of local and national state officials and politicians. The leader of the FLGO is none other than the third assistant to the mayor of Guiglo, and many other local state officials and even ministers from the region are directly involved in the expropriation of land. Expropriations are legitimated through the idiom of autochthony and reclaiming the “lands of our fathers” from “rebel” hands. The nebulous term “rebel” not only evokes the menace and treachery of strangers but also reinforces the ethnicist amalgam between rebel fighters and northerners more generally.

These forces, as well as other groups like them from other cities and towns in the south, were mobilized during the fresh outbreak of hostilities in November 2004, when Gbagbo unilaterally broke the cease-fire and ordered the bombardment of rebel territory. In March 2005, a new militia attacked the rebel-held town of Logoualé in the west, leading to fears of a
general mobilization of militia forces throughout the south. Finally, working under the doubtful hypothesis that the presidential elections would be held as planned in October 2005, the FPI and the presidency gave these militias a more political mission, consisting of preventing opposition party members from campaigning in, or even visiting, their electoral districts in the southwest. Thus UDPCI Health Minister Mabri Toikeusse was prevented on two occasions in late 2004 and early 2005 from entering the towns of Guiglo, Bloléquin, and Toulépleu, where he was attempting to deliver ambulances and medicines (*Le Nouveau Reveil*, February 28, 2005). As one observer, a militiaman from Diégonéfla, remarked:

"Failing an attack from the ex-rebels, the militiamen’s mission has been modified to adapt itself to the current combat. In the forest zones of the south-west, the instructions given to the militias are clear. They consist, on the one hand, in protecting the zones held by the party in power [FPI] against any incursions from the opposition. In regions like Gagnoa, Guibéroua, Divo . . . , the elective posts (MPs, Mayors, and Presidents of General Councils) must remain the exclusive property of the FPI. At the same time, the regime’s militiamen are to ‘chase’ all opposition parties from the zones where they hold elected posts . . . . In the upcoming elections, there will be no Mayor, no MP, nor President of the General Council from the PDCI or the RDR in our region. These parties are rebel parties, and we’re going to prevent the votes of their militants." (*24 Heures*, February 16, 2005)

A year later, these groups have been mobilized in a struggle against the revised national identification process that is required to establish voters’ lists for the elections now scheduled for October 2006. Given the FPI’s political opposition to this process and the ongoing blockages by the “young patriots,” as well as the refusal of the rebellion to disarm until the process has been completed, there is no chance that the elections will be held as planned.

These groups have operated throughout the south with complete impunity for the past four years. Even on the rare occasions when their activities have led to arrest and incarceration, their members inevitably have been released only weeks later. In his only public statement concerning the problem of urban militias in Abidjan, President Gbagbo claimed they were unarmed, only youth who enjoyed “running and doing exercise” (*Le Patriote*, May 19, 2003; *24 Heures* May 20, 2003). On the problem of militias in the west, where it has been established by U.N. forces that several hundred militiamen were bused in to Logoualé from Abidjan, Gbagbo claimed that the attacks were the work of “local farmers” determined to chase the rebels from the “lands of their ancestors” (interview with U.N. officer, DPKO, New York, November 18, 2005; IRIN, March 3, 2005). One can hardly be surprised by the vehemence of the youth when the president’s wife, herself a leading MP in the FPI, calls the peace accords “an
“It’s called the invasion of our country by foreigners, amongst which the most vehement are the Burkinabé who have taken up arms in the rebellion. . . . The logic behind the colonisation of the Côte d’Ivoire by its powerful neighbour, the Burkina Faso, is based on the false hypothesis according to which numerous Burkinabé live in the Côte d’Ivoire and have been here for 3 to 5 decades. They don’t know where to go and want to live here. These Burkinabé don’t want to be called ‘foreigners’ since it sounds pejorative. Some of the most illustrious amongst them, such as ‘the mentor’ [Alassane Ouattara] go so far as to consider the word ‘Burkinabé’ an insult. . . . Can we say that all those born in the Côte d’Ivoire are automatically Ivoirian? . . . We need to realise that a Burkinabé who lives in the Côte d’Ivoire continues to be Burkinabé, and his descendants continue to be Burkinabé ad vitam æternam. (Le Temps, November 21, 2003)

