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In Faint Praise of the World Bank’s Gender Development Policy

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1. The Standard Critique of Structural Adjustment Programmes

Outside the field of economics, it is customary among social scientists to deride the World Bank for its neoliberalism. The standard argument is that the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) favoured by the bank in the 1980s and 1990s sought to impose free market conditions on the less developed countries. However, offering aid in exchange for more international trade, foreign investment, privatization of commerce and industry, the elimination of tariffs and agricultural subsidies, and so forth, did little to stimulate economic growth. World Bank researchers themselves recognize that median per capita income in the less developed countries grew 2.5% in the period 1960–79 (before the advent of SAPs) but languished at 0.0% in the period 1980–98 (in the era of SAPs) (Easterly, 2001). The growing debt burden of less developed countries and falling export commodity prices cancelled out any positive effects the SAPs might have had. Moreover, in many countries, SAPs hurt the poor, which is why in Zambia, for instance, SAP came to stand for satana ali pano, “the devil is among us” (Kufekisa-Akapelwa, 2001), and why some critics thought it ironic that the President of the World Bank, James D.

1. We are grateful to John Fox and John Myles for helpful comments on a draft of this paper.
2. This paper is the result of a project undertaken by a select group of Introductory Sociology students at the University of Toronto, 2002–03, under the direction of their instructor, Robert Brym.
Wolfensohn, should be awarded the Order of the Golden Fleece by the government of Georgia in 1999.

Critics also underline the double standard maintained by the wealthy countries that finance the World Bank’s activities and support its policies. For example, while in a less developed country like Mexico agricultural subsidies amounted to $1,000 per farmer in 2002, the comparable figures for American, European Union, and Japanese farmers were, respectively, $16,000, $17,000, and $27,000: hardly evidence the rich countries are willing to swallow the medicine they prescribe for the poor. These disparities are no small matter because the reduction or elimination of farm subsidies by the wealthy countries would greatly stimulate agricultural exports and economic growth in the less developed countries (Saunders, 2003).

Feminist criticism of SAPs takes a different tack. In the 1980s, UNICEF researchers, among others, noted that mothers with young children are especially vulnerable to the negative effects of structural adjustment (Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart, 1987). In less developed countries, such women are typically saddled with reproductive and domestic work, including buying and preparing food, ensuring the good health of their children, and maximizing their children’s educational opportunities. Since the privatization of government services sometimes involves the elimination of basic food subsidies and the introduction of user fees for education and health services, the burden of SAPs falls disproportionately on women with young children. UNICEF therefore called for safety nets that would protect mothers with young children from the whip of the market: free basic health services, literacy programmes, and the like.

A more recent and radical feminist critique of SAPs holds that such safety nets reinforce traditional gender roles. From this point of view, young mothers who can take advantage of free basic health services and literacy programmes may be better able to perform their domestic responsibilities, but that only helps to reproduce existing patterns of gender inequality in the household and the larger society.

According to the recent feminist critique, the key to reducing gender inequalities in less developed countries lies in identifying and eliminating the male biases of the economic models underlying SAPs (Elson, 1995; Pearson, 2000). These economic models ignore rigidities in the gender division of labour, both in the paid work force and the household. Especially in less developed societies, women and men tend to perform different work roles. Some kinds of work are considered appropriate for women but not for men, and vice-versa. Such rigidities make it difficult for women to enter the paid labour force, move from subsistence to commodity production, and switch to exportable production.

3. All sums are in U.S. dollars.
Specifically, domestic and child rearing responsibilities limit the availability of women for paid work outside the home. Women’s opportunities to enter the paid labour force are also sharply reduced by their restricted access to credit and property ownership, while control over income by men acts as a disincentive for women to work for wages. Meanwhile, in some parts of the world, women’s and men’s income are channelled into different kinds of expenditures, with women paying for daily consumption needs (food and health) and men for more durable items (clothing and household equipment) and discretionary items such as tobacco and alcohol. Because of their disproportionate effect on the price of food, health care and education, SAPs frequently have more negative impact on women’s income and expenditures than on men’s. Accordingly, recent feminist critics argue, development requires not just safety nets but change in the division of labour in both the paid workforce and in the household — a reality the World Bank largely ignored in the 1980s and most of the 1990s.