The Imaginaries of Autochthony and Victimization

Mbembe draws attention to the ways in which local imaginaries of autochthony are converted into political and economic resources and inserted into processes of globalization. Although different in many ways from the forms of ethnonationalism observed in the struggles for independence, these imaginaries reproduce the old theme of autochthony, the language in which the African continent expressed its fundamental, ontological difference. During the anticolonial struggles, the critique founding a truly “African” politics mobilized a reading of history as conspiracy, with the African as innocent victim of a plot fomented by forces beyond all reach: “the imaginaire identitaire” says Mbembe, deploys itself in this framework according to a logic of suspicion, of denunciation of the other and anything that is different: the mad dream of a world without others.” What is presented as a radical discourse on emancipation hides in fact the “neurosis of victimisation” and the “urge of difference” and develops, in reality, “a negative, circular and xenophobic thought” which “must create figures which will then be taken for real things.” The result is a “couple formed by the executioner (enemy) and his victim (innocent) . . . [and] the course of African history depends upon the conjugated actions of this couple.” In the final analysis, “the central preoccupation is the struggle for political power and the conquest of the state apparatus by the autochthons. Everything comes back to this perverse structure: autochthony. The prose of autochthony exhausts the capacity put an end to a condition of servitude and emerge as a subject of the world” (Mbembe 2001:25,35).

In the discourses of the pro-Gbagbo press, party officials, presidential counselors, agricultural spokesmen, and above all, the “young patriots,”
the reactivation of the imaginary of victimization is striking. In the regime’s
eyes, it had done nothing to deserve this “unjust war” and has persistently
projected the image through its media and public discourses of an Ivoirian
“people” assailed from all sides, victims of an “international plot” against
the Côte d’Ivoire, where a formidable coalition of diabolical strangers have
conspired to tear the nation from their hands: the French and its multina-
tional partners (financiers of the rebellion); the United Nations (a coal-
tion of Western interests, complicit in African genocide and intent on sub-
jugating the African continent); the international press (rebels and
manipulators of national and international opinion); the Burkinabé presi-
dent and people (“Mossi scum” who send their mercenaries to kill Ivoirian
patriots, invade the country, and place one of their own in the presidential
palace); northerners in the south (“usurpers” of identity, secret agents,
infiltrators). The French, particularly under fire since the events of Novem-
ber 2004, have most recently borne the brunt of these accusations. The
desire for a “second independence” is now expressed through the most
extreme propaganda, in which “the whites” are considered entirely respon-
sible for the country’s current misfortunes. In the words of Mamadou
Koulibaly, “to say that they’re here to keep the peace is to ridicule the inter-
national community’s intelligence. They’re here to organize coups d’états,
mass killings and pillage” (L’Inter, March 16, 2005). Leading FPI officials
and patriotic leaders have gone as far as claiming that the French soldiers’
deaths in November were faked, and that empty coffins were presented at
the official funeral ceremony at the Invalides in Paris! Koulibaly has written
a book entitled Sur la Route de la Liberté (On the Road to Liberty), about
which a particularly edifying review was published in a pro-Gbagbo new-
paper:

For the President Mamdou Koulibaly, the answer [to the current crisis] is
Sartrien: we must at the very least liquidate the Oppressor. No compro-
mise is possible with him. The “Collabo” is not irremediably dangerous.
He changes his mind as he changes his master. We can thus envisage win-
nning him over. On the other hand, the Oppressor is always an Oppressor
by blood, as one has a nationality by blood. And it is this blood which we
must extract from him. . . . The author himself shows courage in resisting
those oily formulas for protecting his career by naming the Oppressor:
France. By naming the “Collabos”: the Houphouëtists. By indicating the
path to follow: “Liquidate” France. (Le Courrier d’Abidjan, September 17,
2004)

While this discourse represents in part tactical maneuvering against the
only force capable of preventing Gbagbo from reuniting the country by
force, nevertheless, it is a discourse that has profound echoes in Côte
d’Ivoire and that attempts to mobilize the entire country ("Collabos" included) against the external and eternal enemies, all the while mobiliz-
ing the imaginaries of autochthony, filiation, and heritage.

Mbembe argues that today, the old imaginaries of revolution, national liberation, anti-imperialism, and nativism have been reactivated by the youth: “under the flashy rags of the current international lexicon (democracy, social movements, civil society) these imaginaries now combine in opposition to globalization, reactivating the metaphysics of difference, re-enchanting tradition and reviving the utopia of an Africa cut off from the rest of the world and de-occidentalised” (2002:36). The “general” of the “young patriots,” Charles Blé Goudé, provides a telling example of just this sort of imaginary in his assessments of the U.N. Following the publication of the report by the Special Commission of Inquiry of the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCR) on the events of March 25, 2004, the regime fell into a paroxysm of outrage and defiance. Charles Blé Goudé was named in the report as one of the organizers of the “parallel forces” used to kill civilians in their homes during and following the aborted march. Questioned on his views about the commission’s report, Blé Goudé railed against the international press, which published the report before it was officially transmitted to the president: “I’ve got to the point where I don’t believe that Hitler was bad, or that Milosevic was bad. Because it’s the same media networks that presented Hitler and Milosevic as criminals who today present me and the Ivorian patriots who suffer at the hands of the rebellion as the executioners and the rebels as the victims” (Fraternité Matin, May 11, 2004). On the role of the U.N., he had this to say:

This report reminds us of how, in their coalition, these same imperialists used Mobutu to kill Lumumba, the hope of the Congolese people. How these same imperialists formed a coalition to humiliate and finally kill Kwame N’krumah. How these same imperialists leagued together to kill Thomas Sankara. All proud sons of Africa. Today, Gbagbo belongs in this group of atypical presidents who refuse to be used by this system to crush the African continent. It’s all these things that the report reminds us of. But instead of discouraging us, this report increases our power to fight them. We’re going to decolonise Africa through the Ivorian struggle…. Here, there’s a civil society which is highly organised, there’s a tradition of combatants who rise up, who denounce, who expose the secrets of the plotters. It’s this civil society that they want to identify and denigrate to demoralise it. This is the objective of the UN report…. We, the young patriots of the Côte d’Ivoire, hold M. Tévoédjré [Special Representative of Koffi Annan in Côte d’Ivoire] responsible for any catastrophe which may befall the Côte d’Ivoire. Because it’s on the basis of his false and partisan reports that the UN takes position. The enemy of the Côte d’Ivoire is M. Tévoédjré, who wants to use the UN Follow-up Committee to help his friend Dramane Ouattara. We hold him responsible and he won’t escape if a catastrophe arrives. We’re all going to perish. (Le Temps, May 10, 2004)
Sanctioned by the Security Council for his role in the anti-U.N. violence of 2006, Blé Goudé continues to be the vanguard for the “pan-African” struggle against imperialism and “neo-colonialism,” rallying youth not only in Côte d’Ivoire, but also, with mitigated success, in countries such as Togo and Senegal.

Four years of conflict have multiplied by a hundredfold the climate of suspicion, paranoia, and hatred already in gestation before the crisis. How far will the protagonists go in fixing the borders between friends and enemies? Where is the spatial and imaginary limit beyond which one leaves “home” for enemy territory? In many respects, the internal border drawn by the rebellion only concretizes an imaginary national border already represented in the minds of many Ivoirians; the porous national borders between Côte d’Ivoire and its northern neighbors serve only to reinforce this uncertainty and inability to “fix” these populations in determined spaces. Mamadou Koulibaly, himself a northerner and, amazingly, himself of “mixed parentage,” is extremely clear on the subject: “Today, the border of the Côte d’Ivoire stops at Djébounoua [a village in the center of the country]” (Fraternité Matin, August 18, 2004). Rebellion leader Soro Guillaume’s occasional menaces of secession perhaps simply restate the perception that their forces and the populations that support them have already been extirpated from the space of the nation-state. Whenever the “people of the Côte d’Ivoire” are evoked by the “patriots,” Soro’s own “people” know that it does not include them.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, I pose the question of the performative capacity of these discourses. Given the “reality” of Ivoirian populations, the multiplicity of modes of subjectification, the diversity of their individual experiences and origins, and the multiplicity of their ancestries, the totalizations and reductions expressed in the ultranationalist hate propaganda seem simply insane. How is it that these discourses of exclusion were met so rapidly with such radical forms of mobilization and adhesion? No single response, or even series of responses, seems adequate. Even if the majority of the Ivoirian population is horrified by the extremism of the president’s followers, horrified by the violence perpetrated by both sides, horrified by the travesty their country has become, they appear singularly impotent in the face of the continued escalation. It is as if a profound doubt has seized the entire nation, paralyzing its capacity to react, to rally and pull the country away from the brink. Far from allowing Ivoirians to know, “once and for all, who is who,” the war has only made the question more acute and terrifying. The war has shown that in the designation of political enemies and allies, ethnicity and autochthony prove to be highly unstable and deceptive. For the southern autochthons seduced by the “patriotic” awakening, among
the huge mass of “Dioula” perceived as an invasive horde, how is one to tell
who is an Ivoirian Senoufo, a Malian Malinké, who is a peaceable farmer
and who a mercenary or a rebel, who an “infiltrator,” who an unarmed civil-
ian? And the Baoulé—are they not wolves in sheep’s clothing? For years
they have taken land, robbed the state blind, and mortgaged our future.
They said they were with us against the Dioula, but now they too have
joined the rebellion. The greatest sacrilege is the existence of traitors from
our own homelands. The turncoats, like Dacoury-Tabley, Djédjé Mady, Bété
“sons of the soil.” How many more are hiding within our midst? How can
we tell, for once and for all, who is who?