2. The Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Incorporation of Gender in World Bank Policy

The criticisms just reviewed began to lose some of their incisiveness in 1999. That was when the World Bank and its sister organization, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), surprised many of their critics by admitting their development policies had failed to produce the economic growth they had envisaged. They now asked the poor countries to draw up Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Under the terms of the PRSPs, national governments are expected to consult with local non-governmental organizations and develop an analysis of the causes and incidence of poverty in their country along with a strategy for poverty reduction that is sensitive to unique local conditions. They are also expected to recommend ways of increasing public spending, mainly on health care and basic education. Funds are supposed to come from modest debt relief, concessional lending, donor contributions, and other sectors of the national budget. PRSPs must be approved by the World Bank and the IMF.

Furthermore, in 2001 the World Bank called for the “mainstreaming” of gender-equality issues in PRSPs and, indeed, all of its work. Two years later the World Bank announced that it was starting to evaluate all of its projects for their effects on women and girls. In its guidelines for incorporating gender-equality issues into PRSPs, the World Bank states:

Poverty is experienced differently by men and women. A full understanding of the gender dimensions of poverty can significantly change the definition of priority policy and program interventions supported by the PRS. Evidence is growing that gender-sensitive development strategies contribute significantly to economic growth as well as to equity objectives by ensuring that all groups of the poor share in program benefits. Yet differences between men’s and women’s needs are often not
fully recognized in poverty analysis and participatory planning, and are frequently not taken into consideration in the selection and design of poverty reduction strategies. It is essential, then, to integrate gender analysis into poverty diagnosis and to ensure that participatory consultation and planning processes are specifically designed to give voice to all sectors of society — women and men, as well as different age, ethnic, and cultural groups (Bamberger et al., 2003).

To support its claim that gender equality goes hand-in-hand with economic growth, the World Bank commissioned studies showing that greater economic equality between women and men is associated with reduced poverty, increased GDP, and better governance. For example, the female labour force participation rate is lower in the Middle East and North Africa than in any other part of the developing world. Simulations using household survey data show that if female labour force participation rates in the region rose to the level predicted by its female education and age structure, household earnings would increase 25% (World Bank, 2003b; see also World Bank, 2001).

3. External and Internal Constraints on Gender Development

To date (April 2004), two main problems have compromised the effectiveness of recent World Bank gender development policies: the macro-economic policies of Western financial institutions and the social structures of less developed countries. We refer to these problems, respectively, as “external” and “internal” constraints on gender development. Let us consider each constraint in turn.

External constraints. According to a recent policy review by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, PRSPs are novel and beneficial insofar as they recognize that intervention is required to help growth trickle down to the poor (UNCTAD, 2002). It is the type of intervention they urge that is problematic. For example, PRSPs have reversed the tendency of SAPs to reduce spending on preventive health care and primary education.4 They have also introduced safety nets and targeted spending programmes that soften the blow of structural adjustment on the poor. Like SAPs, however, PRSPs strongly favour macro-economic policies that encourage the privatization of government services, import liberalization, the elimination of agricultural subsidies, and other pro-market measures — despite the fact that such policies do nothing by themselves to improve access of the poor to productive assets.5

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4. PRSPs still consider curative health care and secondary and tertiary education largely private goods.
5. In South Korea, Taiwan and the other “Asian Tigers,” liberalization had positive effects on growth and the reduction of poverty. Significantly, however, in such cases liberalization was implemented after protectionist and supportive industrial trade policies had nurtured the domestic economy and made it competitive on the world market. In the great majority of less
Similarly, PRSPs do little or nothing to change the gender division of labour in the paid workforce and the household. As feminists have recognized for at least a decade, softening the blow of structural adjustment merely reinforces traditional domains of male and female responsibility, helping women perform better as domestic workers and caregivers. Free preventive health care and primary education, for example, have little impact on women’s ability to enter the paid labour force, move from subsistence to commodity production, and switch to exportable production.

**Internal constraints.** Compounding the problem is the resistance of many less developed countries themselves to increasing gender equality. Male privilege, religious sanction, and the weakness of women’s advocacy groups in many less developed countries ensure that PRSPs pay lip service to World Bank gender development policies but little more.

This neglect has recently been documented by University of Sussex anthropologist Ann Whitehead (2003). Through a series of interviews with key players, Whitehead examined the process by which the governments of Bolivia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Yemen created their PRSPs. She found that while the World Bank insists on broad-based citizen participation in PRSP formulation and endorsement, local governments complied only reluctantly to that directive, especially if elements in civil society were critical of their neoliberal economic policies. Few or no women’s advocacy groups were consulted in the creation of PRSPs. Narrow citizen participation in PRSP formulation and endorsement was accompanied by weak analysis of the social roots of poverty, especially the disadvantaged position of women. Whitehead describes the treatment of gender issues in the policy priority and budget commitment sections of PRSPs as “fragmented” and “arbitrary.” In a review of PRSPs, the World Bank itself recognizes that “where gender-related poverty issues and constraints are included in the diagnosis, follow-up public actions were rarely identified and indications as to why other actions were considered to be higher priorities were rarely given” (World Bank, 2002, quoted in Whitehead, 2003: 15). Even when women’s and other civil society organizations were consulted, their views were rarely reflected in the PRSPs. The PRSPs of Bolivia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Yemen fail to address gender inequality in reproduction, household management, and labour force participation. They fail utterly to recognize that macroeconomic policy and national budgets have different implications for women and men.
4. The Shape of Gender Inequality Across Countries

Many of the world’s less developed countries fail to promote gender equality. Why is this so? We can begin to answer this question by examining the cross-national comparative literature on values and public policy. It suggests that three factors — one economic, one religious, one political — are central determinants of people’s values and public policies, including their attitudes toward gender equality (e.g., Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; O’Connor, 1993).

First, a country’s level of economic development profoundly influences people’s values and behaviour. For example, economic development universally requires the mobilization of nearly the entire adult population, both women and men, for employment in the paid labour force. Moreover, members of the paid labour force, both women and men, require substantial formal education in a highly developed economy; they must be numerate, literate, and capable of performing complex tasks. Accordingly, one would expect gender inequality to vary inversely with level of economic development.

Second, the predominant religious orientation of a country’s population and its level of religiosity profoundly influence people’s values and the public policies they adopt. Leaving doctrinal questions aside, it is clear that in practice some religions are more tolerant of gender equality than others. Consider the gender composition of religious authorities across religions, for instance. Some Protestant denominations encourage women to assume positions of religious authority while, at the other extreme, Islam forbids it. Such prohibitions reflect a broader set of religious attitudes that constrain women’s participation in the paid labour force, the system of higher education, political life, and so forth.

Third, the type of regime in power has a strong effect on a country’s level of gender inequality. For example, communist governments are well known for having energetically mobilized women for development tasks (although not for positions of political authority) in less developed countries. Although this mobilization was often due to necessity as much as doctrine — the Soviet Union, for example, suffered terrible losses in its male labour force during World Wars I and II and was therefore compelled to increase the proportion of women in the paid labour force quickly — the effect was to increase gender equality. Similarly, Social Democratic governments have adopted more generous welfare state policies with respect to women than have liberal democracies. A year of maternity leave at 80% of salary combined with universally accessible, inexpensive, high-quality daycare prevent Swedish women from being penalized economically for having children, as they are in, say, the United States.