What is clear at least is that in this process of assignation and totaliza-
tion, state power and its techniques have a capital role to play, as they did
in the Rwandan genocide. The current violence is undoubtedly an effect
of, rather than merely a reaction to, both nation-state formation and glob-
alization (Bayart et al. 2001:190; Bayart 2004). At the same time, today’s
representations of self are edified in the interstices, between global and
local horizons, capturing nonisomorphic processes of flux. Particularly
among the youth, representations of self are liminal and unstable. It is per-
haps precisely the current ambivalence of autochthony that is at the heart
of this racializing, biologizing tendency we can observe in the Ivoirian con-
flict, to the extent that individuals such as Mamadou Koulibaly find them-
selves producing discourses on the self that are quite delusional. Appadu-
rai has drawn attention to the key role of this ontological uncertainty in sit-
uations of ethnocide. In his argument, he focuses on “bodily violence
between actors with routine—and generally benign—prior knowledge of
one another” in order to “illuminate ‘threshold’ or trigger conditions,
where managed or endemic social conflict gives way to runaway violence.”
In an unstable situation of violence that is “explicitly about categories
under stress and ideas striving for the logic of self-evidence,” the identifi-
cation of the enemy demands fixed criteria of classification and identifica-
tion as well as taxonomical purity (Appadurai 1999:310). Perhaps Appadu-
rai is correct in suggesting that this very uncertainty itself triggers violence,
as if the ultimate “certainty” can only be achieved through death and dis-
memberment. These brutal actions by no means establish certainty; in-
deed, they only exacerbate the frustrations of their perpetrators and lead
to cycles of revenge and preemptive violence, as the ongoing killings
between autochthons and strangers testify. Appadurai argues that the dead
body as a form of closure in situations of categorical uncertainty is closely
related to themes of deception, treachery, betrayal, imposture, and secrecy.
He reminds us that the themes of trickery, secrecy, and hidden identity per-
vaded the prelude to the Rwandan genocide and other situations of eth-
nocide in recent history (1999:313). The search for secure knowledge in
the midst of cadavers has been taken to extremes in the Ivoirian context.
Patricia Hamza-Attea, one of the lawyers leading the Collective of the Vic-
tims of the War financed by Gbagbo’s wife, announced at an international
conference on the Ivoirian conflict that their forensic scientists had collected bones and had identified the bodies of hundreds of the thousands killed in the fighting in the west. To a stunned audience she declared: “We have the bones, and we’ve done tests, we know who is who, who is Wê, who is Dan, who is Malinké.” The real postmortem has yet to come in Côte d’Ivoire. It should be recalled that the Rwandan genocide occurred not only through the revival of imaginaries of autochthony and the purity of origins, but also because the international community allowed the utopia of autarchy to become a reality, averting its eyes as the killings began.