It seems highly likely that underlying the neglect of gender issues in PRSPs is a set of powerful economic, religious, and political forces that reinforce
gender inequality. To explore this possibility, let us first describe crossnational variations in gender inequality worldwide and then seek to explain those variations. The descriptive task can be undertaken by examining recent data on four variables, three relating to women’s participation in public institutions and one relating to women’s control over their own bodies (United Nations, 2002; World Health Organization, 2001).

Gender inequality is signified by the restriction of women to the domestic or private sphere of life, where they do unpaid work raising children, taking care of the elderly, and doing domestic chores. It is also marked by women exercising little or no control over their own reproductive and sexual functions. In contrast, growing gender equality is signified by the increasing entry of women into public educational, government, and economic institutions and their increasing control over their own reproductive and sexual functions. Accordingly, we focus our analysis on the following variables:

- **The ratio of males to females in primary, secondary, and tertiary education.** The higher the ratio, the higher the level of gender inequality.
- **Men as a percent of parliamentarians in the lower house (or the single house in unicameral political systems).** The higher the ratio, the higher the level of gender inequality.
- **The participation rate of women in the paid labour force.** The lower the rate, the higher the level of gender inequality.
- **The prevalence of female genital mutilation.** The higher the prevalence, the higher the level of gender inequality.

A word of explanation is required concerning the fourth variable. Female genital mutilation is defined by the World Health Organization as “all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs whether for cultural, religious or other non-therapeutic reasons” (World Health Organization, 2000). It results in pain, humiliation, psychological trauma, and loss of sexual pleasure. In the short term it is associated with infection, shock, injury to neighbouring organs, and severe bleeding. In the long term it is associated with infertility, chronic infections in the urinary tract and reproductive system, increased susceptibility to hepatitis B and HIV/AIDS, etc. Although often associated with Islam, female genital mutilation is a social custom, not a religious practice, so although it is practiced only in countries where Islam is the predominant or a major religion, it is uncommon in Islamic countries outside sub-Saharan Africa (Ahmad, 2000). It is typically performed as a rite of passage on girls between

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6. We focus on these four indicators of gender inequality because they are commonly used by researchers, focus on a variety of institutions, and vary widely across countries.
the ages of 4 and 14. It is most commonly based on the assumption that women are naturally “unclean” and “masculine” inasmuch as they possess a “vestige” of the male sex organ. From this point of view, women who have not experienced genital mutilation are thought to be more likely to demonstrate “masculine” levels of sexual interest and activity. They are thought to be less likely to remain virgins before marriage and faithful within marriage. Female genital mutilation is thus designed to lessen or eradicate feelings of sexual arousal in women. It is a form of male domination and its prevalence is therefore a measure of gender inequality.

Figures 1 through 6 present a series of quadrilaterals formed by our four variables. The quadrilaterals illustrate how the “shape” of gender inequality varies across countries. We created the quadrilaterals by first assigning scores on the four variables for each country on which data were available. Scores were assigned so the higher the score on each variable, the greater the level of gender inequality. (We thus took the reciprocal of the percent of women in the paid labour force.) Next we standardized the scores.

As noted above, much research shows that a country’s level of economic well-being, its predominant religion, and the type of government in power influence its social, economic, and political policies and its citizens’ deeply held values. Accordingly, we divided the countries into groups by predominant religion (majority Muslim, majority Catholic, other), size of GDP per capita (less than $20,000 per year or $20,000 per year or more), and type of post-World War II political regime (whether a communist or social democratic party has ever been in power since World War II). Other criteria could have been used to group the countries. We chose these criteria because they have been singled out in the literature as important sources of variation in public policy and citizens’ values. Next we calculated the mean score for each group of countries on each of the four variables and determined the decile of each group mean in the list of all countries for which data were available. The decile scores were used to create the quadrilaterals for each group of countries. The “index” referred to in the title of each Figure is the sum of the decile scores on each variable for the group of countries in question. The maximum index score is 36, the minimum 4. The numbers in parentheses at each corner of the quadrilateral are the mean scores for the group of countries on each variable. (For ease of understanding, the “labour force” mean is given here as the percent of women in the paid labour force rather than its reciprocal.) The six quadrilaterals represent 90 countries.

Figure 1. The Shape of Gender Inequality in Muslim Majority, Never Communist Countries (n=36; index=35)

The following countries are represented by this quadrilateral:

- Afghanistan
- Algeria
- Bahrain
- Bangladesh
- Brunei Darussalam
- Chad
- Comoros
- Djibouti
- Egypt
- Gambia
- Guinea
- Indonesia
- Iran
- Iraq
- Jordan
- Kuwait
- Lebanon
- Maldives
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Morocco
- Niger
- Oman
- Pakistan
- Qatar
- Senegal
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- Sudan
- Syrian Arab Republic
- Tunisia
- Turkey
- United Arab Emirates
- United Nations
- Western Sahara

The bigger the quadrilateral in Figures 1 through 6 (and consequently the bigger its index number), the higher the level of gender inequality. The highest level of gender inequality is evident in the 36 countries that, like Egypt, have a Muslim majority and have never been ruled by a communist regime since World War II (index = 35). Next are the 7 countries like Uzbekistan that have a Muslim majority but were under communist rule at some point after World War II (index = 31). Third come the 24 countries like Brazil that have a Catholic majority, were never under communist rule since World War II, and have a low GDPpc (index = 20). The fourth group includes 6 countries like Italy; they have a Catholic majority and enjoy a high GDPpc (index = 16). The second most gender-egalitarian group is formed by 8 Catholic minority, high-GDPpc countries that, like Canada, have never experienced social democratic
rule since World War II (index = 13). Finally, the 9 most gender egalitarian countries are those like Sweden that have a non-Catholic majority and high GDPpc, and experienced social democratic rule at some point since World War II (index = 9). As the vastly different sizes of the six quadrilaterals suggest, religion, GDPpc, and type of political regime influence gender inequality.

While our gender quadrilaterals illustrate how economic, political, and religious forces shape gender inequality crossnationally, multiple regression analysis can demonstrate the relative causal weight of each independent variable and their combined effect. In our multiple regression analysis, the dependent variable is an additive index comprising standardized values of three of the four measures of gender inequality discussed above. Including female labour force participation in the index caused the alpha reliability coefficient to drop below an acceptable level. With the three other variables remaining in the index, the value of alpha was an acceptable 0.67.

The independent variables in our stepwise regression analysis are: (1) Muslims as a percentage of the country’s population. (2) Catholics as a percentage of the country’s population. (3) The log of Gross Domestic Product per
Figure 3. The Shape of Gender Inequality in Catholic Majority, Never Communist, Low GDP Countries (n=24; index=20)

The following countries are represented by this quadrilateral:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

capita in U.S. dollars. (We took the log to decrease skew.) (4) A dummy variable distinguishing countries that had a communist government at some point after World War II from those that did not. (5) A dummy variable distinguishing countries that had a social democratic government at some point after World War II from those that did not.

Table 1 presents the results of our analysis for the 143 countries on which relevant data are available. Of our five independent variables, two failed to achieve statistical significance at the .05 level: percent Catholic and the Social Democratic dummy. The strongest predictor of gender inequality is the log of Gross Domestic Product per capita. It alone explains 38% of the variation in gender inequality. (We report adjusted $R^2$.) Adding percent Muslim to the equation increases explained variance another 10.6%. The communist dummy boosts explained variance another 1.2%, for a total explained variance of 49.8%.
5. Gender Development, Politics, and Religion

The World Bank has done a service to women worldwide by helping to draw attention to the gendered nature of economic development. Partly due to the World Bank’s efforts, it is no longer contentious or “radical” to claim that macroeconomic policies affect women and men differently insofar as they play different roles in the division of labour in the household and the paid labour force. No credible economic development policy can now fail to take that fact into account.