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Notes

1. I will use the term “stranger” to refer to the French ethnographic term *allo-gène*, which does not have an English equivalent, and which is used in contrast to the term *autochtone* as referring to populations of nonlocal origins, be they nationals or non-nationals.

2. The original rebel movement is the Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), composed largely of northern soldiers in exile or facing demobilization from the Forces Armées Nationale de la Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) who attacked Abidjan and other cities and towns in the center and north of the country on September 19, 2002. On November 28, two other rebel groups made their appearance in the far west of the country, beyond the cease-fire line held by French troops. The Movement Populaire de Grand Ouest (MPIOG) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) had varying degrees of dependence on the MPCI and joined their political forces during the peace
talks in France in January 2003.

3. Put in terms of party political struggle, the debate turns on the question of whether a return to President Houphouët-Boigny’s idealized model of integration and openness is possible—a position defended by the rebellion, the main opposition party (the Rassemblement des Républicains [RDR]), and a section of Houphouët’s former ruling party (the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire [PDCI])—or whether the content of Ivoirian citizenship and belonging should take a much narrower nationalist and nativist form, as expressed in the ideology of President Gbagbo’s FPI and a section of the PDCI.

4. “Any governmentality can only be strategic and programmatic. It never works. But it is in relation to a programme that one can say it never works. . . . We must analyse what type of practice governmentality is, in so far as it has effects of objectification and veridiction with respect to persons (hommes) themselves, in constituting them as subjects” (my translation).

5. Forced migration from Upper Volta came to an end with the suppression of forced labor in 1946. In 1944 the Syndicat Agricole Africain (SAA) organized the voluntary recruitment of Voltaïques, and in 1951, the planters created the Syndicat Interprofessionel d’acheminement de la main-d’œuvre (SIAMO), which recruited (until its suppression in 1960) 254,782 Burkinabé workers. Houphouët continued to facilitate the recruitment of workers throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

6. In more than twenty-five of the largest cities and towns in the south, northern populations account for over 40 percent of the total population. In the Indenié area, for example, the town of Abengourou contains only 15 percent autochthonous Agnis, while in the city of Daloa, in the heart of Bété country, autochthons number only 11 percent, while Ivoirian Malinké and Senoufo represent 26 percent. Sixty percent of the rural population in this area consists of ethnic strangers: Baoulé (the largest group amongst the Akan peoples), Malinké, Sénoufo, Burkinbé, Malian. In the Krou regions of the far southwest, the population of “strangers,” principally Baoulé and Burkinabé, reaches 70 percent.

7. The minister of the interior, one of the FPI hard-line ultra-nationalists, was killed in the early hours of the attacks on September 19, 2002.

8. The term “Forces Nouvelles” is the new name for the rebellion since the official amalgamation of the three rebel groups, the MPCI, the MJP, and the MPIGO in March 2003.

9. These propositions repeat those presented by the FPI in February 2000 to the Consultative Constitutional and Electoral Commission (CCCE) under the Gueï junta. In addition to these propositions, the FPI suggested that alongside the place of birth, the “village of origin” should be marked on the new identity cards.

10. “Cours communes” (common courtyards) are urban living spaces that generally house, within a shared courtyard, several families or unrelated individuals. The Anglophone West African term is “compound.”

11. The G7 is composed of seven of the ten signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis peace accords of January 2003. Apart from the three rebel movements—the MPCI, MPIGO, and MJP (now grouped together under the term “Forces Nouvelles”)—the G7 counts the two largest political parties: the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), the ruling party from independence to 1999,
and the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), led by Alassane Dramane Ouattara, the former prime minister (1990–93). It also includes the Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix de Côte d’Ivoire (created by former President General Gueï) and the small Mouvement des Forces de l’Avenir (MFA).

12. The popular term “Wê” is also used for the Guéré, as is the popular term “Dan” for the Yacouba.

13. Three days after his declaration that he was joining the rebellion, Louis Dacoury-Tabley’s brother, Benoit, was arrested and subsequently found lying shot on an Abidjan street. When, some time later, his family tried to bury him in their native village in Bété country, a frenzied group of “young patriots” assailed the cortège and seized the coffin, attempting to pry it open before being forced back by gendarmes. Djédjé Mady, the general secretary of the PDCI and current leader of the “Group of Seven,” was “disinherited” in the press by members of his home village in Bété country.