By highlighting the gendered nature of economic development, however, the World Bank has also exposed two important flaws in its policies. First, its policies do little to improve the position of women in less developed countries. At best, they slightly ameliorate the conditions of women’s material existence without in any way changing traditional gender roles. At worst, they not only fail to change traditional gender roles but also erode the material well-being of women insofar as neoliberal macroeconomic policies have a more negative effect on poor women than poor men.
The second problem with World Bank gender development policies is their failure to acknowledge the religious and political sources of local governments’ resistance to gender equality, which our empirical analysis highlights. In essence, the World Bank argues that an economic cost is associated with governments in less developed countries allowing vast gender inequalities to persist. On that basis, the World Bank hopes to convince governments in less developed countries with high levels of gender inequality to adopt policies that will increase female participation in the education system, the paid labour force, and political affairs. Yet, as one activist notes, client governments may reply, “Yes we know that lack of women’s participation costs our country economic growth. So what? Our culture does not support this” (Ritu Sharma, quoted in Moline, 2002). Male privilege based on religion and politics will thus trump arguments based on mere economic advantage for the citizenry as a whole. We conclude that, short of religious and political reform in the less developed countries — and a move away from neoliberal development policies by the World Bank — one would be naïve to expect much change in the position of women in less developed countries in the foreseeable future.
One way of encouraging less developed countries to rethink their attitudes towards women’s position in society would be for the World Bank to tie financial assistance in areas that have nothing to do with gender inequality to a country’s progress on gender inequality issues. For example, countries could be offered debt relief or direct financial contributions in exchange for increases in the rate of female participation in the labour force, the educational system, and government. This would constitute a tougher policy stance on gender issues than is presently maintained by the World Bank. However, since the World Bank’s own research shows that such increases in female participation cause GDP to rise significantly (World Bank, 2001), while liberalization policies have had no impact in that regard (Easterly, 2001), it seems an avenue worth exploring.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>sig.</th>
<th>$\text{Adjusted } R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LogGDPpc</td>
<td>-2.504</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>-.512</td>
<td>-7.958</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>.02429</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.343</td>
<td>5.374</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>-.713</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td>-.126</td>
<td>-2.105</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.976</td>
<td>1.226</td>
<td>7.319</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$n = 143$; $F = 47.998$; $p = .000$

The following countries are included in the regression analysis:

- Albania
- Algeria
- Angola
- Argentina
- Armenia
- Australia
- Austria
- Azerbaijan
- Bahamas
- Bangladesh
- Barbados
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Belize
- Benin
- Bolivia
- Botswana
- Brazil
- Bulgaria
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cambodia
- Cameroon
- Canada
- Cape Verde
- Chad
- Chile
- China
- Colombia
- Congo
- Costa Rica
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Djibouti
- Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- Egypt
- El Salvador
- Finland
- France
- Gabon
- Gambia
- Germany
- Ghana
- Greece
- Guatemala
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Haiti
- Honduras
- Hungary
- Iceland
- India
- Indonesia
- Iran
- Ireland
- Israel
- Italy
- Jamaica
- Japan
- Jordan
- Kazakhstan
- Korea, Republic of
- Kuwait
- Kyrgyzstan
- Lao PDR
- Latvia
- Lebanon
- Lesotho
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Tajikistan
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Mexico
- Mongolia
- Morocco
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Nepal
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Nicaragua
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Norway
- Panama
- Papua New Guinea
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Philippines
- Poland
- Portugal
- Russian Federation
- Rwanda
- Senegal
- Sierra Leone
- Singapore
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- South Africa
- Spain
- Sri Lanka
- Sudan
- Suriname
- Swaziland
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Syrian Arab Rep.
- Tanzania
- Thailand
- Togo
- Trinidad & Tobago
- Tunisia
- Turkey
- Turkmenistan
- Uganda
- Ukraine
- United Arab Emirates
- United Kingdom
- United States
- Uruguay
- Uzbekistan
- Venezuela
- Viet Nam
- Yemen
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe
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United Nations  

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  

Whitehead, Ann  

World Bank  


World Health Organization  